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CHAPTER I 
lNTRODUCTION 
The period of 1805 to 1809 was the high water mark of Napoleon's political and 
military power. The Grande Armee had during the period of Austrian, Prussian and 
Polish campaigns grown into one of the world's greatest armies; certainly the best of its 
day. Napoleon had honed it into a precise instrument of destruction, with which he had 
scored a string of stunning victories. 
The Grande Armee was certainly the best led army in Europe, and it was its 
organization which allowed it to be a war winning weapon welded by Napoleon's skillful 
hands. It is the extraordinary organization of the Grande Armee rooted in the Corps 
d'Armee system and its staff that was its secret. 
By late 1807, Napoleon had defeated his opponents m central Europe and 
concluded the Treaties of Pressburg (1805) and Tilsit (1807) which brought a tenuous 
peace to France. The Emperor, however, saw the probability of an Austrian resurgence 
and retained the bulk of Grande Armee in Germany while he began to organize yet a new 
but less potent army for the invasion of Portugal and ultimately of Spain. The Catalan 
operations were to be an intimate part of this new extension of French imperial ambition 
and Napoleon's continuing struggle against Great Britain. 
1 
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It is during this period of imperial expansion too, that French ambition out-ran its 
resources, making Napoleon's dictum "make war feed war" an absolute necessity. The 
French Ministry of War organized the new Armee d'Espagne with younger and more 
green conscripts as well as more allied contingents so as to maintain the strength of the 
Grande Armee in Germany, and the Armee d'ltalie. 
The formation of General Philibert-Guillaume, Comte Duhesme's Corps 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales was particularly important in the context of the 
beginning of the war. It was virtually thrown together with some of the greenest of 
troops, an incomplete staff and no viable war plan. This was a disaster waiting to 
happen, and did. It certainly could not hold its own against the insurgents and required 
reinforcement in the very first months of the war. Throughout the war the French army 
in Catalonia lacked the strength and the resources to prevail against nearly impossible 
odds. The manpower difficulties of the French Empire and Catalonia's status as a 
secondary front doomed it to a low manpower priority despite its strategic requirements. 
Similarly, in logistics, the French armies spread across Europe could not obtain 
from France all of their supply necessities, and what they got they paid dearly for, for 
French resources were already over extended. Napoleon's 1805 campaign in Austria and 
the campaigns of 1806-07 in Prussia and Poland severely strained France despite the 
support the Grande Armee obtained from the Austrian and German countryside. The 
policy of making war feed war was an "economy of force" measure to stretch scarce 
resources. The extraordinarily expensive French concentration for the war in Spain and 
3 
the continued maintenance of the Grande Armee in Germany, anticipating a Austrian war 
further taxed France and made the "war feeding war" policy an absolute necessity. 
The French armies in Catalonia, however, quickly exhausted the resources of the 
country and successive commanders could not support the army off of the land. Clearly, 
support from France was needed and their continual demands for money and supplies 
strained both the French countryside and its treasury. The war in eastern Spain was 
characterized by the back and forth push between the Emperor and his Ministry of 
Military Administration with the French command in Catalonia over the necessarities of 
war. Indeed, the campaigns in Germany, Italy, or the Low Countries, would never 
prepare Napoleon for the logistical shock presented by the barren and backward theater 
of Spain. 
Insurgent warfare was the distinguishing characteristic of the Peninsular War and 
though it was hardly new in the Napoleonic era (note the insurgent operations in Prussia 
1806; Naples, 1806, where General Duhesme fought; and the Tyrol, 1809 where Baraguey 
d'Hilliers fought) but it was taken to brutal heights in Spain 1808-14. The unexpected 
result, however, would be that it virtually hamstrung the French occupation, particularly 
in Catalonia. Neither the Emperor nor his commanders were prepared for such a severe 
and protracted contest. 
As to Military government, Napoleon undoubtedly expected an occupation like that 
of Holland, Naples, Italy, or Germany, where he could establish a government on the 
French model grafted off of the pre-existing structure. In Catalonia the insurrection 
practically destroyed the pre-existing government apparatus making a completely new 
4 
organization necessary. The French were simply unprepared for the difficult requirements 
of establishing a military government from the ground up in the Spanish 'running sore.' 
This dissertation will discuss the organization, operations and logistics of the Army 
of Catalonia through the Peninsular War and its establishment of a military government 
from 1808 to 1810. This will fill a gap in Napoleonic military history and will elucidate 
the method of organizing and supporting large military units. It will also shed light on 
the reciprocal influences of military organization and the conduct of military operations. 
This work will examine the organization and operation of the French Intendance 
and will shed light on the workings of this organization from the Ministry down to the 
soldiers in the field. It will also focus on the actual supply of selected foods to the army, 
to illustrate the discussion. Finally, it will examine the structure of the French military 
government, illuminating the political aspects of managing an army at war. 
This work, will improve on existing scholarship on the organization, operations 
and logistics of a Napoleonic Army. Past and current scholarship generally focused on 
the social history of the armies, such as Colonel H. C. B. Rogers' Napoleon's Army, John 
R. Elting's Swords Around a Throne, David Chandler's The Campaigns of Napoleon, 
Richard Cobb's The Peoples Armies, or Lee Kennett's The French Armies of the Seven 
Years' War. Another area of focus includes Scott Bowden's Napoleon's Grande Armee 
of 1813 and Armies at Waterloo, and Scott Bowden and Charles Tarbox Armies on the 
Danube. 1809. Another type of such history are those many organizational and 
operational studies issued by the pre-World War I Historical Section of the French 
General Staff, notably Lieutenant Colonel H. Coutanceau's La Campagne de 1794 a 
5 
l'Armee du Nord which provides an in-depth study of the organization of the Armee du 
Nord and its operations. 
I will use a synthesis of these various approaches to obtain a unique view of the 
structure of the Army of Catalonia and its evolution from 1807 to 1814 juxtaposed against 
the operational history of the war. This treatment of the army's and the war's history is 
in tum juxtaposed against the administrative functioning of the staff in managing its force 
structure. This way of addressing the problem of military organization and operations 
from the perspective of the staff sheds new light on a hitherto dark area of Napoleonic 
military history. 
Logistics, like organization is also an area of military history that has received 
increasing attention of late, of which Martin van Creveld's Supplying War: Logistics from 
Wallenstein to Patton, H. de Nanteuil's Daru et l'Administration Militaire sous la 
Revolution et l'Empire, Georges Lechartier's Les Services de l'Arriere a la Grande Armee 
en 1806 - 1807, and Captain A. Pemot's Apen;u Historique sur le Service des Transports 
Militaires, are but a few. 
In the sphere of logistical history I will exploit the goldmine of knowledge 
contained in General Paul Thiebault's Manuel General du Service des Etats-Majors 
Generaux et Divisionnaires dans les Armees, and thoroughly examine the structure and 
functioning of the French logistical machinery in the Army of Catalonia, in three areas. 
These will include, first the operations of the Ministry in Paris, and the Army Intendance 
in Catalonia giving a 'birds eye view' of the whole logistical system. The second sphere 
is the 'worm's eye view,' that is the examination of the Intendance in one area of its 
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operations, that is of supply, specifically meat supply and its quality control. Finally, we 
will discuss transportation, by land and sea, which hauled the enormous supply 
requirements to the troops of the Army of Catalonia. The provision of these supplies and 
by extension all the supply requirements of the Army of Catalonia is seen in the context 
of the war, in the reciprocal influence of logistics and operations, often showing that the 
logistical tail does indeed wag the operational dog. 
In the area of military government, I will discuss the early history of the 
improvised government in Catalonia from 1808 to 1810 and its effect on French 
operations, and concluding with a discussion of the organization of the peranent 
government established by Marshal Macdonald, going beyond the treatment of Pierre 
Conard in his Napoleon et Catalogne. 
This area of Napoleonic history is one of considerable importance. Generally, 
administrative, organizational, logistical and civil aspects of war are critical factors in the 
successful outcome of a war, and understanding them is similarly critical to understanding 
the history of war. Nowhere is this more true than in the study of Napoleonic War. 
Hence, the detailed examination of a single army in the field is an extremely important 
undertaking while the study of the Army of Catalonia is particularly enlightening. 
This study will not only shed light on an otherwise dark area of Napoleonic 
history, it will also highlight the administrative methods of the French Army which will 
put Napoleonic military operations in a new perspective. Finally, this study will be useful 
both as history and as a ready guide to the military theorist, logistician or commander 
seeking historical perspective on the nature of modem war. 
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The French military occupation of Catalonia was rooted in the Franco-Spanish 
campaign in Portugal in 1807 and in the succeeding deposition of King Charles IV. The 
Division and Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales opened the occupation under 
the conditions of the Franco-Spanish alliance treaty against Portugal. Catalonia would be 
part of the line of communications for the invasion of Portugal and Napoleon secretly 
ordered it to undertake the military occupation of the province in conjunction with the 
deposition of Charles IV. The commander, the fire eater General Philibert Guillaume, 
Comte Duhesme (1766-1815) was to take the strong points of the province, but only 
managed to take Barcelona and Figueras by a ruse though Rosas and Gerona refused to 
allow French entry, and the other strong points in Lower Catalonia. 
The mission of General Duhesme's Corps was to occupy Catalan strong points, 
subdue the province and cooperate in the ultimate subjection of the Iberian Peninsula. 
The Corps was, however, incompletely organized and manned with an administration that 
was not war ready. Its troops were of indifferent quality, too. Though it possessed some 
excellent veteran French units, the bulk of its units were raw French, Italian and 
Neapolitan conscripts. When the actual rebellion began in May 1808, Duhesme's Corps 
was unable to cope with it. His military operations were a failure, which stunned the 
French command, heartened the insurgents, and his Corps was, by late summer, blockaded 
in Barcelona and Figueras. 
The Emperor sent reinforcements in a division under General Honore-Charles-
Michel-Joseph, Comte Reille (1775-1860) made up of even worse troops, mere conscript 
and National Guard sweepings completely incapable of handling the ever deepening 
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insurgency which gripped the populace, making every tree, boulder or crossroad lethal. 
The nature of the war and Napoleon's unwillingness to expend adequate resources in men 
and material on the corps doomed its mission to failure. Napoleon's military policy in 
Spain only changed when the whole theater collapsed forcing him to personally intervene 
with the Grande Armee. To Catalonia, meanwhile, he sent a new commander and heavy 
reinforcements upgrading Duhesme's small corps to a full Corps d'Armee, the V then VII 
Corps. 
General Laurent, Comte Gouvion Saint-Cyr (1764-1830) and the VII Corps 
flooded into Catalonia determined to reduce the rebellious province, beginning with the 
reduction of Rosas. Once completed, he dashed on to Barcelona to relieve the 
beleaguered city in one of the most daring marches of the war, winning a brilliant battle 
on the way at Cardadeau. This second step completed, he set about the conquest of 
Lower Catalonia, an operation which culminated in the hard fought but less than decisive 
Battle of Valls which all but destroyed the Catalan regular army in January 1809. His 
final task would be the reduction of Gerona, a major fortress requiring a major effort. 
As Saint-Cyr set about this major siege, intrigue in Paris and Napoleon's 
dissatisfaction with Saint-Cyr's seemingly slow progress at pacifying this, the most 
rebellious province in Spain, destroyed his command. Napoleon replaced him with 
Marshal Charles-Pierre Fran~ois Augereau, Due de Castiglione (1757-1816). The whole 
episode of the Siege of Gerona is a story of incredible bravery of the troops and vicious 
infighting within the high command. 
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When Augereau actually took command of the VII Corps he found senous 
administrative torpor in the management of the army and the province, and set about their 
reformation. Unfortunately, his lackluster performance in the field and his virtual slavery 
to the logistical support of his newly promoted and reinforced Army of Catalonia, 
particularly the ever hungry garrison of Barcelona disappointed Napoleon, and his 
embarrassing personal vendetta against General Duhesme, the governor of Barcelona 
enraged the Emperor enough to finally sack the aging Marshal in favor of the newly 
minted Marshal Etienne-Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre Macdonald, Due de Tarente (1765-
1840), whose prodigies of bravery and battlefield know how at Wagram won him a 
Marshal's Baton. 
Marshal Macdonald, perhaps the hero of the war, made a manful attempt to place 
the government on a firm and efficient footing and hopefully to humanize this hitherto 
brutal war. Despite his significant administrative improvements both in the army and the 
French government, his military deficiencies and logistical problems led to his dismissal, 
like Duhesme, St.-Cyr and Augereau before him. Replaced by General Charles-Mathieu 
Isidore, Comte Decaen (1769-1832) after the embarrassment of the insurgent capture of 
Figueras and the costly siege to retake it, the new commander set about building on the 
significant work of Macdonald. He too, was faced, however, with the same problems as 
Macdonald, and in addition the Anglo-Sicilian invasion of 1812-13. Finally, Decaen fell 
like Macdonald because of his failures in the field and was replaced by Marshal Louis-
Gabriel Suchet, Due d'Albufera (1770-1826), who combined the armies of Aragon and 
Catalonia in the final climactic months of the Napoleonic Wars. His unpleasant task was 
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to withdraw to the Pyrenees, leaving French garrisons through Aragon and Catalonia 
which would serve as the anchor for a new invasion that never came. The war died 
almost as quietly as it began with the Treaty of Valen~ay, the French evacuation of Upper 
Catalonia and the abandonment of its dearly held fortresses. 
This war was one which placed intense stress on the occupying French Army and 
on the resources of the French Empire. Napoleon nevertheless saw this as a strictly 
secondary front, and treated it as such, starving it in favor of more decisive fronts such 
as Central Spain in 1808 In 1812, Napoleon did not exactly withdraw troops from 
Catalonia but certainly denied strength replacement. In 1813-1814 he positively used the 
armies in Spain as a manpower pool to fight the decisive campaigns in Germany and 
France. 
The structure of the French army in Catalonia then was a critical aspect of its 
capacity to prosecute the war. Generally, it was one of the most international and varied 
of forces. The first chapter lays out the structure or gross schema of the army, and its 
various parts. Its international character was a salient feature and a unique problem for 
commanders to overcome in the midst of war. The second aspect of force structure I 
examine is the actual material structure of the army and its evolution through the war. 
It changed commanders, and frequently restructured itself all in the face of the demands 
of military operations within the framework of Imperial policy. 
It was logistics which so grossly determined the scheme of military operations 
through the war. Indeed, Marshals Augereau and Macdonald and General Decaen were 
forced, much to Napoleon's chagrin, to make logistical support the center piece of their 
11 
operations, particularly the supply of the division sized garrison at Barcelona. In the face 
of this Sisyphian task, all the French command could do was to supply the troops as well 
as they could and conduct active operations again, in fits and starts. The Intendance, 
which managed the enormous logistical structure of the army, was terribly strained by 
logistical demands. The work output of the officers of the Intendance was staggering, and 
they had to contend not only with local scarcity but with all of the military problems of 
the war which rudely impinged upon his own operations. 
The logistical difficulties of the army were certainly exacerbated by the insurgents 
and exacted an enormous price on the Army of Catalonia, particularly in transporting 
assembled supplies to the garrisons and in the regular requisition of them from the field. 
It visibly made decisive operations nearly impossible. Placed in a perpetual stalemate, 
the French commanders, considering their available strength, could only hold onto their 
strong points and temporarily conquer areas and defeat insurgent forces in the field. 
It was the administrative staff of the Army of Catalonia which kept the structure 
functioning, if creakily, under the most trying of military circumstances. It virtually held 
the occupation together, and without its remarkable efficiency despite severe constraints 
and Imperial demands, the occupation would have collapsed. 
The problems of the French military administration and its occupation policies 
were many, but its sheer consistency kept the army in the field after sustaining crushing 
blows, such as the siege of Gerona, the disaster of Figueras and the Anglo-Sicilian 
invasion. The French army was always a force to be reckoned with and only Napoleon's 
massive troops withdrawals in 1814 lessened its power. 
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One of the most remarkable structures of the war which certainly increased 
logistical efficiency and calmed somewhat the virulence of the guerilla war was the 
military government. When Napoleon promoted Marshal Augereau, Governor of 
Catalonia, giving him virtual vice-royal powers, the Marshal began to plan the 
organizational structure of a new Catalan government which his predecessors were unable 
to accomplish due to overwhelming military considerations. For Augereau too, this 
remained only a plan, for Napoleon unceremoniously sacked him for incompetence. 
Augereau could not conquer the province in the face of Catalan popular opposition and 
overwhelming logistical difficulties. His operational torpor looked even worse in the 
Emperor's eyes because of his embarrassing vendetta to destroy General Duhesme, 
governor of Barcelona. (Napoleon could forgive many things but not personal 
embarrassment.) After five months in command Napoleon replaced him with Marshal 
Macdonald who took up and completed a new military government. His success at 
establishing a viable government and his heroic though failed attempt to infuse humanity 
into the war and reduce its brutality was one of the great episodes of the Napoleonic wars, 
and made him one of its heroes. 
The French military government came m two distinct stages; the improvised 
government of 1808-10 and the established government of 1810 which lasted to the end 
of the war. The former was a mere graft of the Royal system and an absolute failure at 
administering the province and supporting the Army. It was Marshal Macdonald's 
government, however, that established some workable system to accomplish both of these 
tasks. 
CHAPTER II 
THE STRUCfURE OF THE FRENCH ARMY 
IN CATALONIA 1807-1814 
§1. The Command Structure 
From the inception of the Division and Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees 
Orientales in 1807 to the end of the war when the Armee d'Aragon absorbed the Armee 
de Catalogne, the division numbering from 3,000 to 12,000 men was the basic building 
block of the army both for military operations and the occupation of Catalonia. The 
French command tailored its structure to this theater by establishing separate field and 
territorial/garrison commands (Arrondissement Territorial). General Severoli's division 
(May 1810) was a typical example of an active field division with 8,265 men, with three 
infantry brigades, cavalry, artillery and engineers. 1 The brigade or division sized 
Arrondissement Territorial was the typical garrison command based on a district, such as 
Gerona or Figueras. The 2e Arrondissement Territorial at Figueras (December 1810) for 
example, had 6,448 men in two brigades, cavalry, gendarmerie, artillery and a regimental 
1This division had the ler Leger, 2e Leger, 4e Ligne, 6e Ligne, 7e Ligne, Dragons 
Napoleon, Chasseurs Royaux, sappers, train, artillerie a cheval and a pied. SHAT, 
C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811; C(8)362, Situation, Armee 
de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
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depot. 2 Both of these commands reflected the divisional structure established during the 
revolution, creating as it were, self contained miniature armies. 3 The command was also 
geographically organized between Upper and Lower Catalonia and formally established 
as the Division and later Corps of Upper Catalonia. 
The French command evolved both structurally and in size throughout the war, 
from division to Army, which reflected both mission requirements and operational 
necessities. During the siege of Gerona the VII Corps Commander, General Gouvion 
Saint-Cyr, created the bifurcated corps structure. The Division de Troupes employees au 
Siege de Girone was one corps, with over three divisions and a divisional suite.4 The 
other half of the VII Corps included the covering force, and the garrisons. 
In 1810, Napoleon created from the VII Corps the independent Army of Catalonia 
which by 1811 had two subordinate Corps, one in Upper and one in Lower Catalonia. 
The former, the Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, had one active division, three 
2The 2e Arrondissement Territoriale had brigades under Generals Nogues and 
Lefebvre, with the ler and 2e-23e Leger, ler-32e Leger, ler and 2e-79e Ligne, ler 
Westphalien, ler Bataillon du Gear, ler Bataillon de Tam de Garrone, ler-24e Dragons, 
Gendarmerie and Depots ltalien. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 
December 1811. 
3David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1966) 154; Albert A. Nofi, Ed., Napoleon at War. Selected Writings of F. 
Loraine Petre, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1984) 23-25; Robert S. Quimby, The 
Background of Napoleonic Warfare. The Theoi:y ofMilitai:y Tactics in Eighteenth-Centui:y 
France, Columbia Studies in the Social Services, No. 596, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1957; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1967) 255-257 (page references 
are to reprint edition). 
4SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. 
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separate brigades, two garrison brigades, artillery and engineers. 5 The Corps in Lower 
Catalonia was a separate command within the divisional garrison of Barcelona, and had 
two brigades, cavalry, artillery and engineers and some attached garrison commands, such 
as Mataro, Hostalrich, Lerida, and Tarragona. 6 The Army retained this geographical 
structure until the Army of Aragon absorbed it into a new Armee d'Aragon et de 
Catalogne, in December 1813. 7 
In Catalonia, as in the rest of the Grande Armee, Napoleon relied upon the Corps 
d'Armee system as the organizational substructure on which to base the conquest of this 
rebellious province. The Emperor, the Minister of War, General Henri Jacques Guillaume 
Clarke, Due de Feltre (1765-1818); and, to some extent, the various commanders of the 
Army of Catalonia tailored these subordinate commands both to their mission and to the 
talents of each particular commander. Catalonia was a theater which pushed its French 
commanders to the limit, and required men of the finest quality. Napoleon, unfortunately, 
chose only one such commander, Gouvion Saint-Cyr. Since this was a secondary front, 
5SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 15 March 1811. 
6SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811; C(8)371, 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812. 
7SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814; 
C(8)371, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814; C(8)371, Armee 
d'Espagne, Situation, 1 April 1814; Armee de Catalogne, Situation, 15 April 1814; 
C(8)372, Tableau de !'Organisation des Armees d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 December 
1813. 
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it was second in priority for men and material. The Emperor consistently chose second 
rate though (like Marshal Macdonald and General Decaen) talented men. 8 
8Nofi, Napoleon at War, 25. On 7 June 1809, Napoleon wrote to his stepson, Prince 
Eugene Beauhamais (1781-1824), Vice Roy of Italy on the Corps d'armee: "A corps of 
25,000-30,000 men can be left on its own. Well handled, it can fight or alternatively 
avoid action, and maneuver according to circumstances ... because an opponent cannot force 
it to accept an engagement, but if it chooses to do so it can fight alone for a long time. 
A division of9,000-17,000 men can be left for an hour on its own without inconvenience; 
it will contain a foe several times more numerous than itself, and will win time for the 
arrival of the army. Correspondance de Napoleon I, (Paris: Henri Pion et J. Dumain, 
1863) [No. 15310, Napoleon to Eugene Napoleon, 7 June 1809], 19:80-82; Chandler, The 
Campaigns of Napoleon, 154; Laurent Gouvoin Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations de 
l'Armee de Catalogne en 1808 et 1809 sous le Commandement du General Gou:voin Saint-
Cyr, (Paris: Chez Anselin et Pochard, 1812) 26. 
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§2. fuf antiy 
The French infantry regiment as used in Spain were either light (leger) or line 
(ligne) and was organized, under the Imperial Decree of 18 February 1808. It was by its 
"table of organization," 3,900 strong and composed of a regimental staff and five 
battalions. The first four were the bataillons de guerre or combat battalions and the fifth 
was the bataillon de depot, for recruitment, replacements, supply and training. Infantry 
regiments were also assigned a 4 pdr artillery company, which provided immediate fire 
support. Its personnel was drawn from the regiment and the company was attached 
directly to the regimental commander. 9 
The battalions were commanded by chefs de bataillon and composed of one 
grenadier company (heavy shock troops), one voltigeur company (light skirmisher troops) 
and four fusilier or line companies. The depot battalion commanded by the Major was 
organized into four depot companies. The infantry company consisted of an orderly room 
staff and 120 soldiers. ' 0 
The major units, like brigades and divisions were (except for the rare instance of 
major cavalry units) organized around the infantry. The 1st Division in the Corps 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, for example, was entirely infantry. Its 1st brigade 
had five battalions, the 3rd battalions each of the 16e Ligne and 2e Suisse and three 
9See Table 1. Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 63; CN, No. 13574, Decret, 18 February 
1808, 16:38-341; Philip Haythomwaite, Napoleon's Line Infantry; Men-at-Arms Series 
(London: Osprey Publishing Co., 1983) 20, 23-25; Napoleon's Light Infantry, Men-at-
Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing Co., 1983) 11-16, 26-27. 
10Albert A. Nofi, "Napoleon at War", Strategy and Tactics, 32, (May 1972) 18. 
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battalions of the 7e Ligne. The 2nd brigade had four battalions, each a 3rd battalion of 
2e, 37e, 56e and 93e Ligne. 11 
11Each regiment actually had the strength of a brigade with its four battalions and 
when the battalions of a single regiment are combined under one command, they will 
form either an entire or the bulk of a brigade. The regiment is an administrative unit, 
while the brigade is an operational one. General de Brigade Jean-Baptiste, Baron Esprit 
de Latour's (1764-1815) Brigade de Reserve in late 1812, for example, it's staff and three 
battalions and the 23e Leger with a staff and two battalions. SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, 
Armee de Catalogne, 1December1812. SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, Corps d'Observation 
des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 1808. 
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§3. Cavalry 
The types of French cavalry employed in Catalonia included Cuirassiers, 
Dragoons, Hussars and Chasseurs a cheval. They were generally organized in four or five 
field squadrons and a depot squadron. The cuirassier regiments were organized by a 
Decree of 31 March 1807 into five squadrons of two companies, and each company with 
two troops, and 800-960 men. 12 The dragoons were organized with four squadrons (of 
two companies), three mounted and one dismounted, 13 while the Chasseurs a cheval and 
hussar regiments had four to six squadrons of two companies with two troops. All of 
their regimental organizations were identical. 14 
The French cavalry in the Peninsula was not always well mounted due to 
difficulties in the regimental depots procuring suitable horses in France or Italy. In 
Catalonia, the 24e Dragons, a uniquely well-horsed regiment in General Souham's 
division, had in December 1808, 707 men and 755 horses, 15 and by March 1809 the depot 
at Lodi had another 143 horses. 16 Colonel Delort, its commander, was able to procure 
12See Table 2. Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 40; Emir Bukhari, Napoleon's Cuirassiers 
and Carabiniers, Men-at-Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1977) 4, 5-16. 
13Emir Bukhari, Napoleon's Cavalry, (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1979) 63. 
14Emir Bukhari, Napoleon's Line Chasseurs, Men-at-Arms Series, (London: Ospery 
Publishing Ltd. 1977) 3-14; Bukhari, Napoleon's Hussars, Men-at-Arms Series, (London: 
Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1978) 5-18. 
15SHAT, C(8)465, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808. 
16Archives Nationales, AF1vl 181, Etat de !'effective en Chevaux de Troupe des 
Depots des Regiments de l'Espagne, 14 March 1809. 
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adequate mounts though the rest of the corps' 3,328 cavalry had only 3,234 horses. Its 
depot at Lodi had more animals than any dragoon regiment in France. 17 
French heavy cavalry generally rode heavy Norman and Flemish animals while 
the light cavalry rode French and German horses. The quality of French cavalry mounts 
in Spain was seriously degraded after 1812 when the Russian campaign swept away 
150,000 horses. 18 
A unique feature of French cavalry formations in Catalonia, and throughout the 
Grande Armee, after 1808 was the introduction of the provisional regiment. This was a 
regiment amalgamated from companies and squadrons drawn from other units. These 
units had a distinguished combat history in Catalonia and provided much of the cavalry 
support there until phased out in 1811. At the beginning of the war, two of the four 
cavalry regiments represented in the French command were provisional. They were the 
Provisional Cuirassier and Chasseur regiments. The Regiment Provisoire, later the 3e 
Proviso ire Cuirassiers, was formed of the 1st company, 5th squadrons each from the 4e, 
6e, 7e and 8e Cuirassiers. The Regiment Provisoire de Chasseurs a cheval was organized 
from the 1st company, 4th squadrons of the 14e, 15e, 19e, 23e and 24e Chasseurs a 
cheval. 19 
The French cavalry in Catalonia was either organized in brigades, or dispersed 
through the divisions. It was twice, organized into a division but never into higher 
171bid. Colonel, later General Jacques Antoine, Baron Delort (1773-1846). 
18Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 41-42. 
19SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 December 
1807; Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 1808. 
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formations. 20 The Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales had a "division" of two 
separate cavalry brigades,21 and Marshal Suchet's Army of Aragon and Catalonia had a 
"C C 1 .. 22 separate orps ava ry. 
On the whole, however, the cavalry was divided between the divisions in the corps 
or army. In July 1809, for example, the three divisions, and separate siege "corps" in the 
VII Corps each had its own complement of cavalry. Division Souham had bodies of the 
24e Dragons and 3e Provisiore Chasseurs a cheval in both of his two brigades, while only 
one of three in Division Pino had both the Dragons Napoleon and Chasseurs Royaux. 
General Duhesme's garrison of Barcelona, also provided the 3e Provisoire Cuirassiers (and 
three cavalry depots) to one of its three brigades. The corps also had a reserve in the 1 Oe 
Hussards. 23 
2
°Like Marshal Murat's Cavalry Reserve in the Grande Armee used during the 
successive campaigns from 1805 to 1809. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 147; 
David Johnson, Napoleon's Cavalry and Its Leaders, (New York: Holmes and Meier 
Publishers, Inc. 1978), 35. 
21 SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 
1808. 
22In January 1814, Marshal Suchet's Division de Cavalerie under General de Brigade 
Alexandre, Vicomte Digeon (1771-1826) had two brigades of two regiments each and a 
separate regiment. SHAT, C(8)372, Situation Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne 15 January 
1814. By May, the Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne had a "corps cavalry" or "cavalry 
reserve" of two regiments (brigade) under General de Brigade Jean Baptiste, Baron Meyer 
de Schauensee (1777-1860). SHAT,C(8)371, Situation Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 
1 May 1814. 
23SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. Division Souham was under 
General Joseph, Comte Souham (1760-1837). 
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§4. Artillery 
The French Corps Artillery in Catalonia was organized as a division level 
command, with a staff headed by either a General de Division or Brigade, assisted by a 
colonel, Chef d'Etat-Major (or major) and two or three captains. The Commandant 
administered the Corps Artillery (Police Generale); issued the corps commander's orders, 
submitted bimonthly "Situations" and correspondence (personnel and equipment) to the 
Corps Chef d'Etat-Major and monthly Situations and correspondence to the Ministry of 
War (6e Division, Bureau d'Artillerie). Finally, he assumed command of the artillery 
reserve if needed. 24 
The Direction du Pare (Artillery) headed by a Colonel or Major (Directeur) 
managed this huge accumulation of material. His "staff'' included two or three captains 
(adjoints), a Garde Principal/General,25 Conducteur Principal (d'artillerie),26 two 
24Paul Thiebault, Manuel General du Services des Etat-Majors Generaux et 
Divisionaires dans les Armees, (Paris: Chez Magimel, 1813) 365-366; Georges 
Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arriere a la Grande Armee en 1806-1807, (Paris: Librairie 
Militaire R. Chapelot et Cie. 1910) 63-64. The Chef d'Etat-Major corresponded with the 
Commandant d'Artillerie de la Grande Armee when the Corps was part of the Grande 
Armee. In the case of the VII Corps/ Armee de Catalogne such correspondence was 
carried on with the Ministere de la Guerre. 
25Principal Storekeeper (supply sergeant). 
26Conductors. 
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Conducteurs Ordinaires, Maitres/Chef Artificier,27 Ouvriers veterans,28 a company of 
artificers and other workmen. 29 
His duties included establishing depots and entrepots, directing the forges, 
foundries, workshops and wheelwright shops for artillery maintenance. Additionally, he 
oversaw the corps ammunition, and remount horse supply.30 As artillery supply officer, 
he managed expenditures, funding, supply and administration of materials (such as 
receiving the Ordonnances de Credit),31 and submited the numerous administrative reports 
to the Ministry of War, such as the Bordereaux generaux. 32 Inventaires generaux, 33 Etats 
de Remis and Etats de Consumation. 34 
The third part of the artillery staff is the Inspection du train, headed by a chef de 
bataillon or captain (Inspecteur). He managed forage and harness, troop discipline, pay 
and inspection.35 Finally, there were the field artillery commands in the subordinate 
divisions and installations (fortresses). 36 
27Chef artisans, e.g., blacksmiths, wheelwrights, coopers, etc. 
28Veteran laborers (artificers). 
29Thiebault, Manuel General, 366-67. 
3
°Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 64. 
31 0rders for payment. 
32Register of payment and issues. 
33lnventories, 
34Statement of supplies received and consumed. 
35Thiebault, Manuel General, 366-367. 
36lbid. 
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There were five "skill" subdivisions for the artillery branch as such; (Artillerie a 
Ried. Artillerie a cheval, Pontonniers. Ouvriers. and Armuriers ), and four support divisions 
(Train d'Artillerie. Cannoniers gardes-cotes. Cannoniers veterains and Cannoniers 
sedentaires ). 37 The artillery units were organized in regiments of two battalions, each of 
two five company divisions. The regimental staff38 consisted of a colonel (commander), 
four chefs de bataillon (commanders), and nineteen others. 
Company strength for the foot artillery (1805) was 100 men, and 96 for horse 
artillery. Napoleon changed this with the Decree of 18 October, 1811 to four officers and 
110 men (foot) and four officers and 96 men (horse). 39 A company had six or eight 
cannon, depending upon the caliber and unit mission. 40 The 11 e Cie. Artillerie Italien 
had, for example, 18 cannon (4pdr and 8pdr).41 
370f these subdivisions, the Pontonniers, Armuriers, Cannoniers gardes-cotes, 
Cannoniers veterans and Cannoniers sedentaires never served in Catalonia. John Elting, 
Swords Around a Throne. Na12oleon's Grande Armee, (New York: The Free Press, 1988) 
75; Rogers, Na12oleon's Army, 75. 
38See Table 4. 
39George Nafziger, Na12oleon's Invasion of Russia, (Novato, Califomai: Presidio 
Press, 1988) 34. A representative British Field Artillery (a pied) company had five 
officers and 145 men. Nafziger, The British Military. Its System and Organization. 1803-
1815, 42. 
40Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 64-65; Chandler, Campaigns ofNa12oleon, 358-
359. 
41 SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 ·December 
1807. 
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A Corps d'Armee had one company of horse and one and a half companies of foot 
artillery with twelve guns per division. 42 The Corps Artillery Park stored all the 
. l di 43 equipment me u ng cannon. It had a personnel reserve usually comprised of a 
company of foot artillery, ammunition, and material (often enough to equip an artillery 
train company with 150 vehicles); and other workers numbering as much as 500-600 
men. 44 It also held spare vehicles, field forges, supplies and impediment not carried with 
the artillery companies. 45 
The artillery train was a transportation asset, formed into six company battalions. 
An "elite" company supported the horse artillery, four line companies supported the foot 
artillery and Park, and a depot company trained recruits and remounts. A lieutenant 
commanded the company and a captain commanded the battalion assisted by a small 
staff. 46 
42The artillery companies carried an approvisionnement or basic load with them and 
the demi-approvisionnement remained with the Park. Lechartier, Les Services de 
l'Arriere, 65. 
43lbid. 
44lbid, 71. Comparatively, Captain Bayne's second light 6pdr Brigade, Royal Artillery 
had in May 1809, fourteen vehicles (limbers, caissons, forge and stones carts) 81 horses 
including saddle horses and 26 mules. Major General Alexander Dickson, The Dickson 
Manuscripts, 5 vols., ed., General Collingwood Dickson, (Woolwich: Royal Artillery 
Institution, 1905, reprinted, Cambridge: Ken Trotman, 1987), 1 :vii. 
45Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 255. 
46This battalion staff included an artiste Veterinarie, master sadler, and a master 
armorer. The companies had two harness makers and two blacksmiths. Ibid, 254-255; 
Robert Wilkinson-Lathan, Napoleon's Artillery, 6-12. 
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The "French Division Artillery" consisted of two artillery companies, one train, 
and 12 guns.47 A chef de bataillon commanded, assisted by a captain and a conductor. 
For example, General Duhesme's division artillery in 1809 had two foot and two horse 
artillery companies, two train companies and a platoon of artificers. 48 
The corps artillery is merely larger. Duhesme's consisted of a commandant and 
a small staff with a conducteur d'artillerie heading the Park and Trains. Its units were the 
7e/2e Artillerie a cheval and 6e/6e Bataillon (bis) du train attached to the 1st Division; 
and the lle/Artillerie a pied and !er/Train d'Artillerie de la Garde attached to the 2d 
Division. The Corps did not have any organic artillery of its own. 49 
47Lechatier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 65,203. 
48SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. 
49The staff included two captains and a lieutenant, small as compared to the Engineer 
Staff of four captains and four lieutenants. SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, Corps 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 1808. 
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§5. Engineers. 
Corps or Armies drew their engineer support from the Corps Imperial de Genie,50 
whose sapper and miner battalions served as "magazines" from which the field corps drew 
companies. 51 Generally, the corps engineers consisted of a Pare du genie, one or more 
sapper companies and a miner or pontoon detachment. A colonel commanded these 
engineers with a chef de bataillon as his Chief of Staff and a Directeur du Pare. 52 
Normally, mission requirements, topography, roads and fortifications of the country 
determined the size of this command. 53 
The Corps engineer organization in Catalonia was a staff of eight company grade 
officers.54 The VII Corps Engineers had a General de Brigade commanding, a colonel, 
Chief of Staff; chef de bataillon as Chef du Pare, and seven staff officers; three sapper 
and one miner company55 . 
50Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 269-270. The Corps Imperial de Genie in 1804 
had a headquarters of 384 officers (with three Generaux de Division and six Generaux de 
Brigade) and 340 gardes or employees who supervised the maintenance of fortifications. 
By 1812 the Corps had eight sapper battalions, six miner battalions and an Engineer Train 
battalion (Train du Genie) for the pare of equipment. Each battalion had six field 
companies and a depot company. Roger, Napoleon's Army, 86. 
51Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 86. 
52Lechatier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 73-74; Thiebault, Manuel General, 382-385. 
53Thiebault, Manuel General, 3 83. 
54SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, Corps d'Observation de Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 
1808. 
55See Table 4. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps 1 July 1809; J. Belmas, 
Joumaux des Sieges faits OU soutenus par les Fran~ais dans la Peninsule de 1807 a 1814, 
4 vols., (Paris: Chez Firmin Didot Freres et Cie 1836) 2:655; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation 
28 
The Corps of Engineers was organized with a headquarters element of 364 
engineer officers (1804) and 340 employees (including maintenance personnel, such as 
caretakers, storekeepers, clerks and artificers). Its units included five sapper battalions 
and nine miner companies. The engineer mission included construction, and maintenance 
of field and permanent fortifications, 56 reconnaissance,57 siege and tactical engineer 
operations and command of engineer districts. 58 
The sapper battalions were the engineer work horses, completing every type of 
engineer operation; while the miner battalions specialized in the underground warfare of 
mine and countermine. The sappeurs ouvriers or sapper artificers were organized in 1811 
to manufacture and repair engineer material. These troops normally served as one miner 
company per corps and often a sapper company to a division. 59 
Division de General Reille, 1 April 1809; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation Siege de Girone, 15 
September 1809. 
56Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 269-270; Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 85-87. 
57SHAT, C(8)36, General de Division Verdier, Reconnaissance de la Cote de la 
Mediterrannee depuis Calell jusqua Lescala et Rosas, 25 February 1810; Cours 
Elementaire de Fortification. ou Elements de l'art de construire. attaquer et defendre les 
retrenchements et les places. a l'usage dleleves du l'Ecole Speciale imperiale militaire; 
Redige d'apres les ordres de M. le General Bellavene. commandant Directeur des etudes 
de la dite Ecole, (Paris: Chez Valade, 1809) 10-13. 
58Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 270. 
59lbid. 
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§6. Transportation. 
The Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires were the Corps/ Army units 
responsible for the movement of supplies. Established by the Imperial Decree of 26 
March 1807,60 it was a centralized "corps" like the artillery and engineers and, within the 
Corps, placed under the orders of the Commissaires Ordonnateurs. 61 
The French command in Catalonia received its first train units in the spring of 
1809; the l 6e, l 7e, l 8e and l 9e Brigades de Mulets de Bat, organized as separate 
companies62 under a sous lieutenant, with 80 men and 120 mules. 63 In 1810, the Ministry 
sent the 2e and Se Bataillons d'Equipage Militaire to Catalonia. These were 499 man 
battalions commanded by a captain and organized with a staff and four companies. 64 A 
6
°CN, No. 12178, Napoleon to General Dejean, 26 March 1807, 14:542-543; Elting, 
Swords Around a Throne, 568-569. 
61 G. Couget, "L'Arme de Train de l'Empire a nos Jours (1807-1878); Revue Historigue 
des Armees No. 3, 1978 (special)l l; Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 94-95; Lechartier, Les 
Services de l'Arriere, 88-89. 
62AN, AFrvll84, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 31 May 
1809. There were nineteen mule Brigades. The VII Corps had its own train of 408 
Mules to which these four Brigades were added. AFrv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, 
Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, General de Division Dejean, Ministere Directeur de l' 
Administration de la Guerre, Rapport a l'Empereur, 4 October 1809. 
63AN, AFIV 1183, Bureau des Etapes Convois, Rapport a Ministre-Directeur de 
l'Administration de la Guerre, 30 January 1809. 
64The thirteen Bataillons des Train des Equipages Militaires and nineteen brigades de 
Mulets were grouped and had two centralized depots at Pau and Commercy, (1809). AN, 
AFrv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 15 June 1810. 
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sous-lieutenant commanded the 100 man (36 vehicle) companies. 65 
These two battalions were a distinct improvement in transportation support over the use 
of contract and requisitioned transport,66 to support the difficult resupply of Barcelona.67 
65 AN, AFIV 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, May 1809; 
AFIV 1184, Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, [General Dejean] Rapport a l'Empereur, 7 
June 1809, AFIV 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 15 June 
1810. 
66By October 1809, the VII Corps had 200 farm vehicles and 600 horses in its train. 
AN, AFIV 1183, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 4 October 1809. 
67AN, AFIVl 183, Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, General Dejean, Comte de Cessac, 
Rapport a l'Empereur 24 January 1810. As Comte Daru aptly states: "Le service des 
equipages et transports militaires, est l'un des plus importants de l'armee, puisque c'est par 
lui que toutes les autres branches de l'administration sont vivifiees". Pierre-Antoine-Noel-
Bruno, Comte Daru (1767-1829) held many administrative posts during the Revolution 
and Empire, notably as Intendant General, Commissaire General de la Grande Armee, 
Directeur de l'Administration de la Grande Armee and Ministre de !'Administration de la 
Guerre. Colonel H. de la Barre de Nanteuil, Le Comte Dam ou l'Administration Militaire 
sous la Revolution et !'Empire, (Paris: J. Peyronnet et Cie, 1966) 19; Lechartier, Les 
Services de l'Arriere, 88; citing letter, Dam to Napoleon, 6 February 1808. 
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§7. Gendannerie. 
Napoleon organized the Gendarmerie in Catalonia by the Decree of 6 July 1810 
as the 6th Legion, a "regiment" with 20 brigades of gendarmes a cheval and 100 brigades 
a pied. The six man brigades were lumped into six 187 man companies.68 
As an Army asset, it remained with the headquarters, but Force Publique (military 
police) detachments were occasionally distributed to posts or divisions. Gendarme duties 
included the security of the headquarters, the maintenance of order during the supply 
distributions, and regulation of places of entertainment.69 Operational functions include 
following up the rear of the army, regulating the flow of troops during battle, 
apprehending deserters, and managing prisoners of war. Other duties include regulating 
army vehicles, camp followers and employees. 70 In Catalonia, also, the Gendarmerie 
conducted anti-insurgent and anti-bandit operations. 71 
68SHAT, X(f)l71, Extrait des Minutes de la Secretaire d'Etat, 6 June 1810. 
69Emmanuel Martin, La Gendarmerie Fran~aise en Espagne et au Portugal, (Paris: 
Librairie Leauteu, 1898), 21-22, 83-86. In 1811, the 6e Legion de Catalogne numbered 
724 men. The Force Publique detachment distributed through the Armee de Catalogne 
was 75 men, SHAT, X(f)l 71, Inspection General de la Gendarmerie, Marshal Moncey 
to General Clarke, 11 March 1811. 
70Thiebault, Manuel General, 460-470. 
71Bemard Charron, "La Participation de la Gendarmerie Imperiale de la Guerre 
d'Espagne" (Ph.D. dissertation, Universite de Bordeaux, 1972) 34. 
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§ 8. The French Naval ''Slice" in Catalonia. 
French naval involvement in Catalonia, encompassed naval support for the Army's 
logistical efforts, such as naval escorts, for French supply shipping, passing command 
correspondence, patrolling, clearing the sea lanes and fighting corsairs and British 
warships. To accomplish this, the Ministry of Marine assigned a naval detachment with 
ships to the French garrisons in the Catalan ports, such as Barcelona and Rosas. 
Following the French defeat at Trafalgar, 1805, the Emperor made a concerted 
effort to reconstitute the French Navy which had suffered from serious decay since the 
beginning of the Revolution. Beginning a massive rearmament project, he dispersed the 
large dockyards (such as Brest) to smaller ones, facilitating French coastal traffic and 
reconstituted the Mediterranean naval squadrons.72 Napoleon ordered his Naval Minister, 
Vice-Amira! Denis Decres, Due de Saint Germain (1761-1820), to increase ship 
construction in 1807. 73 
Decres undertook this massive project and drafted 3,500 ship builders. By 
November, construction was under way, as the Emperor urged him on: "Activez 
l'armement des deux fregates de Toulon ainsi que de la Dannae ... "74 By March 1808, 
72Philippe Masson and Jose Muracciole, Napoleon et la Marine, (Paris: J. Peyronnet 
et Cie., 1968) 224-225. 
73Je vois avec surprise que je n' ai a Genes ni a Toulon aucune fregate en construction. 
Mon intention est que sur-le-champ vous en fassiez mettre en construction deux a 
Toulon .. .J' ai besoin de fregates clans la Mediterranee ... Donnez aussi ordre a Toulon de 
mettre enarmement l'Uranie et l'Incorruptible, afin d'avoir toujours la deux fregates. CN 
No. 13221, Napoleon to Vice-Amiral Decres, Ministre de la Marine, 6 October, 1807, 
16:69. 
74CN No. 13331, Napoleon to Vice-Amira! Decres, 1 November 1807, 16:140-141. 
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Decres built 43 vessels (12 at Toulon). 75 Between 1809 and 1814, the French Navy 
received 45 capital ships, fifteen frigates and nearly 900 lesser vessels. 76 The Emperor's 
goal was to create a 4,800 ship navy at an expenditure of 480 million cubic feet of 
timber; enough to set back French forests nearly two centuries. 77 
On the Mediterranean, the immediate threats to French logistical shipping for the 
Army of Catalonia (specifically Barcelona) were the Catalan corsairs and the patrols of 
the Royal Navy. For example, Admiral Thomas Cochrane Lord Dundonald (1775-1860) 
took a French merchantman in 1808 filled with munitions for the Army in Spain at the 
Bay of Almeria.78 Such actions induced the Emperor to escort his merchant shipping 
convoys with warships. One such escort occurred on 29 March 1809. Vice-Admiral 
Honore Comte Ganteaume (1755-1818), commander of the Mediterranean Squadron, 
formed a division at Toulon of five capital ships, two frigates, and two small bricks. His 
75CN No. 13698, Napoleon to Decres, 29 March 1808, 16:454-455. 
76Auguste Thomazi, Napoleon et ses Marins, (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1950) 
249. 
77Masson and Muracciole, Napoleon et la Marine, 246. 
78Donald Thomas, Cochrane. Britannia's Last Sea-King, (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1978) 124; J.W. Fortescue, Dundonald, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1895) 54-55. 
Napoleon was apprehensive about the safety of moving strategic materials by sea: 
"Order the evacuation of the artillery of Gerona upon Figueras. I do not 
approve of its evacuation by sea because that is too risky." 
UCN No. 4156, Decision, April 15, 1810, 3:529. 
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mission was to escort merchant ships to Barcelona which carried: 30,000 quintals of 
grain, flour and rice; 300,000 pounds of powder; and one million cartridges.79 
The second form of naval support was to the Catalan ports. For example, in June 
1812 two warships were assigned to Barcelona. These were: Le Chebek de Neptune and 
La Goesette de Cerf. 80 The Barcelona command supported its naval "slice" with 
approximately 3,500 F. a month and " ... payes sur ordonnance du Commissaire des guerres 
principal de Barcelone d'apres un credit mensuel de 4,000 frs. par mois faits pour cet 
object par M. Le General Gouverneur. "81 These ships were permanent parts of the 
garrison and their crew drew rations as such. 82 This squadron guarded the port, escorted 
ships, dispatched messages to France and pursued Spanish corsairs. 
79CN No. 14970, Napoleon to Vice-Amira! Ganteaume, 29 March 1809, 18:401-402. 
The Emperor stressed that time was of the essence and the convoy must sail immediately, 
the cargo was 12,000 quintals of grain, flour and rice (9 ounce pounds), 150,000 pounds 
of powder and 500,00 cartridges. In May 1810, General Lacuee reported to Napoleon on 
revictuling Barcelona " ... by means of commerce protected by the Marine." and the 
Emperor ordered " ... all necessary measures for protecting ... vessels carrying grains into 
Catalonia". UCN, No. 4213, Decision, May 7, 1810, 3:552. A week later, General 
Dejean requested " ... gunboats to protect the commercial expeditions to Barcelona ... ". 
UCN, No. 4233, Decision, May 15, 1810, 3:567. 
80SHAT, C(19)9, Bureau des Vivres No. 163. Commissaire des guerres G. 
Raymondon to Ministre Directeur Lacuee, 10 June 1812. 
81 lbid. 
82SHAT, C(8)271. Commissaire des guerres Mongenot, Journal du Blocus de la 
Place de Barcelone, February 1814. 
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§9. The Allied Contingents. 
Few French armies possessed within their ranks as high an admixture of allied and 
foreign soldiers as the Army of Catalonia. It had Westphalian, Berg, Wurtzburg, Saxon, 
Nassau, Italian, Neapolitan, Swiss, and Spanish contingents throughout its history, and its 
percentage of foreign troops was higher than most French armies of the period. For 
example, the Armee d'Allemagne in 1809, had 186,725 men with 71,694 or 38.39% 
foreign and allied, 83 as compared with half in the Army of Catalonia. 
In 1807 the Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales had 5,605 Italian and 
Neopolitan troops; 71.1 % of its 7,887 men. 84 As the division grew into the Corps 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Oriental es, the influx of French troops reduced this percentage 
to 45.3% or 6,461 out of 14,253.85 By July 1809, it had 45.8% foreign/allied troops, or 
25,122 out of 54,794.86 
In 1810 the foreign contingent in the Army of Catalonia rose to 56.8% or 26,970 
out of 47,519 troops. 87 This was its highest point since 1807 to the end of the war. In 
83The allied elements in the Armee d'Allemagne were mostly Saxon, Barvarian and 
Wurtemburg with a small admixture of Corsicans and Italians. Scotty Bowden and 
Charles Tarbox, Armies on the Danube. 1809, Armies of the Napoleonic Wars Research 
Series, (Arlington, Texas: Empire Games Press, 1980), 56-64. 
84SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 December 
1807. 
85SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 
1808. 
86SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. 
87SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
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1811, Napoleon transferred two divisions from the Army of Catalonia to Marshal Suchet's 
Army of Aragon, and later to the Grande Armee for the Russian Campaign. By 
December, the Army of Catalonia shrank to 24,740 men and its allied elements to 4,814 
men or 19.45%.88 In 1812, however, it nearly doubled its allied and overall strength to 
8,121 out of 40,816, or 19.89%.89 In 1813, the Emperor again halved the Army of 
Catalonia to 23,925 men and its allied contingent quartered, to 2,978 men or 12.4%.90 
Finally in 1814, the Ministry of War stripped the combined Army of Aragon and 
Catalonia of troops to defend France. Its allied contingents melted away as the European 
political realignment left France and Italy isolated. When the war ended in May 1814, 
there remained only 188 Catalan troops attached to Marshal Suchet's army a mere 0.09% 
of its 19 ,315 troops. 91 
88SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. The Corps 
d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne similarly had 4,730 foreign troops of the strength of 25,270 
or 18.7%. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne, 1August1811. 
89SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812. 
90The garrison of Tarragona had the 7e de Ligne ltalien, Gendarmes Espagnole, the 
Compagnie Departmentale and the 1 er Chasseurs a cheval Italiens while the garrison of 
Lerida had a detachment of the 7e de Ligne ltalien. Neither of the blockaded fortresses 
submitted Situations. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 30 
June 1813. 
91 SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814. 
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The Grand Duchy of Berg 
Napoleon created the Grand Duchy by the Decree of 14 November 1808. It 
included lands seceded from Prussia, Kleve, the Duchies of Mark and Dortmund, the 
Castle of Wesel, Bavaria, Ansbach and the Herzogtum of Berg.92 The Berg Army was 
an amalgam of units drawn from the older provinces and newer Grand-Ducal formations. 93 
In 1806, the Grand Duke, Marshal Joachim Murat (1767-1815) organized the 1st 
Berg Infantry Regiment with four battalions of eight, I 00 man companies. To ensure pro-
French reliability, he drafted French troops into its ranks. In August 1808, the Duchy 
reorganized the regiment into the 1st and 2nd Infantry Regiments each with three 
battalions of six 120 man companies. Both regiments shared a four company depot 
battalion, based on the French model. Berg later organzied a third and fourth infantry 
regiment, and adopted the French conscription system to keep a flow of men to the Army. 
In 1811, Berg reorganized its infantry into regiments of two battalions and a depot 
company. Each battalion contained eight 120 man companies which were: one grenadier, 
one voltigeur and six fusiliers. 94 
92There were four departments: the Rhine, the Seig, the Ruhr and the Ems. Otto von 
Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (1): Westphalia and Kleve-Berg, Man-At-Arms Series, 
Martin Windrow, ed., (Berkshire: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1975) 4; Georges Lefebvre, 
Napoleon, vol. 2, Napoleon from 18 Brumaine to Tilsit 1799-1807, (new York: Columbia 
University Press, 1969) 245; F.M. Kircheisen, Napoleon, Tns. Henry St. Lawrence, 
(Freeport, New York: Books for Libriaries Press, 1972; reprint 1932 ed.)346-347 (page 
references are to reprint edition). 
93von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (1) 7. 
94Ibid. 
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Berg had two Chevaux-Legers regiments and one amalgamated artillery/engineer 
battalion composed of five companies, each of horse and foot artillery, sappers/miners, 
pontoners, and a train. Finally, it had a Gendarmerie and National Guard, based on the 
French model.95 
In January 1809, the Emperor ordered the formation of a composite division 
organized under the auspices of the King of Westphalia. Composed of 6,000 
Westphalian, Berg, Wurtzberg and Saxon troops, it was earmarked for service in 
Catalonia.96 Berg provided the ler and 2e Regiments du Berg (four bns with 2,919) 
temporally to General Reille's Division, later reorganized as General Verdier's Division.97 
These two regiments played a distinguished part in the siege of Gerona in 1809, 
extraordinary casualties, and participated in some of its fiercest fighting. 98 The Berg 
contingent suffered terrible casualties from combat loss and epidemic sickness following 
the autumn rains,99 and by the end of the siege only 30% of its beginning strength 
95lbid. 
96CN, No. 14681, Napoleon to Berthier, 11 January 1809, 18:195. 
97This brigade was under General Amey. See Table 7. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, 
Division de General Reille, 1 April 1809; Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:663. 
980man, Peninsular War, 3:47-48. General Verdier assaulted on the breaches on 19 
September 1809, amidst a terrific fire. Though General Arney's German column 
penetrated the breach and got far as some buildings inside they were thrown back with 
296 casualties. Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:604-612. 
99Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:612; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:49-50. 
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remained. The 1st Regiment had 577 men and 662 men in the hospital, or 54% and 52% 
of its troop strength out of 1,327 and 1,274 men respectively. 100 
The Duchies of Nassau-Usungen/Nassau-Weilburg 
The twin Duchies of Nassau became members of the Confederation of the Rhine 
in 1806 and reorganized its Army in 1808, establishing the 1st and 2d Nassau Infantry; 
with two six company battalions: one grenadier, one voltigeur and four fusilier. Nassau's 
light cavalry was the Reitende Jager Regiment. The contingent used the Austrian 
regulations from 1803 until 1810, when it adapted the French regulations. Both infantry 
regiments saw service in Spain, but the 1st Nassau Regiment served in the Army of 
Catalonia from 1810. The regiment was an amalgam of the pre-1803 1st Battalion (one 
grenadier and three fusilier companies), 4th Battalion (one light and one fusilier company) 
and new recruits (1,494 men), and assigned to General Rouyer's division. 101 By May 
1810, Marshal Augereau transferred the Nassau regiment to the garrison of Barcelona 
10
°Despite their grave sick rate, the Berg troops still fought well, as in action against 
the miquelets at Olot, on 23 December 1809. SHAT, C(8)37, Letter, General Souham to 
Marshal Augereau, 25 December 1809; Letter, General de Division Souham to Marshal 
Augereau, 25 December 1809; "Etat des officers sous-officiers et soldats morts, blesses 
ou perdus", 23 December 1809. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810. 
1010tto von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (2) Nassau and Oldenburg, Men-At-
Arms Series (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1976), 3-6; Otto von Pivka, Armies of the 
Napoleonic Era, (New York: Taplinger, 1979), 171-172; Hajo Holbom, A History of 
Modem Germany 1648-1849, (New York: Knopf, 1964), 367. "Actes relatifis a la 
confederation des etats du Rhin et a la dissolution de l'Empire Germanique, 12 Juillet 
1806," Leopold Neumann, Recueil des Traites et Conventions Conclus par l'Autriche, 
(Leipzig, 1856, reprint ed., Krause Reprint 1971 ), 2:202-217. 
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(1,270 men)102 where it served until November 1813, when Nassau defected to the Allies, 
and Napoleon had it disarmed and escorted to France as prisoners of war. 103 
The Kingdom of Westphalia 
Napoleon formed this kingdom at the Peace of Tilsit, 1807, and awarded it to his 
brother Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte. He carved it out of the former territories of Hesse-
Cassel, Brunswick, Paderbom, Stolberg-Wemigerode and slivers of some Prussian states. 
Divided into eight departments, Napoleon incorporated it into the Confederation of the 
Rhine. 104 
He required it to field a 25,000 man army including 20,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry 
and 1,500 artillery. During the Peninsular War, King Jerome provided the 2nd 
W estphalian Division to the VII Corps as part of the reinforcements to besiege Gerona. 105 
The division established a depot at Perpignan and entered Catalonia in May 1809. It 
participated heroically in the siege of Gerona, twice assaulting the fortress on 8 July and 
102It had 1,270 men. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31May1810. 
103Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (2), 18-19. 
104F.M. Kircheissen, Napoleon, Tns. Henry St. Lawrence (Freeport New York: Books 
for Libraries Press, 1972), 409-410. Von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies, I: 15. 
105See Table 5; Westphalia had to provide 9,500 men for in Spain 1809; 2,500 in 
181 O; 2,000 in 1811; 1,000 in 1812 and finally 200 in 1813. The contingent steadily fell 
as Westphalia's requirement to supply troops to German, the Baltic Fortresses and Russia 
increased. Connelly, Napoleon's Satelite Kingdoms, 143-145; Von Pivka, Napoleon's 
German Allies, 1:15; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; Von Pivka, 
Armies of the Napoleonic Era, 256-258. 
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19 September 1809 suffering terrible losses. 106 By December 1809, only 884 men 
remained under arms. Of its total strength of 4,610 men, it had a staggering 3,583 
(77.7%) in the hospital. 107 
In March 1810, the division received 650 fresh men, and Marshal Augereau 
assigned it the garrison of Gerona until April 1811 when the W estphalian battalions were 
returned home. A 500 man amalgamated contingent of Westphalian units remained in 
Catalonia until 1813. 108 
The Kingdom of Saxony 
After the crushing Prussian/Saxon defeat at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806, Napoleon 
concluded a military alliance with the Elector of Saxony, Frederick Augustus. In exchange 
for Saxon military support, Napoleon created the Elector, King of Saxony, Grand Duke 
of Poland (1807), and a member of the Confederation of the Rhine. 109 The King 
106SHAT, C(8)35, Armee d'Espagne, 7e Corps, Siege de Girone, Rapport General du 
Genie sur le Siege de Girone, 20 September 1809. Archives Nationales AFrvl621, plaque 
3(1), Affaires d'Espagne, Siege de Girone, "Lettre de General Verdier 9 July 1809. AN, 
AFrvl621, plaque 3(1II), Affaires d'Espagne, Siege de Girone, Rapports de l'Artillerie sur 
le Siege de Girone. Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:533-538, 602-613. Oman, Peninsular 
War, 3:31-33, 46-49. 
107SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809. 
108In January 1813, the ler-ler Ligne Westphalien formed part of the Garrison of 
Figueras, and the two companies of the 1 er W estphalien Artillerie formed part of the 
Army Artillery. Von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies, 1:17; SHAT, C(8)371, Situation 
Corps d'Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1813. 
109F.M. Kircheisen, Napoleon, 380; Otto von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (3): 
Saxony 1806-1815. Men-At-Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing, 1979), 5. 
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reorganized the Saxon army along French lines in 1810 with two infantry divisions, a 
cavalry division, an artillery regiment plus two companies. 110 
The Saxons sent the 4th "Prinz Clemens" Infantry Regiment to Catalonia in 1810, 
(1,6S8 men). Marshal Augereau assigned it to the garrison of Barcelona, where it 
remained until 1811. 111 
The Confederation of the Rhine 
When Napoleon formed the Confederation of the Rhine in July 1806, it included 
the Kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, Westphalia, Wurtemberg, the Grand-Duchies of Berg 
and Hesse-Darmstadt, the Duchies of Nassau-Usingen, Nassau-Weilberg, Hohenzollern-
Hechingen, Hohenzollem-Zigmaringen, Mechlenburg-Strelitz, Mechlenburg Schwerin, 
Oldenburg and the Saxon Duchies of Weimar, Gotha, Meinengen and Colberg. 112 The 
Confederation sent to Catalonia in May 1810, the Se and 6e de Ligne de Confederation 
du Rhin (1,128 and S3S men respectively), and the Bataillon de Princes (286 men). 113 
110von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies, 3:9-10; von Pivka, Armies of the Napoleonic 
Era, 231; Lt. Colonel Sauzey, Les Allemands sous les Aigles Fran~ais. Essai sur les 
Troupes de la Confederation du Rhin 1806-1813, vol. 3, Les Saxons dans nos Rangs, 
(Paris, 1907, reprint edition, Paris: C. Terana, 1987), 30-33, (pages refer to reprint 
edition). 
111See Table 6. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne 31 May 1810. 
112Kirsheisen, Napoleon, 3S4; Neumann, Recueil des Traites et Conventions,"Traite 
de Confederation des Etats du Rhin, 12 July 1806, 2:202-212. 
1130ne battalion of the Se de Ligne de Confederation du Rhin was from the Saxon 
Duchies of Coburg-Saalfeld, Gotha-Altenburg, Hildburghausen, Meiningen and Weimar. 
The regiments were assigned to Division Rouyer and the battalion to Division Verdier. 
SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31May1810; von Pivka, Armies of the 
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The Kingdom of Italy 
The Republic and later (1804) Kingdom of Italy fell under the Vice-Roy, Prince 
Eugene de Beauhamais (1781-1824), and since 1800, its Army was organized into seven 
divisions numbering 23 ,000 men. 114 It expanded with continued Imperial troop demands 
to 44,00 infantry, 6,000 cavalry; 6,000 naval (three frigates) and 120 guns by 1808, and 
Italy contributed a considerable contingent to the Catalan front. 115 In 1807, it provided 
General Millossewitz's brigade to the Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 
including three battalions, 2e-2e, 3e-4e, and 2e-5e de Ligne Italien, a light battalion, the 
1 er Velites Roy aux, two companies of the Dragons Italien and Chasseurs Roy aux Italiens, 
totaling 3,423 men. 116 Through 1808, the Vice-Roy reinforced the Catalan front, 117 mostly 
to General Pino's Division. 118 
Napoleonic Era, 234-236. 
114These were the Legione Italica, Divisiona Italica, Divisiona Polacca, Divisiona del 
Itemo, Corps Distaccato, and the Guarda de Presidente. Otto von Pivka, Napoleon's 
Italian and Neapolitan Troops, Men-At-Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing, 
1979)5. 
115Ibid, 6. 
116SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 December 
1807. 
117SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 
1808; SHAT, C(8)355, Supplement a l'Etat d'Emplacement de l'Armee d'Espagne, Defense 
de la Frontiere, 12-30 June 1808; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation VII, Corps, 6 January 1809. 
118SHAT, C(8) 362, Division de General Pino, 12 October 1809; C(8)362; Situation, 
VII Corps, 1 January 1810. 
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The contingent served in the Italian Division, under General Pino and later General 
Philippe Severoli through 1811. In 1812, the Emperor reduced it for service in the 
Russian campaign, and by 1813 withdrew its remaining troops for service in Italy to repel 
the Austrian invasion. 119 
The Kingdom of Naples 
Like the Kingdom of Italy, Naples provided a large contingent to Catalonia. In 
1806, after its conquest and the accession of Joseph Bonaparte as king, the new 
government reorganized the remains of the Royal army. 120 It totaled 11,000 troops and 
consisted of two regiments each of line and light infantry, chasseurs a cheval, eight 
companies of foot artillery, one of horse artillery, twelve companies of "d'artilleurs 
littoraux," six companies of sappers, engineers, a legion of gendarmerie, a train battalion, 
the Garde Royale and two foreign units, the Royale-Corse and Royale-Africaine. Its 
administrative machinery was a shallow imitation of the French system. 121 
119SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1812. 
120Most of the Royal army fled to Sicily with King Ferdinand and Queen Marie 
Caroline. Consequently, the Napolitan war machine nearly collapsed. King Joseph and 
his Minister of War, Christophe Saliceti had the unenviable task of restoring it. von 
Pivka, Napoleon's Italian and Neapolitan Troops, 25; Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite 
Kingdom, 72; and R.M. Johnston, The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy. and the Rise 
of the Secret Societies, 2 vols., (London: Macmillan and Co., 1904; Reprint, New York: 
De Capo Press, 1973) 2:90. 
121 Jacques Rambaud, Naples sous Joseph Bonaparte 1806-1808, (Paris:Librairie Pion, 
1911) 282-292; Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms, 86-89. 
45 
Naples provided two battalions, the ler, 2e-ler de Ligne Napolitan (1,912 men), 
an amalgamated squadron of the 2e Chasseurs Napolitan, and Regiment Provisonal de 
Chasseurs/Dragons (160 men) to the Catalan front in 1807122. In January 1808 the ler, 
2e-2e de Ligne Napolitan came to the VII Corps. 123 For the siege of Gerona, General 
Gouvion Saint-Cyr lumped the Neapolitan contingent into Division Verdier as a separate 
brigade, 124 and in 1810, Marshal Augereau reorganized it into a division under General 
Pignatelli. 125 The Neapolitan Division was, however, short-lived for the troops constituted 
a chronic disciplinary problem. Their desertion and crime rate was the highest in the 
Army of Catalonia. Part of the problem was due to the demands placed upon Naples to 
supply troops. These strained King Joseph's shaky administration and forced him to 
empty his prisons, drafting hundreds of jailbirds, goldbricks, and other riffraff into his 
army. 126 Napoleon was furious over the abysmal quality of these troops, as with the 
arrival of a convoy of exceptionally poor Neapolitan recruits at Turin in June 1810: 
The King of Naples is ridding his country of ruffians who are costing us 
very dear. Declare that I hold General Grenier and Marshal Perignon 
122SHA T, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 December 
1807; C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 1808. 
123SHAT C(8)362, VII Corps, Situation, 6 January 1809; and Situation, VII Corp, 1 
July 1809. 
124SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1December1809, and Situation, VII Corps, 
1January1810. General Jean Antoine Comte Verdier (1767-1839) commanded Division 
Verdier. 
125SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
126SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; von Pivka, 
Napoleon's Italian and Neopolitan Troops, 25. 
responsible if ruffians come to us instead of soldiers ... for these rascals 
inflect the whole army. 127 
Within the year, Napoleon cleared the Neapolitan contingent from Catalonia. 128 
The Miscellaneous Contingents 
46 
The Army in Catalonia had odd units such as the Catalan counterinsurgents, 
specially formed French battalions, and a Swiss contingent (on both sides of the conflict). 
These included the bataillons etrangers, such as the Swiss regiments. Switzerland 
provided excellent mercenaries to the French Army since the seventeenth century129 and, 
by 1805, supplied four infantry regiments (1st to 4th). The independent cantons of 
127UCN, No. 4304, Decision, June 14, 1810, 3:603-604. 
128SHA T, C(8)3 70, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. 
... le 5e bataillon de marche ... est parti de Naples pour se rendre en 
Catalogne. Mon intention n'est pas d'encombrer la Catalogne de mauvais 
soldats et d'engrosser les bandes de brigands. Si ce bataillon est compose 
de galeriens ou de bandits, ou d'hommes mal habilles et mal armes, on le 
renverra a Naples. En general, ecrivez au Roi que je n'ai pas besoin de 
nouvelles troupes napolitaines en Espagne, et que je n'en veux plus. 
CN, No. 16765, Napoleon to General Clarke, 6 August 1810, 21:23. 
129nuring the French Revolution, the Swiss withdrew its contingent of eleven 
regiments after the massacre of 600 Gardes Suisses on 10 August 1792 during the 
storming of the Tuileries. A "Capitulation" (convention) between the two countries in 
1803 negotiated by the pro-French Swiss Military organization gave France this 
contingent. Alexandre Paguet, Histoire de la Confederation Suisse, 7e Ed., 2 vols., (Paris: 
H. Georg, Libraire, Editeur, 1879) 2:353-356; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 375-376; 
George Allen, The French Revolution, 4 vols., (Philadelphia: George Barrie's Sons, 1923) 
2:252-256; Rodolphe de Castella de Delley, Le Regiment des Gardes-Suisses au Service 
de France, (Sainte Paul Fribourg: Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1974) 168-173. 
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Neufchatel130 and Valais provided a battalion each. These units totaled 4,000 men and 
were organized as "national" units but paid by France on the French pay scale. 131 
Two Swiss Battalions served in Catalonia. The 3e-2e de Ligne Suisse and its 
depot served there from 1807 to 1812, (550 men), when the Ministry of War withdrew 
it. 132 The Bataillon Valaisan entered Catalonia in 1808 and withdrew in 1811. It 
averaged about 250 men in five companies and did excellent service133 . There was even 
in 1808 a Swiss regiment serving in the Spanish Army, the Regiment de Wimpffen, which 
General Duhesme unsuccessfully attempted to recruit into his Corps. 134 From this 
regiment, Duhesme formed a "unit" of twenty-nine Swiss deserters attached to the 
garrison of Barcelona in 1809.135 
130The Bataillon de Neufchatel, recruited voluntarily from Marchal Berthier's lands as 
Prince de Neufchatel, were in essence a private army which served in Spain. Elting, 
Swords Around a Throne, 378. 
131 lbid, 376. 
132SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees-Orientales, 15 December 
1807; C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees-Orientales, 28 May 1808; 
C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute 
Catalogne, 15 March 1811; C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1812. 
133The Bataillon V alaisan was organized on the same basis as the other Swiss 
regiments of the Capitulation. When France annexed V alais in 1810, it combined the 
Bataillon Valaisan with the Tirailleurs du Po and the Tirailleurs Corses into the 11 e 
Regiment d'Infanterie Legere. Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 377-378. 
134This regiment was at Tarragona in June 1808, and Duhesme unsuccessfully tried 
to recruit it. CN, No. 13586, Napoleon to General Clarke, 20 February 1808, 16:349-350; 
Oman, Peninsular War, 1:310. 
135These "Deserteurs Suisse" were probably organized as a disciplinary company for 
the most unsavory details on the post, similar to the Chasseurs de Flessingue on 
Walcheren Island which was formed from a depot of deserters or other unit of 
"refractaires." Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 434-435; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII 
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Another odd battalion which served in Catalonia was a battalion of the Regiment 
de la Tour d'Auvergne, formed in 1805 to attract the Royalists and Chouans of the 
Northwestern Department of France. 136 The unit was named after La Tour d'Auvergne, 
the late First Grenadier of France. His nephew was its first commander. 137 One of its 
battalions served in Catalonia from 1810 to 1811 (Division Verdier). 138 
Throughout the war, the French used various National Guard (Gardes Nationales) 
and light units drawn from the French frontier departments. These included the Chasseurs 
des Pyrenees-Orientales139 and the Bataillon Departmental assigned to the garrison of 
Barcelona. 140 Other units included the Bataillons de Gars, d'Aude and de Haute Garone, 
Corps, 1 July 1809. 
136The memory of the Royalist and Chouan revolts of the Vendean "counter 
revolution" caused bitter rifts in France until the middle of the nineteenth century. The 
last Ven dean revolts were in 183 2 and, prior to the formation of this regiment, the last 
insurgency was Chouan insurrection to 1799 which was put down by the Armee 
d'Autichamp in November. Andre Montagnon, Les Guerres de Vendee 1793-1832. (Paris: 
Librairie Academique Parrin, 1974) 270. 
137The regiment was unfortunately dogged by corruption. Napoleon relieved La Tour 
d'Auvergne in December 1808 for incompetence, corruption and: "shaking down" officer 
candidates for money. Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 358. "The colonel of the Tour 
d'Auvergne Regiment is incapable of commanding it; named another colonel." UCN, No. 
2533, Napoleon to General Clarke, December 8, 1808, 2:563. 
138SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810; C(8)362, Situation, Armee 
de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
139SHAT, C(8)362, VII Corps, Situation, 6 January 1809. 
140SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Division de General Reille, I April 1809; C(8)362, 
Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810. 
49 
de Tam Garreau, 141 the 3e Provisionale de Bayonne, and the Pionniers Volontaire Etrangers. 142 
All of these units were transferred out of Catalonia (or disbanded) by the end of 1813. 
Finally, the French command formed a variety of Catalan regular and irregular 
units. Amongst the later were the Gendarmes Catalans formed in 1811 by Marshal 
Macdonald and General Suchet and assigned to an Arrondissement Territorial for 'police 
and escort duty, and officered by Frenchmen who lived in Spain prior to 1808. 143 In 
1812, General Decaen converted this Gendarme company into the Guides Catalans, and 
assigned them to the Arrondissement de Girone until the end of the war. 144 Other 
"regular" units included the Compagnie Municipale145 formed in Barcelona; the Bataillon 
141 SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811; 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1812. 
142SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; C(8)371, 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812; C(8)3 71, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 
1 December 1812. 
143This unit was assigned initially to the Adjutant Commandant Molard's 2e 
Arrondissement Territoriale, and later to Adjutant Commandant Dumolard's 3e 
Arrondissement Territoriale. SHAT, C(8)3 70, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute 
Catalogne, 1 August 1811; C(8)171, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; 
SHAT, X(f)l 70, Letter, No. 328, General Decaen to General Clarke, 16 December 1811; 
Letter, Marshal Macdonald to General Clarke, 19 September 1811; Ministere de la Guerre, 
2e Division, Bureau de la Gendamerie Imperiale, Chef de Bureau Pryve Rapport fait au 
Ministre de la Guerre, 14 October 1811; Minute of Letter, General Clarke to General 
Decaen, 15 November 1811; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 364-465. 
144SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; C(8)371, 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Armee de 
Catalogne, 30 June 1813; C(8)372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 
1814. 
145This Compagnie Municipale remained an active unit in the Garrison of Barcelona 
until the end of the war in May 1814. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 
1810; C(8)371, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814. 
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de la Haute Catalogne; 146 the Gendarmes Espagnole; 147 the Irregular Troop Battalion; and 
the Compagnie Departmentale. 148 
Finally, there were Catalan counter-insurgent units which made themselves the 
scourge of the guerrillas. They included the Chasseurs de Montagnes; formed by General 
Duhesme in Barcelona in 1809, and remained on active service until late 1813. 149 
Additionally, there were five Compagnies Miquelets distributed through Upper 
Catalogne150 and other municipal Miquelet companies, such as the Miquelets de Santa 
Coloma. 151 Additionally, there were other small counter-insurgent bands, the 
"Partisans,"152 a battalion of "Troupes Irregulars," 153 and some local chasseur units formed 
146SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 August 1811. 
147This unit remained active until 1813. A similar unit, the Gendarmes de Tarragone, 
was activated in January 1814 and lasted several months. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, 
Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; C(8)3 71, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 
1813; C(8)372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
148The Bataillon Departmentale numbered some 400 men, appeared in 1810 and 
dropped out of the Army of Catalonia within in a few months. SHAT, C(8)362, 
Situation, VII Corps, I January 1810. 
149SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; C(8)371, Situation, Armee de 
Catalogne, 30 June 1813; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 365. 
15
°Miquelet companies were activated in 1811, and they remained in the force until 
1812. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811; 
C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812. 
151 SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1812. 
152This small partisan band was formed in 1812, but only served through the year and 
disappeared. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812; C(8)371, 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1812. 
153SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812. 
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in 1813, that is the Chasseurs de l'Amprudam, the Chasseurs de Girone and the Chasseurs 
de Barcelone. They remained on active service until January 1814. 154 These units served 
as scouts, counter-guerrillas, spies and agents provocateurs to lure insurgents into French 
ambushes. 155 
The organizational structure of the Army of Catalonia, that is, the different 
regiments and the mix of branches (infantry, Gendarmerie, etc.) did not have any direct 
material effect on its operational or administration performance. The infantry 
reorganization of February 1808156 which increased company strength of the field and 
depot battalions (six companies each), enhanced the combat efficiency on the company 
level, and their administrative efficiency on the regimental level. Increased strength 
allowed the Ministry of War and the army commanders greater administrative and 
operational flexibility. Like the reorganization of 1803, which combined battalions and 
regiments of 140 demi-brigades into 117, 157 the Ministry gained streamlined and flexible 
regiments, which it could move by battalion as desired. The battalion then was the 
operational building block of the army while the regiment, its administrative one. 158 
154SHAT,C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1January1813; C(8)372, Situation, 
Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
155Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 365. 
156Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 61-63; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 214-215; Scotty 
Bowden and Charlie Tarbox, Armies of the Danube 1809. Armies of the Napoleonic War 
was research series (Arlington Texas: Empire Games Press, 1980), 25-29. Elting, Swords 
Around a Throne, 214; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 339-341. 
157Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 207. 
158Comte Morand, De l'Armee Selon la Charte et d'apres !'Experience des Demieres 
Guerres (1792-1815), (Paris: Librairie Militaire de L. Baudoin, 1894), 123-130. 
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The administrative effect of this was that the Ministry could assign battalions or 
squadrons to different armies at will without breaking the organizational integrity of the 
regiment. Hence, there were in the Army of Catalonia throughout its history a regimental 
presence represented by as little as detachments or single battalions up to the entire 
regiment, with depot. For example, the 93e Ligne had in 1809 its 3rd battalion in the VII 
Corps159 and its other battalions in Prince Eugene de Beauharnais' Armee d'ltalie. 160 
This allowed the Ministry to build large formations quickly. It built the Division 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales with seven infantry regiments, six of which 
"contributed" one battalion while one regiment, gave two battalions. 161 Additionally, in 
1812, Napoleon ordered each infantry regiment to form a sixth field battalion, 162 to allow 
greater Ministerial flexibility. 
In the army itself, the commander and chief of staff could form commands at will. 
Marshal Macdonald for example formed detachments to meet specific operational needs. 
On 16 November 1810, he sent a detachment of two battalions and cavalry to escort a 
159SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. 
160Bowden and Tarbox, 1809, 110. 
161 SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 December 
1807. 
162Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 213. 
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convoy. 163 He also formed large semi-permanent, commands such as, the five Brigades 
du Blocus for the siege of Figueras in 1811.164 
One aspect which had a profound impact on the Army of Catalonia and its conduct 
of the war was its high admixture of allied troops. As we have seen, this army was one 
of the most polyglot commands of the war, which placed unique demands on the 
Ministries and the army command. The Army of Catalonia had units of six nationalities 
and four languages. Like the Ausro-Hungarian Army in World War I, this caused real 
problems. 165 
The differing languages caused administrative problems throughout the higher 
French command as the Ministry and the Army coordinated movements and 
administration for the foreign units. When, for example, the Westphalian Division arrived 
at Perpignan on its way to Catalonia in 1809, the commander of the lOe Division 
Militaire General Jean Pierre Lacomb Saint-Michel (1751-1812) probably dealt with the 
division in French166 but on the battalion level an undoubted language problem existed. 
Consequently, information such as troop situation reports were translated into French 
163SHAT, C(8)133, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, 2e Cahier, Instruction, 16 
November 1810. 
164SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811. 
165The nationality and language problems of the Austro-Hungarian Army was one of 
major proportions effecting unit efficiency and severely hampering their war effort. 
Despite the fact that German was the language of service, there were six or seven 
languages spoken in the Army which caused considerable command problems. Norman 
Stone, The Eastern Front 1914-1917, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975) 125-
126. 
1661t was common for gentlemen to speak French as the 'lingua franca.' 
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before forwarding to the Ministry of W ar. 167 Yet again General de Division Joseph Lechi 
made a request to the Emperor through the Ministry of War in Italian, for the 
commutation of a prison sentence of an officer due to ill health. 168 
The allied regimental or even division structure within a French Army 169 caused 
distinct administrative difficulties at the Army and Ministerial level. For example, 
Napoleon always insisted that allied governments fund their units in French employ 
through the French Ministries which gave the staff in Paris a headache, but spared the 
French command in Catalonia these problems. However, "glitches" did occur. If support 
for the allied formations was not forth coming from their national treasures, it was 
replaced by French resources. For example, the French Ministry supplied 5,000 
muskets170 to the Westphalian contingent at a cost of 333,426.60 F. The Ministry, of 
167SHAT, C(8)30, General Lacomb Saint-Michel, Commander lOe Division Militaire 
to General Clarke, 16 August 1809; UCN, No. 3086, Decision, April 5, 1809; 3:13. 
168AN, AFIVl 157, General Clarke, Rapport a l'Empereur, 4 October 1811; General 
Lechi to Napoleon ND, Chasseur Joseph Cortone to Napoleon 12 August 1811; Etat de 
signalement de Joseph Cortone Chasseur de la 1 ere compagnie du 4e Bataillon du l 5e 
Leger, deserted 1 O September 1808. 
169unlike separate corps or armies used in the Grande Armee in 1812 [Premier 
Eugene's IV Corps (Italian)], or the separate Allied Corps and Armies in the second 
World War. 
170The Westphalian division had in July 1809, 3,910 troops in Catalonia. SHAT 
C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. It also had 1,255 troops in its Depot; C(8)30, 
2e Division Westphalien, Depots Westphalien, Etat des Officiers, anciens soldats et 
conscrits, 14 August 1809. The whole totaled 5,165 men requiring about 5,500 muskets. 
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course promptly demanded payment. 171 King Jerome Bonaporte at one point refused to 
reimburse the French Ministry for remounts supplied to his troops serving France. 172 
Occasionally, however, Marshal Macdonald requested through the Minister of War, 
Imperial permission to pay one of his Catalan contingents, the Compagnie Municipale de 
Barcelone, on the same footing as French soldiers; not through local contribution, but 
through the French Treasury (and local contribution). 173 
These, and thousands of other allied transactions imposed a strain on the French 
administration system, foremost in the Ministries, but in the field armies too. The only 
real saving grace was the growing sense of regulatory and administrative uniformity of 
the French and allied armies, on the French model. 
Various tactical organizations and procedures caused tactical problems, in the 
army. For example, the Saxon Army had a unique tactical organization. In the Saxon 
company and battalion battle line formation files are arranged differently and officers 
command from different positions. Consequently, tactical evolutions were executed 
differently which could, in the heat of a battle, cause some confusion. 174 
171UCN, No. 3397, Decision, August 5, 1809. 
172The Westphalian Division had in July 1809, 78 horses. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, 
VII Corps, 1 July 1809; UCN, No. 3399, Decision, August 5, 1809. 
173AN, AFIVl 160, Bureau de la Solde, General Clarke, Rapport a l'Empereur, 6 
February 1811. 
174George Nafziger, Mariusz Mesolowski and Tom Devoe, Poles and Saxons of the 
Napoleonic War, (Chicago: The Emperor's Press, 1991)168-172; George Jeffrey, Tactics 
and Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic War, Ned Zuparico, ed. (Brockton, MA: The Courier 
Publishing Co., 1982)35-38, 51-53; Philip Haythomthwaite, Napoleon's Line Infantiy, 
Men-At-Arms Series (London: Osprey Publishing, 1983)3-5. 
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Finally, the one aspect of the multi-national Army of Catalonia which caused 
severe problems was the varying loyalties of the contingents The Catalan war waged by 
the locals with such hatred against the French spared the Germans, and Italians somewhat, 
and drove a psychological wedge between the army's contingents. The varying political 
currents after 1813 brought the loyalty of the German contingents into serious question 
leading to the forced confinement of some battalions. This was as serious a problem as 
the soldier quality in the Neapolitan. contingent earlier in the war. 
The structure and composition of this polyglot army then, caused administrative 
and tactical problems to the French war effort which were manageable between 1807 and 
1811. The increasing strain of war and the changes in political fortunes of the Empire, 
however, lead to the elimination of most of the allied formations in Catalonia by 1813. 
CHAPTER ill 
IBE ARMY OF CATALONIA, STRUC11JRE AND OPERATIONS 
1807-1814 
§1. Force Structure: The Process. 
Force structure is the size, composition and equiping of military units. 1 The 
Emperor managed it through the Ministry of War, which did the ground work to form 
units. An example of this administrative process was the formation of the Division 
Artillery of the Observation Division of the Eastern Pyrenees 1807-1808. Napoleon began 
advance preparations to form this Division Artillery, arming and provisioning the French 
frontier fortresses. 2 
On 6 December 1807, he ordered the Minister of War to form the Division 
d'Observation des Pyrenees. The 6e Division of the Bureau de l'Artillerie had four 
companies3 destined to join the Observation Corps of the Gironde. The Bureau rerouted 
1The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Departments of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, JCS Publ. No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1987), 229. 
2
"Donnez l'ordre qu'au 20 Novembre les places frontieres de l'Espagne soient armees. 
Envoyez-y des approvisionnements pour servir a la gamison ... II CN, No. 13343, Napoleon 
to General Clarke, 11November1807, 16:149-150. 
3The Artillery available to the Ministry were three companies of the 3e Artillerie a 
pied and one of the 4e Artillerie a pied. SHAT, Xd 345, Arttllerie, Division 
d'Observation des Pyrenees, 1808, 6e Division, Bureau de l'Artillerie, Rapport fait au 
Ministere, 14 December 1807. 
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them to the Eastern Pyrenees. The Ministry assigned to the new division the 1st 
Company, 6th Train (bis) Battalion, 4 at Avignon, and recalled three companies of the 3rd 
Regiment destined for the Observation Division of the Western Pyrenees. 
By 15 December, the Eastern Pyrenees Observation Division had one artillery and 
two train companies. 5 The Ministry later sent the 11 ell er Artillerie Italien the company 
of the Train d'Artillerie Italien and the 6e/7e (bis) du Train which arrived in mid-
December.6 
When Napoleon's 23 December order arrived at the Ministry, the chief of the 
Artillery Bureau sent an extract to the Chief of the 6th Ministerial Division, General Jean-
Jacques, Comte de Gassendi (1748-1828). 7 He sent to the Eastern Pyrenees the lle/ler 
Artillerie Italien and a company of the 3e Artillerie a pied. 8 
4lbid, Bureau du personnel, le General de Division, Chef de la sixieme Division, 
Rapport, 16 December 1807. Note par le Bureau de Mouvement, 15 December 1807. 
"12 pieces of artillery shall be detached for this Division." Ernest Picard and Louis 
Tuetey, Unpublished Correspondence of Napoleon I, Tns. Louise Houghton, 3 Vols., 
(New York: Duffield and Company, 1913), No. 1478, Order, December 6, 1807, 1:719. 
5These artillery units were the lle/ler Artillerie ltalien (79 men), Italian Artillery 
Train (75 men and 120 horses) and the 6e/6e (bis) Train (61 men). SHAT, C(8)485, 
Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 December 1807. UCN, No. 1490, 
Order, 23 December 1807, 1:723. SHAT, Xd 345, Extrait d'un ordre de S.M. l'Empereur, 
23 December 1807. CN, No. 13411, Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 December 1807, 
16:211-212. 
6SHAT, C(8)485, Situation Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 
December 1807. 
7SHAT, Xd 345, Artillerie, 3e Division du Ministere de la Guerre, Extrait d'un Ordre 
de l'Empereur a General de Division Gassendi, 23 December 1807. 
8General Gassendi informed General Clarke that he would send a hundred inen of the 
2e Artillerie a cheval to Perpignan; Ibid. 
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The division at Perpignan required eighteen cannon, then unavailable at the 
Perpignan arsenals. The Minstry transfered ten 8 pdr cannon from Valence and twelve 
24 pdr howitzers from the Imperial Guard and equiped them with 117 vehicles and 2,000 
24 pdr shells. 
The train required 80 artillery vehicles and 320 horses, but the Italian Train 
Company had some of the vehicles and 120 horses. Consequently, the Emperor ordered 
the 6e/7e Bataillon du Train (bis) with 230 horses to support the division. General 
Gassendi however noted that the 6e/6e Bataillon du Train (bis) was already at Avignon 
and used it instead of the 6e/7e (bis) Batailon.9 The next day, the Minister reported to 
the Emperor the final composition of this "Divarty": the l le/ler Artillerie a pied Italien 
a company each of the 3e Artillerie a pied; 2e Artillerie a cheval and Italian Artillery 
Train; and the 6e/6e (bis) Bataillon du Train. 10 
As preparations continued, the Ministry purchased 200 mules11 and reshuffled units 
to bring the 6e/6e du Train on line. General Gassendi even obtained horses from the 
ler/6e (bis) Bataillon du Train marching from Avignon to Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port. 12 
9 Ibid, Rapport fait au Ministre 31 December 1807. 
1
°Ibid, 6e Division, Bureau l'Artillerie, Ministere de la Guerre, Rapport a l'Empereur 
January 1808. On January 4, 1808, General Gassendi wrote to General Gerard outlining 
the switch to the 6e/6e (bis) du Train (at Avignon) for the 6e/7e du Train, the purchase 
of 1,000 horses and the concentration of this unit at Perpignan on 25 January. Ibid, 6e 
Division, Bureau de l'Artillerie, Minute, General Gassendi to General Gerard, 4 January 
1808. 
11UCN, No. 1495, Decision, January 4, 1808, 3: I. 
12SHAT, Xd 345, Bureau de l'Artillerie. Minute, General Gassendi to General 
Gerard, 12 January 1808; Minute, General Gassendi to the Commandant du 6e Bataillon 
(bis) du Train d'Artillerie, 13 January 1808. 
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To facilitate these movements, Napoleon ordered artillery and vehicles reshuffled 
from the arsenal at Fere to Perpignan. 13 By the end of January, the Division 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales had at Perpignan 18 cannon, sufficient horses (by 
6 February), and vehicles. The 7e/2e Artillerie a cheval and the company of the 3e 
Artillerie a pied from Aix were also ready to join the division. 14 This staff action took 
six weeks to complete. Even with the movement errors, this typical action rivaled in 
efficiency similar actions of the 20th century. 
An excellent example of creating units in the Army of Catalonia is Gendarmerie. 
The Corps d'Armee had a gendarme detachment assigned to its headquarters, whose 
mission was to serve as guides, escorts, dispatch riders, escort prisoners of war, 
reconnaissance and maintain order amongst the troops as Force Publigue. 15 At the 
beginning of the Peninsular War, the Ministry of War had not assigned any gendarmerie 
to the Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Oriental es, 16 only a detachment of 32 gendarmes 
13CN, No. 13440, Napoleon to General Clarke, 9 January 1808, 16:234-235. 
14SHAT, Xd 345, Bureau de l'Artillerie, Rapport a l'Empereur, 29 January 1808. 
15Gendarmerie units serving as Military Police were called force Publique. Thiebault, 
Manuel General, 461; Bernard Charron, Ph.D. Dissertation, "La Participation de la 
Gendarmerie Imperiale dans la Guerre d'Espagne". University of Bordeaux, 1972, 45. 
16SHAT, C(8) 485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 December 
1807; Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 1808. 
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of the Corps d'Elite17 to General Reille's division under the command of one Captain 
b. 18 Cassa 1anca. 
The new VII Corps had, by December, a gendarme detachment. 19 During this 
period, the Gendarmerie d'Elite in Catalonia served as a force publique, escorts, guides 
or ordonnances (headquarters orderlies) to General Reille. 20 Additionally, they helped to 
guard the line of communications with France by escorting the Paymaster's treasure 
wagons and prisoners of war and by providing reconnaissance, escorting requisitions and 
courriers. 21 
The organization and mission of the gendarmerie in Spain remained unchanged 
through 180922 until the Ministry of War reorganized it as an independent force in the 
hands of the corps commanders. By an Imperial Decision of 24 November 1809 and the 
Ministerial Decision of 23 January 1810, Napoleon created a new gendarmerie. 23 
17This detachment of Gendarmes was part of the Gendarmerie d'Elite to support the 
corps in the field. Organized in 1803, it had 600 men, commanded by an aide-de-camp 
of the Emperor. In 1804 it was renamed the Legion d'Elite and organized as a "demi-
bataillon" of two companies. With 632 men. The Legion was manned with the best 
gendarmes of the Gendarmerie de l'Interieur, which served in Metropolitan France. It was 
later assigned to the Old Guard, Martin La Gendarmerie Francaise, 18-19. 
18SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Division Reille, Nd. 
19SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808. 
2
°Lechartier, Services de l'Arriere, 54-55; Thiebault, Manuel General, 33. 
21Thiebault, Manuel General, 460-461; Charron "La Participation de la Gendarmerie 
Imperiale a la Guerre d'Espagne," 28-29. 
22SHAT, C(8)362, VII Corps, Situation, 6 January 1809; Situation, VII Corps, 15 July 
1809; Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809. 
23SHAT, Xd (f)l 74, Decree, 24 November 1809. 
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It was a twenty squadron command, organized under the Inspecteur General de 
Gendarmerie, Marshal Bon-Adrien-Jeannot Moncey, Due de Conigliano (1754-1842) and 
commanded by General de Brigade Louis-Leopold, Baron Buquet (1768-1835).24 The 
gendarmerie squadrons were organized with 7 officers and 200 troops, divided into an 80 
man cavalry "troop" and 120 man infantry "company." The whole organization had 4,140 
men and 1, 7 40 horses. 25 
In organizing the gendarmerie in Spain, the Ministry of War drew troops from the 
Gendarmerie de l'Interieur and the Regimental depots. The nature of their mission 
necessitated the use of experienced soldiers capable of independent action. Their mission 
is reflected in their smallest unit, the "brigade" of eight to twelve men26 capable of 
independent squad missions. 
The Ministry ordered various combat regiments to supply men and horses to the 
new squadrons. Sufficient quality manpower, however, was a problem which the 
24Martin, La Gendarmerie Fran~aise, 441-442,445-446. 
25See Table 6. Martin, La Gendarmerie Fran~aise, 19; Charron, "La Gendarmerie 
Imperiale", 47. 
26The brigade a cheval had eight troops and the brigade a pied twelve men. The 
squadron had each ten brigades a cheval and a pied. Each brigade a cheval had four 
gendarmes a cheval and four cavalry troops, while the brigades a pied had six men each 
of gendarmes a pied and infantry soldiers. The twenty squadrons had 200 brigades a 
cheval with 800 gendarmes and 800 cavalry and the brigades a pied 1,200 gendarmes and 
1,200 soldiers. Charron, "La Gendarmerie Imperiale", 322-323. 
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Ministry did not immediately solve. Indeed, as the first sixteen squadrons reached a 
strength of 150 men, Marshal Berthier sent them, incomplete to Spain. 27 
This command, however, did not include Catalonia and on 6 June 1810 the 
Emperor ordered a legion of gendarmes organized at Narbonne under Colonel Jean-
Hegesippe le Marchant (1758-1819). Later that month, Marshal Moncey, established its 
organization with 20 horse and 100 foot brigades or four companies, and each company 
with five platoons or lieutenances. The whole totaled 751 men. Marshal Moncey and the 
Ministry of War structured the legion differently from other gendarme units. 28 It had 
reconfigured brigades of six man squads with two veteran gendarmes (one NCO) and four 
line soldiers.29 The 37 man platoon (lieutenance) with foot and horse could function 
independently on small scale operations or garrison small outposts. 30 
The Ministry tailored the gendarmerie effectively to the needs of the VII Corps. 
It worked so well the Ministry adapted the legion formation to the rest of Spain. 31 In July 
27Ibid, 21, 22, 453. In units then and now, when a higher headquarters orders them 
to provide men (and horses) to other units they will normally provide their worst troops. 
For example, when General Duverger inspected 800 horses provided for these gendarme 
squadrons he found 600 of them poor and passed them to the train d'equipage and 
obtained others. Martin, La Gendarmerie Franyaise, 20. 
28SHAT, X(t)l 71, Ministere de la Guerre, Zeme Division Bureau de la Gendarmerie 
Imperiale, Chef de Bureau Prive, Rapport fait au Ministre, 21 June 1810. 
29Martin, La Gendarmerie Francaise, 19; Charron, "Gendarmerie Imperiale", 322. 
3
°Charron, "Gendarmerie Imperiale", 55. 
31Martin, La Gendarmerie Franyaise, 25. 
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181 O, the Ministry of War adapted its own version of the Legion, 32 and 
absorbed some of the gendarmes posted to Catalonia. 33 Additionally, Napoleon 
established a Conseil Superieur d'Administration to organize the Legion de Catalogne at 
its Narbonne depot. 34 Its formation required a coordinated effort of the Inspection 
Generale de Gendarmerie and the Ministry of War. The Administration de la Guerre was 
also required to fund the masses and (depot) logistical support. 
Once the Emperor ordered the Legion formed Marshal Moncey recommended to 
General Clarke the personnel to man its organizational staff and the five man Conseil 
Superieur d'Administration, .under Colonel Lassaux. The Minister habitually rubber 
stamped these requests, for Marshal Moncey was certainly better acquainted with the 
qualities of Gendarmerie officers. 35 On 2 January, Napoleon again altered the Legion's 
structure to six companies and 1,400 men, including 160 mounted gendarmes armed with 
32See Table 7. The VII Corps had 75 gendarmes (30 horse and 45 foot) assigned. 
It would retain 28 for the new legion and disperse the rest between the other corps in 
Spain and the gendarme units in France. SHAT X(f)l 71, Chef de Bureau Prive Rapport 
au Ministre, 21 June 1810. 
33See Table 10. Ibid; SHAT X(f)l71, Napoleon, Extrait des Minutes de la Secretaire 
d'Etat, 6 July 1810. 
341t had a Masse or unit administrative fund of 74,085.60 F. SHAT X(f)l 71, 
Napoleon, Extrait des Minutes, 6 July 1810. 
35SHAT X(f)l 71, Inspection Generale de la Gendamierie Imperiale, Letter No. 22594, 
Marshal Moncey to General Clarke, 18 July 1810. SHAT X(f)l 71, Ministere de la 
Guerre, 2e Division Bureau de la Gendarmerie, Ordre de Division, 9 August 181 O; Minute 
de la Lettre Ecrite par le Ministre, to Marshal Moncey, 9 August 1810. 
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the lance. 36 It included two 279 man companies under a chef d'escadron (1st and 2nd) 
and four companies with 210 men under captains. 37 The Conseil organized the Legion 
according to the requirements of the Emperor's initial order and assembled 724 fully 
equiped troops at Narbonne. 38 Colonel Lassaux assembled 1,935 cavalry and 2,520 
infantry from various unit depots and horses from Toulouse, Montpellier and Beziers. 39 
Interestingly, of the 4,455 troops assembled at Narbonne, only a few were of acceptable 
quality. This was a continual problem throughout the war. By mid-April the Conseil 
obtained 1,173 troops with great difficulty. 40 The standard for admission into the 
Gendarmerie was very high and many failed to complete depot training. As early as 
November 1810 the Ministry of War drafted troops to the Legion. For example, General 
Clarke took eighteen soldiers from the 26e Chasseurs a cheval, and ordered the 
commander of the 5e Legion de Gendarmerie, Colonel Noireau, to gather and send them 
36The Conseil obtained a NCO lance instructor for these cavalry at the Narbonne 
depot, from the 7e Chevaux Leger. Martin, La Gendarmerie Fran£aise, 22. See Table 
8; SHAT X(f)l71, Ministere de la Guerre, Extrait des Minutes de la Secretaire d'Etat, 2 
January 1811; X(f)l 71, Ministere de la Guerre, Extrait de l'Ordre de l'Empereur, 6 March 
1811. 
37SHAT X(f)171, Extrait des Minutes, 2 January 1811. 
38The Conseil spent 48,000 F., or 400 F. per soldier in masse funds, SHAT X(f)171, 
Inspecteur General de la Gendarmerie Imperiale, Marshal Moncey to General Clarke, 11 
March 1811. 
39He got, for example, 160 men from the Depot at Angers and 220 from the depots 
at Grenoble and Besan~on, Ibid. 
40The Legion recruited 724 men including 176 gendarmes from Catalonia (75 men 
were Force Publique), Ibid. 
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to Narbonne. 41 He acted in coordination with General Bonnard, commander of the 22e 
Division Militaire. 42 Similarly, he drew troops from nineteen other regiments through mid-
1812.43 
In May 1811, the Ministry gathered 85 gendarmes from the company of the 
Department du Simplon to make up for the deficiency of troops. 44 Of course, it was a 
continual uphill fight to procure the best soldiers. The 3rd company, for example, 
obtained 137 soldiers from thirty regiments,45 and the 5th company even drafted 
recruits. 46 As the new recruits arrived at the depot they were clothed, equiped, trained, 
then sent to their field company. Once formed, the companies received their own Conseil 
d'Administration, which managed the unit.47 
41 The Minister also informed Marshal Moncey of this action. SHAT X(f) 170, 
Ministere de la Guerre, 2e Division, Bureau de la Gendarmerie, Minute de la Lettre, 
General Clarke to Colonel Noireau, 26 November 181 O; General Clarke to Marshal 
Moncey, 26 November 1810. 
42SHAT X(f)l 70, 2e Division Militaire, Departement de Mame et Loire, Major 
Cataut, 26e Chasseurs to General Clarke, 3 December 181 O; Etat Nomintal, 26e Chasseurs 
4 December 181 O; Colonel Noireau to General Clarke, 3 December 181 O; General 
Bonnard, Commander, 22e Division Militaire to General Clarke, 5 December 1810. 
General Bonnard also drew troops from the 121 e and l 22e Ligne, General Bonnard to 
General Clarke, 4 January 1811; General Bonnard to General Clarke, 27 January 1811. 
43SHAT X(f)l70, General Clarke to Marshal Moncey, 12 March 1812. 
44AN, AFIVl 157, General Clarke to Marshal Moncey, 12 March 1812. 
45See Table 9, SHAT X(f)l 71, Proces Verbal d'Organisation de la 3e Compagnie de 
Gendarmerie de la Legion de Catalogne, 1 April 1811. 
46SHAT X(f)l 71, Proces Verbal de !'Organisation de la Se Compagnie de Gendarmerie 
de la Legion de Catalogne, 1 April 1811. 
471bid. An excellent unit formation example is the Force Publique, Army of Spain, 
m 1813. The administrative unit registers or orderly books were kept to manage the 
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By the end of 1811, the Legion was complete. The Conseil Superieur established 
a clothing and equipment supply depot at Perpignan.48 In October a Sous-Inspecteur aux 
revues from the lOe Division Militaire audited its accounts,49 and formally disbanded it. 50 
Finally on 12 December 1811, the Emperor decreed the reorganization of all of the 
gendarmerie in Spain into legions and redesignated the Legion de Catalogne the 6e 
Legion de Gendarmerie lmperiale. 51 This brought the unit formation process to 
completion. It was a complex and time consuming procedure which occupied a large 
portion of the French administration. 
The command in Catalonia could also structure its own forces. For example, 
General Gouvion Saint-Cyr organized two Catalan gendarme companies, designated the 
Compagnies de Miquelets. He paid and administered them like French troops.52 
various unit administrative functions. They included the Registres de Deliberations, 
Caisse, Journal du Quartier-Maitre, Materials en double (situations) Mutations et 
Mouvements (personnel movements) habillement, armement, Actes Civiles and Controle 
Annuel (pay). SHAT X(f)l 71, Proces Verbal, Force Publique, 23 September 1813. 
48SHAT X(f)170, Marshal Moncey to General Clarke, 30 August 1811. 
49SHAT X(f)l 71, Commission Speciale Chargee de la Verification de la Comptabilite 
des 20 Escadrons de la Gendarmerie d'Espagne to Marshal Moncey, 29 October 1812; 
Commission Speciale to Marshal Moncey, 25 October 1812. 
50See Table 8. SHAT X(f)l 70, Minute de la Lettre, General Clarke to Marshal 
Moncey, 7 October 1811; Minute de la Lettre, General Clarke to Directeur General des 
Revues, 7 October 1811; Chef de Bureau Prive, Rapport fait au Ministre, 29 September 
1811; General Clarke to Marshal Moncey, 3 March 1812. 
51Martin, La Gendarmerie Frans;aise, 24-25. 
52 AN, AFrvll 19, Ministere de la Guerre, Bureau de l'lnspection, General Clarke, 
Rapport a l'Empereur, 18 March 1812. 
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Indeed, Marshal Macdonald and General Decaen undertook the difficult task of 
organizing Catalan gendarmes or Miquelets into a Legion of two battalions and two 
squadrons, totaling 2,246 men. Marshal Macdonald organized this unit, coordinating with 
the Ministry of War in the same way as with the 6e Legion. He organized and paid it 
on the French scale, and placed it in a counterinsurgent and rear area security role. 53 
Finally, the Commander of the Army of Catalonia could alter the structure of his 
units temporarily, to meet specific operational requirements. For example, Marshal 
Macdonald organized a brigade under General Jean-Ernest, Baron de Beuremann (1775-
1850) at Hostalrich to escort supplies to Barcelona. The procedure used was quite simple. 
Macdonald issued orders to various commands to send units to Hostalrich to form the 
brigade. In this case, Macdonald got two battalions each of the I le and 67e Ligne, an 
artillery company and twenty-five chasseurs. 54 
The force structure process was a complex, administrative operation which, as we 
have seen with the gendarmerie, could take years of labor. In Catalonia, it was quick and 
efficient enough to form temporary units such as brigades or permanent units like the 
Catalan Legion which took over a year to form and was never brought up to full strength. 
53See Table 10. SHAT X(f)170, Letter, Marshal Macdonald to General Clarke 19 
September 1811; Chef de Bureau Prive, Bureau de la Gendarmerie, Rapport fait au 
Ministre de la Guerre, 14 October 1811; Minute, General Clarke to General Decaen 15 
November 1811. General Duhesme formed a compagnie Municipale in Barcelona in 1808 
with an unusual structure. It was commanded by a Colonel and had a battalion like staff 
structure in a company sized unit. See Tables 9-12. 
54SHAT C(8)129, Letter, Marshal Macdonald to General Clement, 31June1810. 
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2. Concentration and Build Up: The Campaign of 1807-1808. 
Napoleon began preparing for the war in Spain in March 1807.55 He ordered the 
Minister of War to transfer French units ostensibly to Poland and Germany, and brought 
six infantry regiments in the Army of Italy to full war readiness. 56 He also ordered 
Brigadier General Bertrand Baron Bessieres (1773-1854)57 to organize a provisional 
cavalry regiment from the depots of the Army of Italy. 58 The Minister of War accelerated 
troop concentrations for a war with Spain in the summer of 1807 and organized an Italian 
division in Turin to serve in Catalonia. 59 He also assembled the Gironde Observation 
55Napoleon thoroughly planned and prepared for war as early as possible: "I am 
accustomed to thinking out what I shall do three or four months in advance ... " David 
Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966) 
145-146. 
56These six regiments included the 2e Ligne destined for service in Catalonia. The 
3rd and 4th battalions of each regiment were to augment the 1st and 2nd battalions to full 
war footing. Later, the Ministry assigned the 3rd-2nd Italian Line to the Division. UCN, 
No. 939, Napoleon to General Dejean, March 15, 1807, 1 :485-486. 
57Bertrand, Baron Bessieres (1773-1854) was Marshal Bessieres' brother. He served 
in Catalonia 1808-10 as Cavalry Brigade Commander in Lechi's Division (1807). He 
commanded the cavalry for General Duhesme at the combat at El Rey, 30 June 1808, and 
for General Saint-Cyr in General Souham's Division. Six, Dictionnaire des Generaux et 
Amiraux, 1 :95-96. 
58The elements in this cavalry regiment included the 3e Chasseurs and 24e Chasseurs 
Italiens Royaux making the 1st company; the 15e, 19e and 23e Chasseurs for the 2d 
company, the 4e and 6e Cuirassiers making the 3d company and the 7e and 8e Cuirassiers 
for the 4th company. 
59The Dragons Napoleon, for example, reached Potsdam on 9 July to join the Italian 
Division. Ibid, No. 1203, Divisions, June 24, 1807, 1:593. 
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Corps, later called the Army of Portugal,60 for the invasion of Portugal.61 In October, 
General Clarke expanded this Corps into the Army of the Gironde, and formed a second 
Gironde Observation Corps, a Cavalry Reserve,62 and the "Ocean" Observation Corps in 
the W estem Pyrenees. 63 
General Clarke continued to secretly arm the Eastern Pyrenees fortresses and 
concentrate the Italian Division64 at Avignon. It had a brigade of four Italian battalions, 
60Ibid, No. 1240, Decision, August 9, 1807, 1:616; No. 1264, Napoleon to Marshal 
Berthier, August 26, 1807, 1:627. These troops included the Spanish regiment and 
Lusitanian Dragoons provided by Spain for the Polish Campaign but were never used in 
Catalonia. No. 1282, Decision, September 7, 1807, 1:636. The Emperor established a 
series of flying camps at Bayonne, Saint-Lo, Pontivy and Camp Napoleon, readying units 
of war. No. 1289, Decisions, September 9, 1807, 1:638; No. 1329, Decision, October 
6, 1807, 1:660; No. 1340, Decision, October 10, 1807, 1:664; No. 1343, Napoleon to 
General Clarke, October 12, 1807, 1 :665-666. 
61 CN, No. 13234, Napoleon to Ministere des Relations Exterieures, 12 October 1807, 
16:79; No. 13237, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 October 1807, 16:80. 
62Ibid, No. 13257, Napoleon to General Clarke, 16 October 1807, 16:90-91; No. 
13258, Napoleon to Clarke, 16 October 1807, 16:90-91; No. 13259, Napoleon to Clarke, 
16 October 1807, 16:92-93; No. 13323, Napoleon to Clarke, 3 November 1807, 16: 136-
137; UCN, No. 1347, Napoleon to Clarke, October 15, 1807, 1:669; No. 1347, Napoleon 
to Clarke, October 15, 1807, 1:669; No. 1348, Napoleon to Clarke, October 16, 1807, 
1:669-670; No. 1362, Napoleon to Clarke, October 18, 1807, 1:675; No. 1370, Napoleon 
to Clarke, October 20, 1807, 1:678; No. 1376, Napoleon to Clarke, October 22, 1807, 
1:680; No. 1378, Napoleon to Clarke, October 22, 1807, 1:680-681; No. 1388, Decision, 
nd, 1:683. No. 1389, Napoleon to Clarke, October 25, 1807, 1:683-694; No. 1390, 
Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, October 25, 1807, 1:684; No. 1402, Napoleon to Clarke, 
October 30, 1807, 1:690; No. 1406, Decision, October 31, 1807, 1:692; No. 1421, 
Decisions, November 3, 1807, 1:699; No. 1426, Napoleon to General Dejean, November 
4, 1807, 1:701; No. 1439, Napoleon to Clarke, November 6, 1807, 1:702. 
63CN, No. 13326, Napoleon to General Clarke, 5 November 1807, 16: 138-139; No. 
13343, Napoleon to General Clarke, 11November1807, 16:149-159. 
64Napoleon wrote to General Clarke to " ... accelerez le depart des regiments 
Napolitains ... en route pour Avignon. Donnez des instructions secretes, et ni.arche les 
corps de maniere que les premieres operations ostensibles ne se fassent pas voir dans ces 
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a Neapolitan regiment, an Italian cavalry regiment, and General Bessieres' cavalry brigade, 
which included provisional chasseur and cuirassier regiments from Turin.65 The whole, 
thus far, numbered some 6,000 men. 66 Napoleon awarded its command to the talented 
and ruthlessly amoral General de Division Joseph Lechi,67 who recently commanded a 
division in the Army of Naples.68 
Amidst a flurry of Imperial orders, General Clarke hurried units, horses, supplies 
and equipment to Avignon69 and, in December, assembled the artillery. 7° Finally 
pays avant le 25 Novembre. Ibid, No. 13343, Napoleon to General Clarke, 1 November 
1807, 16:149-150. 
65Ibid, No. 13346, Napoleon to Eugene Napoleon, Vice-Roy of Italy, 11 November 
1807, 16:154. UCN, No. 1463, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, November 24, 1807, 
1:714. 
66UCN, No. 1464, Napoleon to General Clarke, November 24, 1807, 1:715. 
67The Italian General Joseph Lechi (1767-1836) commanded the Division 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales in 1807 which became the 2nd Division (Italian) 
in the Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales under General Duhesme, This 
division was later redesignated the 3rd Division. As Commandant d'armes in Barcelona 
General Lechi earned the reputation for utter rapacity in funding his troops off the 
population. Implicated in the murder of a citizen of Barcelona, Marshal Augereau 
relieved him in 1810. Napoleon refused to court-martial him. Six, Dictionnaire, 1: 81-82. 
68Edward Gachot, La Troisieme Campagne d'Italie. (1805-1806), 2d Ed., (Paris: 
Librairie Pion 1911) 345. 
69Clarke sent an infantry and Neapolitan chasseur regiment from Grenoble and 
Chembery and 200 horses. The Minister for War Administration, General Dejean, 
purchased horses near Avignon. UCN, No. 1465, Napoleon to General Clarke, November 
24, 1807, 1:715. 
70SHAT, Xd 345. 6e Division Bureau de l'Artillerie, Ministere de la Guerre. Division 
d'Observation des Pyrenees, Rapport fait au Ministre, 14 December 1807. 
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organized, the division had two infantry, one cavalry brigade, and a division artillery71 
as the Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales. General Clarke concentrated at 
Perpignan the base for the invasion of Catalonia. 72 
This method of creating and assembling large forces for a lightning offensive was 
a hallmark of Napoleonic military administration which few have mastered.73 Two of the 
instruments which made this possible were the "provisional" and "marching" units. 
The provisional regiment was an amalgamated unit created out of disparate parts. 
For example, the Provisional Cuirassier Regiment was a squadron of four companies, each 
drawn whole from the fifth squadrons of four cuirassier regiments. 74 Marching battalions 
71The Division had two brigades of four battalions each, a cavalry brigade of two 
regiments and artillery of three companies. CN, No. 13411, Napoleon to General Clarke, 
23 December 1807, 16:211-212. UCN, No. 1490, Order, December 23, 1807, 1:723. 
SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees-Orientales, 15 December 1807. 
72CN, No. 13413, Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 December 1807, 16:212-214. 
73The greatest example of Napoleon's method of creating forces is the build-up prior 
to the 1813 campaign. Having lost over 500,000 men in Russia, he accomplished a 
administrative miracle by assembling another 656,000 army based on the remnant of 
Grande Armee of Russia (50,000). He then called 137,000 conscripts already at their 
depots and another 80,000 National Guards to form 88 battalions (22 regiments). 
Napoleon then brought in another 450,000 conscripts using every imaginable 
administrative trick to scrape manpower up. By mid-1813 the Emperor met his goal, 
certainly one of the finest military feats of the century. Chandler, The Campaigns of 
Napoleon, 866-867; F.M. Kircheisen, Napoleon, trans., H. St. Lawrence, (Reprint, 
Freeport, Books for Librieries 1972), 602-604; Scott Bowden, Napoleon's Grande Armee 
of 1813, Armies of the Napoleonic Wars Series, (Chicago, The Emperor's Press, 1990), 
22-32, 35-52; F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany 1813, (London: 
John Lane, the Bodley Head, 1912), 10-17; Albert A. Nofi, Napoleon AT War, Selected 
Writings of F. Loraine Petrie, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1984), 99-107. 
74UCN, No. 1463, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, November 24, 1807, J:715; No. 
1464, Napoleon to General Clarke, November 24, 1807, 1:715. 
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or squadrons, on the other hand, were temporary units formed simply to move troops. 
When several disparate companies or battalions were assembled, the Emperor ordered 
them lumped into a marching battalion or regiment placed under an officer and marched 
to the theater of operations where it disolved, and the parts linked up with their parent 
units. One of the three marching battalions of Catalonia, for example, was the 1 er 
Bataillon de Marche composed of three companies each of the 7e Ligne and the 93e 
Ligne.75 
As the Minister of War concentrated the division at Perpignan in January 1808,76 
the Emperor ordered M. de Champagny, Minister of Foreign Relations, to inform the 
court at Madrid of the presence of General Lechi's division at Perpignan and of its 
instructions to march on Cadiz (stopping off at Barcelona) to participate in the invasion 
of Portugal. 77 Napoleon also ordered General Duhesme, the new commander, to march 
on 9 February 1808, and gather intelligence on Spanish forces and fortresses on his way 
75Ibid, No. 2083 Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, July 8, 1808, 2:317. Napoleon's letter 
to General Clarke of 22 February clearly illustrates the purpose of the marching units: 
Issue orders that on the arrival of the marching regiment that was formed 
at Turin and is going to Catalonia, it shall be dissolved and each 
detachment join its corps. Order also that the marching squadrons which 
are going from Piedmont to Catalonia be dissolved on their arrival. 
No. 4044, Napoleon to General Clarke, February 22, 1810, 2:467. CN, No. 14168, 
Napoleon to General Reille, 8 July 1808. 
76UCN, No. 1495, Decision, January 4, 1808, 2: 1. 
77CN, No. 13495, Napoleon to M. de Champagny, Ministre des Relations Exterieures, 
January 1808, 16:281. 
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to Cadiz. 78 On the 9th, Duhesme marched into Catalonia though the division still lacked 
an adequate staff and artillery. 79 On the 20th, Napoleon appointed Marshal Murat 
Lieutenant General, commanding all the troops in Spain. 80 
Meanwhile, Napoleon ordered a 5,000 man reinforcement in six battalions to 
Perpignan to build the new Corps81 which included deserters, conscripts82 and "refractory 
conscripts" from depots. 83 In mid-March, he sent another division from Italy under 
78In his instructions, the Emperor cautioned General Duhesme to maintain a 
"Draconian" discipline, particularly over his Italian troops: "Il fera fusiller le premier 
Italien qui manquera a la discipline et la fera observer rigoureusement... ", and to report 
back to France daily on his progress: "II ecrira tous les jours, des qu'il aura mis le pied 
en Espagne, pour faire connaltre la disposition des esprits, la situation des places fortes 
et ce qu'il y a devant Jui depuis Barcelone jusqua l'Ebre." Ibid, No. 13496, Napoleon to 
General Clarke, 28 January 1808, 16:281-282. 
79The Division staff had no Commissaire des Guerres, Inspecteur aux revues, division 
artillery commander or a chief of staff, as of December 1807. SHAT, C(8)485, Division 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales 15 December 1807, UCN, No. 1606, Napoleon to 
General Clarke, February 13, 1808, 2:55. 
80
"It is my intention that Generals Moncey, Dupont, Duhesme and Merle be under the 
orders of the Grand Duke of Berg." UCN, No. 1633, Napoleon to General Clarke, 
February 20, 1808, 2:76-77. CN, No. 13588, Napoleon to Marshal Murat, Grand Duke 
of Berg, 20 February 1808, 16:351-352. 
81They included the 1st and 2nd Line and the 3rd-37th Line, (2,800 men) three 
battalions of the 2nd, 56th, and 93rd Line (2,500 men). UCN, No. 1634, Napoleon to 
General Clarke, February 20, 1808, 2:77. 
82This reinforcement included the 2-2 Chasseurs Napolitains. Ibid, No. 1700, 
Decision, March 12, 1808, 2:11. "General Duhesme ... proposes to authorize Generals to 
receive ... deserters or conscripts," No. 1728, Decision, March 19, 1808, 2: 127. 
83These included, for example, 120 men at the depot of Perpignan who went to the 
16th Line. UCN, No. 1744, Napoleon to General Clarke March 24, 1808, 2:138-139. 
Conscrits Refractaires were recaptured deserter conscripts. 
75 
General Joseph Chabran (1763-1843) and a staff organization to form the new Corps 
d'Observation des Pyrenees-Orientales,84 nearly completed by May. 85 
84UCN, No. 1729, Napoleon to General Clarke, March 19, 1808, 2: 128. CN, No. 
13721, Napoleon to Marshal Murat, 5 April 1808, 16:476-477. By 1 April, a detachment 
of Italian Velites attached to Division Lechi was due to reach Avignon on 16 April. 
UCN, No. 1776, Decision, April 1, 1808, 2: 151. 
85See Tables 12 and 13; Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 1808-1814, 63. 
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§3. Expansion: The Campaign of 1808. 
General Philibert-Guillaume Duhesme (1766-1815), the new Commander of the 
Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales which numbered 13,253 troops in three 
divisions, opened the first campaign of the Catalan war by occupying Figueras with one 
brigade and Barcelona with the rest of his Corps. 86 The Spanish populace reacted to the 
revolt of 2 May and exploded in organized resistance throughout Spain while Spanish 
garrisons throughout the country deserted en masse. 87 In June, Duhesme began active 
operations against them, sending General Fran~ois Xavier Schwartz, (1762-1826), with 
a brigade to Manresa to put down the revolt and then march on Aragon to support French 
efforts there. 88 When General Schwartz's 3,000 troops approached Manresa, swarms of 
Sometenes beat them back to Barcelona. 89 
Meanwhile, General Joseph Chabran, (1763-1843), opened two other equally 
unsuccessful expeditions,90 while in Upper Catalonia the insurgents cut French 
86See Table 14; Robert Southey, History of the Peninsular War, (London: John 
Murray, 1823) 1:160. 
870man, Peninsular War, 1 :307-308. 
88See Table 17. CN, No. 14028 Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 17:241-242; No. 
14029, Napoleon to Marshal Murat, 17:242-243; SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, Corps 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales 28 May 1808; Oman, Peninsular War, 1 :308-309. 
89 AN, AF1v 1621 plaq 1, General Duhesme, Resume des Operations Militaires, Corps 
d'Armee des Pyrenees Orientales; Juan Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, (Madrid: 
Libreria Editorial San Martin, 1972) 2:100-101; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:308; Southey, 
Peninsular War, 1:357. 
90G. Laffaille, Memoires sur la Campagne du Corps d'Armee des Pyrenees Orientales 
Commande par le General Duhesme en 1808, (Paris, Anselin et Pochard, 1826) 37-38; 
Adolfo Blanch, Historie de la Guerra de la Independencia en el Antiguo Principado 
(Barcelona: Editorial Frontis, 1968) 61-62. Oman, Peninsular War, 1:313. 
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communications and blockaded Figueras, even raiding into France as far as Rousillon. 
The commander of the 10th Military Division called out several thousand National Guards 
and commandeered reinforcements earmarked for Duhesme to guard the frontier. 91 
General Duhesme finally marched into Upper Catalonia with a division to reopen his 
communications. He even dispersed a mass of insurgents at Mongat six miles from 
Barcelona and sacked the town. 92 He cut his way to Gerona and made two haphazard and 
unsuccessful attempts to capture this well defended fortress,93 before retiring to Barcelona 
to clear the insurgents from environs of the city.94 By July, he found that, as the 
insurrrection spread, his corps was too small to cope with the operational demands placed 
upon it. 
Napoleon's hastily assembled reinforcements were formed into a division, under 
General Honore Charles, Comte Reille (1775-1860), and marched into Catalonia in July 
to besiege Rosas, but intense insurgent activity forced him to abandon the operation. 
91 The commander called out six formations for frontier defense including those from 
the Basses-Pyrenees under Adjutant Commandant Lomer (later General Woullemont), the 
Hautes Pyrenees under General Viala, Senator Lamartelliere's National Guard battalion, 
formations from Arriege under General Miguel, Pyrenees Orientales under General Ritay 
and one from Turin. SHAT, C(8)355, Supplement a l'Etat d'Emplacement de l'Armee 
d'Espagne, Defense de Ia Fron ti ere, 15-30 June 1808; C(8) I 0, General Martin, Arrete 
Concemant l'Organisation d'un Bataillon de Gardes Nationales destines a la Defense de 
la Frontiere, I July 1808. AN, AFrv 1605PL2 (III), Supplement a l'Etat d' Emplacement 
de l'Armee d' Espagne, Defense de la Frontiere, 1-16 July 1808. 
92Laffaille, Memoires, 41-43; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:314. 
930man, Peninsular War, 1:315-317. 
94Laffaille, Memoires, 38-41; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:318-319; Maximilien 
Sebastien, Comte Foy, Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule sous Napoleon, 2d ed., 
(Paris: Baudouin Freres, 1827) 4:156-159. AN, AFrv 1621 PLl, Duchesme, Resume des 
Operations Militaires. 
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General Duhesme meanwhile marched to Upper Catalonia with a division against equally 
intense opposition to besiege Gerona in late July. Duhesme and Reille opened the siege 
against fierce resistance, only to abandon it due to the Catalan blockade of Barcelona 
which forced Duhesme's return to Barcelona while Reille returned to Figueras95 . 
In September Duhesme swept the country round Barcelona, dispersing several 
insurgents camps,96 only to have them return to reocupy their old positions, and tighten 
the blockade. He now, however, faced a logistical crisis, for the garrison only had six 
weeks provender.97 By October the garrison was living from hand to mouth, and even 
made several raids on insurgent camps to capture meat to supplement their dwindling 
rations.98 In November Duhesme defeated a major Catalan attack on Barcelona,99 but, 
deeply worried about his ability to hold out, prepared the city for a serious defense. Soon 
95AN, AFIV 1607, General Duhesme, Journal des Operations Militaires de l'Armee des 
Pyrenees Oriental es depuis 15 Juillet jusqu' au 1 er Septembre 1808; Lopez, Guerra de la 
lndependenci!!, 2:308-309; Foy, Histoire, 4: 169; Napier, Peninsular War, 1 :82-83,; Oman, 
Peninsular War, 1:321-324; Donald Themas, Cochrane. Britannia's Last Sea King, (New 
York: Viking, 1978) 128-129; Laffaille, Memoires, 117-120. 
96AN, AFIV 1621PL1, Duhesme, Resume des Operations; Laffaille, Memoires, 126-
130; Oman, Peninsular War, 2:38; Lopez, Guerra de la lndependencia, 2:336; Napier, 
Peninsular War, 2:56. 
97SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 
1808; C(8)3 98, Administration de la Guerre, Etat du Nombre des Rations allouees chaque 
grade sur le pied de paix, en Rassemblemens, et sur le pied de Guerre, a dater du 1 er 
Aout 1810, 30 June 1810; Laffaille, Memoires, 132-133. 
98SHAT, C(l 9)7, Commissaire Ordonnateur Rey to General Lacuee, Ministre 
Directeur de l'Administration de la guerre, 4 January 1809; AN, AFIV 1621 Plaq 1, 
Duhesme, Resume d'Operations; Laffaille, Memoires, 138-140; Oman, Peninsular War, 
2:38-39. 
99Laffaille, Memoires, 169-171, 181-187, 191. 
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after, Lord Thomas Cochrane's British Navy squadron bombarded the city with Congreve 
rockets, while the insurgents abortively attacked. 100 By December provisions in Barcelona 
were dwindling, despite aggressive foraging and requisitions. Catalan attacks continued 
as General Duhesme desperately wrote to the new VII Corps Commander, General Saint-
Cyr then besieging Rosas, for immediate succour. 101 
Since mid-1808, Duhesme's corps proved too small to cope with the war. 
Barcelona alone absorbed a division for its defense. In Upper Catalonia, the insurgents 
occupied Gerona and Rosas and infested the Ampurdam. It required another division to 
maintain French communications. Indeed, the insurgents had cut communications with 
France, blockaded Figueras, and made several devastating raids into France as far as 
Roussillon. The Emperor responded by sending more reinforcements in June 1808, to 
include the reserve troops of the Pyrenees Departments, 102 under General Jean Marie, 
Baron Ritay ( 1761-1819). The Minister obtained fresh units to reinforce Duhesme's 
Corps. 103 By mid-June, General Lacombe Saint-Michael, Commander of the 1 Oe Division 
100AN, AFIV 1621 Plaq 1, Duhesme, Resume des Operations; Laffaille, Memoires, 
207-212. 
101Laffaille, Memoires, 207-212. 
102The Emperor ordered the Departments of Gers, Haute-Garonne, Aude, Haute and 
Basses Pyrenees, Pyrenees Orientales, Ariege, Landes, Tarn, Herault, l'Aveyron, Gard, 
Lot and Lot-et-Garonne to provide 10,000 conscripts (conscription of 1810) for the crisis 
developing in the Pyrenees. "These 10,000 men will be formed into 60 companies of 180 
men ... half... will be mustered in Perpignan, the other half in Bayonne." UCN No. 1948, 
Note, n.d., 2:238. 
103These units included a battalion from Grenoble, the 32e Leger, 16e Ligne the 
Valaisan Battalion, 3e-7e Ligne, 2e-93e Ligne, separate companies from the 37e, 56e and 
2e Ligne, detachments of the 4e, 7e, Se Cuirassiers, and 3e, 14e and 24e Chasseurs a 
cheval. CN, No. 14092, Ordres pour le Major-General, 14 June 1808, 17:304-305. 
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Militaire, assembled these troops ostensibly to defend the French frontier. Napoleon also 
diverted troops destined for Bayonne to Perpignan, 104 and by July formed two more 
composite battalions, ler and 2e Bataillons Provisoire de Perpignan. 105 The whole 
reinforcement made a 7,000 man division, which the Emperor assigned to General Reille. 
Napoleon ordered him to raise the blockade of Figueras, revictule it with 200,000 rations 
of biscuit, and assist in the reduction of Gerona. 106 
The commander of the 1 Oe Division Militaire and the Minister of War, meanwhile, 
worked to defend the French frontier. General Joseph Martin (1753-1815), commander 
and Prefect of the Department of Pyrenees Orientates, for example, organized a National 
Guard battalion of 560 men drawn from his communes. 107 
General Ritay's initial force included a battalion of the National Guard of the Department 
of Pyrenees Orientales and a company each of the Reserve des Pyrenees Orientales, 
Gendarmes and artillery with six cannon; SHAT, C(8)355, Supplement a l'Etat 
d'Emplacement de l'Armee d'Espagne, 15-30 June 1808; Foy, Histoire, 4: 163-164. 
104Napoleon diverted the 7th and 8th companies of the 3e-5e Legion de Reserve to 
Perpignan. UCN, No. 2029, Decision, June 21, 1808, 2:276. 
105CN, No. 14150, Napoleon to Berthier, 2 July 1808, 17:345-346; No. 14148, 
Napoleon to Berthier, 1 July 1808, 17:343-344. 
Ordre au general de division Reille ... de reunir les regiments de 
lanciers avec sa cavalerie, tous les bataillons de la reserve de gardes 
nationales de la Haute-Garonne, des Pyrenees-Orientates, et tacher de 
communiquer avec Figueras pour ravitailler cette place et y faire entrer un 
convoi de biscuit. ..... autoriser a lever un plus grand nombre de gardes 
nationales en se concertant avec le prefet. 
CN, No. 14141, Orders Dictated to Berthier, 29 June 1808, 17:338-339. 
106See Table 15. CN, No. 17151, Napoleon to General Reille, Aide de Camp of the 
Emperor, 2 July 1808, 17:345-34 7. 
107SHAT, C(8)10, General Martin, Arrete Concemant !'organisation d'un Bataillon de 
Gardes Nationales, destine a la defense de la frontiere, 1 July 1808. 
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In the first week of July, meanwhile, General Duhesme sent several letters to the 
Emperor, pleading for immediate assistance and reinforcement, lest Barcelona collapse 
causing irreparable harm to the French war effort and imperial prestige. 108 Napoleon 
stressed to General Reille the vital importance of breaking the Catalan blockade of 
Figueras, capturing Rosas and opening Duhesme's line of communications. 109 
Reille's division was a 'hodge podge' of 8,370 troops from dispirate battalions, 
such as the three bataillons de marche, 110 and miscellaneous depot sweepings. 111 During 
the first two weeks of July, 4,000 of these troops marched into Catalonia while other 
troops arrived at Perpignan. 112 These reinforcements, however, proved inadequate to 
108General Duhesme wrote to Napoleon in early July. Since French communications 
between Barcelona and France were cut, Duhesme sent correspondence by sea in boats 
which slipped out of Barcelona at night to elude the English patrols. These ships landed 
at Port Vendres or Collioure and the dispatches went from there to Paris. Oman, 
Peninsular War, 1:319. 
109CN, No. 14168, Napoleon to General Reille, 8 July 1808, 16:357-358. 
110These Battalions de Marche were the ler Bataillon de Marche de Catalogne 
(includes three companies each of the 7e and 93e de Ligne), 2e Bataillon de Marche de 
Catalogne (two companies, each 37e Ligne, 2e Ligne and 56e Ligen), and the 3e Bataillon 
de Marche de Catalogne (two companies, Swiss and 16e de Ligne). These batallions 
marched from depots to Catalonia and break off separate companies trained recruits to 
their parents units. See Table 18. UCN, No. 2083, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 
Bayonne, July 8, 1808, 2:317. 
111UCN, No. 2098, Napoleon to General Clarke, July 11, 1808, 2:328. 
112See Table 15. AN, AFrvl605, Plaq 2 (III), Supplement a l'Etat d'Emplacement de 
l'Armee d'Espagne, Defense de la Frontiere, 6-16 Juillet 1808; Foy, Histoire, 4:165-167. 
SHAT, C(8)355, Supplement a l'Etat d'Emplacement de l'Armee d'Espagne, Defense de 
la Frontiere, 15-30 Juin 1808; UCN, No. 2124, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, Bayonne, 
July 16, 1808,2:342-343; Oman,PeninsularWar, 1:319-321; CN,No.14172,Napoleon 
to Berthier, 9 July 1808, 17:360-362; AN, AFrvl 607, Letters, Alexandre Berthier to 
Napoleon, 30 June 1808; Berthier to Napoleon, 2 July 1808, Berthier to Napoleon, 17 
July 1808; SHAT, C(8)267, Registre de Correspondance du General Reille du 4 Juillet 
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reduce Rosas and Gerona, protect the French frontier, and pacify the province. Indeed, 
Reille and Duhesme only opened communications briefly during the second siege of 
Gerona, from 24 July to 17 August 1808. 113 
Clearly, larger reinforcements were needed to complete the task. In August the 
Emperor ordered to Catalonia, an Italian division from Prince Eugene's Army in Northern 
Italy, and a veteran French division, in all, some 17,000 troops. 114 In September, he 
unveiled his intention to form a new Corps, the (V and later) VII Corps d'Armee 
d'Espagne under the command of Colonel General Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr (1764-
1830), who marched into Catalonia in November with three new divisions. These were 
an Italian division under General Dominique Comte Pino, (10,938 men); a crack French 
division, under General Joseph, Comte Souham (1760-1837), (9,238 men); and a second 
French division under General Louis-Fran~ois-Jean, Baron Chabot (1757-1837), (1,908 
men). 115 This new VII Corps numbered about 32,000 troops. 116 
1808 au 13 Mai 1809, General Rei Ile to Berthier 4 July 1808, General Rei Ile to 
Napoleon 6 July 1808, General Reille to Berthier, 6 July 1808, General Reille to Berthier, 
9 July 1808. 
1130man, Peninsular War, 1:322-325; AN, AFrvl621, Plaq 1, Duhesme, Resume des 
Operations Militaires; William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and the South 
of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, (London: Thomas and William Boone, 
1862)1:82-83; Foy, Histoire, 4:169; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:321-324. 
114CN, No. 14249, Napoleon to Eugene Napoleon, Vice-Roi d'Italie, 10 August 1808, 
17:435; UCN, No. 2175, Napoleon to General Clarke, August 16, 1808, 2:373; No. 2181, 
Napoleon to General Clarke, August 18, 1808, 2:375-376; No. 2185, Decision, n.d. 
(August 18, 1808), 2:377; No. 2190, Decision, Saint-Cloud, August 18, 1808, 2:380. 
115UCN, No. 2291, Napoleon to Berthier, September 14, 1808, 2:454; CN, No. 14342, 
Napoleon to Berthier, 22 September 1808, 17:523; SHAT, C(8)465, Situation VII Corps, 
5 December 1808. 
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These reinforcements were badly needed for Reille's untrained Gardes Nationales, 
Tuscan and Swiss bataillons de marche troops were inadequate to stabilize Eastern Spain 
and by September its ranks were thinned by combat and disease (such as dysentery). 
Indeed, Reille was in as nearly bad a position as Duhesme blockaded in Barcelona. m 
General Gouvion Saint-Cyr marched to Catalonia in November,118 while General 
Vivres, commander of the Catalan army, meanwhile tightened his blockade of 
Barcelona119 attacking the city several times until December 1808. 120 By then, Vivres had 
tightened the blockade to the point that General Duhesme was in desperate straights, bent 
under supply difficulties and handling both the exterior defense of the city and its interior 
security against insurgency. 121 The Royal Navy's Mediterranean squadron under Admiral 
Thomas Cochrane even participated in the blockade by severely bombarding Barcelona 
116CN, No. 14256, Note for the Ministers of War and Military Administration, 17 
August 1808, 17:443-444. 
moman, Peninsular War, 2:38-40. The poor quality of the initial drafts of the Corps 
d'Observation and Reille's reinforcements in several ways made operations more 
hazardous, mere numbers being in no way a substitute for quality, well trained and 
disciplined troops. Reille's drafts melted away to disease and poor discipline. 
118UCN, No. 2291, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, September 14, 1808, 2:454.; CN, 
No. 14342, Napoleon to Berthier, 22 September 1808, 17:523. 
119 As Vivres drew the knot of the blockade closer, General Duhesme considered 
abandoning the city and simply standing the blockade in the Citadel and Monjuich but 
changed his mind when he heard that Gouvion Saint-Cyr had arrived at Perpignan at the 
head of considerable reinforcements. Oman, Peninsular War, 2:41-42; Laffaille, 
Memoires, 171-172. 
12
°Laffaille, Memoires, 157-165, 197-209; AN, AFrvl621, Plaq 1, Duhesme, Resume 
des Operations Militaires; Oman, Peninsular War, 2:41-55. 
121Laffaille, Memoires, 171-172. 
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with cannon and Congreve rockets on November 8th and 13th. 122 The hard-pressed 
General Duhesme sent dispatches to General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, urgently requesting 
relief. 123 
General Saint-Cyr's three step task was to conquer Rosas and Gerona, relieve 
Barcelona, then subdue the rest of Catalonia. In November, he began the one month siege 
of Rosas. 124 General Sanson, Commandant of Engineers, masterminded a classical siege 
against the 3,000 man Catalan garrison, despite attempts to relieve the beleagured fort by 
the Commander of Gerona, General Julian Alverez and Lord Cochrane. On 30 
November, General Pino's division unsuccessfully attacked the breach. General Sanson 
with in days blew a larger breach, forcing the garrison to capitulate. 125 
The siege of Rosas ended the first phase of Saint-Cyr's campaign to subdue 
Catalonia. There remained the relief of Barcelona, the reduction of Gerona, the 
122Ibid., 193-194. 
123In one letter to Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Duhesme noted that to get correspondence out 
of Barcelona he sent six spies over land and by sea in fast boats or provision ships. AN, 
AFIV1615, General Duhesme to Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 19 November 1808. Belmas, 
Joumaux des Sieges faits OU soutenus par les Fran~ais dans la Peninsule de 1807 a 1814, 
(Paris: Chez Firmin Dedut Freres et Cie, 1836), 2:466; Marshal Berthier to General 
Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 10 November 1808; Oman, Peninsular War, 2:41. 
124Ibid, 2:44-50. 
125Ibid, 2:51-57. Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:438-455; AN, AFrv 1615, VII Corps, 
Armee de Genie, General de Division Sanson, Rapport du Siege de Rosas a l'epoque de 
la Reddition de cette citadelle, 5 December 1808. Napier, Peninsula War, 1:395-397, 
Oman, Peninsular War, 2:48. 
85 
destruction of the Catalan armies126 and its insurgency, then the slow conquest of the 
country. The siege of Gerona would, however, stymie his attempt. 
126Napoleon gave Saint-Cyr four general missions: Sucour General Duhesme, supply 
the magazines of Figueras, subdue the Catalan countryside, and place upon them the 
burden of war, and subdue the enemy (armies). Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 351. 
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§ 4. The First Great Crisis: The Campaign of 1809. 
General Gouvion Saint-Cyr completed the reduction of Rosas on 6 December 
1808, 127 and only Gerona in Upper Catalonia, and Tortosa, Tarragona, Hostalrich and 
Lerida remained unconquered in Lower Catalonia. He could not, however, reduce Gerona 
and conquer Upper Catalonia until he relieved General Duhesme, tightly blockaded in 
Barcelona128 
In October, General Duhesme wrote to Marshal Louis Alexandre Berthier (1753-
1815) predicting Barcelona's collapse for lack of provisions. 129 On 19 November 1808, 
he wrote a final desperate dispatch to General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, bewailing the 
difficulties of holding down the canaille de Barcelone ready to revolt at the first 
opportunity. He stressed that his provisions were critically low and could not hope to 
127 AN, AFIV 1615 General de Division Sanson, Rapport du Siege de Rosas a l'epoque 
de la Reddition de Cette Citadelle. 5 December 1808. Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges faits 
OU Soutenus par les Fran£ais dans la Peninsule. de 1807 a 1814; Rediges d'apres les 
ordres du Gouvemement. sur les Documents Existant aux Archives de la Guerre et au 
Depot des Fortifications, (Paris:Chez Firmin Didot Freres et Cie, 1836), 2:473-474. 
128General Duhesme's garrison consisted of a division under General Chabran, a 
second division under General Lechi (second in command to General Duhesme) a cavalry 
division under General Bessieres with two brigades and finally a division artillery under 
Colonel Fabre. SHAT C(8)485, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808. See Table 21. 
1290n 8 September 1808, General Duhesme wrote to Marshal Berthier stating that he 
had in the magazines two months supply of grain, and he could only hold out another 
month without help. On 13 October, he wrote again to Berthier pleading that the garrison 
was in great want, and he could only hold out until December. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 
Journal des Operations de l'Armee de Catalogne en 1808 et 1809 sous le Commandement 
du General Gouvion Saint-Cyr OU Materiaux pour servir a l'histoire de la Guerre 
d'Espagne. (Paris: Chez Anselin et Pochard, 1821 ), 3 59. Christiane d'Ainval, Gouvion 
Saint-Cyr. Soldat de l'An II. Marechal d'Empire. Reorganisateur de l'Armee. (Paris: 
Copemic, 1981 ), 95. 
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survive without immediate succor. 130 Duhesme's collapse would be a tremendous blow 
to French prestige, a loss of 12,000 troops, and a loss of the French foothold in Lower 
Catalonia. General Saint-Cyr had to save it at all costs. 
On 9 December he gathered three divisions, leaving Reille's division to occupy 
Upper Catalonia. 131 Saint-Cyr sent his artillery and heavy baggage back to Figueras and 
marched off into the mountains past Gerona. At La Bispal he distributed four days biscuit 
and fifty cartridges to his troops, and put 150,000 rounds on pack mules. He then burned 
his transport and plunged back into the mountains on 12 December, on one of the most 
dangerous and daring marches of the war. Reaching Cardadeau, Saint-Cyr encountered 
General Redding with 8,000 Catalan troops, opposing his march. 132 Saint-Cyr attacked 
on 16 December, and punched through the Catalan line, completely routing them, 
inflicting 600 casualties, and taking 1,500 prisoners. 133 
Having scattered Redding's force, he dashed on to relieve Barcelona134 on 
17 December. He went on to defeat the main Catalan force at the Battle of Molins de 
130AN, AFrv 1615, Letter, General Duhesme to General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 19 
November 1808. 
131These were the divisions of Generals Chabot (1,344 men), Pino (9,391 men), and 
Souham (7,427 men), totaling 18,562 men. SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, VII Corps, 5 
December 1808. 
132Redding's division was part of General Vivres' Army. Oman, Peninsular War. 
2:63. 
133Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 64-71. Oman Peninsular War, 2:65-68. 
Napier, Peninsular War, 1:400-401. Lopez, Guerra de la lndependencia, 2:357-362. 
Christine d'Ainval, Gouvion Saint-Cyr. 96, Arteche, Guerra de la lndepencia, 4:275-283. 
1340man, Peninsular War, 2:68-69. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations. 72-73, 
319-321; Laffaille, Memoires, 223-224. 
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Rey, 21 December, capturing 1,200 prisoners, twenty five cannon, and some 3,000,000 
cartridges. 135 Saint-Cyr then spent January 1809 clearing the area of insurgents136. 
In January, the new VII Corps, had six divisions, artillery and engineers totaling 
48,518 men and 5,403 horses. 137 General Saint-Cyr began with it the thankless task of 
"pacifying" the Lower Catalan countryside, sending flying columns to destroy the 
insurgent bands and suffering considerable casualties themselves. 138 This period however, 
allowed the French and Spanish commands, to regain strength. In mid February, Redding 
concentrated a division at lgualada for a second offensive. General Saint-Cyr, however, 
quickly concentrated three French divisions and enveloped the Spanish position, forcing 
their disordered retreat, and to abandon their magazines. 139 Redding then concentrated 
another 12,000 troops 140 in two divisions and measured swords with Saint-Cyr in the 
1350man, Peninsular War, 2:70-72; Lopez, Guerra de la Independenci~ 3:362-364; 
Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 77-87. Arteche, Guerra de la Indepencia, 
4:163-171; Vacanl, Storia della Campagne, 1:268-270. 
136Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations. Oman, Peninsular War, 2:73-75. 
137The divisions were General Pino's 1st Division, Souham's 2nd, Chabran's 3rd, 
Chabot's 4th, Duhesme's garrison of Barcelona, Reille's division (division Allemande). 
SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 6 January 1809. See Table 16. Gouvion Saint-
Cyr, Journal des Operations, 97-98, 403-404. Oman Peninsular War, 2:76-77. 
138 SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 6 January 1809. See Table 21. The 
magazines in Barcelona provided 1,889,325 cartridges. The total consumed from 
December 1808 to February 1809 was 2,589,325 rounds. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des 
Operations. 97-98, 403-404. Oman Peninsular War, 2:76-77. 
1390man, Peninsular War, 2:78-81. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 108-
111; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 3:369, 371-373, 403-404; Arteche, Guerra de la 
Independencia, 5: 186-190. 
1400man, Peninsular War, 82-89. 
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Battle of Valls. There, on 25 February, he encountered General Souharn's Division, and 
attacked, pushing the French back. Winning a partial victory, Redding rested his troops, 
allowing Saint-Cyr with Pino's Italian Division to arrive. 141 In a grim battle, Saint-Cyr 
decisively defeated and scattered the Catalan divisions, killing General Redding, inflicting 
3,000 casualties and capturing their cannon and baggage. The French lost about 1,000 
men. Following his victory Saint-Cyr pursued the wrecked Catalan army to Tarragona 
and blockaded the place142 for a several weeks, and returned to Barcelona. 
Though General Saint-Cyr clearly demonstrated French superiority in the field, he 
was still far from pacifying the country. He had two difficult problems to solve. The 
first was operational. Two key fortresses, Gerona and Hostalrich still threatened French 
communications. 143 The second was logistical. By March 1809 Barcelona was again near 
starvation and its magazines could not hope to support three active divisions (Pino, 
Chabot, and Souharn) and the division sized garrison. The area around Barcelona was 
exhausted and Saint-Cyr lacked the land transport to carry the needed supplies. 
Additionally, the British Mediterranean fleet continued its blockade. It would be May 
141The French troops at Valls were Souharn's and Pino's divisions totaling 13,300 men. 
Oman, Peninsular War, 2:84. 
142Ibid., 2:85-89; Napier, Peninsular War, 1 :410-416; Lopez, Guerra de la 
Independenci~ 3:364-374; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations. 120-131, 409-424. 
143Carnillo Vaciani, Storia delle Campagne e Degli Assedj degl'Italiani in Ispagna dal 
1808-1813, 3 vols., (Milano:Paolo Pagnoni, 1845), 2:79-81, 83-85, 88-91; Colonel Juan 
Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 1810-1814, 5 vols., (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 
1972, 2:369, 371-374; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 97-98, 103.:.106, 112-
114, 117-126; Napier, Peninsular War, 3:89-91. 
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before a French convoy under Admiral Julien Baron Cosmac-Kerjulien (1761-1825)144 
carrying supplies from Toulon, finally ran the British blockade. 145 Consequently, Saint-
Cyr left Barcelona and occupied Vich to relieve the garrison's supply situation. 146 
Since Saint-Cyr's arrival at Barcelona, the insurgents had cut his communications 
with General Reille in Upper Catalonia. To reestablish it, he sent General Lechi's 
division with some thousand Spanish prisoners to the Ampundam. 147 Though General 
Saint-Cyr could hold his own in Lower Catalonia, General Reille's task with a single 
"green" division was nearly futile. 148 By January 1809, it was painfully clear to the 
Emperor that no further progress in Catalonia's subjugation was possible until Saint-Cyr 
reduced Gerona, and reestablished French communications. 149 Napoleon began assembling 
troops for this operation in January, concentrating regiments from Berg, Wurzburg and 
the Confederation of the Rhine, 150 some 6,000 troops, at Perpignan. In January 1809, 
1440man, Peninsular War, 3:16; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 159-160. 
1450man, Peninsular War, 3: 16; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 138-139. 
1460man, Peninsular War, 3:16-17. 
147SHAT, C(8)267, Registre de Correspondance du General Reille du 4 Juillet 1808 
a 13 Mars 1809; Reille to Prince Berthier, 20 December 1808; Oman, Peninsular War, 
3:15-18; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 160. 
148CN, No. 14652, Napoleon to Berthier, 4 January 1809, 18:175-176. 
149CN, No. 14652, Napoleon to Berthier, 4 January 1809, 18:175; Oman, Peninsular 
War, 3: 15. 
15
°CN, No. 14681, Napoleon to Berthier 11January1809, 18:195. These units were 
the Regiment de Wurtzburg (1,521 men), Regiment de Berg (1,183 men), 2e Regiment 
de Berg (1,153 men) and the Bataillion des Princes (767 men) totaling 4,624 men present 
under arms in mid-May 1809. Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:663. Their effective 
strength totaled 5,607 by July. SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, de l'Armee 
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General Reille received the Division Allemande, under General Pierre, Baron Arney 
(1768)-1850), and two National Guard battalions. 151 The Emperor expected General Reille 
to do the impossible and begin the seige by 15 February, 152 without Saint-Cyr's assistance, 
for he was embroiled in Lower Catalonia. Napoleon poured more troops into Catalonia, 
ordering King Jerome Bonaparte to send a 6,000 man Westphalian Division, under 
General Annet, Baron Morio de L'Isle (1779-1828). 153 
By mid-spring Napoleon had put thirteen German battalions into Catalonia. 154 
General Reille, meanwhile, assembled a large siege train, while Saint-Cyr concentrated 
d'Espagne, 1 July 1809. 
151The Chasseurs de (Ia) Montagne de Haute-Garrone ex Pyrenees Orientales. SHAT, 
C(8)362, Situation VII Corps, 1 July 1809. UCN, No. 2630, Decision, January 7, 1809, 
2:605; No. 2669, Napoleon to General Clarke, January 13, 1809, 2:622-623; No. 2696, 
Napoleon to General Clarke, January 24, 1809, 2:636-637; No. 2756, Decision, February 
10, 1809, 2:666. Ibid., No. 2675 Napoleon to General Clarke, January 14, 1809, 2:624-
625; No. 2715, Decision, January 16, 1809, 2:645; No. 2776, Decisions, February 13, 
1809, 2:704; No. 2830, Napoleon to General Clarke, February 26, 1809, 2:708-709; No. 
2845, Decision, March 2, 1809, 2:714. Napoleon ordered, for example, the organization 
of a new division of German troops, Division Morio and the Regiment de Wurtzburg 
attached to Division Verdier for the reduction of Gerona. CN, No. 14868, Napoleon to 
General Clarke, 7 March 1809, 320-322. 
152CN, No. 14681, Napoleon to Berthier, 11 Jnuary 1809. 
153CN, No. 14686, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 January 1809, 18:199. Its main 
depot was posted at Metz. UCN, No. 3086, Decisions, April 5, 1809, 3:13; No. 3096, 
Decisions, April 5, 1809, 3: 18. The Westphalian Division had two brigades of two 
regiments each; General Bomer's 1st Brigade (2nd and 4th Line) and General Och's 2nd 
Brigade (1st and 3rd Ligne). Belrnas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:651; SHAT, C(8)362, 
Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. 
1540rnan, Peninsular War, 3:15. UCN. No. 3114, Napoleon to General Clarke, April 
17, 1809, 3:37; No. 3115, Napoleon to General Clarke, April 17, 1809, 3:27; No. 3188, 
Decision, May 25, 1809, 3:66. The Minister of War even called up one National Guard 
cohort, each from the departments Aude and Pyrenees Orientales (the regular garrisons 
were funneled into the VII Corps). UCN, No. 3108, Decision, April 12, 1809, 3:24. 
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his four divisions around Vich, continually fighting the insurgents. 155 Saint Cyr then 
reestablished his communications with Reille. 156 
As Saint-Cyr's and Reille's preparations continued, Napoleon waited impatiently 
for positive results from the operations in Lower Catalonia. 157 He excepted a quick payoff 
from Saint-Cyr's recent victories and impatiently instructed his VII Corps commander to 
simultaneously besiege Gerona, Tortosa and Tarragona. 158 The intense Catalan resistance 
and enormous logistical difficulties, however, precluded any swift conclusion to the 
campaign. The Emperor, unimpressed by these problems, was disappointed by the lack 
of progress, particularly Saint-Cyr's withdrawal from Tarragona, as he was with Reille's 
slowness at pacifying the Ampundam. 159 
Napoleon preferred commanders who were fire-eaters capable of doing the 
impossible, and intensely disliked complainers like Reille or Saint-Cyr. Additionally, 
Marshal Pierre Fran~ois Charles Augereau, Due de Castiglione (1757-1816) apparently 
155lbid, 3: 16-17. 
156lbid. Vacani, Storia delle Campagne, 2: 171-172. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des 
Operations, 157-161. Letter of Gouvoin Saint-Cyr to Reille, 12 May 1813, Belmas, 
Journaux des Sieges, 2:659-660. 
157CN, No. 14955, Napoleon to Marshal Jourdan, Major General de l'Armee d'Espagne 
26 March 1809, 18:391. 
158Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 130: Letter General Gouvion Saint-Cyr 
to Marshal Berthier, 6 March 1809, 424-429. 
159Napoleon clearly, but mistakenly thought that the VII Corps was capable of 
completing Catalonia's pacification. Oman, Peninsular War, 3: 17. 
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exploited the Emperor's dissatisfaction with French progress there in order to replace 
Saint-Cyr as VII Corps commander. 160 
In any case, Napoleon decided, and build a new "command team" to conquer 
Catalonia. In January 1809, he appointed the brilliant engineer General Sanson as chief 
engineer commander of the siege works at Gerona. 161 In May, he decided to replace 
Gouvoin Saint-Cyr with Marshal Augereau. 162 Additionally, he appointed General Jean-
Antoine, Comte Verdier (1767-1839) to command the siege. 163 Marshal Augereau was 
an "old hand" in Catalonia, having fought there in 1793-1794 and thought he could easily 
manage the VII Corps, mired in Catalonia. When Napoleon gave him the appointment 
in mid-May, he went to Perpignan, but suffered a severe attack of gout and remained 
there, unable to assume command of the VII Corps. 164 
General Lechi's division, having got to the Ampurdam, had cut its way back to 
Vi ch and Lechi informed Saint-Cyr of, his replacement by Augereau, and of the Marshal's 
1600man, Peninsular War, 3:17-18. 
161CN, No. 14652, Napoleon to Berthier, 4 January 1809, 18:175-176. 
162UCN, No. 3080, Napoleon to General Clarke, April 5, 1809, 3: 11. Scotty Bowden 
and Charlie Tarbox, Armies on the Danube. 1809, Armies of the Napoleonic Wars 
Research-Series, (Arlington, Texas: Empire Games Press, 1980), 62; David Chandler, 
ed., Napoleon's Marshals, (New York: Maxmillan, 1987) l; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal 
des Operations, 161. 
163General Verdier had just recovered from a wound he received while directing the 
Siege of Saragossa from June to August 1808. He was quite experienced in the 
management of large sieges. Six, Dictionnaire, 2:540; Raymond Rudurff, War to the 
Death. the Sieges of Sarragossa 1808-1809, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1974), 3; Belmas, 
Journaux des Sieges, 2: 1; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 430-432. 
1640man, Peninsular War, 3:18; CN, No. 15553, Napoleon to Clarke, 18 July 1809, 
19:264-265. 
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gout which would force Saint-Cyr to begin the thankless task of besieging Gerona until 
Augereau recovered to assume command. 165 
General Verdier now replaced General Reille, as commander in Upper Catalonia, 
and siege commander. As a "Lieutenant General" of the Emperor, he corresponded 
directly with Paris, rather than through General Saint-Cyr much to the latter's distaste. 
Verdier demanded from Saint-Cyr strong reinforcements to begin the investment, and 
threatened not to begin the siege without them. 166 Though vexed by this high-handed 
insubordination Saint-Cyr, sent Verdier 3,500 of his worst troops from General Lechi's 
division. 167 
By mid-May the VII Corps took on a new operational structure for the siege of 
Gerona. It fell into three major parts, the Armee d'Observation under the command of 
General Saint-Cyr, including three infantry divisions totaling 15,732 men and 1,819 
horses, Verdier's Armee de Siege with 23,382 men and 1,970 horses and the garrison of 
Barcelona with 8,408 men. 168 
1650man, Peninsular War, 3:18. 
166Letter, General Verdier to General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 15 May 1809, Belmas, 
Joumaux des Sieges, 2:660-662; Oman, Peninsular War, 3: 18. 
167General Lechi's Italian Division had two brigades with 5,156 men and 432 horses. 
Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:651; SHAT C(8)362, VII Corps, Situation, 6 January 
1809; Oman, Peninsular War, 3 :19. When called upon to make troop sacrifices, 
commanders often send their less reliable units. Certainly Saint-Cyr, angered by Verdier 
spitefully, sent his worst troops. 
168SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VIII Corps, 6 January 1809. 
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In May, prior to his departure, General Reille, and the newly assembled siege 
force 169 marched on Gerona, while General Lechi's division marched from Vich to support 
the siege. Both commanders swept the Gerona area of insurgents, and Reille concentrated 
his 16,200 men at Gerona, 170 while Saint-Cyr covered the operation with his three 
divisions from Vich. 171 
On 24 May, General Verdier assumed command of the siege force and invested 
Gerona with over two divisions, 172 and on 6 June, General Nicolas Antoine, Comte 
Sanson (1756-1824) opened the attack against Fort Monjuich and some outlying forts 
supported by a heavy artillery bombardment173 which continued for a month, blowing a 
35 foot breach into its ramparts. On 7 July, General Verdier ordered an assault with 
twenty elite Grenadier and Voltigeur companies (2,400 men) under Adjutant Commandant 
Beuremann174 which collapsed under a storm of shot. General Verdier rallied his shaken 
troops and disastrously attacked again, all at a cost of 1,079 casualities, 45% of the 
169SHAT C(8)35, General Sanson, Rapport General du Genie sur le Siege de Girone, 
20 September 1809. 
1700man, Peninsular War, 3: 15-19. 
171These reinforcements included the bulk of Lechi's artillery engineers and a cavalry 
regiment, leaving him with 3,116 men. Ibid. 
172The covering force consisted of General Souham's, and Pino's divisions, and the 
Grande Quartier General under Adjudant Commandant Devaux. See Table 19; SHAT 
C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; Saint-Cyr, Joumaux des Operations, 153, 155-
156. 
174Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:503-508; SHAT, C(8)60, Rapport Genercil du Genie 
sur le Siege de Girone; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:28-29. 
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attacking force. 175 The greater loss was to French morale, which was shaken to its very 
foundations. The hospitals were filled to bursting with wounded and sick (dysentery, 
malaria and sunstroke) while troops deserted en mass. By mid-September Verdier had 
5,120 troops in hospital out of 15,640 (32.9%). 176 These accelerating loss rates had a 
serious impact upon continued fighting ability of the besieging force. 177 
General Saint-Cyr, meanwhile, secured Verdier's rear and systemically destroyed 
the insurgent strongholds. 178 The insurgents, however, redoubled their efforts, harrassing 
Verdier's communications. 179 Through July, Verdier continued the attack on Monjuich; 
and on 2 August launched a second assault, capturing its outworks, blowing in its 
counterscarp, and gaining a foothold in its gaping breach, to mine it. 18° Finally on 10 
175AN, AFIV 1621 plaq3(1), General Sanson and Taviel to General Clarke, Rapport 
de l'Artillerie et du Genie, 9 July 1809; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:32; Belmas, Journaux 
des Sieges, 3:681; Lopez, Guerra de la lndependencia, 4:287-291; Arteche, Guerra de la 
lndependencia, 7:385-394; Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 244-253. 
176SHAT C(8)362, Situation sur le Siege de Girone, 15 September 1809. 
177AN, AFIV 1621 plaq 3(1), Rapport de l'Artillerie et du Genie, 9 July 1809; Oman, 
Peninsular War, 3:32; Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:536-537; SHAT C(8)60, Rapport 
General du Genie sur le Siege de Girone. 
178Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 156; One of Saint-Cyr's Italian brigades for 
example captured a Catalan supply convoy of some 1,200 oxen on 7 July, and another 
insurgent force of 900 men on 10 July. Oman, Peninsular War, 3:30. 
1790man, Peninsular War, 3:35. General Verdier scored some victories against the 
insurgents, pushing one force of some 5,000 guerrillas into the mountains in July. 
180General Mariano Alvarez de Castro, Governor of Gerona, fearing the fall of 
Monjuich unsuccessfully sallied out to save the ill fated fort. AN, AFIV1621 plaq 3(111), 
Generals Sanson and Taviel to General Clarke, Rapport de l'Artillerie et du· Genie 11 
August 1809; Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:565-566; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:34. 
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which the French 
Verdier now turned to attack Gerena proper, and battered four breaches into it by 
30 August, as his engineers sapped to its ramparts. 183 The Catalan Army again tried a 
counterstroke. The newly appointed Captain-General Blake assembled 20,000 men to 
relieve Gerena. 184 Opposed by three French divisions, one Catalan division cut its way 
into Gerona185 with a 1,100 mule supply convoy, on 1 September and broke out again on 
the 4th. 186 
In mid-September General Verdier assaulted the breaches with 3,000 troops after 
an intense bombardment only to suffer a second defeat, losing 624 casualities. 187 The 
181The retiring garrison blew up a large mine, ( 46 barrels of powder). AFIVl 621 plaq 
3(111), Generals Sanson and Taviel, to General Clarke, Rapport de l'Artillerie et du Genie, 
12 August 1809; Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:566-571. 
1820man, Peninsular War, 3:34. 
183Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:580-581. 
1840man, Peninsular War, 3:41-42. 
185General Saint-Cyr provided Divisions Souham and Pino, and Verdier provided his 
own division, reducing his besieging force to 6,200 men. Ibid. 
186AN, AFIV1621 plaq 3(11), Extrait, Lettre, M. Gault, Inspecteur aux revues de la 
Division Westphalien, 6 September 1809; SHAT C(8)60, General Sanson, Rapport 
General du Genie sur le Siege de Girone, 20 October 1809; Vacinai, Storia della 
Campagne. 2:273-278; Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:583-593; Oman, Peninsular War, 
3:42-45; Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 209-210, 215-219, 235. 
187AN, AFIV1621 plaq 3(111), Generals Sanson and Taviel, Rapport de l'Artillerie et 
du Genie du 16 Septembre 1809; Rapport, 17 Septembre 1809; Rapport, 18 September 
1809; Rapport, 18 Septembre 1809. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Siege de Girone, 15 
September 1809; C(8)60, Rapport General du Genie; AN, AFIV 1621plaq3(111), Generals 
Sanson and Taviel, Rapport de l'Artillerie et du Genie, 20 September 1809; Saint-Cyr, 
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immediate effect of this check was devastating. The long venomous relations between 
Verdier and Saint-Cyr completly ruptured,188 and French morale plummeted, as casualities 
soared. Of the 18,663 men in his original force Verdier had 9,988 left, (46.5%). 189 
General Saint-Cyr meanwhile, spitefully sent a letter to General Clarke laying the 
attack's failure squarely on Verdier's shoulders,190 while Verdier too, sent caustic letters 
to Clarke, the Emperor and, Marshal Augereau, blaming Saint-Cyr's lack of support for 
the failure. Finally, in complete frustration he invalided himself (with fever) and threw 
up his command, returning to France. 191 This "desertion" nearly killed French morale, 
causing some 1,200 soldiers to go sick in hospital by 1 October, abandoning many of the 
trenches. 192 
Journal des Operations, 253-256; Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:604-610; Vacani, Storia 
della Campagne, 3:294-299; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:287-291; Napier, 
Peninsula War, 3:45-46; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:47-49; Arteche, Guerra de la 
Independencia, 7:406-414. 
1880man, Peninsular War, 3:46; Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:739-742, 750-751. 
Prior to the assault, General Verdier requested from Saint-Cyr the loan of a brigade to 
reinforce the assaulting columns, partly because he did not trust to the elan of his nearly 
worn-out soldiers. Saint-Cyr however left Verdier in the lurch, "every general has his 
own task; yours is to take Gerona with the resources placed at your disposal." Oman, 
Peninsular War, 3:46. 
189SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Siege de Girone, 15 September 1809. 
190Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:766-768. 
191lbid, 2:769-771, 797, 798-800. Oman, Peninsular War, 3:49. 
192This lack of troops allowed a surge of insurgent attacks, e.g. the capture of a 
French convoy from Bascara. AN, AFIV1621, Unsigned letter to General Saint-Cyr, 15 
September 1809. 
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General Saint-Cyr now took personal command of the siege and reestablished the 
investment. He concentrated his 16,000 man VII Corps (including 4,000 reinforcements) 
at Gerona to resume the siege, 193 and brought in a huge convoy of supplies to feed his 
nearly starving troops. 194 Soon, however, General Saint-Cyr, disgusted with Marshal 
Augereau's lack of support, petulantly threw up his command and went on furlough. 195 
Marshal Augereau, was forced to leave for Gerona and assume personal command, of the 
battered VII Corps. His Armee d'Observation had a 26% sick rate and 13,729 men under 
arms, while the Armee de Siege had 39% sick and 9,103 men in the field. 196 
During this period Captain General Blake attempted to force another convoy into 
Gerona, but Augereau, now fully in command, quickly foiled the attempt. 197 In the face 
of continued insurgent skirmishing, he resolved to end the siege quickly. He first sent 
1930man, Peninsular War, 3:50. 
194lbid, 3: 52-53; Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 264-266. Marshal Augereau 
meanwhile, took the waters with the Prefect of the Department of Pyrenees Oriental es and 
the commander of the 1 Oe Division Militaire, as he wrote to General Clarke: "j'etais a 
Moltig, a douze lieues de Perpignan, dans le departement des Pyrenees-Orientales, a 
prendre des gains, afin de detruire le germe de ma maladie", Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 
2:813-815, Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 264. 
1950man, Peninsular War, 3:53. 
196 Augereau found in October another 300-400 sick in each regiment not covered in 
the hospital statistics. Ibid; Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:618-621; AN, AFrv 1621 plaq 
3(111), Letter, Marshal Augereau to General Clarke, 21 October 1809. 
197Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:620-623, 825-827; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:55-56; 
Lopez, Guerra de la lndependencia, 4:349-351. Arteche, Guerre de la Independencia, 
421-423; Vacani, Storia della Campagne,2:150-151. 
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Souham's and Pino's divisions to Hostalrich to destroy General Blake's headquarters, at 
the end of October. 198 
Then, Augereau continued the relentless bombardment of the now desperate city, 
whose resistance began to crumble. By 10 November, General Albert Louis, Valentine, 
Baron Taviel (1767-1831), Augereau's artillery commander battered a huge breach into 
its walls, and on 6 December, Augereau launched a successful attack to capture two 
outworks and a redoubt. 199 
The garrison finally capitulated on 11 December. French losses were terrible, with 
some 14,000 casualties in the seven month siege. At the beginning of the siege Verdier 
had 18,663 men and 1,838 horses (22,282 effectives).200 By the end, the Armee de Siege 
only had 6,348 men under arms with 8,126 in the hospital, a gigantic 58.3% of 15,243. 
198Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:625-627, 827-831; Vaciani, Storia della Campagne, 
2:327, 332; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:56-57. 
199 AN, AFIV 1621 plaq 3(Ill), Siege de Girone, Rapport a l'Empereur 27 November 
1809; General Rey to General Clarke, 19 November 1809; Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 
2:630-631; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:58; Lopez, Guerra de la lndependcia, 4:351. 
200SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; AN, AFIV 1621 plaq 3(111), 
Marshal Augereau to General Clarke, 3 December 1809; General Rey to General Clarke, 
5 December 1809; Capitulation de la villa de Girone et des Forts, 10 December 1809; 
AFIV 1621 Rapport a l'Empereur le 12 Decembre 1809; Rapport a Empereur, 18 
December 1809; Marechal Augereau to General Clarke, 14 December 1809; Belmas, 
Joumaux des Sieges, 2:631-634, 636, 643; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:58-60; Saint-Cyr, 
Journal des Operations, 153, 155-156; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:363-367; 
Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, 7:454-468. 
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By I January 1810, the VII Corps suffered 5,000 deaths and 16,342 or 36.6% of his 
44,552 men in the hospital. 201 
From January to July 1809, the VII Corps underwent structural changes in its 
divisions. General Souham's division underwent several lateral unit transfers and a 12% 
increase in manpower.202 General Saint-Cyr broke up Chabran's division, and transferred 
three of its regiments with Chabran and his staff to Barcelona to form the garrison's 1st 
Brigade, and divided the rest of this division amongst the corps. By July, the garrison 
of Barcelona increased its strength from 6,705 men to 8,408 men.203 
This radical change eliminated a 6,000 man division. Administratively, the Corps 
staff's Bureau General managed the operational aspect of disolving Chabran's division, and 
issuing movement orders to the effected units. The Bureau d'Administration and the 
Commissaires de guerre coordinated the logistical support, while the Bureaux des 
Situations et Finances, and the lnspecteurs aux revues managed the strength accounting, 
and administered and audited the personal and pay of the effected units. When all the 
preliminary staff work was complete, the movement orders were sent and the action set 
in motion. General Decaen, commander of the Army of Catalonia in 1813, for example, 
made artillery material over to General Severoli's division in October. General Jean-
Maximilien, Comte Lamarque's ( 1770-183 2) division provided an escort company and 
201 General Souham's division had 30% of its 9,860 men in the hospital (3,275) leaving 
5,241 with the colors. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, I December 1809; Situation, 
VII Corps, I January 1810. 
202See Table 17. These were the 7e Ligne, 3e Leger, 93e Ligne and the 3e Provisoire 
Chasseurs a cheval. SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, I July 1809. 
203Ibid. 
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General Claude, Baron Prost (1764-1834 ), the artillery commander provided the 
transport. 204 
From July to the end of December 1809, there were few changes in the force 
structure of the VII Corps except for the dissolution of Chabran's division. The Ministry 
sent in one battalion in November,205 and in December, 2,210 replacements came from 
the depots of eleven regiments in Catalonia,206 were forwarded in three marching 
battalions. 
204SHAT, C(8)320, Registre de Correspondance pour le mois d'Octobre 1813, No. 
1382, [General Decaen] to General Severoli, 4 October 1813. No. 1383 [General Decaen] 
to General Lamarque, 4 October 1813. 
205UCN, No. 3750, Decision, November 10, 1809, 3:333. 
206Ibid, No. 3844, Napoleon to General Clarke, December 22, 1809, 3:373-374. 
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§5. Vll Corps into Annee de Catalogue, 1810 
Following its tremendous growth in 1809, and subsequent losses during the Siege 
of Gerona, Marshal Augereau slowly reconstituted and expanded the VII Corps. He also 
turned his attention to the difficult task of completing the subjugation of Catalonia. In 
mid-December 1809, he began active operations in Upper Catalonia with Generals 
Souham and Pino's divisions,207 to clear the insurgents from around Gerona, and his line 
of communications.208 In January 1810 he marched with two divisions to relieve 
Barcelona, and even detached one brigade under General Mazzuchelli to besiege 
Hostalrich, a Catalan fort on the Gerona-Barcelona road. 209 For the next five months, 
General Mazzuchelli, later reinforced by General Severoli's division besieged it by 
bombardment and starvation. By mid-May the garrison, its provisions exhausted, 
attempted a daring but unsuccessful break-out and were captured.210 
207General Souham's division had 5,241 troops under arms and 3,272 men or (35.2%) 
of its 9,293 men in the hospital. Division Pino had 6,780 troops under arms and 2,655 
troops (26.9%) of its 9,860 men in the hospital. These losses were moderate as compared 
to those of General Verdier's force which had 53% of its effective strength in the hospital. 
SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809; Lopez, Guerra de la 
Independencia, 4:91-94. 
208During this operation, Marshal Augereau issued his "hanging order" in which all 
insurgents caught under arms would summarily hanged. SHAT C(8)37, Letter, General 
Souham to Marshal Augereau, 25 December 1809; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:288; Lopez, 
Guerra de la Independencia. 1808-1814, 4:93-94; Vacani, Storia delle Campagne, 2:384, 
386; SHAT C(8)37, Letters, General Souham to Augereau, 26 December 1809; Souham 
to Augereau, 26 December 1809. 
2090man, Peninsular War, 3:288. 
210SHAT C(8)40. Chef de Bataillon E. Paris, Rapport du Genie sur les Operations 
Relatives au Blocus d'Hostalrich, 23 January 181 O; Chef d'Escadron Clement, Journal du 
Bombardement d'Hostalrich, Rapport du 22 au 23 February 1810, 23 Fevrier 1810; Oman, 
Peninsular War, 3;298-299; Vacani, Storia delle Campagne, 2:402-412; SHAT, CGM 
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That January, meanwhile, Augereau relieved Barcelona211 and set about putting this 
command in order. He fired General Duhesme, and returned him to France in disgrace for 
gross corruption and abuse of power. 212 Returning to Gerena in February, he assembled 
an enormous supply convoy of over a thousand wagons to haul six months provisions to 
feed Barcelona, and marched there in mid-March under a huge escort of two Divisions 
(Severeli, Pino and Rouyer). 213 During the uneventful march to Barcelona, General 
Mazzuchelli's brigade at Hostalrich even assisted in the convoy escort.214 
General Souham, meanwhile, at Vich with his division (5,692 men) holding down 
the mountainous regions of Lower Catalonia, took the first shock of the 1810 campaign. 
759, 1°, Anon., Journal Detaille des Mouvements de l'Armee Fran~aise en Catalogne, 
Depuis le Mois de Juin 1808, jusqu'en 181 O; Lopez, Guerra de Ia Independencia, 4: 113-
121. 
211Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 2:197-198, 398-400. Lopez, Guerra de Ia 
Independencia, 5:97-98; Oman, Peninsular War, 289-290. 
212Marshal Augereau formed a Commission Administratif at Gerena on 27 February 
1810 to hear to case of General Duhesme, which included the murder case of one J. 
Canton in which Duhesme and his police commissioner, Casanova, was involved; and 
mismanagement of the resources of the country and corruption, in what was one of the 
great corruption cases of the war. Pierre Conrad, Napoleon et la Catalogne. 1808-1814, 
Vol. 1, La Captivite de Barcelone. Fevrier 1808-Janvier 1810, (Paris, Felix Alcan, 1910), 
392-395, 398-402, 408-410. 
213General Severeli took temporary command of Pino's division, and by May assumed 
permanent command. SHAT C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne 31 May 1810. In 
March 1810, the Emperor granted General Pino six months furlough; UCN, No. 4068, 
Decisions, 4 March 1810, 3:476. 
214Augereau left General Verdier the task of holding Upper Catalonia with one 
division (5,514 men). The escort consisted of Division Severoli, 6,309 men, including 
General Mazzuchelli's brigade, and Division Rouyer with 3,100 men, totaling 9,409. 
SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; Oman, Peninsular War, 
3:293; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 2:426-431. 
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The insurgent commander, General Henry O'Donnell, saw a unique opportunity to destroy 
this division, while Augereau was occupied with feeding Barcelona, and attacked Vich 
on 19 February 1810 with 8,000 men. In a shifting battle which lasted two days, General 
Souham decisively defeated O'Donnell inflicting 1,800 losses. 215 
In March, after resupplying Barcelona, Augereau concentrated three divisions in 
Lower Catalonia (Divisions Severoli, Augereau and Rouyer) totaling 16,108 men,216 in 
accordance with an Imperial order to support General Suchet's Army of Aragon in the 
siege of Lerida whose fall would disrupt Catalan communications in Lower Catalonia.217 
Augureau, however, chafing at so inglorious a role, opened his own campaign, and 
marched two divisions to Reus to besiege Tarragona, and establish communications with 
Barcelona. 218 
General O'Donnell meanwhile, spoiled Augereau's projected siege219 by attacking 
the French communications on 30 March, first capturing the French garrison (1 Yz 
215 Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, 8:258-265. Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 
2:426-431; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:292; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5: 100-104. 
General Souham was severely wounded in the head and relinquished command to General 
de Brigade Jean-Pierre baron Augereau (1771-1836), one of Souham's brigade 
commanders. Six, Dictionnaire, 1 :30. In April, General Souham took four months 
furlough to recover from his wound. UCN, No. 4138, Decision, 28 March 1810, 3:519. 
216These divisions were General Severo Ii 's 6,3 09 men, Rouyer's 3, 100 men and 
Augereau's, (later General Bemard-Georges-Fran~ois, Comte Frere's (1764-1826)), men. 
SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
217Napoleon ordered "Retirez-lui [Due de Castiglione] l'ordre positif de se mettre en 
communication avec General Suchet en portant des corps sur Lerida et Tarragona". CN 
No. 16294, Napoleon to Clarke, 26 February 1810, 20:246. 
2180man, Peninsular War, 3:294-295. 
2191bid, 3:295. 
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battalions) at Villafranca, and defeating a French brigade under General Schwartz on 5 
April at Manresa forcing him to retreat on Barcelona, harried by Miguelets all the way. 
On 7 April, Augureau withdrew to Barcelona, abandoning his brief offensive. 220 In April 
he reinforced Verdier at Gerona, continued the siege of Hostalrich, and consolidated his 
hold on Upper Catalonia.221 Later that month he returned to Gerona with the huge, empty 
convoy to gather more supplies to yet again replenish Barcelona's provisions. 222 
Marshal Augereau's whole campaign in Catalonia thus far came to nothing. 
Napoleon had already replaced two commanders in Catalonia, for a lack of success at 
conquering the rebellious province, and his third one showed him little or no progress 
either. Augereau had disobeyed his express orders, attempted his own campaign and 
failed. He displayed, as far as the Emperor was concerned a signal lack of judgement and 
serious resolution to fight. 
He had not yet begun the reduction of Tarragona, Lerida or Tortosa, let alone the 
pacification of Lower Catalonia by April 1810. Augereau was certainly slow, mostly due 
to his overwhelming logistical difficulties. Many complaints had however reached 
Napoleon's ears concerning Marshal Augereau's operational mismanagement and lack of 
22
°Ibid, 3:295-296. 
221Lopez, Guerra de la Independenci~ 5: 180-183; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 
2:484-499; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:296. 
2220man, Peninsular War, 3:296. 
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cooperation with the Army of Aragon,223 the latter, perhaps from General Suchet's vitriolic 
pen.224 
By May 1810, Augereau's at best lackluster field performance, his reluctance to 
support General Suchet, his failure to pacify Catalonia, and his endless command and 
logistical problems galled Napoleon, who expected a real fire-eater. Augereau's inability 
to manage his generals added to Napoleon's disappointment. He showed a disgracefully 
factitious handling of the feud between Generals Gouvion Saint-Cyr and Verdier during 
the Siege of Gerona,225 and his own indulging of a long standing hatred for General 
223Napoleon wrote to the Minister of War: 
... write to the Duke of Castiglione that complaints are very abundant between 
Lerida and Villafranch; that General Suchet lost nothing in his retreat from 
Valencia, and that he always beat everything before him. I think that the Duke 
of Castiglione has by this time taken Tarragona and that he is in communication 
with the Army of Aragon. 
UCN, No. 4164, Napoleon to General Clarke, 17 April 1810. 3:531. 
224Richard Humble certainly does not exagerate when he states that Suchet "could be 
as factious and bloody minded with headquarters or his fellow army commanders as any 
of them" and it was certainly within his capability to use the failures of a fellow Marshal 
to gain more troops as against Macdonald in 1810, or increase the holdings of his "fief' 
of Aragon: "Suchet tended to hang on to as many troops as he could and to warn off his 
colleagues from "his" territory like a goldfish patrolling its tank." Humble, Napoleon's 
Peninsular Marshals, 216-217. Suchet too incurred Napoleon's anger occasionally, as 
when Marshal Berthier reported a brigand incursion in Navarre in December 1809 and 
noted "Express to General Suchet my displeasure that he does not have more troops in 
Navarre." UCN, No. 3862, Decision, 25 December 1809, 3:382. 
225CN, No. 16004, Napoleon to General Clarke, 16 November 1809, 20:35-36; Oman, 
Peninsular War, 3:15-16; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 161. Letter, Verdier 
to Saint-Cyr, 15 May 1809, Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 430-432; Oman, Peninsular 
War, 3: 16, 49, 52-53; Letter, Verdier to Saint-Cyr, 13 September 1809, Letter, Saint-Cyr 
to Verdier (reply), Letter Saint-Cyr to Napoleon, 20 September 1809, Rapport, Saint-Cyr 
to General Clarke, 20 September 1809, Letter Verdier to Saint-Cyr, 21 September 1809, 
Letter Verdier to Saint-Cyr, 21 September 1809, Rapport, Verdier to Napoleon, 26 
September 1809, Letter, Saint-Cyr to General Clarke, 3 October 1809, Letter; Augereau 
to General Clarke, 9 October 1809, Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:739-740, 740-743, 
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ouhesme by beginning a vendetta against Duhesme and General Lechi, soon after his 
arrival in Catalonia. On 27 February 1810 Augereau informed the Minister of War that 
he had created an administrative commission, to investigate financial turpitude within the 
French command. 226 It met on 16-19 March at Barcelona227 and unearthed the harsh 
contributions squeezed out of the populace and the most damning of all, the Canton 
Affair, 228 a murder case over which Augereau sacked Commissaire-General Casanova, 
chief of the Barcelona police. 229 He sent Duhesme back to France in disgrace to await 
the commission's findings and the Emperor's decision on his conduct.230 General Lechi, 
751-752, 765-767, 769-771, 785-788, 791-800, 813-818. 
226SHAT, C(8)42, Letter, Augereau to Clarke, 27 February 1810; Conard, Napoleon 
et la Catalogne, 389. 
227SHAT, C(8)50, Letter Augereau to Clarke, 9 April 181 O; Letter, Augereau to 
Clarke, 17 April 1810; AN, AFIV1625, Letter, Commission Administrative to Augereau, 
nd. The Commission consisted of Commissaire des guerres Grobert (president) Chef de 
Bataillon Touque, Payeur Lehody, Capitaine Pelletier and Administrateur des Domaines 
Lapasset, Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 390. 
228The Canton Affair was a murder case in which Commissaire-General Raymond 
Casanona's Barcelona Police beat to death one Joseph Canton, while attempting to extract 
information on the whereabouts of a cache of money for contributions; AN, AFrvl625, 
General Clarke, Rapport a l'Ernpereur 20 May 1809; F(7)6554, Letter, Commissaire 
General de Police of Barcelona, Beaumont-Brivazac to General Savaray, Minister of 
Police, 30 June 1812; SHAT, C(8)50, General Duhesme to General Clarke, 28 July 1810. 
229Conrad, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 394-395. 
230AN, F(7)6564, Letter, General Duhesme to General Savaray, 30 November 1810; 
AFrv 1623 Letter, Marshal Berthier to General Duhesme, 26 April 1810; SHAT, C(8)44, 
Letter, General Clarke to Napoleon 13 March 1810; C(8)42, Letter, Augereau to Clarke, 
23 February 1810; Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 395. 
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also implicated as commander of the garrison of Barcelona, took extended furlough. 231 
The Commission's verdict surprisingly was favorable to Duhesme, only censuring him on 
excesses in his private life, and did not implicate him in the Canton Affair. 232 This 
murder case, however, plagued General Lechi and Commissaire Casanova till the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars. 233 
Napoleon was deeply disappointed with Augereau for making a public spectacle 
of his generals, and his scandalous attempt to satisfy a personal grudge against Duhesme. 
The whole affair showed a want of strength, self restraint and discretion at managing and 
disciplining his senior officers. He displayed the embarrassing habit of annoying the the 
Emperor and the Ministry of War with a stream of correspondence discussing his 
command problems. This whole affair politically embarrassed the Emperor, for which he 
was unlikely to forgive. 234 
Finally, Marshal Augereau hypocritically engaged in peccadillos of his own, as 
when he applied to the Ministry of War for permission to assign his brother, General de 
231 General Lechi took an extended convalescent leave. UCN, No. 4027, Decisions, 
15 February 1810, 3:460. 
232SHAT, C(8)60, Letter, General Clarke to General Duhesme, 26 August 1810; 
Letter, (response) Duhesme to Clarke, 26 August 1810; Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 
398. 
233 AN, AFIV 1157, Ministre de la Guerre, 8e Division, Bureau de la Police Militaire, 
General Clarke, Rapport a l'Empereur, 4 October 1811; AF1v 1158, General Clarke, 
Rapport a l'Empereur, 19 January 1814. 
234CN, No. 16411, Napoleon to General Clarke, 24 April 1810, 20:308-309. 
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Brigade Jean Pierre Augereau (1772-1836) as Chief of Staff of the Army of Catalonia. 
This blatant nepotism earned the Marshal a stinging rebuke from Napoleon.235 
The Emperor had already been seriously disappointed by General Gouvion Saint-
Cyr and ordered General Clarke to investigate his operations. 236 He was in no mood to 
tolerate the same nonsense from a Marshal of France, and showed little patience when he 
saw Augereau's failures were far worse than Gouvion Saint-Cyr's had ever been. On 24 
April 1810, Napoleon sacked Augereau in a blistering order to General Clarke. The 
Emperor noted his displeasure with Augereau's operations and that his actions were hardly 
the way to merit either glory or the Imperial esteem.237 He disgustedly rebuked Augereau 
235Napoleon angrily replyed to Augereau's request: "It is contrary to the [sic] principle 
for a Marshal to have a brother for his Chief of Staff." UCN, No. 2775, Decisions, 3:345. 
The Marshal instead assigned General Augereau to command a brigade in General 
Souham's division. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810. 
236Napoleon ordered "ii faut me faire un rapport serieux sur la campagne du General 
Gouvion Saint-Cyr en Catalogne". This report was to address four issues: (1) His lack 
of cooperation with General Suchet and Marshal Mortier, and not invading Valencia; (2) 
Why he did not attack the insurgents but took the defensive instead, and when he won 
in the field why he did not exploit his victories; (3) Why his actions, characterized by 
egoism, compromised the success of the siege of Gerona; and ( 4) Why he left his Corps 
without permission on a pretext of illness. Napoleon also ordered the seizure of Saint-
Cyr's papers for this investigation. CN, No. 16004, Napoleon to Clarke, 14 November 
1809, 20:33-34; No. 15594, Napoleon to Clarke, 29 July 1809; No. 15958, Napoleon to 
Clarke, 16 October 1809, 20: 1-2. 
237Napoleon wrote: 
Je n'ai point reconnu le zele qu'il avait toujours montre pour mon service et pour 
la gloire de mes armes. Ce n'est qu' en restant dans les capitales eloignees de 
l'armee que des genraux en chef peuvent acquerir de la glorie et meriter mon 
estime. 
CN, No. 16411, Letter, Napoleon to Clarke, 24 April 1810, 20:308-309. 
111 
for his vendetta against General Duhesme238 his attempt to make his brother 
Chief of Staff of the Army of Catalonia, and its acting commander during the Marshal's 
illness. 239 In a justified fury, Napoleon ordered Marshal Macdonald to take command of 
the Army of Catalonia instantly. 240 
In the next fortnight, in writing to General Lacuee to congratulate the Minsitry of 
Military Administration on its excellent logistical support to Catalonia, he took another 
opportunity to lambast Augereau: 
I know very well ... that if the Marshal who commanded it (Army of 
Catalonia) had been with the troops instead to remaining twenty leagues 
in the rear, he would have thrown into the sea the wretched troops who 
lost his detachments and brought him to ... retreat. 241 
This ended Marshal Augereau's command of the Army of Catalonia, and for all practical 
purposes destroyed his military reputation with Napoleon, who only used him in minor 
roles to the end of his reign. He chose in Augereau's stead, the newly minted Marshal 
238Napoleon noted to General Clarke: 
Apres la denonciation du Marechal Augereau contre le General Duhesme, le 
consul de France et autres individus, ii faut demander des renseignements precis, 
les noms des membres de la commission formee par le Marechal Augereau, les 
resultats de l'enquete, les interrogatoires de General Duhesme et des autres 
prevenus. II y avait bien autre chose a faire que de rejouir les Espagnols par cette 
reaction. 
Ibid. 
239
"11 vous sera facile de lui faire comprendre que le Marechal Augereau, casse et 
infirme au lieu de commander lui-meme ses troupes, les a laissees a son frere, officiers 
tres mediocre ... " Ibid. 
240
"Donnez ordre au Marechal Macdonald de partir dans le plus court delai pour 
prendre le commandement de l'armee et le gouvemement de la province". Ibid. 
241UCN, No. 4215, Napoleon to General Lacuee, 8 May 1810, 3:552. 
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Etienne-Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre Macdonald, Due De Tarente (1765-1840), who had just 
won his baton for breaking the Austrian center at the Battle of Wagram, 6 July 1809.242 
Earlier, on 8 February 1810, the Emperor decreed the promotion of the VII Corps 
into the restructured Armee de Catalogne, with two new divisions. Its commander would 
command both the Army and the province as Governor, and would answer directly to 
Paris instead of Madrid, as a virtual vice royalty. 243 
The newly restructured Army of Catalonia had five divisions and the Army 
services, artillery and engineers. The 1st Division changed its command from General 
Joseph, Comte Souham (1760-183 7)244 to General Bemard-Georges-Fran~ois, Comte Frere 
(1764-1826). It also received considerable troop reinforcements, increasing its strength to 
10,655 men.245 The 2nd Division with 8,965 men simply changed hands from General 
Pino to Severoli.246 The multi-national 3rd Division, under General Verdier, had suffered 
terribly from the Siege of Gerona and lost 5,458 men or 37.7% of its 9,021 troops. It had 
I 
four brigades: French, German, Wurtembourg and Neapolitan. In May, Augureau took 
242Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 727-728; Jean Thiry, Wagram, (Paris: 
Editions Berger-Levrault, 1966), 183-187; Marshal Macdonald, Recollections of Marshal 
Macdonald. Duke of Tarentum, ed. Camolle Rousset, trans. Stephen Simon, (London: 
Richard Bentley and Son 1892), 1:342-344; Oman, Penninsular War, 3:299. 
243SHAT, C(8)41, Ministere de la Guerre Marshal Berthier, Extrait du Decret de 
l'Empereur, 8 February 1810. 
244General Souham received a severe head wound at the battle of Vich, and took 
convalescent leave in France. Oman, Peninsular War, 3:292. 
245SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, l January 181 O; Situation, Armee de 
Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
246lbid. 
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its Neapolitan brigade to form the cadre of the 4th division, under General Pignatelli, with 
5,493 men.247 A new 5th Division, under General Fran9ois Marie, Baron Rouyer (1765-
1824) had simply a German/Saxon brigade under General Schwartz with 3,976 men.248 
The Garrison of Barcelona under General Lacombe Saint-Michel numbered 6,502 men. 
As a whole, the Army of Catalonia increased in size by 2,967 men (6.2%) to 47,519. 249 
By 1 October 1810, the new commander, Marshal Macdonald reorganized it again. 
He divided the Army into two distinct parts, the Armee Active for field operations and 
the Armee Territoriale, which occupied the country and garrisoned its fortresses. The field 
Army had three divisions, the newly formed Brigade d'Avant Garde, and the Army 
headquarters troops. The Armee Territoriale had two separate commands, Upper and 
Lower Catalonia. The former was the Division Territoriale and the latter the Garrison of 
Barcelona and its outlying garrisons.250 
Colonel General Louis, Comte Baraguey d'Hilliers (1764-1833) an old hand at 
counter-insurgent operations and had just emerged from a successful campaign in the 
Tyrol, in 1809. 11,212 man Division Territoriale was actually a Corps of two divisions, 
247SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. See Table 17. 
248lbid. General de Brigade Francois-Xavier, Comte Schwartz (1762-1826) was a 
Bavarian officer and an old hand in Catalonia, there since 1807. Six, Dictionnaire 
Biographique, 2:212; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
249lbid. 
250See Table 18. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, I October 1810. 
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including those of Generals Joseph, Baron Pepinville (1765-1811) (7,145 men) and 
Rouyer (4,266 men). The whole Army of Catalonia, numbered 46,348 troops. 251 
When Marshal Macdonald arrived at Perpignan on 22 May he saw that before he 
could begin active operations he must take up the laborious task of resupplying Barcelona. 
Since Augereau sent the last convoy in March, Barcelona had nearly exhausted its 
provisions and required another massive resupply convoy. 252 In June and July 1810, he 
dispatched two supply convoys, each escorted by at least two divisions, a third one in 
August, and a fourth in November.253 
He was now ready to begin active operations to support General Suchet's (Army 
of Aragon) conquest of Lower Catalonia. Personally escorting the third convoy to 
Barcelona with three divisions,254 totaling 13,000 troops, he left General Baraguey 
d'Hilliers in command of Upper Catalonia with, the Division Territoriale. 
2511bid; Six, Dictionnaire, 1 :48-49. 
252SHAT, C(l 7)9, Regie des Vivres Pain et Liquide Approvisiomement Extraordinaire, 
20 January 1809. 
253SHAT, C(8) 335, Register, Marshal Macdonald, Movement Orders, 10, 12, 1810, 
Continuation of Movement Order, 15 June 1810; C(8) 133, Register, Ordres, 2e Cahier, 
Marshal Macdonald, Movement Orders, 10, 12, 15, and 16 June 1810, Order of the Day 
17 June 1810, Movement Orders, 20, 21, 22, 23, 23 (No. 2), 23 (No. 3), 24, 25, and 25 
(No. 2) June 1810; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:311-312. 
254SHAT, C(8) 335, Register, Marshal Macdonald to General Frere, 31 July 1810, 
Macdonald to Ordonnateur en Chef Bourdon, 31 July 1810, Macdonald to Baraguey 
d'Hilliers 31 July 1810, Macdonald to Pignatelli, 1 August 1810. The escort divisions 
were those of General Pignatelli (2,154 men); Severoli (3,723 men); Frere (5,639 men). 
There is also a large headquarters element. The escort totaled 13,000 men. SHAT, C(8) 
362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 October 1810. 
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Once he resupplied Barcelona, Macdonald marched to Lerida and conferred with 
General Suchet, to map out the strategy for the coming campaign. They agreed that the 
Army of Aragon must undertake the successive sieges of Tarragona and Tortosa in 
accordance with Napoleon's 27 May order,255 while Macdonald covered Suchet and held 
the Catalan Army at bay. Macdonald took up covering positions near Lerida (HQ at 
Cervera) and sent Pignatelli's Division to escort Suchet's siege train. Macdonald then 
"settled" down to a grinding campaign of counter guerilla operations against the ever 
active insurgents. 256 On 9 September, for example, Macdonald sent Severoli's Division 
on a foraging expedition. The Sometenes continously harrased his march. He fended off 
repeated attacks, and destroyed the villages along his line at march. He returned ten days 
later carrying only wounded. 257 
The insurgents continuously harrassed Macdonald's positions, occasionally 
destroying a small detachment. The roads were so dangerous that he had to escort every 
detachment with large bodies of troops. A requisition detachment, for example, needed 
255CN, No. 16505, Napoleon to Berthier, 27 May 1810, 20:379. 
2560man, Peninsular War, 3:496; Louis Gabriel Suchet, Memoirs of the War in Spain. 
from 1808 to 1814, (London: Henry Culburn, 1829) 1:199-206. 
257Severoli encountered either deserted villages or fierce resistance. At one river 
crossing for example, 600 peasants barricaded and defended the bridge which Severoli 
cleared with a calvary charge. As he advanced, the Italian division looted and burned the 
deserted villages, whose populations abandoned them on the division's approach. Vaciani, 
Storia della Campagne, 2:618-620; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:496-497; SHAT~ C(8)276, 
Analyse du Rapport du 1 er Septembre 1810, Report, 22 September 1810, No. 4. 
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an escort of a hundred cavalry,258 a reconnaissance party needed 250 troopers. 259 An 
exasperated Macdonald began to employ the harsh methods of Marshal Augereau, to 
pacify the country. He burned villages and summarily executed guerrillas caught under 
arms.260 
The worst effect of the insurgent war was on French logistical support. Unable to 
depend on convoys from Barcelona to feed his corps, they became prisoners of their huge 
daily supply requirements. 261 Macdonald eked his supplies out of the nearly exhausted 
country and shared the dwindling stocks at Lerida, which also supported General Suchet's 
troops. 262 Unable to support his troops near Cervera by September, Macdonald dispersed 
258SHAT, C(8)129, CM, Tome I, Mai-Decembre 1810, Letter, Macdonald to 
Commandant du Quartier General Ducoudary, 2 September 1810; Order to Commandant 
Ducoudray, 3 September 1810. 
259lbid, Letter, Macdonald to Adjutant Commandant Guillement, 11 September 181 O; 
Letter, Macdonald to General Frere 19 September 1810. 
260General Frere at Cervera for example court martialed and hanged one insurgent, his 
village was fined 10,000 piastres and 2,000 sacks of grain. Ibid, Macdonald to General 
Frere, 20 September 1810; Macdonald to Adjutant Commandant Charroy, 21 September 
181 O; SHAT C(8)276, Analyses, Report No. 16, 23 September 181 O; Oman, Peninsular 
War, 3:496. 
261Macdonald's corps daily need were about 9,600 kg bread, 3,200 kg meat, 1,200 kg 
legumes, 3,200 liters of wine, 1,500 kg firewood, 5,500 kg hay and 9,500 kg oats. SHAT, 
C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 October 1810; C(8)398, Administration de la 
Guerre, Etat du Nombre des rations Allouees a chaque grade sur le pied de guerre a dater 
du ler Aofit 1810, 30 June 1810. 
262Don W. Alexander, Rod of Iron. French Counterinsurgency Policy in Aragon 
During the Peninsular War. (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc. 1985) 81. 
117 
his divisions further afield to facilitate supply.263 General Florentin, Baron Ficatier, 
commander of Macdonald's advanced guard brigade, had to get his subsistence from 
Lerida through the good offices of General Suchef64 who admitted the paucity of the 
country: " .... the plain of Tarragona, [is] so completely exhausted that they [Army of 
Catalonia] had the greatest... difficulty in subsisting even for a few days. "265 By mid-
August Macdonald's logistical situation deteriorated so badly that Napoleon ordered 
supply convoys from France to feed the Army of Catalonia. 266 
General O'Donnell, with his 6,400 man division added another problem to 
Macdonald's already full budget of troubles by mounting a destructive raid in Upper 
Catalonia in September. He attacked General Schwartzz's 2,717 man brigade of four 
battalions of the 5th and 6th Confederation of the Rhine. 267 General Schwartz occupied 
the coast with several small forts including 2,000 troops at La Bispal.268 
In a lightning attack on 13 September, O'Donnell attacked several coastal posts 
simultaneously to include General Schwartz's main body at La Bispal, capturing three 
263SHAT, C(8)129, CM, Macdonald to Colonel Delort, Commander, 24e Dragons, 31 
August 181 O; Macdonald to General Severoli, 31 August 1810; Macdonald to Ordonnateur 
en Chef Bourdon, 31 August 1810. 
264SHAT, C(8)276, Analysis, Reports Nos. 2 and 3, 22 September 1810. 
265Suchet, War in Spain, 1:202-203. 
266UCN, No. 4508, Decision, August 16 1810, 3:711. 
267The four battalions were the 1st, 2d - 5th and the 1 er, 2d - 6th Confederation of the 
Rhine regiments. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 October 1810. 
2680man, Peninsular War, 3:498. 
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German battalions (1,241 men), and the coastal posts of Palamos, Calonja and San Felieu. 
He captured the garrisons of the last two places whole. 269 O'Donnell even captured 
General Schwartz. This swift stroke destroyed Schwartz's brigade at a cost of only 
twenty-five casualties. O'Donnell quickly sailed to Tarragona with his prisoners eluding 
capture. 
Marshal Macdonald received news of this disaster two weeks later and though 
shaken, refused to leave his supportive positions in Lower Catalonia. He did, however, 
unsuccessfully attack one of O'Donnell's outlying divisions on 18 October. 270 General 
Baraguey d'Hilliers in Upper Catalonia had suffered a terrible loss, and could no longer 
protect the French communications with Barcelona. Macdonald then had to concentrate 
his divisions and return to Gerona to escort supplies to Barcelona in November. Baraquey 
d'Hilliers simply could not manage such an operation now. Once completed in mid-
December Macdonald returned to his supporting role to support Suchet.271 
269SHAT, C(8) 276, Analyses, Reports, No. 6, 14 September 1810; No. 7, 15 
September 1810; No. 3, and No. 5, 18 September 1810; No. 12, 20 September 1810; No. 
13, 21 September 1810; No. 15, 22 September 1810; and No. 1 and 2, 23 September 
1810; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 2:620-623; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:496-499; 
Lopez, Guerra de la lndependencia, 5:342-344; Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, 
9:273-278, 511-558; Carlos Martinez Valverde, La Marina en la Guerra de la 
Independencia (Madrid: Editoria Nacional, 1974) 133-135, 180. 
2700man, Peninsular War, 3:499-500; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 2:631-633; 
Lopez, Guerra de la lndependencia, 5:344; Napier, Peninsular War, 4:24-25. 
271 Vaciani, Storia della Campagne, 2:642. 
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§6. Restructure and Reduction of the Annee de Catalogne: The Campaign of 1811 
In December 1810, as Marshal Macdonald prepared to support General Suchet's 
siege of Tortosa, 272 the Army of Catalonia continued to expand to 59,232 men and 4,808 
horses, reflecting a growth of 21. 75%, though only 60% of these troops were in the 
l . 273 me. 
That winter, Macdonald suffered several military disasters. A Catalan force, in 
December 1810, surprised and cut to pieces a 650 man French cavalry foraging party. 274 
On 6 January 1811, the Catalan general, Sarsfield inflicted a sharp defeat upon General 
Polombini's Neapolitan division, near Valls. Polombini attacked the Catalan division but 
Sarsfield routed the leading Neapolitan Brigade throwing it back onto the oncoming 
second brigade. Only a timely charge of the 24th Dragoons saved the division from a 
disaster with a loss of 600 men. 275 
The Emperor, meanwhile, was displeased with Macdonald's failure to subdue 
Catalonia, or offer effective support to General Suchet. Consequently, he reassigned most 
of Lower Catalonia (Lerida, Tortosa and Tarragona) to Such et after the fall of Tortosa, 276 
272Marshal Macdonald supported General Suchet's III Corps with the three divisions, 
of Generals Frere, Pignatelli, and Pino, and two brigades totaling 16,966 men. SHAT, 
C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1810. 
273Ibid. This included 35,645 men and 3,274 horses present under arms; 5,010 men 
and 1,534 horses detached; 14,907 men in hospital and 3,231 men as prisoners of war. 
2740man, Peninsular War, 4:241. 
2750man, Peninsular War, 4:240-243; Napier, Peninsula War. 4:46-47; Vaciani, Storia 
della Campagne, 2:712-713. 
276CN, No. 17443, Napoleon to Berthier, 9 March 1811, 21:456. 
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transferred Macdonald's three divisions of Generals Frere, Pino and Pignatelli, some 
20,000 troops to the III Corps, to form a new Army of Aragon. This massive and 
humiliating force reduction slashed the strength of the Army of Catalonia by 34.9% to 
38,797 men.277 Marshal Macdonald swallowed this bitter pill and put a good face on 
it. 278 As Macdonald transferred this large detachment to Suchet, he continued to fight the 
counterinsurgent war. It was so bad that his 10 March trip to Barcelona required a 
division sized personal escort (7,700 men). 279 
This was, however, just a prelude to a catastrophe, which upset the whole strategic 
balance of the province, set the war effort back nearly a year, and virtually destroyed 
Marshal Macdonald's command. The Catalan insurgents surprised and captured the 
277These three transferred divisions were General Frere's French division with 7,987 
men, Pino's Italian division with 10,285 men and Pignatelli's Neapolitan division with 
2,163 men. The whole totaled 20,435 men and 1,648 horses. SHAT C(8)370, Situation, 
Armee de Catalone, 1 December 181 O; CN No. 17443, Napoleon to Berthier 9 March 
1811, 21:456457. 
Marshal Berthier, wrote to General Suchet: 
The Emperor has just determined that the Government of Aragon ... shall be 
augmented by the provinces of Tortosa, Lerida, and Tarragona ... all the troops 
forming part of the active Army of Catalonia shall pass immediately to your 
command. 
Suchet, War in Spain, 2:3-4. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:485. 
278Marechal Macdonald, Souvenirs du Marechal Macdonald. Due de Tarente, (Paris: 
Librairie Pion, 1892). 176. Suchet, War in Spain, 2:3; David Chandler, Napoleon's 
Marshals, (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 238. 
279SHAT, C(8)133, Ordres du Jour et de Mouvements, 2eme Cahier, Ordres de 
Mouvements du mois de Mars 1811, Ordre (Movement) 26 March 1811; Oman, 
Peninsular War, 4:485-486; Vaciani, Storia della Campagne, 3:37-41. 
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fortress of Figueras, one of the best fortified posts in Europe, and (with Gerona) was a 
major nexus of communications. 280 
In March, Marshal Macdonald divided the Army of Catalonia into two Corps, the 
20,000 man Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne under General Baraguey d'Hilliers, who 
found counter insurgent operations and military governorship in Catalonia far more trying 
than in the Tyrol where he won his spurs;281 and the smaller Barcelona command. The 
Army still, however, retained its active field and garrison/territorial commands.282 The 
Corps in Upper Catalonia had one active division, three separate brigades, two 
Arrondissement commands, artillery and engineers. It also received a new division, under 
General Fran~ois-Jean Baptiste, Baron Quesnel du Torpt (1765-1821),283 not yet arrived, 
had 7,215 troops. 284 The three separate brigades were those of General Clement with 
2,617 men, General Simon, Baron Lefebvre (1768-1822) with 1,686 men, and General 
Charles Dumoulin (1768-1847) with 4,034 men. The whole Corps totaled 15,554 
troops. 285 
280General de Brigade Guillot's garrison had two battalions 4e- l 6e Ligne and Bataillon 
Westphalien totaling 865 troops, and eleven depots with another 1,985. SHAT C(8)370, 
Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne, 15 March 1811. 
281 Six, Dictionnaire Biographique, 1 :48-49; Robert M. Epstein, Prince Eugene At War. 
1809, Napoleon's Commanders Series, (Arlington, Tx: Empire Press, 1984), 67-68. 
282SHA T C(8)3 70, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne, 15 March 1811. 
283Six. Dictionnaire, 2:338-339. 
284See Table 19. SHAT C(8)3 70, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne, 15 
March 1811. 
285lbid. 
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The Garrison units included the 1 er Arrondissement Territorial at Figueras with 
2,850 men, with two battalions of mostly raw depot recruits, under General Florentin, 
Baron Guillot (1759-1818). 286 ANd the 2e Arrondissement Territorial at Gerona, 
commanded by Adjutant Commandant Molard had two battalions, and nine regimental 
depots, totaling 1,405 men. 287 Finally, the corps artillery and engineers were distributed 
amongst the units of the corps. 288 This corps had 15,812 men and 731 horses or 78.4% 
of its strenth present under arms, and a total effective corps strength of 20,149 men and 
749 horses.289 
One of the most remarkable actions of the war, was the fall of Figueras. It had 
enormous implications on the war effort. Its psychological effect was similar to the fall 
of Stalingrad on the German high command in 1943. It shook the French command in 
Catalonia to its foundation and altered both the structure of the Army of Catalonia and 
its operational scheme for months. 
The daring and resourceful Catalan guerrilla leader, Captain Andres Rovira bribed 
three Catalan Afrancescados290 employed in the garrison supply section as storekeepers 
to supply duplicate keys to a postem gate and to the supply magazines. At midnight on 
286See Table 19; Ibid. 
288lbid. 
289lbid. 
290An Afrancescado is the Spanish collaboration with the French. Gabriel H. Lovett, 
Napoleon and the Birth of Modem Spain, Vol. 2, The Struggle Without and Within (New 
York University: New York University Press), 555. 
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9 April 1811 Rovira sent 700 insurgents supported by a regular Catalan division into the 
main fortress of San Femando291 and captured the garrison in a single surprise stroke, 
literally in their beds, including the commander, General Guillot. Only an Italian Batallon 
de Marche quartered in the town of Figueras escaped to Bascara. 292 General Baraguey 
d'Hilliers, apprized of this disaster, reinforced this battalion and sent it back to observe 
Figueras. By 17 April, he had concentrated 7,000 troops there and invested the fort. 293 
When Marshal Macdonald received the news of the catastrophe at Figuras he 
immediately applied to General Suchet for reinforcements,294 to stiffen the 16,000 men he 
had in Upper Catalonia. The only immediately available troops were Quesnel's division 
291 The three men were Juan Marquez, Commissaire des Guerres Bouclier's servant, 
and the brothers Gines and Pedro Pons. Oman, Peninsula War, 4:491-492; Napier, 
Peninsular War, 3:59-61; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:47-50. 
292The reports and correspondence on the Siege of Figueras in the SHAT is quite 
extensive. These include registers C(7)* 18, No. 11, Correspondance au sujet de la 
reddition du fort de Figueras du 1 er aofit 1811 au 6 fevrier 1812; C(8) 282, Armee de 
Catalogne, Etat Major General, Correspondance Generale, No. 3, 15 February 1811to31 
July 1811; C(8) 3 82, Correspondance Generale No. 4, 1 August to 31 August 1811; C(8) 
131, CM, Tome III, March 1811 to March 1812; C(8) 132, CM, Tome V, May 1810 to 
October 1811. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:492-493; David Gates, The Spanish Ulcer: A 
History of the Peninsular War, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1986), 301-302; 
Napier, Peninsular War, 3:221-223; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:47-50. 
2930man, Peninsular War, 4:492-493. 
294Macdonald wrote: 
the service of the Emperor requires imperatively and without delay, the 
most speedy succour; otherwise Upper Catalonia is lost. Send me all the 
troops of Catalonia which have been transferred to you. 
Suchet, War in Spain, 2: 13-14. General Maurice-Mathieu, governor of Barcelona sent a 
similar dispatch to the commander at Lerida: "All is lost in Upper Catalonia unless 
General Suchet sends the troops that have passed under our command to our succour, 
Suchet, War in Spain, 2: 14. 
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of 12,641 troops, concentrating in the lOe Division Militaire. 295 While Baraguey d'Hilliers 
scrambled to concentrate a besieging force, Rovira threw another 3,000 troops into San 
Fernando and mounted several raids to keep the French off balance. 296 The whole of 
Upper Catalonia was now abuzz with military activity. 
Once Napoleon received news of the sudden fall of the Figueras, he undoubtedly 
flew into a towering rage but took swift action to lance yet another boil in Spain. He 
immediately dispatched two new divisions from France. The first division under General 
Louis Auguste Narchand, Baron de Plauzonne (1774-1812)297 from Provence 4,380 
troops. 298 The second, the Division de Cerdagne from Lanquedoc was under General 
Jean-Maximilien, Comte Lamarque (1770-1832) immortalized in Victor Hugo's Les 
Miserables.299 The reinforcements flowed into Upper Catalonia to retake Figueras.300 
295SHAT C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 15 March 1811. 
296Rovira's troops attacked Olot and Castelfollit capturing 548 troops, the Royal Navy 
raided Rosas and Palamos and swarms of Sametenes demonstrated against Hostalrich and 
Gerona. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:492-493; Napier, Peninsula War, 4:61-62. SHAT, C(8) 
3 70, Situations, Corps en Haute-Catalogne, I May 1811, 16 May 1811, and I June 1811. 
297Six. Dictionnaire, 2:318. 
298Division Plauzonne had four battalions of the 3e Leger, three battalions of the I le 
Leger and a battalion of the 32e Leger. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:642. 
299Six, Dictionnaire, 2:42. Henry Lachouque, Jean Tranie and J-C Carmignaini, 
Napoleon's War in Spain, trans. J.S. Mallender and Lide Beaufort, (London: Arms and 
Armour Press, 1982) 163. 
300Brigade Petit had the 4e-16e Ligne, ler, 2e, 3e, 4e-67e Ligne, 4e-8le Ligne, and 
Brigade Lefebvre had the 4e-8e Leger, 4e-37e Ligne, ler-Westphalien and 3e-24e 
Dragons. See Table 29. SHAT C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne, 
1August1811; Oman, Peninsular War, 4:492-493, 642; CN, No. 17644, Napoleon to 
General Clarke, 23 April 1811, 22:103; No. 17693, Napoleon to General Clarke, 4 May 
1811, 22: 142. Division Plauzonne had the 3e Leger, I le Ligne, 79e Ligne, 67e Ligne and 
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As reinforcements began to arrive, General Baraguey d'Hilliers opened the siege. 
The insurgent leader General Campoverde with 9,000 men tried on 20 May to force a 
1,200 mule supply column through the French cordon into the fortress, but Baraguey 
d'Hilliers, however, concentrated, drove off the Catalan raid and captured the whole 
convoy. 301 By the end of May the promised divisions poured into Catalonia. Marshal 
Macdonald also arrived from Barcelona with a few battalions, and General Quesnel sent 
several more. 302 Macdonald then took personal command of the corps and the siege. 
The Emperor meanwhile enjoined Macdonald to not only retake Figueras, but 
continue to assist Suchet's operations in Lower Catalonia. 303 This was clearly an 
unrealistic expectation for Macdonald simply did not have the strength to accomplish this 
double task. He did, however, ponderously besiege Figueras establishing complete lines 
16e Leger. 
301 Campoverde's initial attack fell on the 3e Leger which retreated into the town of 
Figueras. Its commander, Colonel Ruffin, cleverly negotiated an involved capitulation 
negotiation with the Catalan general allowing Baraguey d'Hilliers sufficient time to 
counter attack. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:494-495; Napier, Peninsula War, 4:62-63; 
Vaciani, Storia della Campagne, 3:59-60; CN, No. 17715, Napoleon to Berthier, 12 May 
1811, 22:154. 
302Macdonald brought the lere, 2e-5e Ligne and Det-102e Ligne. General Quesnel 
sent battalions of the 3e, 60e, 81e, and 93e Ligne. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps 
d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 15 March 1811; C(8) 282, Correspondance Generale, No. 
3, Macdonald to General Clarke, 25 May 1811, Macdonald to General Beauremann, 28 
May 1811; Macdonald to General Taviel, 1 June 1811; and Macdonald to General 
Quesnel, 1 June 1811. 
303CN, No. 17799, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 June 1811, 22:231; No. 17811, 
Napoleon to General Suchet, 14 June 1811, 22:239-240. 
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of circumvallation304 and contravallation, 305 protective structures first used by Julius Caesar 
at the seige of Alesia in 52 B.C.,306 but not since the War of the Spanish succession. 
Through June and July Macdonald tightened the investment, hoping to starve the garrison 
out, and only put batteries within 500 yards of the ramparts. Lacking sufficient artillery, 
he only blockaded the Figueras despite Napoleon's orders to conduct a vigorous siege.307 
Indeed, he had only 44 heavy cannon, though sufficient ammunitions, with 79,699 solid 
shot, and 89,543 kg of powder.308 
304A line of circumvallation is a belt of field works facing outward, about two miles 
from and encircling the besieged fortress. They are designed to defend the besieging army 
and its siege works from outside interference. Hector Straith, Treatise on Fortification and 
Artillery, 7th Ed. (London: Wm H. Allen, 1858) 7; H.L. Scott, Military Dictionary 
Comprising Definitions and Information on Raising and Keeping Troops: Actual Service. 
including makeshifts and improved materiel: and Law. Government. Regulation. and 
Administration relating to Land Forces. (D. Van Norstrand, 1861; reprint New York, 
Greenwood Press, 1968) 610. 
305 A line of contravallation is a belt of field works facing inward encircling the 
besieged fortress to defend the besieging army and its siege works from interference from 
the besieged garrison. Straith, Treatise on Fortification, 18. 
306Etienne Macdonald, Due de Tarente, Souvenirs, (Paris: Librairie Pion, 1891) 177; 
Julius Cesar, The Gallic War, trans., H.J. Edwards, The Loeb Classical Library, ed. T.E. 
Page (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) 483-487. 
307Macdonald, Recollections, 2: 187-188. 
308Thirty-nine cannon were bronze, and could only tolerate a low rate of fire without 
ddrooping of the tubes. John T. Jones, Journals of Sieges Carried on by the Army Under 
the Duke of Wellington in Spain During the Years 1811 to 1814, Ed. H. D. Jones 
(London: John Weale, 1846) 1:352. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation Corps d'Armee en Haute-
Catalogne, 16 June 1811. Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne, 1 August 1811. 
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During the blockade, the French troops slowly wasted away to the intense mid-
summer heat and malarial fevers admist the unsanitary conditions of the lines.309 Despite 
these difficulties, and Napoleon's impatient urging, Macdonald continued his policy of 
slow starvation. Refusing to open trenches, he reinforced his ever tightening lines. By 
mid-July his strategy began to pay off, for the Catalan commander, General Martinez, 
unable to feed his 850 prisoners any longer, released them only keeping General Guillot 
and the officers as hostages. 310 Within the next month the Catalan garrison consumed the 
last provisions and began eating the horses, dogs and even the rats. 311 
Once the provisions were exhausted, Martinez led his whole garnson m an 
unsuccessful attack to break through the French lines. The assault collapsed on the line 
of circumvallation, and Martinez fell back into San Fernando and remained until he 
capitulated on 19 August, surrendering his 3,000 man garrison. This not very violent 
siege took a toll of 1,500 Catalans killed, 1,000 hospitalized and 4,000 French casualties 
mostly to illness. Macdonald hanged the only one of the original conspirators he caught, 
Jean Martinez. 312 Finally, the newly repatriated General Guillot, utterly disgraced, was 
309The climate and conditions took a particularly heavy toll on the newly conscripted 
Gardes Nationaux. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:536-538. 
31
°Ibid. 
311Ibid; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:233-239; Napier, Peninsula War, 5: 110-111. 
3120man, Peninsular War, 4:538-539; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:237-239; 
Napier, Peninsular War, 5:110-111; SHAT, C(8)283, Armee de Catalogne, 
Correspondance Generale 1-31 Aout 1811, Macdonald to General Lefebvre, 19 August 
1811; Macdonald to Commandant Cassabianca, 19 August 1811; Macdonald to General 
Baraguey d'Hillers; 19 August 1811; Macdonald to Adjutant Commandant Vigier, 19 
August 1811; C(17)* 18, No. 11, Correspondance, various pieces. 
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tried by Imperial Order at an extraordinary court martial and condemned to death for 
culpable negligence and stripped of his rank and titles. 313 
While Macdonald was mired down at Figueras the freshly minted Marshal Suchet 
invaded the unpacified portions of Lower Catalonia, opened up communications between 
Barcelona and Macdonald at Figueras, captured the mountain monastery strongpoint of 
Monteserrat, and cleared the countryside of insurgents.314 Suchet's hard won victories 
were, however, checked by another daring coup of the ever active Catalan insurgents, 
showing him too, the difficulties that Macdonald suffered under. Captain General Luis 
Lacy, after levying troops for a new (though incomplete) army, conducted a destructive 
raid across the French frontier into the Cerdagne in August. Napoleon threw a fit of 
rage315 when he got the news, and turned his displeasure not only on Macdonald but on 
Suchet too, chiding the new Marshal for not cooperating more fully with Macdonald by 
covering the siege of Figueras. 316 
The country side was still alive with insurgents, even within a few miles of 
Macdonald's lines. They raised contributions on nearby towns317 and attacked every 
313Typically, Napoleon forgave General Guillot, (like he forgave General Dupont for 
the Balien disaster in 1808) pardoned him, and even restored his rank, titles and gave him 
another command. AN, AFIV1158, General Clarke, Report, 3 December 1813. 
3140man, Peninsular War, 4:530-535, Suchet, War in Spain, 2: 109-11 O; Vacani, Storia 
della Campagne, 3:222; Napier, Peninsular War, 5:103-106 
3150man, Peninsular War, 4:539. 
316CN, No. 18006, Napoleon to Berthier, 22 August 1811, 22:429-430. 
317SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne, I August 1811. 
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convoy coming from Perpignan. 318 For example, the 
captive Catalan garrison of Figueras needed an escort of two brigades, numbering 4,500 
troops, in two brigades. 319 
Macdonald restructured the Army of Catalonia for the siege of Figueras. He 
reorganized the Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogue in three parts; an active division, siege 
brigades, and Arrondissement commands. It centered around four Brigades du Blocus 
which carried on the siege. It numbered 10,923 troops and 216 horses present under 
arms. The 1 er and 2e Brigades du Blocus under General Louis Marchand de Plauzonne 
(1774-1812) had 1,908 and 2,191 troops respectively, the 3e Brigade du Blocus under 
Colonel Jean Martin, Baron Petit (1772-1856) with 2,364 troops, and General Lefebvre's 
4e Brigade du Blocus had 1,432 men. 320 
General Quesnel's Division Active was the offensive arm and numbered 4,434 
troops in two brigades. A separate brigade, the Brigade de Reserve, under General Louis, 
Baron Garreau (1769-1813) added to the offensive field forces with 1,151 men. The third 
portion of the Corps was the two Arrondissements Territoriaux, the ler Arrondissement 
Territorial at Rosas under Chef de Bataillon Baudy, (620 men), and the 2e 
318SHAT, C(8)283, Correspondance Generale, Macdonald to General Beuremann, 17 
August 1811. 
319SHA T C(8) 283, Correspondance, Marshal Macdonald to General Lefebvre, 19 
August 1811; Macdonald to Chef de Bataillon Casabianca, Commander, 6e Legion de 
Gendarmerie, 19 August 1811; Macdonald to the Colonel General of Dragoons, 19 August 
1811; Macdonald to Adjutant Commandant Vigier, 19 August 1811; C(8) 370, Situation, 
Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne, 1 August 1811. 
320SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogue, !August 1811. 
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Arrondissement Territorial of Gerona, under Adjutant Commandant Molard, (1,725 
men).321 A third Arrondissement Territorial at Figueras was reestablished after its 
recapture. The Corps totaled, including the Gendarmerie and artillery 25,290 troops 
(1,442 horses). 322 
As we have seen, Napoleon was greatly displeased with Marshal Macdonald's 
military performance. In September 1811, this was again brought to the fore when 
Captain General Lacy delivered a series of daring attacks, including his capture of the 
island of Medas in the mouth of the Ter River, a raid on Palamos, the levy a heavy 
contribution on the populace and attacking a large French convoy. In October, he 
captured Iqualada with its 200 man garrison, attacked another French supply convoy, 
captured Cervera taking 645 French prisoners and the 150 man French garrison at 
Belpuig. He even cut French communication between Lerida and Barcelona.323 
321 See Table 29, Ibid. One of its battalions was the Chasseurs de Montagne, which 
Napoleon ordered imprisoned in Gerona and replaced with the 2e Gendarmerie Catalogne 
a cheval; "mette dans Ia place de Girone des Gendarmes Catalans apres ce qui lui est 
arrive a Figueras par la trahison des Catalans", CN, No. 17644, Napoleon to General 
Clarke, 23 April 1811, 22: 103. 
32218,319 troops ( 1, 178 horses) present under arms; 72.44 % of its total effective 
strength. There were 1,291 detached troops (264 horses) (5.1%) and 4,793 men in 
hospital or 18.95%. Prisoners of War were General Guillet's troops taken in April and 
there were 33 troops furloughed. In January 1810 there was 16,342 troops in the hospital 
out of a total effective strength of 44,552. This rate included the 26,459 troops present 
under arms making 59.39% of the VII Corps strength. SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII 
Corps, 1 January 1810; C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 
1811. 
3230man, Peninsular War, 4:540-541; Napier, Peninsular War, 5:276; SHAT C(8)370, 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 September 1811. 
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Completely dissatisfied with Marshal Macdonald's conduct of the war,324 Napoleon 
relieved him and appointed in his place General Charles-Mathieu-Isidore Decaen (1769-
1832),325 recently military governor of the French colonies in India (1801-1810), having 
returned to France after a futile though heroic attempt to defend them against the English 
invasion of 1810. He was a talented officer and an old hand at military governship. 
He assumed command of the Army of Catalonia on 20 October 1811, and was 
immediately confronted with the Catalan raid into the French Cerdagne of the previous 
August,326 and all of the humiliating string of defeats Lacy inflicted on the French 
command there in September and October at lqualada, Cervera and Belpuig. The 
insurgents continued to harass French movements throughout the province. 327 General 
Decaen had a nearly impossible task before him. The Army could make little headway 
in pacifying the province, split between a occupation and field force, and his formidable 
logistical burden drained his troops, money and time. 
324Napoleon's opinion of Macdonald was: "He was a reliable man, good to command 
between 15,000 and 20,000 men. Brave but slow and lazy." Chandler, Napoleon's 
Marshals, lvi. Marshal Macdonald was physically incapable of continued command due 
to severe gout and fever: "ou bientot apres a la suite demon acces de goute, je fus atteint 
par la fievre. Hors d'etat d'exercer le commandement, je demandai un successeur, qui me 
fut accorde; je rentrai en France et me rendis a Paris. Jene pouvais encore marcher qu'a 
l'aide de deux bequilles." Macdonald, Souvenirs, 179. 
325Six, Dictionnaire, 1:301-303; Napoleon wrote to the Minister of War, "donnez le 
commandement de l'Armee de Catalogne au General Decaen", CN, Napoleon to General 
Clarke, 3 October 1811, Supplement: 152-153. 
3260man, Peninsular War, 4:539. CN No. 18066, Napoleon to Berthier, 22 August 
1811, 22:429-420. 
3270man, Peninsular War, 4:541; SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 
November 1811. 
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The Emperor was now, after the disasters of 1811, unwilling to support General 
Decaen's efforts and preferred to "subsidize" Marshal Suchet's successes in Lower 
Catalonia. He halved the size of the Army of Catalonia. In the face of this reduction, 
Decaen could barely field a weak division, and could only reinforce a garrison or field 
force by dangerously reducing other parts of the Army. 328 
Captain General Lacy, could now bring more troops to bear than Decaen, placing 
the French command on the permanent defensive.329 Naturally, Lacy exploited his tactical 
advantage and again raided the French Cerdagne on 29 October 1811. He defeated two 
French National Guard battalions, requisitioned thousands of sheep, and cattle, and levied 
money contributions from the Pyrenean villages. A furious Napoleon, disappointed yet 
again in his command in Eastern Spain, levied more National Guards to secure the 
frontier. 330 
By the end of the year, General Decaen occupied his meager forces in holding 
down the rebellious countryside and staving off Lacy's depredations such as the 
amphibious landing of Catalan corsairs at Palamos which the French garrison (2e-3e 
Leger) barely held off until rescued by General Lamarque's Division. 331 General Decaen's 
328SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. 
3290man summed the matter up well, "Catalonia could only be held down by 
garrisoning every village, and if the Army of occupation split itself into garrisons it was 
helpless." Oman, Peninsular War, 5:93. 
330CN, No. 18531, Napoleon to General Clarke, 29 February 1812, 23:262-263; 
Napoleon to Berthier, 8 March 1812, 23-296; Oman, Peninsular War, 5:93. 
331 SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1812. 
133 
other endemic worry, was supplying Barcelona, and he sent it a large supply convoy, 
escorted by Lamarque's Division. 332 
By December 1811, the Army of Catalonia, still recovering from the siege of 
Figueras, reverted back to the original structure of active and the territorial commands. 
The active division, Division Lamarque, contained about half of the Army, with some 
10,000 troops, and the Arrondissement portion was slightly larger.333 
The active division had three brigades, with only eight regiments strong enough 
to take the field. The rest could only be swept together into larger units. Furthermore, 
3,975 men (36.3%) were in the hospital, leaving only 5,960 men (54.4%) present under 
arms.334 
The second half of the Army, the ler Arrondissement Territorial at Mont-Louis 
under General Garreau, was a five battalion brigade of 2,595 troops of which only 1,619 
were available (62.3%). The second and largest was the 2e Arrondissement Territorial 
at Figueras. A division level command of General Quesnel, it had, two brigades, totaling 
6,448 men, but only had available 49.6% of its strength or 3,201 troops, whereas 42.3% 
(2,752 men) were in the hospital. The 3e Arrondissement Territorial at Gerona was a 
brigade sized element commanded by Adjudant Commandant Dumolard with 2,488 men. 
3320man, Peninsular War, 5:94. 
333See Table 20; SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. 
334See Table 30; Ibid. 
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There were 61.4% or 1,526 men of the force were available for operations, and 952 men 
or 38.2% in the hospital.335 
One of the unique aspects of the Army's organization at this juncture is the 
centralization of the artillery gendarmerie and engineers at Army level. The artillery had 
721 men in the ranks.336 The engineers had, with 77 men (49.3%) in the ranks, and the 
6e Legion de Gendarmerie had 794 men ( 68.4%) in the ranks. 337 
The Army of Catalonia totaled 24,740 men and 1,660 horses, of which 13,900 men 
(56.1%) were able to take the field. The army had 35.7% of its strength unavailable, 
including 8,738 men in hospital. 338 Since barely 60% of the army was capable of taking 
the field, it could not hold its own against the larger Catalan formations or lend any 
effective support to General Suchet. The Siege of Figueras inflicted grave losses upon 
the army, and seriously affected its ability to prosecute the war. Napoleon's further force 
reduction was far more damaging. General Decaen faced a difficult task as the new 
commander. He "occupied" a rebellious province with insufficient troops and could only 
look forward to a difficult campaign of 1812. 
335Ibid. 
336Present under arms. Ibid. 
337Ibid. 
338Ibid. 
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§7. Stabilization and Second Front: The Campaign of 1812 
The Army of Catalonia expanded its operational sphere in 1812, for Napoleon 
incorrectly perceived the imminent collapse of Spanish resistance there as was evidenced 
by several insurgent defeats. 339 He reinforced the defense of the Pyrenees frontier 
activating 45,000 National Guards in four Pyrenean departments, and the 1 Oe Division 
Militaire mobilized eleven (900 man) elite battalions (bataillons d'elite) totaling 10,800 
troops.340 This "mobilization" immediately brought nearly two divisions to bear on the 
Catalan frontier but nothing to the Army of Catalonia. 
Napoleon retained two of Decaen's old divisions, (Divisions Polombini and 
Severoli), in the Army of Aragon341 and organized a four division corps under General 
339Napoleon wrote: " ... que le General Decaen est parti pour secourir Barcelone et 
Pera tout ce qui sera possible ... " CN, No. 18267, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 19 
November 1811, 23:21-22. 
340Napoleon's disposition of these troops were outlined in his letter to General Clarke: 
Les deux bataillons d'elite des Pyrenees-Orientales seront places a Mont-
Louis et en avant de Perpigan; les deux de l'Ariege, deux de la Haute-
Garonne, quatre des quatre departements de 2e Ligne, total huit, seront 
sous les ordres directs du Senateur, a Foix, et seront charges de la defense 
de l'Ariege et du val d'Aran; les deux bataillons des haute Pyrenees seront 
places a Venasque, dans le val d'Aran et sur tout autre point voisin. II y 
aura done sur cette frontiere 6,000 hommes, gardes nationales, armes, 
10,000 delite, en tout 16,000, uniquement charges de la defense des 
frontieres. 
CN, No. 18309, Napoleon to General Clarke, 6 December 1811, 23:54-55. 
341Division Polimbini had 6,000 men and Division Severoli had 5,000 men. The 
whole formed a Corps of 21,000 men with 1,500 cavalry. CN, No. 18398, Napoleon to 
Marshal Berthier, 30 December 1811, 23:134-140. 
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Reille. 342 Napoleon posted this new Corps d'Armee de l'Ebre 
in Aragon to maintain order in General Suchet's rear, assist General Decaen in 
provisioning Barcelona and maintain communications with Valencia and Portugal. 343 
Finally, he planned to send this corps to reinforce General Decaen's forces to subdue 
Lower Catalonia. 344 
These plans generated two changes in the organization of the government, and the 
structure of the Army of Catalonia. Napoleon divided Catalonia into four departments,345 
342Napoleon outlined the corps mission: 
maintenir la tranquilite dans le pays, approv1s1onner fortement 
Barcelone ... 11 maintiendra la communication avec l'Armee de Valence, avec 
celle de Portugal ... avec celle du centre ... et protegera Aragon. II aura pour 
instruction d'avoir toujours une OU deux divisions placees de maniere a 
appuyer fortement l'Armee de Portugal... 
Ibid, 23:136-140. 
3431bid, 23:139. CN, No. 18267, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 19 November 1811, 
23:21-22; No. 18310, Napoleon to General Clarke, 6 December 1811, 23:56; No. 18373, 
Napoleon to General Clarke, 26 December 1811, 23:110-111; No. 18386, Napoleon to 
General Lacuee, 29 December 1811, 23: 125-129; No. 18424, Napoleon to Vice-Amiral 
Comte Decres, Ministre de la Marine, 9 January 1812, 23: 162. 
344Napoleon ordered, 11 ••• reiterez-lui (General Decaen) les ordres de manoeuver de 
maniere a inquieter par Vich ou Rippol l'ennemi sur Braga, et de se concerter pour cette 
operation avec le General Reille ... 11 CN, No. 18531, Napoleon to General Clarke, 29 
February 1812, 23:260-263; Oman, Peninsular War, 5:97. 11 Avec ces quatre divisions, ii 
doit soumettre definitivement toute la Basse-Catalogne, maintenir la tranouilite en Aragon 
et pouvoir s'occuper de !'organisation de ce pays. 11 CN, No. 18452, Napoleon to Berthier, 
25 January 1812, 23:185-186. 
34511Vous trouverez ci-joint le decret par lequel la Catalogne est organisee en quatre 
departements ... 11 Ibid. The Emperor even sent French Intendants to 11 ••• mettre de la 
Regularite dans !'administration. 11 of Catalonia. These administrators, the direct 
representatives of the Emperor, commanders were obliged to assist them in administration. 
CN, No. 18502, Napoleon to General Clarke, 18 February 1812, 23:228. 
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and organized a National Guard division to protect the French frontier to discourage 
continued Catalan insurgent operations there. 346 
Headquartered at Toulouse, this division347 drew troops from the (I le Division 
Militaire) and other frontier units including a regimental cadre of conscrits refractaires,348 
and 3,500 conscripts of the premier ban de la garde nationale de la lOe Division Militaire, 
the Bataillon de Wurtzbourg, and the sweepings from Fort Mont-Louis. It had a 
provisional cavalry brigade of 1,220 men, artillery and engineers, the whole totaling 9,000 
men. This division also had a large admixture of troops drawn from the National Guard 
Cohorts of the 9e, lOe, and I le Divisions Militaire. It concentrated at Tarbes, Foix, 
Mont-Louis, and Toulouse to cover the French frontier. 349 
From February to July 1812 in Catalonia, General Decaen, enmeshed in the 
counter-insurgent war was spread far too thin to obey Napoleon's orders and assist 
346 
II ••• qui mette une fois pour toutes mes frontieres a l'abri des incursions des 
brigands" CN, No. 18531, Napoleon to General Clarke, 29 February 1812, 23:260-263. 
In February 1812, the insurgent leader Sarsfield made yet another serious raid into France, 
Departement de I' Arriege, capturing the town of F oix ( 19 February) and raising a 
contribution of 70,000 dollars. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:99. On March 8, Napoleon 
fired a furious dispatch to Marshal Berthier: " ... renouvelez l'ordre au General Reille de 
se porter sur Berga et sur la Cerdagne fran~aise pour deloger les insurges. II n'est que 
trop vrai qu'ils se nourrissent de France, et qu'ils sont cantonnes a Puycerda, d'ou ils ne 
bougent point." CN, No. 18557, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 8 March 1812, 23:296. 
347CN, No. 18351, Napoleon to Clarke, 29 February 1812, 23:260-263. 
348lbid. Conscrits refractaires or deserted conscripts, when apprehended were thrown 
into eleven companies; strictly disciplined, given extra drill and partial pay. When not 
on duty, they worked as laborers on French fortifications. By 1810, these units over 
flowed and Napoleon organized four Disciplinary Regiments. Elting, Swords Around a 
Throne, 436. 
349Ibid. 
138 
General Reille in a new offensive. Decaen had more pressing problems within Catalonia. 
An insurgent raid into France that February then derailed the Emperor's plans, forcing him 
to divert Reille's divisions to reinforce the frontier defense.350 Decaen parried Catalan 
attacks on Mataro and Olot, General Lacy's attempt to poison the Barcelona flour supply 
on July 12,351 the bomb in the powder magazines at Lerida on July 16 and a naval 
bombardment of Mataro. 352 
Unlike the war, the army's force structure stabilized in the first half of 1812. It 
retained the same general structure as in 1811, with an active field division, three 
Arrondissements Territorial, and army assets (gendarmerie, artillery, and engineers). 
Division Lamarque, had 12,503 men. The ler Arrondissement Territorial at Mont-Louis 
had 1,119 men, while the 2e Arrondissement Territorial at Figueras and 3e 
Arrondissement Territorial at Gerona had 6,448 and 2,396 men respectively. 353 
Overall, the Army in January 1812 had 30 battalions, six squadrons, artillery and 
engineers with 17,620 men present under arms, 6,876 men in the hospital, and a total 
effective strength of 24,906 men and 1, 791 horses. 354 
35
°CN, No. 18557, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 8 March 1812, 23:276; Oman, 
Peninsular War, 5:563-564. 
351 AN, AFIV 1158, Bureau de la Police Militaire, General Clarke Rapport a Empereur, 
23 January 1813. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:341. 
3520man, Peninsular War, 5:564. 
353SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811; C(8)371, 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1812. 
354The Army's overall strength rose by 166 men from 24,740 to 24,906, a mere 0.7%. 
Its strength present under arms rose 21.1%; (3,720) men from 13,900. Similarly, hospital 
inmates dropped 21.3%, from 8,737 to 6,876 men. These declines in the numbers of 
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Within the next six months, General Decaen again restructured his army, along 
familiar lines. He established the Division de Basse-Catalogne under General David-
Maurice-Joseph, Comte Mathieu de Saint Maurice (1768-1833 ). It included the garrisons 
of Barcelona, Lerida, and Tarragona. He also formed a new field division, the Division 
de Segre, under General Quesnel, out of the old ler Arrondissement Territorial.355 
The long established Division en Haute-Catalogne, under General Lamarque 
underwent both structural alterations and strength reductions when it absorbed the 2e and 
3e Arrondissements Territoriaux, of Figueras and Gerona. The Division had 13,799 men 
under arms, 2,360 in the hospital and a total effective strength of 16,361 men. Its 
effective strength actually decreased 23.3% from its previous 21,230 men, though its 
present under arms troop strength rose 15.8% from 11,704 to 13,799.356 
Let us digress momentarily to discuss one phenomenon encountered in the troop 
strength structure of the Army of Catalonia in 1812, that of a rising "present under arms" 
strength yet shrinking "effective" strength. The army commander often consolidated his 
units by evacuating sick, exchanging prisoners of war; recalling detached units and 
returning depots to France. Proportionally, the effective numbers of troops would 
decrease, while Marshal Macdonald, for example, merged a battalion of the 7e Ligne 
hospital inmates is due not only to discharge of sick and wounded back to their 
resprective units, but to evacuations from the hospitals to France. Leave, always small, 
rose from seven to nine men and prisoners of war from 84 to 99. Finally, courtmartials 
fell from seven to none. Ibid. 
355The Division de Serge grew 79.9% from 1,119 to 3,809 men present under arms. 
See Table 31. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1January1812; C(8)371, 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812. 
356See Table 21. Hospital inmates fell 61.1 % from 6,322. Ibid. 
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Italien into the 5e Ligne ltalien,357 raising its present under arms and lowering its total 
strength. 
The Garrison of Barcelona358 (Division de Basse-Catalogne) numbered 7,235 men, 
Tarragona totaled 2,598 men and Lerida had 4,316 men. 359 The division totaled 10,434 
men present under arms (73.72%), 14,153 effectives, 1,853 men in the hospital (13.9%), 
and 14,153 total effectives. 360 This was strictly an armee sedentaire and only had troops 
for occupation, without a standing field force. 
General Decaen created for himself a separate Brigade de Reserve under General 
Clement with 3,796 men and was his army level, field command.361 The Army artillery, 
unlike the other major commands, underwent radical increases both in units and troop 
strength. Of the twelve artillery units in the army in July, eight were either entirely new 
regiments or augmented by new companies. It totaled 1,756 men increasing 43.7% from 
January. 362 
357General Clarke submits for the Emperor's approval, the authorization given by 
Marshal Macdonald to merge in the 5th Italian Line the battalion of the 7thLine. UCN, 
No. 4897, Decision, December 10, 1810, 3:934; No. 4806 Napoleon to General Clarke, 
November 11, 1810, 3:882-884. 
358General David-Maurice-Joseph, Comte Mathieu de Saint-Maurice puis de la Redorte 
(1768-1833) is shortened to Maurice-Mathieu. Six, Dictionaire, 2:169. 
359See Table 23, 16 July 1812. 
360Ibid. 
3611t had 2,977 men and 209 horses present under arms (78.42%), 782 men in the 
hospital (20.6%). Ibid. 
362The Army artillery had 1,603 men present under arms, and 109 in the hospital, a 
decrease from 199 in January, (45.2%). SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 
1 January 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812. 
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The Army of Catalonia totaled in July 1812, 51 battalions and 7 squadrons with 
33,792 men (1,723 horses) present under arms; and 5,830 men in the hospital. Its total 
effective strength was 41,816 men and 1,768 horses; remarkably, there was the 
considerable 80.1 % of its strength present under arms, and only 13.94% in the hospital, 
illustrating the improvement in the army's readiness by a 10% rise in its present under 
arms rate since January. 363 
In July Lord Wellington initiated an Anglo-Sicilian invasion of Catalonia from 
Sicily, opening a "Second Front". This was the single greatest threat to the French hold 
on this contentious province during the war. Earlier that year, the British intercepted a 
coded message from King Joseph Bonaparte which ordered Marshal Suchet to detach 
troops from the Army of Aragon to support French forces in La Mancha. 364 Wellington 
responded by coordinating with Lord William Bentinck, commander of the British forces 
in the Mediterranean, for an invasion of Valencia and Catalonia, to take French pressure 
off his front in Central Spain. Additionally, reserves in France and Italy were already 
absorbed by Napoleon's Grand Armee in Russia. 365 Lord William Bentinck informed Lord 
363Troops present under arms is 80.1 % of the whole while detached were 2.5% 
hospitalized were 13.94%, furloughed were .218% and prisoners of war were 2.6%. Ibid. 
364Sir Charles Oman explained that unbeknownst to Wellington, Marshal Suchet 
refused to obey this order. It must be remembered that the Imperial Decree of 8 February 
1810 made Aragon (and Catalonia) a virtual Vice-Royalty, answerable to Paris, not 
Madrid. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:341. Like most of the Peninsular Marshals, Suchet 
was quite independent: "He could be as factious and bloody-minded with headquarters 
or his fellow Army Commanders as any of them." Richard Humble, Napoleon's 
Peninsular Marshals. A Reassessment, (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1973) 216. 
365Lord Bentinck had another choice for a second front. He could invade Southern 
Italy, then defended by one division, as King Murat had sent two divisions to Russia. 
Piers Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean 1803-1810, (London: Longmans Green and 
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Wellington on 5 March 1812 that he was prepared to send 10,000 troops against Marshal 
Suchet if London was averse to an invasion of Corsica.366 A delighted Wellington wrote 
to the Earl of Liverpool: " ... the attack of both Tarragona and Barcelona appears to me ... to 
be the most desirable ... the French would move heaven and earth from Aragon and 
Valencia ... "367 He wrote again to Bentinck stressing the importance of this operation. He 
considered a siege of Barcelona however as impossible. The Anglo-Sicilian invasion 
force proposed was simply insufficient to defeat the 6,299 man garrison. On the other 
hand, he could take on Tarragona's 1,039 man garrison with the possibility of success.368 
In any case, the Anglo-Sicilian invasion would throw Catalonia and Aragon into 
disarray, hopefully precipitating the collapse of the French occupation of Valencia. 
Wellington, in fact, wrote to his brother Henry: " ... a diversion of the enemy's force must 
be created for my operation without which I shall have upon me the Armies of Portugal, 
the South, the Center and that of Suchet."369 He then coorinated with Bentinck to induce 
Co., 1957)369-372; Lt. General Sir Henry Bunbury, Narrative of Military Transactions 
on the Mediterranean, 1805-1810, (London: Privately Published, 1851) 196-201. 
3660man, Peninsular War, 5:343. Duke of Wellington, The Disptaches of Field 
Marshal the Duke of Wellington during his various campaigns in India, Denmark. 
Portugal Spain. the Low Countries and France. from 1799 to 1815, Ed. Gurwood, 
(London: John Murray, 1838), The Earl of Liverpool to Wellington, 5 March 1812, 8:301. 
367W ellington, The Dispatches, Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool, 20 March 1812, 
9:554. Wellington did not believe in the actual success of this operation beyond a 
diversion: "I think it probable, however, that neither will succeed." 
368SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812; Wellington, 
Dispatches, Wellington to Lt. Gen. Lord William Bentinck, 24th March 1812, 9:5-6. 
369The Gibraltar garrison provided to Wellington a 45 gun battering train, and the 
Royal Navy supported the train with four ships. Wellington, Dispatches, Wellington to 
General Campbell, 10 May 1812, 9:131-132. Wellington to Sir Henry Wellesley, 11th 
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the Spanish Regency at Cadiz to provide two British led (3,000 man) Spanish divisions, 
those of Generals Ross at Alicante and Whittingham at Majorca. Additionally, 
Wellington provided 1,400 Portuguese troops, two foreign regiments and a artillery 
battering train. Sir Edward Pellew's Mediterranean squadron would lend the necessary 
naval support. 370 Through spring, Wellington, in several letters, pushed London and Sicily 
to support this expedition. 
After three months delay and changes of plans, 371 Bentinck finalized the invasion 
plans, and assembled the Anglo-Sicilian Army, a 7,000 man division under General Sir 
Thomas Maitland.372 Prior to the invasion, Marshal Suchet received warning of a possible 
landing between Alicante in Valencia and Rosas. To meet this threat, he formed a flying 
column, and warned General Decaen. Indeed, in July Suchet received a rumour that 
April 1812, 9:53-56. Wellington to General Lord Willian Bentinck, 24th March 1812, 
9:5-6. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:341, 344-345. Wellington to Lieutenant General 
Campbell, 10 May 1812, 9:131-132. 
370Wellington, Dispatches, Wellington to Sir Henry Wellesley, 11April1812, 9:55-56. 
371lbid. Wellington to Major General Cook, 5 June 1812, 9:208; Wellington to 
Lieutenant General Campbell, 5 June 1812, 9:208-210; Wellington to Vice Admiral G. 
Berkeley, 5 June 1812, 9:210-211; Wellington to Earl Bathurst, 9 July 1812, 9:277-278; 
Wellington to Bathurst, 14 July 1812, 9:285-287. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:245-246. 
372General Sir Thomas Maitland's Anglo-Sicilian Expeditionary Force had on 25 June 
1812, eight battalions, cavalry, engineers and artillery, supported by 200 ships. Oman, 
Peninsular War, 5:609; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:265; William henry Dillon, A Narrative 
of My Professional Adventures (1790-1839) ed. Michael Lewis, Navy Records Society 
Series, Vol. 97 (London: Navy Records Society 1956) 2:203. 
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Maitland would invade Upper Catalonia, and marched to counter it, but found nothing and 
returned to Tarragona.373 
On 31 July, the long anticipated invasion finally came. Maitland's invasion force 
anchored off Palamos and he conferred with Catalan commanders to decide on the 
invasion point. Near Palamos, the French had 15,000 men available to oppose a landing. 
The naval commander, Sir Edward Pellew, noted however that the anchorage was too 
dangerous to disembark troops in any case. Maitland abandoned Palamos and sailed to 
Alicante. Arriving on 7 August, he landed with 10,000 men, linking up with General 
Roche's 4,000 man division. 374 
The Anglo-Sicilian invasion of Valencia in August 1812 had a profound effect 
upon Suchet's operations, but was not directly felt in Catalonia until 1813. Indeed, the 
war slowed in the last half of 1812, as General Decaen engaged only in minor 
373 At Reus Suchet confered with Decaen. Reacting to poor intelligence was indemic, 
as confirming it was often impossible. At Tarragona, Suchet inspected its fortifications 
and reinforced the garrison. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:566-567. 
374lbid, 5:572-574; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:265; Sir William Dillon, A Narrative of 
My Professional Adventures. 2:203-211. General Maitland coordinated a secondary 
operation, sending a Colonel Green into Catalonia to raise an insurgent force to occupy 
and fortify the abandoned Convent of Montserrat and establish a post at Saint-Denis. 
General Decaen responded by sending Maurice Mathieu to eject Green's force, besieging 
him at Saint-Denis and taking it in a day (27 July), forcing Green out. The French 
immediately marched on Montserrat, reduced it and destroyed its fortifications in early 
August. When Maurice Mathieu returned to Barcelona, he received news of Maitland's 
landing. Green's operation worked. Laffaille, Precis des Campagnes de Catalogne, 266-
271. 
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counterinsurgent operations. 375 There was consequently no immediate requirement to alter 
the Army's structure. 
By December, the Army decreased its troop strength though its structure remained 
unchanged. It had the Division de Segre, the Division en Haute-Catalogne, the Division 
en Basse Catalogne and the Brigade de Reserve.376 General Quesnel's Division de Segre 
received three new types of units, the 29e, 30e and 3 le Cohortes, and totaled 4,502 
troops. 377 General Lamarque's division maintained its previous organization of two active 
brigades and the two arrondissements of Figueras and Gerona. The active brigades 
together had 5,493 men, and the Arrondissements, 7,333. 378 The Division, on the whole, 
then had 10,853 troops present under arms and 12,826 effectives. The Division in Lower 
Catalonia with 12,088 troops remained structurally unchanged, but the 7,291 man garrison 
375General Lacy had a considerable logistical problem. To alleviate the wants of his 
soldiers, he engaged in an illicit trade with the French and allowed Barcelona merchants 
to move commercial supply columns. Hence, he did not attack either commercial or 
military supply columns. The Catalan army engaged in only a few actions, including 
General Eroles' establishment of a base between Lerida and Tarragona (despite a French 
attack against it from Tarragona) on 27 October. On 2 October, Eroles attacked a French 
column near Reus, and Lacy attacked Mataro with his whole force (7,000 men). General 
Manso also defeated 200 French at Molins del Rey. General Decaen countered by 
marching to Vich and dispersing Lacy's division and occupying the city on 3 November. 
The French even occupied Reus which was recently evacuated by Lacy and cut the 
Catalan communications with the British Navy. Eroles now attacked Reus, but its French 
garrison was promptly rescued by troops sent by Decaen and the garrison at Tortosa. By 
December, both adversaries engaged only in minor operations. Napier, Peninsular War, 
5:351-355. 
376SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1812. 
377The Division de Segre had 3,151 men present under arms, and it had 1,319 in the 
hospital. Ibid. 
378Ibid. 
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of Barcelona had received a reinforcement of five infantry battalions and two cavalry 
detachments. The garrison of Tarragona had 2,619 men and Lerida had 2,098 troops.379 
The Army units included the Brigade de Reserve, with 3,330 men,380 the 6e Legion de 
Gendarrnerie with 1,205 men, the Artillery with 1,654 men and the Engineers with 155 
troops.381 
As a whole, the Army of Catalonia had 33 infantry battalions, two Bataillons 
Nationaux, three Cohorts, eight foreign regiments, three cavalry squadrons, gendemerie, 
artillery and engineers. Its total effective strength was 35,680 men which declined 14.7% 
since July. Its present under arms strength with the colours was 28,757 (80.6%); and 
hospitalized 5,833 (16.4%). 382 
379Ibid. 
38
°Its soldiers with the colours declined from 2,977 to 2,922, a mere 1.9%. There 
were also reductions in other areas. Hospital inmates declined tremendously from 782 
to 408 (47.8%). Ibid. 
381 Ibid. 
382The Army also had 240 detached, 834 as prisoners of war, and 16 on furlough. It 
decreased in nearly every recorded category since July 1812. Present under arms 
decreased 14. 9%, the detached by 76. 70%, furloughs by 82.4%, and prisoners of war by 
22. l %. Court-martials disappeared altogether and only hospitalizations increased by a 
mere 0.1%. Ibid. 
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§8. Anglo-Sicilian Abcess, The Campaign of 1813 
The year opened quietly with only minor counterinsurgent operations,383 but 
General Eroles shattered this calm with a brilliant but abortive attempt to capture 
Tarragona. 384 There were also minor attacks against the French throughout Catalonia. 385 
In February, General Sir John Murray opened the second campaign in Eastern Spain.386 
He attacked and defeated Marshal Suchet's Army of Aragon, in the badly muddled Battle 
of Castala on 13 April. Meanwhile, a 5,000 man Anglo-Sicilian force (Roche's Division) 
made a dash on the Valencian capital.387 
383SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Corps d'Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1813; C(8) 
324, Registre de Correspondance, General Decaen to M. Mataro, 23 January 1813; 
General Decaen to General Maurice Mathieu, (No. 3) 24 January 1813; General Decaen 
to Payeur General Cochetet, 1 January 1813; Decaen to General Clarke, 1 January 1813; 
Decaen to Inspecteur aux revues Prisye, 1 January 1813; C(8) 329, Registre des Ordres 
du Jour, Order of the Day, 17 January 1813. In February, General Decaen even did the 
hitherto unthinkable in Catalonia. He opened a correspondence with the Spanish staff, 
on accords in the treatment of prisoners of war and on the imposition of civilized rules 
of war, which lasted through 1813. C(8) 327, Registre avec l'Etat Major Espagnol, 13 
February - 9 November 1813. 
384General Bertoletti commanded Tarragonna with 1,270 present under arms. See 
Table 24. Napier, Peninsula War, 5:446. 
385Lafaille, Memoires, 276. 
386W ellington, Dispatches, Wellington to Lieutenant General Sir John Murray, 3 
March 1813, 10:161-162. 
387Murray barely won the victory at Castala, for his timid generalship nearly spelled 
disaster. Indeed, his staff forced him to fight. After his victory he refused to pursue the 
defeated French, and allowed them time to rally and retire, Oman, Peninsular War, 
6:283-298; Wellington, Dispatches, Wellington to Lieutenant General Sir John Murray, 
16 April 1813, 10:301-302; Michael Glover, The Peninsular War. 1807-1814. a Concise 
Military History, (London: David and Charles Newton Abbot, 1974), 270-271; David 
Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 397-401; Napier, Peninsula War, 5:58-62. 
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By mid-April, Lord Wellington developed a viable plan of operations for the 
spring campaign which used the Catalan invasion to support his campaign in Castile. 388 
On 27 May, buoyed by his Castalia victory, General Murray assembled his 16,000 man 
expeditionary force with Admiral Hallowell's Naval Armada of 103 ships. 389 The Spanish 
contingent included three "armies" under Generals Copons, Elio and del Parque, totaling 
58,957 men.390 
Setting his subordinate elements in motion, General Murray sailed for 
Tarragonna.391 Arriving at Salou Bay on 2 June, he invested the dilapidated fortress the 
388Wellington outlined a four phase plan to General Murray. These were a link-up 
with the Spanish forces of Generals del Parque and Elio (Second Army); the Anglo-
Sicilian forces in Valencia would hold Suchet at bay and the Army of Valencia would 
attack Suchet if he attempted to relieve Tarragona which was to be besiged by Murray. 
Simultaniously, General Copon's Catalan forces would hold General Decaen's forces at 
bay while the Spanish irregular divisions of the Second Army would cut Marshal Suchet's 
communications with Madrid and the Armee d'Espagne. Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 397; 
Oman, Peninsular War, 6:283-284. 
389His force included over three divisions, cavalry and artillery and a naval contingent 
of three line ships, a frigate, nineteen minor vessels and 80 transports. Oman, Peninsular 
War, 6:762-767; Vaciani, Storia delle Campagna, 3:672. 
3900man, Peninsular War, 6:764-765. 
391 SHAT, C(8)371, Situation Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1813; Napier, Peninsula 
War, 5:9. 
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next day. 392 On 6 June, Murray opened his siege, as his artillery batteries battered the 
fortifications, and engineers dug siege works. 393 
Marshal S uchet, meanwhile, got news of the invasion on 31 May, and immediately 
concentrated three divisions (14,000 men), but was, however, unable to advance for the 
artillery capable roads were blocked and in no state to allow heavy carriage. He could 
only await General Decaen's arrival.394 
General Decaen, meanwhile, set Upper Catalonia abuzz with troop movements and 
concentrated three brigades from Upper Catalonia, the 1st and 2d Active Brigades and the 
Division en Cerdagne, making a large division of 7,169 men, and sent the 1st Brigade to 
march on Barcelona. 395 Simultaneously, General Maurice Mathieu, Governor of 
Barcelona, marched with the recently arrived 1st Active Brigade (2,492 men) on 10 June 
392For a flavor at Murray's landing see August, L. F.Schumann On the Road with 
Wellington, Ed. trans. A. M. Ludovici, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) 2-3. General 
Murray was paralyzed with fear from the beginning of the siege, anticipating the arrival 
of Marshal Suchet and General Decaen who "would move heaven and earth" to relieve 
Tarragonna. He calculated that the two French commanders could assemble 25,000 men 
in just a few days. Oman, Peninsular War, 6:492-495. 
3930man, Peninsular War, 6:493-499; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:311-312. 
394Suchet's force consisted of General Musnier's 1st Division (4,163 men), General 
Pannetier's Brigade (2,600 men), five cavalry squadrons and artillery. The whole totaled 
7,613 men. Oman, Peninsular War, 6:501-503; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:313. 
3950man, Peninsular War, 6:503; SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 30 
June 1813. 
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and one of his own totaling 6,300 men. He drove in the Catalan outposts at Villafranca 
and halted, hoping to delay the siege of Tarragona.396 
Despite the dire French situation in Lower Catalonia, General Decaen had 
problems of his own. Admiral Sir Edward Pellew conducted a successful demonstration 
in the Bay of Rosas to deceive Decaen as to the actual location of the invasion with an 
elaborate invasion display, even disembarking a few hundred Royal Marines (8 June). 397 
The news of the British Mediterranean fleet's arrival off Rosas led Decaen to 
believe the Tarragona landing a ruse. Consequently, he remained in Upper Catalonia until 
14 June, when he realized that the actual invasion point was Tarragona, and marched with 
the Division en Cerdagne and 2d Brigade Active to linkup with Maurice Mathieu who, 
in tum, unsuccessfully marched linkup with Suchet, only to return to Barcelona on 13 
June to await General Decaen's arrival. 
In the British camp, meanwhile, General Murray was apprehensive that Decaen 
and Suchet would attack and destroy his beachhead. Both sides in the finest comic opera 
style were apprehensive of the other, for neither had accurate intelligence. Indeed, the 
French commanders didn't even know the whereabouts of their fellow commanders. On 
9 June, Murray received the heartening news that Suchet and Decaen were still far off. 398 
396SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 30 June 1813. General Maurice 
Mathieu sent off two dispatches telling Decaen that he must come and succour Tarragona 
immediately, lest the fortress fall. Oman, Peninsular War, 6:504. 
397SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 30 June 1813. This successful 
deception is reminiscent of the Allied deception against Calais to draw the German forces 
away from the actual invasion site at Normandy for Operation Overload, June 1944. Ibid, 
6:503; Napier, Peninsula War, 5:168-169; Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 402-404. 
3980man, Peninsular War, 6:507. 
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As Murray continued his siege, he sent two divisions to reinforce the outlying 
Catalan divisions; but on the 11th he received news of the French approach and lost his 
nerve. Despite the fact that Tarragonna was ripe for an assault and the French columns 
still two days off, Murray panicked raised the siege and evacuated, on the 13th despite 
the arguments of his enraged commanders. 399 
Meanwhile, Colonel Prevost commanding one of Murray's outlying units captured 
the fort of San Felipe and held Suchet off. On 14 June the Royal Navy, disembarked 
General Mackenzie's Division, but reembarked on Suchet's approach.400 General Maurice 
Mathieu then linked up with Suchet and relieved Tarragona. On the 18th, Lord William 
Bentinck with a naval squadron embarked Prevost's troops, blew up Fort San Felipe and 
sailed with the rest of the Anglo-Sicilian Expeditionary Force to Alicante. This sorry 
affair ended in General Murray's court-martial in 1814.401 
During the drama at Tarragona, Napoleon slashed the strength of the Army of 
Catalonia by another 33% from 35,680 men to 23,925.402 His overriding concern was his 
main front in Germany, and fielding another army after the disaster in Russia. 403 He 
3990man, Peninsular War, 6:505, 507-512. Napier, Peninsula War, 5:148-158; Gates, 
The Spanish Ulcer, 402, 404; Laffaille, Memoires, 280-283. 
4000man, Peninsular War, 6: 515; S uchet, War in Spain, 2: 3 15. 
401Laffaile, Memoires, 282; Oman, Peninsular War, 6:513, 517-522. 
402This inclueded a horse reduction from 1,916 to 1,309. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, 
Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1812. C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 30 
June 1813. 
403In January Napoleon fired off letters to General Clarke to begin work on forming 
a 150,000 man army in four corps, a Corps d'observation de l'Elbe, Corps d'observation 
d'Italie and two Corps d'observation du Rhin. CN, No. 19425, Napoleon to General 
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ordered General Clarke to form thirty provisional regiments (regiments provisoires), partly 
from the fifth battalions of twenty-four regiments in Spain, to stiffen the German and 
Italian fronts with battle hardened troops. He hoped to assemble 60 battalions and 34 
depots totaling 168,000 men, including the twenty two cohorts distributed amongst the 
Corps d'observation d'Italie, de l'Elbe, du Rhin and the Grande Armee.404 The Emperor 
began this reduction in Catalonia by ordering on 4 January 1813 the ler Ligne 
Westphalien and artillery to Cassel, the 3e Ligne de Berg, and a variety of units to France 
to form cadres. As the year advanced, the Ministry of War accelerated the recall of cadre 
units to France to receive the conscripts of the class of 1814. 405 
In March 1813, Napoleon recalled officers from Catalonia for his cadres, 
restructured cavalry squadrons in two or three 125 man companies, and reduced infantry 
Clarke, 6 January 1813, 24:370-371; No. 19429, Napoleon to General Clarke, 7 January 
1813, 24:373; No. 19431, Napoleon to General Clarke, 7 January 1813, 24:374-375; No. 
19433 Napoleon to General Clarke, 7 January 1813, 24:376-377; No. 19437, Napoleon 
to Berthier, 9 January 1813, 24:378-380; No. 19445, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 
January 1813, 24:385-387; No. 19446, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 January 1813, 
24:387-388; No. 19447, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 January 1813, 24:388-389; No. 
19448, Napoleon to General Clarke, 14 January 1813, 24:390; No. 19459, Napoleon to 
General Clarke, 15 January 1813, 24:390-395; No. 19452, Napoleon to General Clarke, 
16 January 1813, 24:395. 
404CN, No. 19431, Napoleon to General Clarke, 7 January 1813, 24:374-375; the ler 
Corps d'Observation du Rhin, for example had 49 battalions. Of these, there were nine 
provisional regiments with 18 battalions. No. 19433, Napoleon to Clarke, 7 January 1813, 
24:376-377; No. 19445, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 January 1813, 24:385-387; No. 
19431, Napoleon to Clarke, 7 January 1813, 24:374-375; No. 19447, Napoleon to Clarke, 
12 January 1813, 24:388-389. 
405CN, No. 19417, Napoleon to General Clarke, 4 January 1813, 24:365; No. 19669, 
Napoleon to Clarke, 6 March 1813, 25:34-35. 
153 
battalions to 840 men with two per regiment. 406 In the former case for example, General 
Decaen's Chief of Staff, General Hamelinaye sent experienced captains in the 5e and 20e 
Ligne to cadre duty, replacing them with newly promoted officers.407 
Earlier in January the Grande Armee numbered 266,000 men while the armies in 
Spain shrank to 303,000.408 To stretch his troops even further, Napoleon restructured 
units, adding a sixth conscript battalion to existing regiments and remanned the 
remainder.409 He even restructured his train regiments to two battalions of four companies 
each and a depot company.410 
Every man counted and Napoleon tightened administrative procedures to better 
account for the troops in France which he could send to Germany. General Decaen took 
the rump of the Division de Segre, forming the Division en Cerdagne, under General 
Esprit; while the Ministry of War, recalled the rest of these units. 411 General Decaen then 
406CN, No. 19417, Napoleon to Clarke, 4 January 1813, 24:365; No. 19669, 
Napoleon to Clarke, 6 March 1813, 25:34-35. 
407SHAT, C(8)371, Registre de Correspondance, No. 842, General Hamelinaye to 
Inspecteur aux Revues Prisye, 8 July 1813. 
408CN, No. 19496, Note Dictee en Conseil des Ministres, 24 January 1813, 24:433-
435. 
409Tue cadres of the 2nd, 3rd and 6th battalions would fill their units up from the 
conscripts arriving from France. These regiments would go to the Grand Armee. CN, 
No. 19432, Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 January 1813, 24:423-425; No. 19500 
Napoleon to Eugene Napoleon, Vice-Roi d'Italie, 24 January 1813, 24:437-440. 
41
°Ibid. No. 19532, Napoleon to General Clarke, 4 February 1813, 24:474-475. 
411The rump division took the 102e Ligne and ler Hussards from the Division de 
Segre. The Ministry recalled the 3e-l 16e Ligne, 29e, 30e and 3 le Cohorts. SHAT, 
C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Corps 
d'Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1813. 
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reformed the new division with two infantry regiments and a cavalry company, up to 
2,281 men.412 
This division was to defend the French frontier against Catalan incursions and 
maintain order in the Cerdagne. 413 Napoleon, also mindful of Catalan depradations, 
mobilized a National Guard brigade (cohorte) to guard the French Pyrenees.414 When he 
withdrew cohortes from Spain for the emergency in Germany ,415 it terribly strained French 
manpower resources. 416 By June the Division fought one action (27-29 June) against 
Erole and Rovira's 3,000 insurgents.417 
412The division's new units were the 102e Ligne, 143e Ligne, and a company of the 
ler Hussards. The Division en Cerdagne's strength present under arms was 2,140 men 
and 50 horses. Its hospitals were, however, nearly cleared out, reflecting repatriation. 
Numbers of hospitalized fell 89.3% from 1,318 to 140, Ibid. 
413CN, No. 19854, Napoleon to General Clarke, 13 April 1813, 25: 191. 
414In a letter to General Clarke, after one of the many brigand incursions over the 
Spanish frontier, Napoleon told him: "Je vous avais mande de diriger de ce cote une 
brigade de cohortes de gardes nationales .... Les cohortes de gardes nationales ne doivent 
pas entrer en Espagne, mais seulement garder les frontieres." CN, No. 19323, Napoleon 
to General Clarke, 5 November 1812, 24:300. This is reminiscent of earlier Catalan 
incursions and their consequent call up of Gardes Nationales in 1808. SHAT, C(8)8 
General Martin, Arrete Concemant l'Organisation d'un Bataillon de Gardes Nationales, 
Destine a la Defense de la Frontiere,l July 1808. These two battalions were the cohortes 
of the ler Ban de la Garde Nationale from the Departement des Landes and a battalion 
of Gardes Nationales d'Elite from Basses-Pyrenees, and would guard the lOe Division 
Limitrophes de l'Espagne. 
415CN, No. 19400, Napoleon to General Clarke, 26 December 1812, 24:352. 
416The cohortes alone absorbed 17,000 men in reinforcements. CN, No. 19415, 
Napoleon to General Clarke, 3 January 1813, 24:362. This included the ler Bataillon de 
la Garde Nationale de l'Aude. The soldiers and officers in this battalion requested 
Imperial permission to join the Grand Armee. The Emperor, not passing up such an 
opportunity approved this request. CN, No. 19486, Decision, 23 January 1813, 24:426. 
4170man, Peninsular War, 6: 
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The second major unit of the Army of Catalonia was the Division en Haute 
Catalogne. Its subordinate commands were the ler and 2e Brigades Actives, and its 
garrison commands of Gerona and Figueras, underwent minor changes and decreased a 
mere 4% to 12,302 men. It's present under arms strength was 11,418, with 1,959 in 
hospital.418 The division in Lower Catalonia, too, remained unchanged. On the whole, 
the Army of Catalonia numbered 22,460 men present under arms, 1,336 in hospital, and 
23,925 men total effectives.419 
The second half of 1813 showed itself no less interesting than the first. In June, 
General Bentinck reorganized his army at Alicant, while Marshal Suchet engaged in 
active operations defeating a Spanish division at the Battle of Aleira on 13 June. 420 
Wellington's victory at the Battle of Vitoria on 21 June, which destroyed the French 
Kingdom of Spain,421 galvanized another coalition against Napoleon in Germany422 and 
418See Table 22. SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1December1812; 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1813; Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 30 June 
1813; CN, No. 19416, Napoleon to General Clarke, 4 January 1813, 24:362-365; SHAT 
C(8) 411, Situation, Place de Gerone, 1 January 1813; Situation, Fort de Figueras, 1 
February 1813; Situation, Place de Bascara, 16 February 1813; Situation, Arrondissement 
de Rosas, I June 1813. 
419Ibid. 
4200man, Peninsular War, 7:66-67. 
421The now dethroned King Joseph wrote to his wife Julie Clary Bonaparte, "I do not 
think that affairs in Spain can be re-established except by a general peace. I am staying 
here because the frontier is in danger, but as soon as the first wave of terror wears off and 
the defense is organized, I shall be useless." A. du Casse, ed. Memoires et 
Correspondance Politique et Milititaire du Roi Joseph, 14 Vols, 2e Edition, (Paris: 
Perrotin Librairie-Editeur, 1841) 13:343, Joseph Napoleon to Julie, 1 July 1813, quoted 
in Michael Glover, The Peninsular War 1807-1814. A Concise Military History, 244. 
422Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 392. 
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threw all French occupied Spain into disarray. Indeed, all the French armies except 
Marshal Suchet's and General Decaen's were concentrated back towards the French 
frontier, poised to begin the last tragic campaign of the Peninsular War. 423 
On the Catalan front proper, General Decaen continued his counterinsurgent war, 
sending units from one hot spot to another and continuing the relentless logistical 'war' 
which every commander there had to wage. Throughout July, General Lamarque's troops 
continually patrolled the Upper Catalan roads to keep them clear of insurgents,424 and 
small supply convoys absorbed large bodies of troops for escort duty. Decaen sent 
General Lamarque with his two brigades actives (Beuremann and Petit) to escort a convoy 
to Barcelona. 425 This stripped Upper Catalonia of field units except for General Esprit's 
brigade. No sooner than Lamarque started off than an insurgent attack in Upper Catalonia 
brought him rushing back.426 The insurgents were so active that not only did Decaen still 
need 5,000 troops427 to escort a convoy, but they virtually held the operational initiative 
and forced the French onto the defensive. 
423Michael Glover, Wellington's Peninsular Victories, (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1963) 128. 
424SHAT C(8) 317, Registre de Correspondance, No. 843, General Decaen to General 
Beaurmann, 8 July 1813. 
425SHAT C(8) 317, No. 916, Decaen to General Lamarque 13 July 1813; No. 917, 
Decaen to Ordonnateur Bouldon 13 July 1813, No. 918, Decaen to Bouldon 13 July 1813; 
No. 919, Decaen to Lamarque, 13 July 1813; No. 920, Decaen to Boundon, 14 July 1813; 
No. 930, Decaen to Lamarque, 14 July 1813; No. 931, Decaen to General Travost, lOe 
Division Militaire, 14 July 1813. 
4261bid., No. 922, Decaen to General Esprit, Commander of the Division en Cerdagne, 
14 July 1813. 
427SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 30 June 1813. 
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General Decaen was also heavily engaged in the process of sending troops back 
to France, to reinforce Napoleon's German front, even before the disaster at Leipzig in 
October 1813. These troop transfers began in February 1813 and picked up speed as the 
year progressed. 
When Suchet received the news of the catastrophe at Vitoria on 3 July,428 he 
resolved to abandon Valencia,429 after General Murray abandoned his Tarragona siege 
works. Suchet threw together a hotchpotch brigade of 2,000 men. Marching on Lower 
Catalonia, he linked up with a brigade from Maurice Mathieu's garrison of Barcelona and 
replenished the ammunition supplies of Tarragona. Decaen, now with 8,000 troops 
searched to strike at the insurgent army, but it too retired when Murray left. On 1 July 
1813, Decaen returned to Barcelona. On 2 July he resolved on another offensive against 
General Copons' force at Vich, which now unbeknownst to the French general, numbered 
some 8,000 troops. Decaen resolved to attack in two columns, his own of ten battalions, 
and a 2,000 man brigade under General Lamarque. The columns marched out on 6 July. 
Decaen had meanwhile learned of the French defeat at Vitoria and decided to break off 
the offensive and recall his columns already in motion. He halted his own column and 
sent out triplicate orders to Lamarque to return. Unfortunately, General Lamarque, 
commanding his second column never received Decaen's message and continued his 
4280man, Peninsular War, 7:68. 
429Suchet left garrisons behind at Devia, Pensicola, Saguntum and Morella, in the hope 
that these posts would facilitate the eventual reconquest at Valencia. Ibid, 7:68-69. Don 
W. Alexander, Rod of Iron. French Counterinsurgency Policy in Aragon during the 
Peninsular War, (Wilmington, Delaware, Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), · 220-221. 
Suchet, War in Spain, 2:323-328. 
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march against Copons, defeated him in a sharp action on 8 July. 43° Copons now counter 
attacked and he nearly destroyed Lamarque's unsupported brigade at a battle at La Salud 
before Decaen rescued him from destruction. 431 
Once the news of Decaen's near disaster reached Paris, General Clarke severely 
reprimanded him for indecision during the Siege of Tarragona and his inability to march 
to the cannon! In this unfortunate operation, he planned an offensive, called it off and 
did not inform his subordinates, allowing them to be nearly destroyed. This episode was 
the "last straw" and destroyed Decaen's little remaining credit with Paris.432 
Marshal Suchet, meanwhile, evacuated Valencia, leaving garrisons behind to hold 
the province in a last ditch defense. 433 He then assumed "operational control" of the 
Army of Catalonia and ordered General Decaen to concentrate 10,000 men to assist him 
in fending off another Anglo-Sicilian invasion of Catalonia. Decaen, however, was hard 
pressed to find the troops, but managed to get about 8,000 men,434 while Suchet prepared 
to defend Lower Catalonia. 
Lord William Bentinck, meanwhile, prepared for his own offensive. Erroneously 
informed that Suchet and Decaen evacuated Valencia and most of Lower Catalonia, he 
430SHAT, C(8) 317, Registre de Correspondance, No. 843, General Decaen to General 
Beurmann 8 July 1813; No. 844, Decaen to General (Colonel) Petit, 8 July 1813; No. 852, 
Decaen to Lamarque 9 July 1813 and No. 889, Decaen to General Esprit, 11 July 1813. 
431 0man, Peninsular War, 7:70-71. Napier, Peninsula War, 6:46-47. 
4320man, Peninsular War, 7:71. 
433Ibid, 7:75-58. Napier, Peninsula War, 6:48-49; Alexander, Rod of Iron, 220-223. 
Suchet, War in Spain, 2:328-334. 
4340man, Peninsular War, 7:78. 
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planned to besiege Tarragona, Barcelona and Tortosa. Suchet, however, had 15,000 men 
near Tarragona while Decaen marched with reinforcements. Bentinck advanced on 
Tarragona and invested it on 30 July. Suchet waited with four divisions on the Llobregat, 
while General Decaen escorted a convoy of sick, wounded, and refugees from Valencia 
to Upper Catalonia, and returned to Barcelona escorting a provision convoy.435 
Though Bentinck had invested Tarragona, his enormous logistical difficulties and 
Suchet's presence forced him to postpone landing his siege train until the arrival of 
reinforcements. 436 When Decaen arrived on 14 August, Suchet advanced, forcing 
Bentinck to raise the investment and retreat. Suchet then evacuated Tarragona, blew up 
its fortifications, and released General Decaen to return back to Upper Catalonia to 
disperse the resurgent guerrillas. 437 
During this period, Suchet remained in his defensive positions with about 57,000 
men, determined to hold Catalonia and safeguard the French frontier. The garrisons 
remaining in Valencia and Lower Catalonia swallowed up 27,000 and another three 
brigades (about 5,000) were engaged in escorting convoys, leaving 25,000 field troops 
including Decaen's 8,000.438 
435SHAT C(8) 317, Registre, No. 949, Decaen to General Clarke, 20 July 1813; 
Oman, Peninsular War, 7:78-83. 
436Bentinck's lack of land transport was so acute that he required Royal Navy support 
to supply his Army, while his Spanish units shifted for themselves. Ibid, 7:83-86. 
437Ibid, 7:83-87; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:336-337. 
4380man, Peninsular War, 7:87-90; Wellington Dispatches, Wellington to Lord 
William Bentinck, 4th August 1813, 6:647-648; Wellington to Bentinck, 9th August 
1813, 6:666; Wellington to Bentinck, 9th August 1813, 6:666-669; Wellington to 
Bentinck, 14th August 1813, 6:678-679. 
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During this "lull," Marshal Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult, Due de Dalmatia (1769-
18 51 ), newly appointed commander of the Armee d'Espagne, 439 and S uchet organized the 
defense of the Pyrenees. On 10 August, Soult requested that Suchet open an offensive 
to relieve the pressure on the Army of Spain440 which recently suffered a double defeat 
at the Battle of Sorauren (28 and 30 July). 441 Soult enjoined Suchet to link up with the 
Army of Spain. The two combined armies, 80,000 strong he argued would then fall on 
Wellington's flank, forcing him back into the heart of Spain. Marshal Suchet, however, 
considered the idea unworkable and refused to cooperate, for Lord William Bentinck 
would certainly advance to the French frontier unchecked by garrisons in Catalonia. 442 
439CN, No. 20208, Napoleon to Marshal Soult, Commandant en chef des Armees en 
Espagne, 1 July 1813, 25:447-448. 
440The Emperor ordered the Armies of Portugal (General Reille) du Centre (General 
D'Erlon), du Midi (General Gazan) and du Nord, (General Clausel) united under Marechal 
Soult as the Armee d'Espagne. CN, No. 20234, Napoleon to Clarke, 6 July 1813, 25:463-
464. Napoleon ordered Clarke: 
Yous ferez connaitre au due de Dalmatie le decret que j'ai pris pour 
reorganiser l'armee d'Espagne. Je desire qu'il forme autant de divisions 
qu'il aura de fois 6,000 hommes: ainsi, s'il reunit 72,000 hommes, ie aura 
douze divisions. 
No. 20236, Napoleon to Clarke, 6 July 1813, 24:465. Commandant Clerc, Campagne du 
Marechal Soult dans Les Pyrenees Occidentales en 1813-1814, (Paris: Librairie Militaire 
de !'Baudoin, 1894), 2:21-22. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:591-596. 
441 Clerc, Campagne dans les Pyrenees Occidentales, 45-65. Oman, Peninsular War, 
6:587-680. 
4420man, Peninsular War, 7:90-94. Glover, Wellington's Peninsular Victories, 135. 
Suchet, War in Spain, 2:337-341. Additionally, the reader must understand the personal 
attitudes of both Marshals. Neither was willing to serve "under" the other. Napoleon 
correctly titled Soult "the best strategic brain in the Peninsula." His faults were, however, 
as great as his talents: "Selfishness, jealousy, folie de grandeur, mendacity, avarice, and 
a strong measure of idleness on occasion." Marshal Suchet also possessed great talent. 
He was the best administrator in Spain, but he could be impossible to serve with. Richard 
Humble, Napoleon's Peninsular Marshals. a Reassessment, (New York: Taplinger 
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In any case, operations in eastern Spain ground on slowly as General Bentinck 
prepared to launch a third invasion of Catalonia. He discovered that General Decaen had 
returned to Upper Catalonia, and again thinking the French were abandoning Lower 
Catalonia, he marched again on Tarragonna on 27 August with 22,000 men supported by 
his Spanish allies and the Royal Navy. He occupied the abandoned fortress and organized 
its defense while his Catalan allies shadowed Barcelona, blockading Tortosa, Mequinenza 
and Lerida, and besieging Pensicola and Saguntum. General Cupons, in fact, scored an 
impressive victory on 10 September at Pallega, only ten miles from Barcelona, when his 
troops destroyed a French battalion.443 
Bentinck was, however, mistaken in his assumption, for Decaen's task was to clear 
the roads to Gerona to allow the passage of convoys. 444 In September, Bentinck however 
continued his advance through Lower Catalonia, repaired and resupplied Tarragona, and 
occupied Reus, Valls and the Ordal Pass. 445 
Marshal Suchet, hearing of Bentinck's advance, concentrated his 12,000 men at 
Molins de Rey and recalled Decaen's 10,000 men from Upper Catalonia. He launched 
a lightning offensive in two columns, converging on Ordal, where on the 13th, he routed 
an English brigade, and advanced on to Bentinck's positions, while the English General 
Publishing Co., 1973), 216-219. Napier, Peninsula War, 5:325-334. 
443SHAT C(8) 326, Registre de Correspondance, Decaen to Lamarque 12 August 
1813; Decaen to Lamarque, 12 August 1813 and Decaen to Maurice Mathieu, 13 August 
1813. 
4440man, Peninsular War, 7:96-97. 
445Ibid, 7: 100-103; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:242-243; Napier, Peninsula War, 5:574-
577; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:373-374. 
162 
retired to Tarragona. There, Bentinck discovered that Sicily had plunged into civil strife. 
He immediately placed General Sir William Clinton in command and returned. 446 
From July to December 1813, the European military situation continued to drive 
force structure development. The main front in Germany needed troops, and the defection 
of Napoleon's German allies forced a radical restructuring of many French commands, and 
the accelerated withdrawal of troops from Spain.447 Soult now defended the western 
Pyrenees, and Suchet withdrew into Catalonia, the two Marshals, debated campaign plans. 
Suchet proposed that the Minister of War combine their two armies under his command 
for the summer campaign. Surprisingly, even Soult assented to it. General Clarke and 
Soult concurred with the plan, and the Emperor approved it in October. He ordered 
Suchet to reinforce the garrisons at Barcelona, Figueras and Puycerda, and concentrate his 
available field force. Napoleon expressed his confidence in Suchet by appointing him 
Colonel General of the Imperial Guard and awarding him the command of the Army of 
Catalonia at the end of the year. 448 
The structure of the Army of Catalonia remained essentially unchanged since June 
1813, though continued withdrawals reduced its size. The Emperor recalled all of its 
German units from Catalonia, including the ler Leger Nassau, and ler Ligne Wurtzbourg 
which were disarmed. 449 The desertion of the Nassau and Frankfort infantry from the 
4460man, Peninsular War, 7:103-106; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:343-345. 
447Von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (1), 17. 
448Suchet, War in Spain, 2:338-339, 350-353; Napier, Peninsula War, 5:325-334. 
4490man, Peninsular War, 7:408; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:358; SHAT C(8)371, 
Situation, Armee de Catalogue, 30 June 1813. 
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Army of Spain during the Battle of the Nive compelled Napoleon to disarm his German 
units, and return them to France for fear of further desertion.450 
In August, Decaen received 4,341 troops which Suchet had borrowed earlier during 
his operations against the Anglo-Sicilian invasion. It was, however, a short lived though 
welcome reinforcement, for in the next month the Ministry of War increased troop 
reductions in Catalonia,451 including the withdrawal of conscripts from Decaen's 
regimental depots. These however did not effect the present troop strength, only their 
future strength by reducing the flow of replacements. 452 
The Army of Catalonia in November 1813 its last month of independent existence 
retained its existing organization and increased its manpower despite Ministerial conscript 
and unit withdrawals. Its effective strength rose 5.1 % from 22,460 to 23,662, but hospital 
admissions ballooned 48.3% (1,336 to 2,583).453 
The year brought considerable operational activity. The Anglo-Sicilian Army half-
heartedly developed a second Peninsular front and Wellington shattered Joseph 
Bonaparte's kingdom for good. The Army of Catalonia however weathered the stress of 
450The Emperor's fears of desertion had some foundation, for Colonel Kruse, who led 
the ler Nassau defection at Nive, sent a letter to Colonel Meder, Commander of the ler 
Leger Nassau, to defeat too. Meder, however, remained loyal and turned the letter over 
to Suchet. Many German soldiers in the Army of Aragon and Catalonia deserted General 
Clinton in December 1813. Oman, Peninsular War, 7:408-409. 
451 SHAT C(8)41 l, Situation, l'Armee de Catalogne, 22 August 1813. 
452SHAT, C(8) 320, Registre de Correspondance, No. 1438, Decaen to General 
Lamarque, 10 October 1813; No. 1439, Decaen to General Maurice Mathieu, 10 October 
1813: No. 1440, Decaen to General Esprit, 10 October, 1813 and No. 1445, Decaen, 
Order, 11 October 1813. 
453SHAT C(8) 317, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 November 1813. 
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the year's campagning with less disastrous loss than the Army of Spain though General 
Decaen's vacillating operations and near disasters cost him his command in favor of the 
more successful Marshal Suchet. The Army of Catalonia underwent little structural 
change except the steady drain of troop units and the subtler siphoning off of 
replacements coming from the regimental depots. The Army's strength, even with a 
reduced mission precluded its conduct of field operations and garrison duties. Only the 
active cooperation of Suchet and Decaen mollified this condition. In the end, only the 
combination of the Armies of Catalonia and Aragon and the abandonment of Suchet's 
holdings in Valencia, Aragon and a good portion of Lower Catalonia, allowed for the 
effective defense of Upper Catalonia and the French frontier. 
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§9. Last Phase: The Campaign of 1814 
In the autumn of 1813, the new commander of the Anglo-Sicilian Army, General 
Sir William Clinton, positioned his troops near Tarragona while, General Elio, with four 
divisions of his Second Army besieged Tortosa, Lerida, Saguntum and some smaller 
French posts. Marshal Suchet's new "combined" Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne 
occupied the line of the lower Ebro River, with 28,000 troops and held the fortresses of 
Lower Catalonia. He reasoned that the possession of these posts was essential to the 
reconquest of Lower Catalonia. In the meantime, they could tie down a considerable 
body of enemy troops. 454 Secondly, Suchet would have to justify abandoning them to the 
Emperor. 
On 25 November, Napoleon reacted to Wellington's success in the Pyrenees and 
the threat to the French frontier by calling on Suchet to withdraw more troops, allowing 
him to retrieve the garrisons of Lerida, Mequenensa and Tortosa and blow up their 
fortifications. 455 Suchet now concentrated two divisions, two separate brigades and three 
4540man, Peninsular War, 7:406-407. A good fortress garrisoned with 5,000 men can 
keep a good portion of the enemy troops otherwise occupied with a blockade/siege instead 
of on the main front required, using a force of from 15,000 to 25,000 to besiege it. 
Smaller posts occupied an even larger besieging force. Consequently, the garrisons of 
Lerida, Tortosa, and Barcelona could occupy several divisions, allowing Suchet to bring 
more force to bear on the battlefield. Wellington, for example besieged Badajos 
(garrisoned by 5,000 French) with 12,000 and later 16,000 men. He also besieged St. 
Sebastian (garrisoned by 3,400) with 11,000. John T. Jones, Journal of the Sieges Carried 
on by the Army Under the Duke of Wellington in Spain Between the Years 1811 and 
1814 with an Account of the Lines of Torres Vedras, (London, High Holbom, 1846), 
2:309-311. The fortress' ability to occupy much larger numbers of besieging troops (by 
at least a factor of two) makes it a potent "economy of force" instrument. 
4550man, Peninsular War, 7:407. 
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cavalry regiments on 2 December to attack General Clinton's Anglo-Sicilian Anny, which 
had retired behind the Ebro. 456 
Napoleon faced his greatest threat on the eastern frontier both in terms of enemy 
action and allied defections. He withdrew all of Marshal Suchet's German troops457 and 
interned them in response to the defection of the Nassau and Frankfort regiments over to 
Wellington on 10 December 1813, after the Battle ofNive. Colonel Kruse commander of 
Soult's Nassau Regiment unsuccessfully, urged Colonel Medor, commander of Suchet's 
Nassau Regiment to defect en masse with his unit. Some German soldiers did, in fact, 
desert over to the Anglo-Sicilians, though the unit remained on the whole loyal to 
Napoleon. In any case, the Emperor withdrew 2,500 German troops from Suchet's 
forces. 458 
He also ordered Suchet to transfer 120 men from each of his infantry regiments, 
some 5,000 men, to form cadres for two reserve divisions forming at Nimes and 
Montpellier which he sent respectively to man a new Corps d'Armee under the aging 
456Ibid, 7:407-408. Napier, Peninsula War, 7:482. Suchet did make a dash from his 
lines to mask a convoy marching to revictual Barcelona. This thankless logistical mission 
continued until the end of the war. 
457These included two battalions of the ler Ligne Nassau, the battalion of the 4e Ligne 
Westphalien and the Nassau and Westphalian Light Cavalry. 
458Despite Colonel Medor's loyalty, Napoleon had the ler Nassau discretely disarmed 
and interned in a French fortress. Oman, Peninsular War, 7:408; Gates, The Spanish 
Ulcer, 458. The Emperor ordered the 4e Regiment Etranger back to Antwerp and told 
General Clarke to arrange to have them disarmed once they arrived and "interned" in the 
French interior. He ordered the same measures taken with the Regiment de Castille and 
the units of the Confederation of the Rhine in the Armies of Catalonia and Spain. Once 
disarmed they were to be sent to the depots de prisonniers. CN, No. 20940,. Napoleon 
to General Clarke, 25 November 1813, 26:466; No. 20941, Napoleon to Clarke, 25 
November 1813, 26:467; No. 20942, Napoleon to Clarke, 25 November 1813, 26:467. 
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Marshal Augereau forming at Lyon, and to garrison the fortresses of the eastern Pyrenees. 
Napoleon also withdrew another 800 veteran troops to form cadres for the Imperial Guard. 
These transfers cost Suchet about 8,500 men, the equalivant of an entire division.459 
As the allies closed in on the French frontier with a powerful combined army, 
Napoleon attempted a political gambit he hoped would quickly end the Peninsular War 
in order to allow him to concentrate all his forces on the Rhine. He cajoled "King" 
Ferdinand VII to sign a worthless document, the spurious Treaty of Valen-ray, declaring 
a separate peace with Spain in exchange for his release. The Emperor planned a complete 
military withdrawal from Spain based on this treaty, and ordered Marshal Suchet on 4 
January 1814, to abandon all the French fortresses in the Spanish provinces still under 
French occupation. On 10 January, Suchet received the Imperial order to concentrate an 
11,000 man division on the Pyrenees and march to Lyons once the Treaty of Valencay 
was ratified. 460 The Spanish Cortez however, refused to ratify the treaty and continued 
the war. 461 
4590man, Peninsular War, 7:408. Napoleon even withdrew three divisions with 14, 
435 men and 40 cannon from Marshal Soult's Armee d'Espagne in January 1814. Clerc, 
Campagne de Marechal Soult, 315-317; Napier, War in the Peninsul~ 7:482-483. 
460Wellington momentarily feared that Copons would treat separately with Suchet and 
allow the French garrisons in Catalonia to return to Suchet. Suchet, War in Spain, 2:360-
362; Oman, Peninsular War, 7:408-410; Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 451-452; Clerc, 
Campagne de Marechal Soult, 309-314. 
461 0man, Peninsular War, 7:411. Napoleon wanted Suchet to concentrate all his 
cavalry (a division of 2,708 men and 2,881 horses), horse artillery (with 433 men and 131 
horses) and some 8,000 infantry. SHAT C(8)372, Situation Armee d'Aragon et de 
Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
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Marshal Suchet even requested permission to abandon his fortresses, except for 
2,500 men at Barcelona and 2,000 at Figueras to insure that Copons and Clinton allowed 
the other French garrisons passage to the frontier. 462 The Allied passage of the Rhine in 
December 1813 and the beginning of the 1814 Campaign forced Napoleon to set the 
treaty aside and strip his other armies to defend France. On 14 January, General Clarke 
ordered Suchet immediately to send the bulk of his cavalry and an infantry division (8,000 
men) back to France by 1 February.463 
The new disposition did not allow Suchet to withdraw the French Division 
(Division Habert) garrisoning Barcelona (7,500 men), and reduced his field forces to 
18,000 troops. Unable to continue holding the Llobregat line, however, he retired to 
Gerona leaving Barcelona (and other French posts) to fend for itself. 
On 16 January General Clinton opened an offensive on the Llobregat line after 
receiving news of Suchet's force reduction. Attacking with only 6,000 men (he kept his 
British regiments in reserve) and reinforced by General Copons' Catalan Army, Clinton 
crossed the Llobregat in the face of stiff opposition, but broke off the engagement and 
withdrew when Suchet reinforced his line with some troops rushed up from Barcelona. 
Suchet himself abandoned the Llobregat line and sent one of his brigades under 
General Pannetier (2nd Division) to Lyons and recognized his army into divisions and a 
462Suchet also suggested sending Ferdinand VII to Barcelona to hasten the evacuation. 
Oman, Peninsular War, 7:411-412; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:364-365. 
4630man, Peninsular War, 412-413. 
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brigade by spring; a field force of 5,000 men and 10,000 garrisoning the posts in Upper 
Catalonia. 464 
The war was now winding down, but this was hardly an anticlimatic period. In 
January another catastrophe struck the French command in Catalonia, which was as 
devastating as the fall of Figueras in 1811. This was the Juan van Halen plot, which 
precipitated the capitulation of several French garrisons. 
Juan Van Halen was a Flemish born Spanish officer, an Afrancescado, who served 
m King Joseph Bonaparte's Army since 1809. After Vitoria, he fled to Paris and 
successfully applied to the Ministry of War for another position on Marshal Suchet's staff. 
Van Halen, however, not wishing his fortunes to sink with Napoleon's, attempted a 
spectacular "patriotic" blow for Spain. Using knowledge of the French negotiations for 
the Treaty of Valen~ay, he got into secret communication with Baron Eroles, commander 
of the 1st Spanish Division, and stole the staff seal from Marshal Suchet's portfolio, the 
cypher and a quantity of "Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne" letterhead paper. He then 
boldy crossed the French piquets under a cavalry guard as a Parlementaire to Eroles. 
Quickly betraying his escort to capture, he deserted to Eroles. 465 
With General Eroles' assistance, he sent in phony French spies with forged 
letterhead dispatches informing the commanders of Tortosa, Lerida, and Monzon, of the 
Treaty of Valen~ay, attempting to convince them that the war was over, and they should, 
4640man, Peninsular War, 7:413-416; Napier, War in the Peninsula, 7:484-485; 
Suchet, War in Spain, 2:367-368; SHAT, C(8)271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
4650man, Peninsular War, 7:416-417; Napier, War in the Peninsula, 7:487; Suchet, 
War in Spain, 2:368. 
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by the treaty, abandon their posts and march back to France. General Robert at Tortosa 
suspected a trap and refused. General de Brigade Jean Baptiste Isidore, Baron Lamarque 
d'Arrouzat (1762-1834) commanding at Lerida, with an 1,800 man garrison and the 
Captain commanding 98 man garrison at Monzon fell for the ruse and were captured.466 
Despite these disasters, Suchet and Napoleon continued to place hope in the Treaty 
of Valenyay, and both tried to use Ferdinand VII as a bargaining chip to allow the French 
evacuation of Catalonia, and Napoleon sent Ferdinand to Suchet to negotiate the pact.467 
Suchet made the Spanish monarch sign a pledge to release the captured garrison of 
Barcelona prior to his release. Ferdinand, however when released on 21 March, 
repudiated the treaty, killing it. 
The French campaign, meanwhile, made great demands on the Grande Armee, and 
Napoleon, on 1 March 1814 ordered General Clarke to get another 10,000 troops from 
Suchet and evacuate his Catalan fortresses. 468 Suchet immediately sent General 
Beuremann's division to Lyons and evacuated the fortresses in Catalonia except Figueras 
and Barcelona. 469 His force as a result of the successive cuts fell in strength from five 
4660man, Peninsular War, 7:418-420; Napier, War in the Peninsul~ 7:490-493. 
467Napoleon wrote to General Clarke: 
Laissez carte blanche au due d'Albufera qu'il demolisse Barcelone ou garde 
ce qui lui conviendra .... si le roi Ferdinand veut aller a Barcelone qu'il parte 
incognito. On lui remettra les places fortes moyennant le renvoi des 
gamisons franyaises. 
CN, No. 21213, Napoleon to Clarke, 8 February 1814, 27: 135. 
468CN, No. 21403, Napoleon to Clarke, 1 March 1814, 27:272-273. 
4690man, Peninsular War, 7:424; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:490; SHAT,· C(8)372, 
Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
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infantry, one cavalry division, a separate brigade and garrisons (43,799 men) to one 
division, a reserve brigade and garrisons (19,315 men). Suchet also had to man the new 
III and IV Reserve Divisions forming at Nimes and Montpellier providing 19 regimental 
depots and 6,400 troops. 470 
Suchet now took command of the 9th and I 0th Military Divisions in March and 
pushed his line of communications through Perpignan-Narbonne-Beziers to evacuate 
Catalonia, repair the fortifications of Beziers, and Narbonne (Suchet's rear headquarters) 
and prepare the defense of Perpignan. 471 His main problem was, however, manpower, for 
by March, his army only numbered 19,000 men, and he needed more troops. 
Consequently, he ordered the garrisons of the 10th Military Division to squeeze 4,000 
men out for the field. 472 Lord Wellington, meanwhile, ordered General Clinton to break 
up the Anglo-Sicilian Army as a now useless front but, only at the end of hostilities, for 
Suchet had not fully evacuated Catalonia.473 Another thunderbolt struck when Wellington 
470SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814; 
Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, I May 1814. He prepared Figueras for 
defense and determined to holding a line to both cover the French frontier and provide 
a base to recover the French fortresses remaining in Catalonia. Suchet, War in Spain, 
2:382-383. 
471 Suchet, War in Spain, 2:383, 388-391, 479. 
472The former plan never worked, for the war ended. Suchet, however, did reopen 
negotiations with Soult to combine both their armies. Ibid, 2:393-397. Suchet's strength, 
according to his Memoirs, was 11,327 men and is low. Ibid, 2:393. According to the 
Situations of 1April1814, Suchet's strength present under arms was 16,166 active troops. 
SHAT, C(8)372, Armee d'Espagne, Situation, I April 1814. 
473Wellington, Dispatches, Wellington to Lieutenant General Clinton, 4th March 1814, 
7:343-344; Wellington to Clinton, 4th March 1814, 7:344; Wellington to Clinton, 8 
March 1814, 7:360; Oman, Peninsular War, 7:429-430. 
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defeated Soult at the Battle of Toulouse on 10 April, inducing him to apply to Marshal 
Suchet for assistance,474 who sent 3,000 troops. 475 
Suchet now evacuated Upper Catalonia with his steadily shrinking army to defend 
the line of the Pyrenees. On 16 April, however, he received the dispatches declaring the 
fall of Paris on 30 March, the Emperor's abdication on 31 March and the restoration of 
the Bourbon Monarchy and a new king, Louis XVIII. The Marshal held a council of war 
and advised his generals of the Emperor's fall, and sent to Paris his allegiance to the royal 
government. 476 
With Napoleon's collapse, Wellington accepted an armistice, and Suchet set about 
the task of repatriating the French garrisons and prisoners in Catalonia. On 19 April, 
Marshal Berthier and the new Minister of War, General Pierre, Comte Dupont de l'Etang 
(1765-1840),477 dispatched news of the final armistice, and Suchet communicated this to 
Soult and Wellington and concluded his own armistice with General Copons while 
ordering the governors of Barcelona, Tortosa and Saguntum to evacuate the fortresses. 
General Habert, for example, did so on 28 May and arrived at Perpignan on 3 June. 478 
474Suchet, War in Spain, 2:399. 
4751bid, 2:393-395. 
476Ibid, 2:397. 
477General Dupont, (1765-1840) a rising star, defeated at Bailen in 1809 nicknamed 
"Le Capitulard" and disgraced by Napoleon. 
478SHAT, C(8)271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:403-406. 
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As the war drew to a close, Marshal Suchet went to Toulouse with his 
commanders and presented himself to the Royal representative, the Due 
d'Angouleme. 479Retuming to Narbonne with the Duke, Suchet took command of his new 
Armee des Pyrenees combined with the Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne as the Armee 
du Sud on 4 May. By early June, the garrisons of Barcelona, Tortosa, Pensicola, and 
Saguntum reached the French frontier, and General Copons allowed the repatriation of 
20,000 French prisoners.480 
During the last period of General Decaen's command, as the war lurched to its end 
and the French armies slowly came apart at the seams, there were no grand operations. 
Certainly, Decaen lacked the troops and the credit with Paris to stand a failure. Decaen's 
task was to stave off a disaster and keep the Army of Catalonia running until Suchet 
replaced him. This was itself no mean task. 
From September to November, 1813, General Decaen kept General Lamarque on 
the go as he had the only two disposable field brigades left in the army. General Esprit's 
Division en Cerdagne was tied to guarding the French frontier with a mere 2,448 troops. 
General Lamarque's division of 4,771 men, divided into two brigades under Generals 
Beuremann (2,155) and Petit (2,556) was the only disposable field force. The rest of 
479Louis de Bourbon, Due d'Angouleme (1775-1844) was the nephew to Louis XVIII 
was the Royal Representative who landed in France in 1814 to bring the populace over 
to the Bourbon cause. 
480Suchet, War in Spain, 2:403-406. 
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Decaen's army of 18,933 men481 were tied up in the physical occupation of French strong 
points. 
On 23 August, Decaen sent Lamarque on one of the many interminable supply 
convoys to Barcelona.482 On the conclusion of this all too necessary task, Decaen 
requested from Marshal Suchet483 the services of General Severoli's Italian Division to 
occupy St. Celoni on the main Barcelona - Gerona Road and cover the return trip of 
Lamarque's convoy. Decaen was in no position to risk another near disaster at La Salud. 
He coordinated this simple operation with the same care that Augereau and Macdonald 
lavished upon their huge convoys of 1810. He carefully supervised every movement, 
every position taken, and the actions of every commander until the conclusion of the 
convoy on 7 September. 484 He sent some twenty-seven dispatches to complete this 
operation, undoubtedly keeping his staff working furiously and his dispatch riders and 
481 SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 November 1813. 
482SHAT C(8) 326, Registre de Correspondance, Decaen to Lamarque 18 August 
1813; Decaen to Maurice Mathieu, 19 August 1813; Decaen to Lamarque, 22 August 
1813; Decaen to Lamarque, 23 August 1813; Decaen to Maurice Mathieu, 23 August 
1813; Decaen to Ordonnateur Raymon don, 23 and 24 August 1813; Decaen to Lamarque, 
24 August 1813. 
483SHAT C(8) 326, General Decaen to Marshal Suchet, 19 August 1813; Decaen to 
General Severoli, 24 August 1813; Decaen to Maurice Mathieu, 24 August 1813; Decaen 
to Lamarque, (two letters) 24 and 25 August 1813. 
484SHAT C(8) 326, General Decaen to General Severoli, 3 September 1813; Decaen 
to General Petit, 3 September 1813; Decaen to General Petit, 3 September 1813; Decaen 
to Severoli, 3 September 1813; Decaen to Petit, 3 September 1813; Decan to Severo Ii, 4 
September 1813; Decaen to General Ordonneau, 5 September 1813; Decaen to Severoli, 
5 September 1813. 
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escorts forever in the saddle.485 The operation was entirely uneventful, and Lamarque 
returned with a convoy of 1,000 sick while Severoli and General Beuremann's brigade 
cleared the main road of ever present insurgents. 486 
General Decaen had virtually given up on gaining the strategic or tactical initiative 
in Catalonia. The direction of the war was in Marshal Suchet's hands, and he contented 
himself with the management of local operations and to cooperating with Suchet in 
fighting the Anglo-Sicilian threat as best he could with his two disposable brigades.487 
October 1813 was exactly the same. His minuscule field force was totally occupied in 
convoys488 and cleaning insurgents off the line of communications. 489 
General Decaen was fully immersed in the administration of his army, particularly 
the handling of its internal security.490 He was also in contact with the Catalan Staff 
485SHAT C(8) 326, Decaen to M. Dubois (dispatch rider) 12e Hussards, 5 September 
1813; and Decaen to Severoli, 6 September 1813. 
486SHAT C(8) 326, Decaen to Ordonnateur en Chef Bourdon, 7 September 1813; 
Decaen to General Beuremann, 7 September 1813; Decaen to Lamarque, 7 September 
1813; Decaen to Severoli, 7 September 1813. 
487SHAT C(8) 326. Decaen to General Hamelinaye, Chief of Staff, 14 September 
1813; Decaen to General Nicolas, 14 and 15 September 1813; Decaen to General 
Beuremann 17 September 1813; Decaen to Severo Ii, 15 September 1813; and Decaen to 
Suchet, 15 September 1813. 
488SHAT C(8) 320, Registre de Correspondance, No. 1357, Decaen to General Petit, 
1 October 1813. 
489SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1367, Decaen to General Gudin, (Army of Aragon), 3 October 
1813. 
490SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1388, Decaen to General Nogues, 5 October 1813; No. 1392, 
Decaen to Lamarque 5 October 1813; No. 1394, Decaen to Colonel Casabianca, 
Commander 6e Legion de Gendarmerie, 5 October 1813; and No. 1375, Decaen to 
Casabianca, 3 October 1813. 
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conducting unique negotiations on the treatment of prisoners, and the civilized conduct 
of the war and treatment of the inhabitants. 491 The regular administrative work of the 
army absorbed the rest of his time.492 By November, when Marshal Suchet took 
command of his army and made him a mere 'disposable' general officer on the staff,493 
Decaen virtually ceased all but the most minor operations, such as small convoys, 
escorting dispatch riders, as the hussar escort for a courrier to Barcelona;494 or the 
establishment of security on the Pyrenees frontiers. 495 Logistics still took center stage and 
Decaen assiduously managed these operations with his Commissaire-Ordonnateur. 496 
Generally, the Army of Catalonia, no longer an independent force, its commander now 
491 SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1358 and 1359, Decaen to General Nogues, (2 letters) 1 
October 1813; No. 1361, Decaen to General Pallmerol, Commander of Figueras, 2 
October 1813; No. 1365, Decaen to General Clarke, 3 October 1813; No. 1386 and 1401, 
Decaen to General Clarke, 5 October 1813; SHAT C(8) 327, Registre de Correspondance 
avec l'Etat major Espagnol; No. 28, Decaen to Adjudant General Cabanes 2 October 1813; 
No. 29 and 30 Decaen to Cabanes, 8 October 1813; No. 31, Decaen to Cabanes, 21 
October 1813; No. 32, Decaen to Cabanes, 25 October 1813; and No. 32, Decaen to 
Cabanes, 28 October 1813. 
492Register C(8) 317 and 320 are replete with a mass of adminstrative correspondance 
on every internal issue of the Army of Catalonia. 
493SHAT C(8) 372, Tableau de !'organisation des Armees d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 
1 December 1813. 
494SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1419, Decaen to General Severoli, 7 October 1813; No. 1420 
Decaen to Chef de Bataillon Voisin, Commandant d'arrnes a Hostalrich, 7 October 1813; 
and No. 1421 Decaen to Lamarque, 8 October 1813. 
495SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1425, Decaen to Lamarque, 9 October 1813. 
496SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1432, Decaen to Ordonnateur Bourdon 9 October 1813; No. 
1492, Decaen to Lamarque, 22 October 1813; No. 1493, Commissaire des guerres Berand, 
22 October 1813; and No. 1494, Decaen to Bourdon, 22 October 1813. 
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a mere subordinate to Marshal Suchet, quietly passed to Suchet's command in November 
1813. 
This period, from October 1813 to May 1814 was one of radical force structure 
changes in the Army of Catalonia. It lost its independence in October and its structural 
integrity in December, becoming part of the Army of Aragon and Catalonia which later 
combined with the Army of the Pyrenees. As we have seen, General Decaen's 
"lackluster" performance during the invasion of Catalonia in June 1813, and his near 
disaster at La Salud destroyed his already poor credit with the Emperor, who virtually 
relieved him of command in November 1813.497 
Marshal Suchet, meanwhile, assumed command of his combined army to defend 
the eastern Pyrenees. Although he received a net increase in troop strength by December, 
and requested new conscripts, 498 this was offset in the loss of two divisions, and the 
internment of his German troops as a result of the defection at the Battle of Nive. In this 
4970man, Peninsular War, 7:73-74; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:350-353. General Clark's 
letters to Marshal Suchet in September and October discuss the Armies of Aragon and 
Catalonia, without reference to General Decaen. The Ministre clearly saw Suchet as 
commander of both armies. "Informed as you are by the letters of the Marshal Duke of 
Dalmatia, on the side assigned in his plans to the Armies of Aragon and Catalonia ... " 
General Clarke to Marshal Suchet, 13th September 1813, Ibid, 2:447. Also, in a 2 
October letter, General Clarke states: " ... your excellency introduces the new organization 
of the armies of Aragon and Catalonia ... " General Clarke, Duke of Feltre to Marshal 
Suchet, 2nd October 1813, Ibid, 2:447-448. 
498lbid, 2:447-448. SHAT, C(8)372, Tableau de !'Organisation des Armees d'Aragon 
et de Catalogne, 1 December 1813. 
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way, Suchet lost the 1,822 troops of the ler Leger Nassau, and the 387 men of the ler-ler 
de Ligne Wurtzbourg and later another 1,100 men of the 6e Legion de Gendarmerie.499 
After September 1813, the Emperor accelerated troop withdrawals from Spain. On 
the 28th, for example, he took 21 cavalry squandrons from Soult.500 By November he 
needed 500,000 more troops to replace the losses in Germany, and he ordered the 
Directeur de la Conscription to draft 690,000 men. He planned to form four 100,000 man 
reserve armies at Bordeaux, Turin, Metz, and Anvers, two Armies of the Pyrenees and 
Italy of 25,000 men each and the Grande Armee itself would absorb 275,000 men. 501 The 
Minister of War meanwhile continued feeding troops to the two reserve divisions forming 
at Nimes and Montpellier by recalling more troops in November from Suchet's Army. 
On 16 November, the Emperor made yet deeper cuts into Suchet's army to form 
an Armee de Reserve du Cote des Pyrenees, under Marshal Moncey, from the cadres of 
ten regiments, two of which would come from the Army of Aragon and Catalonia. The 
Ministry drew experienced junior officers and non-commissioned officers to form the 6th 
battalions to form new unit. The Minister sent ten cadres to Toulouse and ten to 
499SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 November 1813; Oman, 
Peninsular War, 7:408-409; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:358. Napoleon considered the 
foreign regiments dangerous and in a note dictated to Pierre Bruno Count Daru (1767-
1829) divided them into the following classes: Swiss, foreign regiments/battalions, 
Illyrien regiments, Croation, Spanish, Portuguese, Grand Duchy of Berg and fiinally, the 
lease reliable, the Baden Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau units in the Armee de Catalogne. 
Napoleon ordered a roster of the posts where these German units were assigned and a list 
of the number of fusils they had. He also ordered Suchet to disarm the German soldiers. 
CN, No. 20893, Note Dictee au Comte Daru, 15 November 1813, 26:427-428. 
50
°CN, No. 20657, Napoleon to General Clarke, 29 September 1813, 26:263-264; No. 
20866, Napoleon to General Clarke, 6 November 1813, 26:410-411. 
501 CN, No. 20874, Napoleon to General Clarke, 10 November 1813, 26:414-416. 
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Perpignan to form two 11,600 man divisions, the Pyrenees Occidentales and Pyrenees 
Orientales. Once in place, the cadres would receive 1,500 conscripts each, drawn from 
the Pyrenees departments totaling 30,000 men. The armies of Catalonia and Aragon 
contributed 400 men for each of these cadre battalions, and clothed, equipped and armed 
the other 1,100 men. The Armies of Aragon and Catalonia would also reroute 16,000 of 
their conscripts into these reserve divisions. Additionally, there was 128,000 other men 
to form 40 battalions in four divisions, destined for the Armee de Reserve. 502 
By December 1813, Marshal Suchet completed the amalgamation of the two 
Armies into the Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne. It included seven divisions and a 
separate brigade. 503 Its garrisons in Catalonia were the strategic foothold in the province 
and were divided into three groups. First, Upper Catalonia including the Arrondissements 
of Figueras and Gerona; second, Lower Catalonia had the Arrondissement of Barcelona 
and third the posts of Aragon. The whole combined army and garrisons had 56,484 troops. 504 
502CN, No. 20898, Napoleon to Clarke, 16 November 1813, 26:431-432; No. 20901, 
Napoleon to M. Melzi, Due de Lodi, Chancelier du Royaume d'Italie, 16 November 1813, 
26:434; No. 20904, Napoleon to Clarke, 17 November 1813, 26:435; No. 20906, 
Napoleon to Clarke, 17 November 1813, 26:437-438; No. 20907, Napoleon to Clarke, 17 
November 1813, 26:438-439; No. 20908, Napoleon to Clarke, 17 November 1813, 
26:439-440; No. 20912, Napoleon to Clarke, 18 November 1813, 26:441-443; No. 20914, 
Napoleon to Clarke, 26:443-444; No. 20915, Napoleon to Clarke, 18 November 1813, 
16:444-445. In 1814, the Reserve Division at Nimes was sent to Marshal Augereau's 
Armee des Rhone at Lyons. Six, Dictionnaire, 1:28-30. CN, No. 21055, Ordres a donner 
par le Major General, 1 January 1814, 27:1-3. The second reserve division was never 
completely formed, and sent to garrison Mont Louis, Perpignan and other frontier posts 
in the lOe Division Militaire. Oman, Peninsular War, 7:409; CN, No. 20941, Napoleon 
to Clarke, 25 November 1813, 26:467. 
503SHAT, C(8)371, Tableau de !'Organisation des Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne 1 
December 1813. 
504Ibid. 
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The major force structure change at the end of 1813 was the Imperial withdrawal 
of Division Severoli to defend Italy from the Austrian invasion (3,185 troops), Suchet's 
Nassau and Westphalien troops, his cavalry replacements, and the bulk of the 6e Legion 
de Gendarmerie to France. 505 He also ordered Suchet to consolidate and recall his 
scattered garrisons, saving 10,000 men.506 To complete this reorganization, Suchet 
appointed a new staff headed by his old Chief of Staff, General Cyr, Baron Saint-Cyr 
Nougues (1774-1892), replacing all of General Decaen's staff with his own. 507 The 
Emperor reassigned General Decaen to command the fortress of Hellevoetsluis in 
Holland. 508 
The new Army of Aragon and Catalonia had five infantry divisions; the Brigade 
de Cerdagne, a cavalry division, the arrondissement commands of Figueras, Gerona, La 
Bispal, and Lower Catalonia; and the combat service commands. This new organization 
in Suchet's army, particularly of his divisions reflected a restructuring of the whole French 
army. Infantry divisions were no longer organized in the loose manner of the past, but 
were restructured with two brigades of two (four battalions) regiments, and artillery 
505CN, No. 20942, Napoleon to Clarke, 25 November 1813, 26:467-468. 
506Ibid. 
507SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
508CN, No. 20159, Napoleon to Clarke, 3 December 1813, 26:485. Ibid., No. 20981, 
Napoleon to General Lebrun, Due de Plaisance, Govemeur d'Anvers, 7 December 1813, 
24:494-495; No. 20982, Napoleon to Berthier, 8 December 1813, 26: 495; No. 20983, 
Napoleon to Vice-Amiral Decres, Ministre de la Marine, 8 December 1813, 26: 495; No. 
20984, Napoleon to Decres, 8 December 1813, 26:495-496; No. 20985, Note Paris, 8 
December 1813, 26:496. 
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numbering about 10,000 troops. 509 This standardization allowed Napoleon to make the 
most of increasingly scarce manpower and it eased the administrative tasks of 
organization, command and control. 
By 1814, the manpower stresses forced another downsizing of the French 
divisions, but they retained their new standardized structure. 510 The Emperor not only 
restructured the French infantry divisions in Spain along these standardized lines, but did 
so with Suchet's cavalry, dividing it into divisions with two brigades of six squadrons 
each, as reflected in the Grande Armee and the Armee d'Espagne511 
The 1st Infantry Division had 4,281 troops and was organized strictly from troops 
of the Army of Aragon. Similarly, the 2nd Infantry Division issued from the Army of 
Aragon with 5,496 men. 512 The 3rd Infantry Division, on the other hand, was an amalgam 
of units from both the Armies of Aragon and Catalonia, and had 3,439 men.513 The 4th 
Division of 2,577 men, under General Louis, Baron Ordonneau (1770-1855), an old hand 
509Scott Bowden, Napoleon's Grande Armee of 1813, Armies of the Napoleonic Wars 
Research Series, (Chicago: The Emperor's Press, 1990) 241-282. 
510Jean Tranie and J.C. Carmigniani, Napoleon: 1814. La Campagne de France, (Paris: 
Pygmalion, 1989) 290-291. The Grande Armee retained this structure through 1815. 
Scott Bowden, Armies at Waterloo, (Arlington: Empire Games Press, 1983) 85-134. 
511Tranie and Carmignani, Napoleon 1814, 294; SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armee 
d'Espagne, 1 April 1814. 
512See Tables 23 and 24. This division had 3,828 present under arms, 871 detached 
and 797 in hospital. The 2d Brigade also transferred out the 81 er Ligne to Marshal Soult. 
Ibid. 
513See Table 23. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd divisions had 3,751, 3,828 and 2,946 present 
under arms. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, l'Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 
1814. 
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in Catalonia who served as General Duhesme's Chief of Staff in 1808,514 was made 
entirely of units of the old Army of Catalonia. Suchet, however, split this division in 
half. He assigned the 1st Brigade to the garrison of Barcelona, and retained the 2nd 
Brigade for the field. 515 General Lamarque's 5th Division was also drawn entirely from 
the Army of Catalonia with 4,836 men.516 Suchet still retained a separate brigade in the 
Cerdagne, under General Esprit de la Tour, with 1,886 men. 517 He centralized his cavalry 
into one Cavalry Division with 3,439 men and 3,399 horses. 518 
The garrisons were divided between the two commands of Upper and Lower 
Catalonia, both under General Pierre-Joseph, Baron Harbert ( 1773-1823 ), Governor of 
Barcelona. These garrisons were largely composed of formations of the Army of 
Catalonia.519 The Arrondissement of Gerona with its small posts numbered with 2,971 
men and the Garrison of Barcelona with 7,652 troops. 520 
514SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 29 May 
1808. 
515The 2e Brigade totaled 2,203 men present under arms, C(8)372, Situation, Armee 
d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
516The 5th Division had 4,278 men present under arms. Ibid. 
517The Brigade had 1,714 men present under arms. Ibid. 
518The Division totaled 2,708 men and 2,881 horses present under arms. Ibid. 
519This does not include the outlying posts of Tarragona, Tortosa, and Lerida which 
were traditionally garrisoned from the assets of the Armee d'Aragon. Ibid. 
520SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814; 
C(8)411, Situation, Fort de Gironne, 1 January 1814; Situation, Fort de Figueras 315, 
January 1814. 
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The Gendarmerie Imperiale was completly gutted with the withdrawal of the 6e 
Legion. The ambulance companies or Compagnies d'infirmeries d'hopitaux remained,521 
along with the equipage and pack mule units, with 1,376 men, 1,180 horses, 702 mules 
and 166 vehicles.522 The engineers and artillery were the two portions of the Army that 
expanded in both unit and troop strength in this time of drastic cuts. Suchet divided them 
between field and garrison commands. In the artillery in particular, the Army of Aragon 
added seventeen new units, and an artillery park, the whole totaling 874 men and 1,275 
horses. 523 Suchet's combined army then underwent a complete structural change. The 
Army had in fact an overall growth of 40% in manpower to 43,799 men (37,594 present 
under arms). 
In January 1814, the Emperor continued to reduce Suchet's army as he feverishly 
prepared for the defense of France, sending some men and material to the aged Marshal 
Augereau's Corps d'Armee at Lyon,524 which included the new 20,000 man Reserve de 
Geneve, drawn from the regimental depots of the 7th, 8th, and 9th Divisions Militaires. 
The Army of Lyon would be composed of the Reserve de Geneve, battalions from the 
521Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 284; Francois Percy, Journal des Campagnes du 
Baron Percy. Chirurgien en Chef de la Grande Armee (1754-1825), 3d Ed., (Paris: 
. Librairie Pion, 1904) 440-441. SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de 
Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
522 AN, AFrv 1184, Situation des Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires et 
Brigades de Mulets de Bat, (a loger) attaches aux Armees d'Espagne, d'Aragon et de 
Catalogne, 16 Decembre 1813 au 1 Janvier 1814. SHAT, C(8)372, Situation. Armee 
d'Aragon et de Catalogne. 15 January 1814. 
523SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Arme d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
524See Tables 24 and 27. CN, No. 21055, Ordres a donner par le Major General, 1 
January 1814, 27:1-2; No. 21086, Napoleon to Clarke, 11 January 1814, 27:25. 
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Grande Armee (or the Armee d'Alexandrie), Division de Reserve de Nimes, Gardes 
Nationaux, a division from the Army of Catalonia, and four reserve divisions from Nimes, 
Bourdeaux, Toulouse and Montpellier. 525 As the conscript army gathered at Lyon in 
January, Napoleon stiffened it with one of Suchet's divisions. 526 On 4 January, Napoleon 
sent Suchet a "warning order" to evacuate Catalonia, while he continued to concentrate 
Suchet's cavalry and horse artillery and half of his infantry to reinforce Augereau's Army 
if the hoped for (but stillborn) Treaty of Valen~ay were ratified. 527 
Napoleon planned every detail informing the reserve divisions and the Armee de 
Lyon, including extending Marshal Augereau's authority to organize a National Guard in 
the 15 e and 21 e Divisions Militaires. 528 As the days passed, Napoleon became 
increasingly aware, to his chagrin, that there were insufficient veteran troops to spread 
between four fronts, and he reiterated his order to Suchet to send a division,529 and more 
from Soult. 530 He ordered General Clarke to "Press the Due d'Albufera to send more 
525CN, No. 21100, Ordres, 15 January 1814, 27:40-42. 
526CN, No. 21097, Napoleon to Clarke, 14 January 1814, 27:38-39; No. 21100, 
Ordres, 15 January 1814, 27:40-41. 
5270man, Peninsular War, 7:411-412. 
528CN, No. 21114, Notes, 18 January 1814, 27:53-54. 
529Napoleon also ordered Marshal Soult to send 10 to 12,000 troops in three letters. 
Soult answered these orders protesting his lack of troops, particularly the 4,000 cavalry 
the Emperor wanted. Ibid, No. 21121, Napoleon to Clarke, 22 January 1814, 27:60-61; 
No. 21132, Napoleon to Clarke, 24 January 1814, 27:70. 
53
°Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 958-960. F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon at 
Bay. 1814, (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1914), 19-25. 
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troops to Lyon". 531 By the first week of February, when the expected reinforcements had 
not arrived,532 Napoleon lost his patience and railed at Marshal Suchet's unresponsiveness 
to his orders at so critical a time, and personally blamed Suchet for the tardiness of 
desperately needed reinforcements. 533 
Marshal Suchet, did in fact, very slowly form the required division under General 
Claude, Comte de Valdotte Pannetier (1769-1843), with 8,051 infantry and 2,132 cavalry. 
This forced him to abandon his outlying posts around Barcelona, only retaining the city 
itself.534 By I March, Napoleon demanded yet another 10,000 man division from Suchet 
for the Army of Lyon. 535 
On 7 March, a chastened Marshal Suchet sent a division of 9,661 men under 
General Beuremann to Lyon, abandoned all the posts in Upper Catalonia, and blew up 
531Napoleon also gave terse orders to Augereau to rally 7 or 8,000 men in the 
Dauphine or Geneve to place a division on the enemy flanks. Ibid, No. 21162, Napoleon 
to General Clarke, 31 January 1814, 27:95-97. 
532Ibid., No. 21180, Napoleon to Berthier, 5 February 1814, 27:111; No. 21181, 
Napoleon to Berthier, 5 February 1814, 27:111. 
533lbid., No. 21213, Napoleon to Clarke, 8 February 1814, 27: 135. 
5340man, Peninsular War, 7:412. 
535Napoleon still harbored hopes in this letter of a favorable result to the Treaty of 
Valencay. CN, No. 21403, Napoleon to Clarke, I March 1814, 27:264-265. Marshal 
Berthier relayed Napoleon's orders to Suchet on I March 1814: "The Emperor's orders are 
that you send off .. a second column of I 0,000 infantry en poste in the direction of Lyons." 
Suchet, War in Spain, 2:473; Oman, Peninsular War, 7:424. 
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their fortifications. He retained Figueras, a vital key to the French frontier defense. In 
this way he amassed another 14,000 men. 536 
Though Napoleon's strength reductions were severe, Suchet did have access to two 
new reserve divisions. The III Division de Reserve des Pyrenees at Montpellier (1,648 
troops) and the IV Division de Reserve des Pyrenees at Nimes (4,752 men), formed from 
S uchet's own depots. 537 These reinforcements unfortunately never reached a state of field 
readiness. Suchet placed Figueras in a state of defense and planned to hold this "line" 
to cover the French frontier, and hopefully recover some of the remaining Catalan 
garrisons. 538 He took command of parts of the 9e and I Oe Divisions Militaires to support 
his armies, and arranged his line of communications through Perpignan-Narbonne-Beziers 
in order to evacuate Catalonia. He put Beziers and Narbonne in a state of defense, 
reconnoitered the Pyrenees for defensive positions, and paid personal attention to the 
defense of Perpignan. 539 
In March 1814, his combined army numbered 11,327 men under arms .540 To 
make-up his chronic troop shortage, he ordered General Louis, Baron Robert (1772-1831 ), 
5360man, Peninsular War, 7:424; CN, No. 21403, Napoleon to Clarke, 1 March 1814, 
17:264-266. 
537Suchet, War in Spain, 2:382; SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, 4e Division de Reserve 
des Pyrenees, 30 May 1814. 
538Suchet, War in Spain, 2:383, 479. 
539lbid., 2:388-391. 
540Ibid., 2:393. 
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governor of the 5,000 strong garrison of Tortosa,541 to make a lighting march to Barcelona 
and linkup with General Habert. From there, General Habert would march with the 
combined garrisons totaling 12,000 men to Upper Catalonia. Peace, however, caught up 
with this project and ended before General Habert could effect it. 542 Suchet could also 
reduce the size of the eight garrisons in the I Oe Division Militaire, currently numbering 
11,350 troops, down to 7,200 men and free 4,000 men for the field. 543 In these desperate 
days, Napoleon again became quickly dissatisfied with Marshal Augereau and proposed 
to General Clark on 14 March to send Suchet to Lyon in Augereau's stead and to send 
General Decaen back to the Pyrenees. 544 
In early spring, Marshal Suchet faithlessly (and under the circumstances quite in 
character) corresponded with Soult over cooperation between two armies yet tarried over 
sending his army to the Western Pyrenees. The Battle of Toulouse on I 0 April in which 
Wellington defeated the French, compelled Soult to urge Suchet to join him in fighting 
541 Suchet's garrisons of Saguntum, Denia, Pensicola and Morella had 2,000 men but 
were so widely dispersed it would be nearly impossible under existing conditions to 
concentrate them. Ibid., 2:389-390. 
542Letter, Suchet to General Habert, Governor of Barcelona, 3 lst March 1814: " ... you 
are called upon to act a brilliant part, and to save the garrison of Tortosa, which would 
proceed to join you at Barcelona ... The success of this enterprise ... would restore to 
Emperor a column of 12,000 experienced troops ... " Ibid., 2:390-391, 483. 
543Letter General Clarke to Marshal S uchet, 28th March 1814. General Clarke 
concurred with Marshal Suchet's request to reinforce the logistical support to eight 
fortresses in the I Oe Divison Militaire and would coordinate with General Lacuee to order 
the Commissaire de Guerre to support them. Ibid, 2:389, 482. 
544CN, No. 21482, Napoleon to General Clarke, 14 March 1814, 27:313-314. 
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the English,545 but Marshal Suchet replied that he was unable to link up but would send 
3,000 men instead while he evacuated Catalonia. 546 
As Suchet finally set about evacuating Catalonia in March, Napoleon sent to the 
ex-King Joseph Bonaparte, now Lieutenant General of the Emperor, new dispositions for 
I 0,000 of Suchet's remaining troops, including sending 5 or 6,000 to Dordogne, and the 
cavalry to the Loire. He put the Pyrenees under General Decaen, and gave Suchet a new 
command, the Armee de la Garonne. 547 
On I March 1814, the army was headquartered at Narbonne, and consisted of three 
divisions and a reserve, supported by two cavalry regiments, artillery and support troops. 
The 1st Infantry Division at Narbonne under General Lamarque (6,732), General Habert's 
2nd Division garrisoning Barcelona (8, 163 ), the Reserve of the army under General Jean, 
Baron Mesclop (1775-1844) at Montpellier had ( 4,062 men), the Division de Commandant 
des Pyrenees Orientales under the command of General Paris (4,129) at Perpignan, and 
finally. The Cavalry Division under General Jean Baptiste, Baron Meyer (1770-1860) had 
(1,443 men and 1,541 horses). The services remained intact with 4,128 men. 548 All told, 
the Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne had 22 battalions and 6 squadrons, with 19,315 men 
and 3,305 horses.549 
545Suchet, War in Spain, 2:394-399. 
546lbid., 2:393-394. 
547CN, No. 21504, Napoleon to King Joseph, 17 March 1814, 27:326-327. 
548See Table 25. SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 
1814. 
549lbid. 
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By March 1814, operations in Catalonia had ground to a halt. Suchet received 
news of the fall of Paris, Napoleon's abdication, and the restoration of Louis XVIII. He 
called a "council of war" and informed his generals, then dispatched his allegiance to the 
new Royal government at Paris. Lord Wellington, meanwhile, agreed to an armistice, and 
Suchet set about the task of repatriating both the French garrisons in Catalonia and French 
prisoners of war. Marshal Berthier and the new Minister of War, General Dupont, then 
sent Suchet news of the final armistice concluded at Paris, who in tum, informed Marshal 
Soult and Wellington. Suchet sent General Lamarque to conclude an armistice with 
General Copons in Catalonia, and sent an officer to Barcelona, Tortosa and Sanguntum 
with news of the armistice and ordered the governors of those cities to relinquish their 
posts.550 
The last military events of the war took place at Barcelona. When General Habert 
received news of the fall of Napoleon on 20 April, he reviewed his troops and had them 
swear their allegiance to Napoleon. On the 24th, Habert received news of the armistice 
and evacuated Barcelona on 28 May. His division arrived at Perpignan on 3 June.551 
At the end of the war, Marshal Suchet took command of the new combined Armee 
d'Aragon et de Catalogne and the Armee des Pyrenees, called the Armee du Sud, 
headquartered at Toulouse. He set about assisting Wellington in embarking the British 
Army for its return trip to England and evacuated the occupied districts of the l le 
Division Militaire. Finally, he demobilized the Armee du Sud by discharging unnecessary 
550Suchet, War in Spain, 2:398-401. 
551 SHAT, C(8)271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
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officers, soldiers and army employees and dispersing the Army's remains amongst French 
fortresses. Once Suchet dissolved the Army, King Louis XVIII summoned him to take 
a seat in the Chamber of Peers. 552 By early June, the remaining French garrisons 
(Barcelona, Pensicola, Sanguntum and Tortosa) in Catalonia passed into France. Also, 
20,000 French prisoners of war (from Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon) were repatriated 
to France and disbanded. 
The force structure of the Army of Catalonia had as we have seen underwent 
several phases through the tumultuous war years and was guided by the necessities of 
Imperial and local strategy as well as in tum driving the war for French commanders. 
From the very beginning of the war, the sheer weight of events dictated the Army's size 
and structure. From December 1807 to the autumn of 1808 General Duhesme, given the 
mission of occupying and subdividing Catalonia with some 15,000 troops found the 
available force quite insufficient to meet his task, lost the strategic initiative in the 
conduct of his operations, and required immediate reinforcements which Napoleon sent 
in a division under General Reille, who found Upper Catalonia as hard as a nut to crack 
as Duhesme found. He too was thrown back into the defensive. Under the circumstances 
neither could mold a force of the correct strength and mix to achieve Napoleon's strategic 
and tactical aims. They were forced to field as many troops as possible as quickly as 
possible, ready or not. 
It was only under General Gouvion Saint-Cyr that the VII Corps had the strength 
to take the initiative in the siege of Rosas, relief of Barcelona and offensive in Lower 
552Suchet, War in Spain, 2:403-406. 
191 
Catalonia. The Corps was of sufficient size to take and hold the initiative through the 
siege of Gerona. This traumatic operation decimated the Corps, only worsened by the 
lack of a steady flow of reinforcements and materials to reconstitute shattered units. 
Continuing Imperial demands in 1810 and 1811 robbed Marshals Augereau and 
Macdonald of both the operational initiative and the opportunity of consolidating their rear 
area and pacify the country. Additionally, there was little time and no reinforcements to 
build the Army of Catalonia up to a strength commensurate with its task. Napoleon rarely 
appreciated the extent of Catalan resistance and held them consistently in contempt, as 
evidenced by his heavy use of green and foreign troops of questionable quality, such as 
raw Neapolitan troops. Additionally, he demanded rapid and complete conquest of the 
province which was impossible with the existing force divided between garrison and field 
"armies". He pushed his commanders in Catalonia hard for results, particularly since 
Marshal Suchet obtained stunning successes in Aragon and Lower Catalonia, despite the 
lack of available force. The thunderbolt catastrophes of 1810-1811 ended the commands 
of Augereau and Macdonald, but only in the case of the Siege of Figueras did the Army 
receive substantial reinforcements. During General Decaen's "watch" the same problems 
persisted for he too had to split his reduced Army in half while he dealt with the 
overwhelming difficulties of the Anglo-Sicilian invasion. Again, he never had either the 
operational initiative on the force to gain it. Only Marshal Suchet's combined Armies 
despite the continuous force reduction of 1813-1814 could hold their own. The great 
innovation of course was the streamlining of his divisions into a two brigade organization 
which eased the problem somewhat, but only the winding down of the war relieved the 
operational and consequently structural demands on the Army of Aragon and Catalonia. 
CHAPTER IV 
LOGISTICS 
§1 The Logistical Structure. 
In the Army of Catalonia the logistical and administrative office was the 
Intendance. 1 This administrative apparatus was virtually, a second army composed of 
civil and semi-militarized personnel. It had six subservices, vivres pain (bread supply) 
occasionally called vivres pain et liquids, responsible for the supply of all foodstuffs 
(except meats), vivres viande (meat supply) which managed fresh and preserved meats, 
fourrages (forage supply) to feed the army's animals, chauffage (fuel) for lighting and 
heat, habillement (clothing) for clothing and equipment supply, transportation, and 
hospitals. 2 
The Intendance managed every area of corps and division administration, except 
the pay and financial accountability of the army, which fell under the purview of the 
1Pierre-Antoine-Noel-Bruno, Comte Daru (1767-1829) Served as Intendant-General 
of the Grande Arrnee 1806-1809 and in 1813 as Directeur de l' Administration de la 
Grande Arrnee. H. de la Barre De Nanteuil, Le Comte Daru ou }'Administration Militaire 
Sous la Revolution et l'Empire (Paris: J. Peytronnet et Cie. 1966) 19; Lechartier, Les 
Services de l'Arriere, 45: Thiebault, Manuel General 531-532. 
2Is one of the logistical ancillary services managed in the Intendance, contrary to 
Elting's opinion. Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 553. 
192 
193 
Paymasters and Inspection aux revues. 3 It took responsibility for the supply, movement, 
medical service and often, funding of the army.4 
The Army or Corps Intendance5 was headed by a Commissaire-Ordonnateur, as 
Ordonnateur en chef who fell directly under the Chief of Staff. He had an extensive staff 
of Commissaires des guerres to support the headquarters, a Commissaire des guerres 
Ordonnaires (first class) to manage medical services, another to manage subsistance, and 
one of the second class to head the convalescent depots, calvary depots, transport parks 
and finally, one to organize and administer the lines of communications.6 
The Ordonnateur's staff then is an infrastructure for the logistical support and 
administration of the army. It resembled a separate command within the army, under the 
the Chief of Staff. 7 This work is supplemented by a Commissaire des guerres attached 
3Lechartier, Le Services de l'Arriere, 76-77. 
4Prior to 1799 the Intendance controlled the whole of army's administrations, to 
include pay, audited accountability for masses (unit funds), supply, the workings of the 
etapes or supply lines and, convoys and transport, the medical service and the distribution 
of supplies (food, fuel, forrage and clothing), management of military establishments, (e.g. 
prisons, magazines, etc.) and verification of legal expenses, such as pay. Thiebault, 
Manuel General, 534-535. After 1800, the First Consul established the Inspection aux 
Revues to manage monetary accountability for every type of expense throughout the army. 
5Intendant General M. Denniee, of the Armee d'Espagne for example was assisted by 
a personal staff of one Commissaire des guerres, as acting Ordonnateur and four Adjoint 
(assistant) Commissaires des guerres. The Intendant General's 'second in command', 
Commissaire Ordonnateur en Chef Mathieu-Faviers also had a staff of one Commissaire 
des guerres and three assistants. SHAT, C (8) 398, Administration Generale de l'Armee 
d'Espagne, 15 December 1809. 
6Thiebault, Manuel General, 537. 
7Colonel Furse discusses such a support staff for an army, under a General of 
Communications, answering to the Chief of Staff or Commanding General. This officer, 
like the Ordonnateur was charged with the handling of administrative services. Furse, 
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to the military government to facilitate the logistical support from the country. 8 The 
Intendance staff then possessed an array of personnel including including inspecteurs 
(inspectors), requisseurs (administrative manager), commises (clerks), gardes magasins 
(store keepers) of various types and other employees, including secretaries, locally hired 
supply workers, domestics, contractors, and so forth. 9 A Commissaire-Ordinnaire headed 
the division Intendance, with a staff of assistants, such as inspectors, managers, clerks, 
storekeepers, etc. 10 
The Corps Ordonnateur en chef organizes the rear/logistical services by 
determining supply and transport resources of the country and organizing them for 
military use. 11 During active operations, he directs the logistical operations of the 
headquarters and division Commissaire des guerres, 12 specifically in obtaining food and 
forage and as necessary, and organize the etape or line of communications under a 
Lines of Communication, 24-32. 
8Thiebault, Manuel General, 537. 
9Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 553. 
10Elting correctly maintains that the Commis was more than a clerk. He supervised 
supply distribution and the collection of contributions. Ibid., 553, 725. 
11To ensure the equitable distribution of supplies the Ordonnateur will publish a 
feuille or sheet noting the composition, variety, and number of rations each soldier is 
allowed. Thiebault, Manuel General, 538. For example, the Intendant General of the 
Army of Portugal in July 1810 issued a Reglement pour le Service des Etapes et Convois 
Militairies in which he laid out for the 'benefit' of local Portuguese authorities who 
would support the French advance. This document established the number and type of 
rations allowed each member of the army by grade and the composition (weight) of each 
ration. SHAT X (s) 114, Intendant General Lambert, Armee de Portugal, Reglement pour 
Le Service des Etapes et Convois Militaires, 1 July, 1810. 
12Thiebault, Manuel General, 539-540. 
195 
separate Commissaire des guerres to include the magazines, a convoy/transport system and 
hospital. 13 The logistical support for the advancing army was often based on the road 
network, and divisions would draw their support along their route out to a distance 
determined by the Commissaire des guerres. 14 
The Commissaire des guerres established supply centers and magazmes m 
occupied towns and fortresses, accumulating provision dumps, transport animals and 
hospitals. He also used them as points to requisition supplies off the country. 15 In 
Catalonia, the etape or supply line was from Perpignan to Barcelona and Rosas, Figueras, 
Gerona, Hostalrich, became logistical nexi, an integral part of the occupation. 16 
The Ordonnateur, like every high level staff administrator, was awash in staff 
actions, paper, meetings and conferences. He regularly worked with the Ministries, the 
Army or Corps command and the staff. 17 He continuously inspected his local contract 
manufactorers (such as bakeries), and magazines to review the performance of his 
13Ibid., 540-541. 
14During the Eylau Campaign of 1806-07, Intendant General Daru drew out separate 
areas for corps support determined by the road network, which served as logistical 
boundaries. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 525, 529. 
15Thiebault, Manuel General, 540-541. 
16The duties of managing one of these magazines was quite extensive, spanning every 
area of supply and material transportation and required continual consultation with the 
Ordonnateur and subordinate Commissaire des guerres with their respective Chief of 
Staffs and continual visits and inspections of their HQs, divisions, magazines,hospital 
vehicle parks and provision distribution points, to assure the efficient operation of the 
logistical machine. Ibid., 542-545. 
171bid., 542-543. 
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personnel. 18 He also looked into the hospitals to inspect their administrative functioning 
and the transport parks to see to their continuous readiness. 19 
The nightmare administrative paper load of the Ordonnateur was hardly less than 
the Chief of Staff, and he must have been chained to his office,20 receiving masses of 
correspondence from the Ministry of Military Administration in Paris, other ministerial 
and Imperial directives, orders and instructions for the conduct of the logistical service. 
Similarly, he obtained specific direction from the commander through the Chief of Staff, 
while to the latter he submitted a monthly situation report21 of provisions to include the 
181bid., 544-545. 
19The Ordonnateur inspected the military hospitals carefully, for they would tum into 
pigsties very quickly. He inspected the patient admissions, records, verified the 
expenditure of medical and other supplies, reviewed the work of personnel and treatment 
of patients. Ibid., 545. 
20Colonel, Lord Edward Cecil, A minister in the Egyptian Government at the tum of 
the twentieth century described arriving in his Cairo office after a mid morning meeting: 
"I find my outer office crowded with a growling mob of officials waiting to see me. 
Before I can attend to them, however, there are between twenty and thirty letters to sign." 
Edward Cecil The Leisure of an Egyptian Official, 2d Ed. (London: Hadder and 
Stroughton, Ltd., 1921) 70. 
21 This report is divided into seven sections, including one general section, 
summarizing all areas of supply, five sections discussing individual supply areas and 
observations. Thiebault, Manuel General 546. 
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consumption, rationing and supply of food, fuel and forrage. 22 This is the basic report in 
which the Ordonnateurs established supply requirements. 
Often these reports took on various forms, such as regular staff Situations, 
administrative services reports or supply reports. For example, Commissaire des guerre 
Grobert on the Corps logistical staff submitted to Ordonnateur en Chef Rey a Rapport sur 
les Services Administratifs of Barcelona on 23 January 1810. This document outlined the 
quantities of foodstuffs, clothing, funds and the status of the hospital. 23 Ordonnateur en 
Chef Rey in tum submitted these reports to the Ministre Directeur. In August 1809, he 
drew up a Rapport sur la Situation du 7e Corps which discussed the unit strength and the 
administrative services, transportation,24 hospitals, clothing and equipment, and subsistance 
supplies. 25 Similarly, he drew up reports to the Minister Director. 26 
22This is a seven section report, including a general section summarizing all areas of 
supply, five sections discussing individual areas of supply and a seventh section of 
observations. The vivres-pain section discusses grain, flour, breads, biscuit, dried legumes 
(and other vegetables) and salt. The vivres-liguides section discusses wine, brandy, and 
vinegar. The vivres-viande section covers fresh (on the hoot) and preserved meat (e.g. 
salt lard). Chauffage et Lumiere discusses firewood, coal, peat, and other combustables 
and candles. Fourrages covers fodder, (grains, hay, and straw). Thiebault, Manuel 
General, 546. 
23SHAT C (8) 40, Commissaire des guerres Grobert, Rapport Sur les Services 
Administratifs de la Place de Barcelone, 26 January 1810. 
24This included the regular train battalions, mule bigades, and the auxiliary transport. 
25SHAT, C (8) 40, Ordonnateur en chef Rey, Rapport sur la Situation du 7e Corps, 
5 September 1809. 
26SHAT, C(l9) 7, VII Corps, No. 353, Ordonnateur en chef Rey, to General Dejean, 
4 January, 1809. In 1812, the Commissaire-Ordonnateur of Lower Catalonia, 
Commissaire des guerres Raymondon submitted such a report to the Ministry's Bureau of 
Provisions with a series of fourteen sub-reports on provisions, transport, clothing, fuels, 
hospitals, etc. SHAT, C(l 9) 7, Armee de Catalogne, Bureau des Vivres, No. 163, 
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The Ordonnateur en chef worked closely with every portion of the staff to assure 
efficient administration and logistical support. These included the Inspecteur aux revues 
for personal status, the Paymaster General to obtain funds, the Director of Posts for 
communications support, and with the local authorities to coordinate supply requisitions. 27 
The most important single responsibility of the Ordonnateur and his subordinates 
m the divisions was their fiduciary responsibility for the enormous sums of money 
expended in paying for the logistical and administrative support of the army.28 The 
Ordonnateur places this task under the charge of a Commissaire des guerres who 
established accounts for the various logistical and administrative activities. He was 
authorized by the Ordonnateur to pay for contract services, to agents or regisseurs29 of the 
Ministry for Military Administration, and special expenses. 30 
Funding came from special Ministerial credits31 through the Payeur (Treasury) or 
locally procured contributions from the Receveur, the officer who received funds for an 
Army. Finally, these funds are accounted for directly through the Ministries.32 When 
services or supplies are delivered, the Ordonnateur pays them by Mandat de paiement or 
Commissaire des guerres Raymondon to Minister Directeur Lacuee, 10 June 1812. 
27Thiebault, Manuel General, 546. 
28Ibid., 54 7. 
29Manager or administration of Ministerial affairs e.g. vivres-viande, etc. 
30Ibid. 
31 Credits Speciaux, Ibid. 
32Ibid. 
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payment request off of his Minesterial credit account. The recipient presents this 
document with his invoice and the Marche or request for material, to the Paymaster for 
payment. Funds not expended are returned to the Ministry as de fonds libres for 
commitment to other expenses. 33 
The two Ministries of War and Military Administration, have separate financial 
functions. The former managed Ministerial pay and unit material expenditures, such as 
artillery and engineer equipment,34 through the Division de la Surveillance de 
!'Administration des Recettes et Depenses des Armees en Espagne. 35 Similarly, the 
Ministry of Military Administration managed logistical, and administrative funding. 36 
The divisional Commissaire des guerres had sizable funding accounts. 
Commissaire des guerres Mongenot at Barcelona had 700,465 F. in credits for 1814 
alone. 37 At Figueras, for example, Commissaire des guerres Leamont38 received a special 
shipment of 120,000 kg of salt meat for 230,000 F., which Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon 
provided by contract and paid for through the Ministry of Military Administration. 39 
33Ibid. 
34SHAT C (8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
35SHAT C (19) 7, Ministere de la Guerre, Division de la Surveillance de 
!'Administration des Recettes et Depenses des Armees Imperials en Espagne, General 
Maurice Mathieu to Marshal Suchet, 26 September 1813. 
36The Ministry of Military Administration had eight huge accounts. 
37SHAT, C (8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
38SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1812. 
39SHAT C (19) 9, No. 1527, Bureau des Vivres, M. Legere, Rapport au Ministre 
Directeur de I' Administration de la Guerre, 10 November 1813. 
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The Commissaire Ordonnateurs performed a variety of non-logistical duties too. 
In the division, they served as a substitute Sous-Inspecteur aux revues,40 initiated (by 
12.roces-verbal) audits on Receveurs and Paymasters or requested reimbursement for 
combat losses. 41 These varied administrative duties were codified in the law of 28 Nivose 
an IIl. 42 
The Ordonnateurs and Commissaires had an extensive staffs. Including assistants 
(Commissaires adjoints provisoires),43 logistical services employees, such as substance, 
clothing, and transport employees, who formed separate staff subsections,44 a medical and 
hospital staff (physicians, surgeons, pharmacists, and their employees), and civilian service 
employees, such as the entrepreneurs or contractors. 45 The military contractors were 
bound by the terms of their contract or Marche to provide quality goods or services. The 
40Ibid; In 1809, for example Napoleon approved the distribution of 6,500 F. in extra 
pay to thirty-two Commissaires des guerres who doubled as Sous-Inspecteurs aux revues. 
UCN No. 3514 Decision, August 29 1809. 3:214. 
41 0ne Colonel Dulong, 31 e Ligne lost all his equipment in action, and the Emperor 
granted him a 1,200 F. indemnity to replace it. UCN, No. 3701, Decisions 25 October 
1809, 3:299. 
42Thiebault, Manuel General, 549-552. 
43lbid., 563. 
44Ibid., 569-573. 
45lbid., 575-576, For example Joseph Reynaud et Cie supplied salt meat to the Army 
of Catolonia through the Ministry in 1812. SHAT C (19) 9, Reynaud et Cie. and 
Ordonnateur en Chef Bourdon, Marche Pour la Foumiture de 1,200 Quintaux metriques 
de viande salee destines pour l'Approvisionnement du Siege du Fort de Figueras, 13 
October 1813. In 1810 M. F.B. Boyer Fonfrede transported food to Barcelona by sea in 
a contract with the Ministry. SHAT, C (19) 8, F.B. Boyer Fonfrede to General Lacuee, 
2 October 1810. 
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commissaire insures its fulfillment and on completion, allows payment by Proces-Verbal 
from the Paymaster. 46 
Other types of employees in the army's logistical tail include Vivandiers and 
Cantiniers or civilian suttlers (often soldier wives) attached to the regiments or staffs, to 
purvey food or liquid refreshment. 47 Boulangers, bouchers, touchers were (bakers, butchers 
and drovers) specially hired to the supply sections of the Intendance,48 and other hired 
workers included tailors, laundry workers (blanchisseuses), cobblers, harness makers, 
wheel wrights, and rope makers, etc. Skilled and unskilled employees were hired at every 
level, but in the staff, these and all other workers were hired by the Intendance. 49 
Intendance personnel, like supply personnel today, were not averse to feathering 
their own nest. They habitually had the best billets and food. Line troops vilified them 
as cowards and thieves. The Vivres pain or 'riz-pain-sel' personnel were known as 
'chancres' or the 'leprosy of the army. ' 5° Forage personnel habitually supplied poor or 
shortweight fodder, and vivres-viande employees often traded their good cattle to farmers 
for poor or sickly ones for a neat profit. They often declined requisitioning livestock 
from rich farms for a bribe while quickly taking a poor peasant's only cow. Lazy, they 
often allowed cattle to starve rather than feed them. Cowardice was one of their main 
46Theibault, Manuel General, 575-756. 
471bid., 578-580, Lechartier, Services de l'Arriere, 52. 
48Thiebault, Manuel General 580-581, Lechartier, Services de l'Arriere, 52. 
49Thiebault, Manuel General, 581-582. 
5
°Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 555. 
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virtues. If combat got too close or during a defeat or hasty retreat, Intendance men could 
be relied on to save their skins and their booty. 51 
Although throughout the French Army, line troops universally jeered and cursed 
them there were many who were capable and honest. Good commanders however, like 
Marshal Davout and the Emperor hunted dishonest Intendance personnel 'like rats.'52 The 
hastily assembled Corps in Catalonia 1808, had few Intendance personnel,53 and these 
were often poorly qualified. 
Army contractors were an even greater source of trouble. Loyal only to their 
profits, they never scrupled to cheat the government, never ready to render goods or 
services correctly. They were particularly unwilling to deliver near combat areas, and 
would readily abandon supplies on the first whif of danger. Only additional money could 
induce them to risk their property, profits or skins.54 Contractors had the equipment and 
a staff of employees, and administrators to manage movements. 55 They could also serve 
in the administration of the Intendance, (Regie) like army civilian employees, on fixed 
pay or with additional pay (Regie Interessee) for efficient service. 56 
51Ibid. 
52Ibid., 556. 
53 Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 41-42; SHAT, C (8) 485, Situation, Corps 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 1 April, 1809. 
54Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 559; SHAT, C(19) 8 General Lacuee, Rapport a 
l'Empereur, 27 October 1810. 
55Similarly, the Compagnie Breidt provided horses and drivers, while the government 
provided vehicles, Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 558. 
56Ibid. 
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In many ways the Intendance was the backbone of the Army of Catalonia as 
throughout the Grande Armee, providing logistical and administrative support, and yet 
was its Achilles heel. Its sheer scale and the complexity of its task was its root problem, 
compounded by the enormously difficult operations in a theater dominated by savage 
insurgent warfare. Indeed, after 1809, they never held the initiative in the war, a 
distinction which only General Gouvion Saint-Cyr held. The continued defensive posture, 
the poverty of the country and the sheer destructiveness of the war posed nearly 
insurmountable logistical problems on the Intendance, which it struggled heroically to 
solve, and managed to hold its own only with considerable Imperial assistance. 
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§2. Subsistence. 
The heart of lntendance work was procuring subsistence; the most difficult and 
consistently critical task of Napoleonic logisticians. Of the five lntendance services, four 
were subsistence, vivres-pain or vivres-pain et liquides, vivres-viande, fourrages, and 
chauffage. 57 These services were discrete organizations with their own personnel, mission 
and authority. Often, however, they came together in a combined service, called the 
Services Reunis. The Armee d'Espagne had under the overall direction of the Intendant 
General; the Directeur General des Services Reunis or in his stead, the directors or 
Regisseurs of each of the services, of vivres-pain, vivres-viande, and fourrages/chauffage. 
The Corps had four subsistence services in its services reunis, each headed by a Directeur 
Principal or Agent en chef, under the overall direction of the Ordonnateur en chef. 
Occasionally the Corps services reunis was headed by an Inspecteur Principal des services 
reunis. The division had four services headed by a Controleur or Inspecteur, under the 
authority of the Commissaire des guerres. 58 The service heads managed subsistence 
57Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 553. General Thiebault called them vivres-pain, 
legumes et sel; vivres-viande, and fourrages bois et lumieres, lumping chauffage and 
fourrage together, as division and corps had to do occasionally for lack of personnel. 
Thiebault, Manuel General 569. 
58Thiebault, Manuel General, 570; Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 77; At the 
GQG of the Armee d'Espagne at Madrid a Regisseur (and assistant) headed the services-
reunis de subsistances-generales, who in tum fell under a Commissaire Ordonnateur and 
assistants. SHAT C(8) 398, Armee d'Espagne, Personnel, Administration Generale de 
l'Armee d'Espagne, 15 December 1809. SHAT C(8) 398 Etat du Nombre des Rations, 
30 June 1810. 
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procurement and distribution, formed a supply reserve, magazines, and managed their 
transport. 59 
In the division, the lnspecteur had under his control three (or four) gardes-
magasms to head each subservice, assisted by clerks, aides-gardes magasins and 
specialized employees, (butchers, bakers, etc.) These workers were organized into 
'brigades' of three men and a leader (brigadier). 
The garrison of Barcelona, for example, had a large service. In 1814, it was 
headed by a Directeur, assisted by an lnspecteur, with a clerk (commis). The vivres-pain 
section had thirty-seven employees, including the Garde-Magasin Principale (chief) and 
his two assistants (Garde-Magasin Principale and Garde-Magasin Ordinaire), six aide-
gardes-magasins, and twenty-seven sous-employees (bakers, millers, etc.) headed by a 
brigadier principal. Vivres-viande service had five members, a Garde-pare (chief), aide-
garde pare (brigadier) and three employees. Finally, the fourrage (and chauffage) had 
three members, headed by a Garde Magasin des fourrages and assisted by two aides.60 
Duties were divided in two. The Inspecteur and the service heads managed 
subsistence administration, such as food weight/measure, distribution, receiving supplies 
and he assured a orderly operation.61 The actual conduct of operations fell to the garde 
magasin. The Ministre-Directeur d'Administration de Guerre commissioned Inspecteurs 
and Directeurs, and during a campaign, the Intendant, Commissaire-Ordonnateur en chef 
59Thiebault, Manuel General, 570. 
60SHA T C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
61Thiebault, Manuel General, 571. 
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or Ordonnateurs Ordinaires could hire them as needed. 62 There were dangers however in 
employing locals. For example, several locally hired storekeepers at Figueras were 
recruited by the Catalan insurgents to give up the fortress postem gate key that led to its 
capture in April 1811. 63 
The line soldiers uniformly despised the subsistence personnel for their corruption. 
Forrage personnel consistently short weighted fodder, vivres-viande men provided bad 
meat, and many throughout the service were roundly crooked, and many a commander 
has beaten them for their corruption or inefficiency. Often gardes magasins lived in better 
quarters than regimental commanders and ate well while soldiers starved. 64 
The vivres-pain et liquides service managed grain, flour, breads, and small rations 
(petits-vivres riz et legumes secs), such as lentils, rice, salt, and the liquids (vinegar, wine, 
and brandy).65 Breads were the largest part of a soldier's diet and there were two varieties 
issued to the French Army, bread and biscuit, or hard tack/ammunition bread. The former 
was made of wheat or rye, but the French soldier preferred wheat bread, and white when 
62Commanders could hire local employees for field service. Ibid. 
630man, Peninsular War, 4:491. 
64Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 555. Deputy Assistant Commissary-General 
August Schaumann of the British Army described the billet of an Asst. Quartermaster 
General at Salamanca in 1808: "This officer was most comfortably installed beside a 
brasero in a magnificent room, and was reading a book, while at his side there stood a 
bottle of wine and a dish of roast chestnuts." Schaumann's billet on the contrary was in 
the garret of a house stuffed with troops. August Schaumann, On the Road with 
Wellington The Diary of a War Commissary in the Peninsular Campaigns. ed. and Trans. 
by Anthony Ludouici (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925), 77. 
65Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 554. 
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possible66 and baked in oblong or round loaves. Biscuit was squared to ease packing. 
Either local bakeries or military bakers in army ovens could manufacture bread. The 
baker brigadier actually baked while others kneaded, and provided fuel. A standard army 
oven could be built by a crew of eight masons in fourteen hours and could bake 500 
rations of bread or biscuit per load and as much as six loads per day.67 Manutentions or 
groups of ovens could provide huge quantities of bread, as in Barcelona which produced 
as much as 35,000 rations of bread per day. 68 They provided in a week, for example, 
231,278 rations of bread and 15,900 rations of biscuit between 21 and 27 May 1814.69 
It would take fourteen ovens to bake this 173,458.5 kg of bread and 8,745 kg of biscuit. 70 
The vivres-pain personnel managed raw grain, including wheat maize (froment 
66The urban populations of France particularly Paris universally preferred white bread 
or the 'bis blanc' loaf, while the French provincial could only obtain inferior whites or 
bread of other grains, such as rye, barley or maslin. Steven L. Kaplan, Provisioning Paris. 
Merchants and Millers in the Grain and Flour Trade during the Eighteenth Century 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) 44. In Paris 1810, anticipation of a poor harvest 
made the Empire anxious over the price and quality of bread. Indeed, there was a real 
fear of rioting over the lack of food and of white bread in particular. Maurice Guerrini, 
Napoleon and Paris: Thirty Years of History, trans. and ed., Margery Weiner (London: 
Cassell, 1970) 249-251. Part of the crisis was caused by the shipment of vast amounts 
of bread to the Grande Armee; Etienne-Denis Pasquier, The Memories of Chancellor 
Pasguier 1767-1815, trans. Douglas Garman (Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson University 
Press, 1968) 117. Furse, Lines of Communications, 284. 
67Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 554. 
68SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 
554. 
69SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
70The ration size for bread both for the units and in the hospitals was 7.5 hectograms 
(750 gms) and 5.5 hg. for biscuit. During the period in question the ovens produced 
224,314 rations (168,235.5 kg) of regular bread, 6,964 rations (5,223 kg) of higher grade 
hospital bread, and 15,900 rations 8, 745 kg) of biscuit. Ibid. 
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d'Espagne), rye, barley, or the available bread grain. Varieties of flours included course 
milled and sifted flours, the former were ground unsifted flours (brutes), coarse ground 
whole flour called "two stroke" (coarse, 10%) flour, of wheat (froment), rye, wheat/rye 
(meteil), and maize meal. The sifted flours (blutes), coarse and fine (15% fine and 20% 
very fine). Bran (son) served as bread filler and animal fodder as needed. Breads 
themselves were of two or sometimes three varieties, separated by weight and quality. 
These included ordinary ration bread, called ammunition bread or pain de munition, was 
made of 10% often mixed flours, intended for the soldiery. Ordinary bread or pain 
ordinaire, made of 15% milled and sifted wheat (or mostly wheat) flour, was for officers. 
The finest white bread of 20% sifted wheat flour was for hospitals, pain d'hopital. 71 The 
fourth bread was biscuit. 
Napoleon always tried to issue white or part white (bis blanc) to his armies, and 
rye or meteil breads were used when nothing else was available. The garrison of 
Barcelona in 1814 for example used five types of flour. There were three coarse (10%) 
flours (brutes): wheat (brutes froment), a wheat and metail blend called melange and 
maslin, called meteil; or mixed wheat and rye. 72 The service also managed the other 
staple foods, such as rice, dried legumes, peas and beans, and salt. The liquid rations 
71 AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 22 September 1813; SHAT, 
C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
72SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
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included oil for cooking, usually olive oil, vinegar to purify drinking water,73 wine, and 
d 74 bran y. 
Vivres-viande managed meat supplies of either fresh on the hoof or preserved and 
included oxen (bullock) cattle, pigs and sheep. Preserved meat and their by products, 
included salt beef, pork and lard. 75 
Fourrages provided fodder, including grain (oats, rye or barley), hay, straw and 
bran. It unfortunately required excessive transport. A day's fodder ration for 2,500 horses 
needed twenty-five wagons. Consequently, the logisticians depended upon the unsure 
transport of contractors, forcing field units to feed their horses on anything they could 
procure locally, such as roof thatch straw, green grain, twigs, etc. 76 Finally, Chauffage 
included fuels, like firewood, peat or coal, and candles for light. This service was used 
mostly in garrison and was always procured off the land. 77 
73Vinegar was extensively used in Frederick the Great's Prussian Army to allay thirst 
and purify water. Jay Luvaas, Ed., Tns., Frederick the Great on the Art of War, (New 
York: Free Press 1966) 108. Vinegar was also used to prevent scurvy, Ema Risch, 
Supplying Washington's Army, Special Studies Series, Maurice Matloff General Edition 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981) 190-191. 
74Spirituous liquors, or eau de vie. 
75Daniel A. Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, The Navy Records Society 
Services Vol. 120, (London: The Navy Records Society, 1977) 413-414. 
76Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 554. 
77Ibid., 559; Lechatier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 84-85; Thiebault, Manuel General, 
570; SHAT C(l9) 9, LS No. 163, Commissaire des guerres Raymondon to General 
Lacuee 10 June 1812, Rapport Mensuel des Divers Services Administratifs; C(8) 271, 
Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
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The services procured other foodstuffs locally, such as vegetables, beans, fish, 
mutton, etc. In Lower Catalonia, the main crop was olives, fruit, citris, rye and wheat, 
while in Upper Catalonia the crops included rye, maize, and rice. The major livestock 
animal was sheep, providing both wool and meat. 78 There was also oxen and cattle, some 
poor vineyards, and French beans and millet. 79 In addition to these products Catalonia 
produced fish, which became a military ration in the costal garrisons like Barcelona. 80 
There were two methods used to subsist the Army of Catalonia; supply off the 
land by requisition and through formal supply lines from France and magazines. 81 The 
determining factor in this system is availability of provender, the difficulties of movement, 
the road network, and the tactical problem of insurgent attacks of supply columns. 82 
The first step in determining how to supply the army was to ascertain the 
resources of the country. For the Army of Catalonia to live off of the country at the 
height of its strength of about 50,000 troops and 5,000 horses,83 it needed a population 
density of about 3,000 per 25 square miles (120 people/sq. mile) and about 200 square 
78Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain, Map II. 
79 Arthur Young, Travels During the Years 1787. 1788. and 1789 (London: Bury St. 
Edmonds 1794, Facsimile reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1970) 307, 310 
80SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
81 Armies often used both methods depending upon the availability of supplies; 0. 
Espanet, Notes on the Supply of an Army During Active Operations, Tns. H.F. Kendall 
and henry G. Sharpe (Kansas City: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co. 1899) 31. 
82C. E. Caldwell, Small Wars. Their Principles and Practices (London: His Majesty's 
Stationary Office Facsimile reprint, East Andsley: EP Publishing LTD., 1976) 57-58. 
83SHAT C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1810. 
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miles of subsistence space to survive completely off the land.84 A reconnaissance of the 
country would determine these resources. 85 This was only completed by Marshal 
Augereau in early 1810 when an Administrative Commission investigated the resources 
of the country.86 Earlier, Generals Duhesme and Saint-Cyr relied on the provisions of the 
magazines of the 8e, 1 Oe, and 11 e Divisions militaire87 and the remaining supplies in 
Catalan magazines. The countryside, however, was incapable of supporting the French 
corps. 88 From the beginning of the war the French supply services based their support on 
the convoy/magazine system. 89 The base or main magazines, such as Perpignan in France 
were those for the transhipping of supplies. 90The intermediate or theater magazines 
included Figueras, Barcelona, Rosas, Gerona, and the advanced dumps included the small 
garrison magazines, like Palamos, Hostalrich, Bascara, etc. 91 Additionally the field 
84Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed., trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 332-333. 
85SHAT, C(8) 35, Reconnaissance de la Cote de la Mediterrannee depuis Catella 
jusqu' a Lescala et Roses 25 February 1810. 
86See Section 3; SHAT, C(8) 42 Arrete pour la creation d'une Commission 
Administrative Provisoire du Govemement de Catalogne, 27 February 1810; Thiebault, 
Manuel General, 96-97 Models A-F. 
87 AN, AFiv 1174 Administration de la Guerre, 1 er Section Bureau des Vivres, General 
Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 18 May 1808; Rapport, 3 August 1808. 
88AN, AFiv 1174, Administration de Guerre, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 
21 April 1809; Rapport, 3 May 1809. 
89Furse, Lines of Communication, 265. 
90AN, AFiv 1174, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur 3 Aout 1808. 
91 Bascara near the frontier was one such post which served as a road station which 
units, convoys, etc. passed through. For example, such a convoy passed through on its 
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divisions could stockpile supplies in temporary magazines. General Sevoroli, for example, 
stockpiled supplies temporally in a house within a village that provided requisition 
l . 92 supp ies. 
The large magazmes like Barcelona or Figueras had prov1s10ns for normal 
consumption, and siege or reserve stores. General Duhesme had reserve stores in the 
Citadel and Monjuich enough to last several weeks, as of January 1809.93 Figueras, a 
transhipment point for supplies exiting France (over land) had at any one time a large 
store of garrison and siege provisions. In January 1814, its garrison held enough 
provisions to last its 1,740 men garrison over a year. 94 
The most important aspect of subsistence supply was its enormous accounting 
burden. The Intendance had a system of inventories, accounts, and journals to allow 
efficient accounting of supply stocks, receipts, expenditures and funds. 95 The 
way to Figueras on 2 December 1812 and another to Gerena on 30 November 1812. 
SHAT, C(8) 411, Situation, Garrison de Bascara, 1-15 December 1812. Similarly, 
Hostalrich served such a purpose C (8) 411, Situation, Garnison du Fort et la Ville 
d'Hostalrich, 15 March 1811. 
92SHAT, C(8) 276, Analyses de Lettres et de Rapports, Report, 23 December 1810. 
Suchet, War in Spain, 2: 11-12. Schumann, On the Road with Wellington, 8-11. 
93 SHAT, C (8) 276, Analyses de Lettres et de Rapports, Report No. 10, 22 September 
1810; C(l9) 9, Viande Sale sur l'approvissionement de Figueras 16 April 1811. 
94SHAT, C(19) 9, Place de Figueras, Inventaire des divers effects, service de 
l'approvissionement. Nd (1814). Meat supplies were low and would last 81 days. SHAT 
C(8) 372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. Another case 
was Pensacola under General S uchet. In 1813, this small post was fully provisioned with 
enough stores to last a brigade some six months. SHAT, C(18) 370, Situation des 
Magasins d'approvisionnement du Siege du Fort de Pensicola, 15 April 1813. 
95SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
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Commissaire, whether with an active division or installation, discussed the status of 
provisions daily with the Chief of Staff to whom he reports each morning and fortnightly 
with a statement of logistical services, provision consumption and the contents of 
magazines. He also continually inspected services to assure the quality of the supplies 
and the efficiency of service and administration.96 
The Commissaires accounted for funds to the Ordonnateur on etats or bordereau 
noting receipts and expenses. These funds were approved by the Commander or 
Ordonnateur from money contributions, ministerial fonds libres, or bugitary credits 
approved by the Emperor. 97 
Administratively, subsistence supply was a complex and time consuming process. 
In October 1813, for example, Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon requested from the Ministry 
approval and credit to purchase 1,200 metric quintals98 of salt meat as siege provender for 
96Thiebault, Manuel General, 543-544. 
97lbid., 54 7-548. 
98The Quintal ( qx) is a measure of weight which signifies a hundred-weight (cwt) in 
any scale of weight, e.g. metric, avoirdupois, mare, etc. The quintal most often used here, 
and by French logisticians, is the metric quintal or metric hundred weight. The French 
metric quintal (qx metric) equals 100 kg. or 220.49 pounds avoirdupois. The Barcelona 
(or Catalan) quintal, which the French logisticians occasionally used (qx/C) equals 91.94 
lbs. avoirdupois or 41.70 kg (four arrobas). The Spanish quintal (of four Castillian 
arrobas) equaled 101.43 lbs. avoirdupois or 46.00 kg. There is no evidence that the 
logisticians of the Army of Catalonia used this latter unit of measure. The other type of 
quintal which French logisticians in Catalonia occasionally used was the quintal mare, 
including the French, Spanish or Catalan quintal mare. The mare is a metallic weight 
equal to eight onces and is similar to the Troy system of metallic weight measurement. 
it is used as a commercial weight measure. The French mare is a measure of weight 
equal to eight onces of 30.594 grams (472.19 grains) or 244.75 grams. The French 
quintal mare (qx mare) equals 24.475 kg. The Catalan quintal mare (qx marc/C) quintal 
mare (qx marc/S) equals 23.005 kg. Doursther, Dictionnaire Universe!, 247-250, 457-461; 
Zupko, French Weights and Measures, 103, 154-155. 
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Figueras. Ordonnateur Bourdon applied to the Ministry to initiate a contract to supply 
the meat,99 then negotiated contract with Joseph Reynaud and Company at Lyon for 500 
qx of salt beef and 700 qx of salt pork. The contract specified the quality standards and 
the conditions of the transaction. 100 There were six shipments from Perpignan of 200 qx 
each, scheduled to begin on 15 November, while payment was made between 1-15 
January 1814. 101 
In the regiments, the French ration consisted of bread, biscuit, fresh or salt meat, 
seven ounces of salt lard, once ounce of rice, two of dried vegetables and half ounce of 
salt. The liquid ration was half a pint of wine or beer, two ounces (.1 pint) of brandy and 
31/z oz. (.2 pint) of vinegar. 102 
The unit quartermasters went to centralized division or installation distribution 
points and drew about three days ration which included six days ration of biscuit during 
990rdonnateur en chef Bourdon also wanted to distribute 1,315 quintals of fresh meat. 
SHAT, C(19) 9, Letter No. 4253, Bourdon to Cessac, 24 October 1813. 
100The contract specified; high quality meat, packed in quality salt and brine. Packed 
weight of beef was set at 300 kg/barrel and pork at 50 kg/barrel. The barrels of good 
quality with two iron hoops (stays), and capable of holding 100 quintals. SHAT, C(l 9) 
9, Approvision du Figueras. Marche pour la Foumiture de 1200 Quintax metriques de 
viande salee destinee pour l'approvisionnement du siege du fort de Figueras, 16 October 
1813. 
101 Ibid. 
102The liquid rations were calculated at one liter per four men of wine, one liter of 
brandy for sixteen men and a liter of vinegar for eight men. See Table 26 for metric 
ration. SHAT, C(8) 398, Etat du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810. 
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active operations. 103 He distributed it to the companies and in tum to the fifteen man 
mess squads or ordinaire under a corporal. Each took turns at company mess duty. Its 
equipment included a camp kettle (marmite), large canteen (bidon), several mess tins 
(gamelles), and a hatchet. Ordonnaire members took turns as company cooks or 
experienced soldiers were assigned the duty permanently. 104 Stationed in the unit rear 
with the domestics, they established a 'cookhouse' in some barn or shed, or in good 
weather, in the open. Gathering the rations, he made a soup for a noon meal consisting 
of meat, vegetables with some biscuit or pain de soupe dissolved to thicken the boullion, 
with bread and wine to wash it down. The evening meal usually had some vegetable, 
such as the ubiquitous potato, bread, and wine. 105 
To make the soup, the cook gathered water106 in the canteen and mixed it with 
meat, vegetables, and biscuit. Occasionally, salt lard was used as a flavoring or drippings 
103During General Saint-Cyr's perilous march to Cardadeau after the siege of Rosas 
in December 1808, he distributed four days biscuit to his troops. Oman, Peninsular War, 
2:60. Napoleon restricted the amount of rations carried in the trains to seven days biscuit. 
Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 366. 
104Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 580. 
105Ibid., 575-577. 
106There is the humorous story told by Captaine Elzear Blaze. In bivouac he found 
dead mice boiling away in the soup kettle which the cook had accidently put in the 
morning soup when he gathered water from a vat on some German farm used to kill mice, 
which were floating there. When the cook scooped up the water he got some mice, too. 
Blaze ordered him to dump the soup and begin afresh, but the cook begged to be allowed 
to retain it for when the soldiers awoke and found the soup not ready he'd get fifty kicks. 
Blaze had mercy on him and allowed him to retain the soup which turned out much to 
the liking of the troops though flavored with mice. Elzear Blaze, Recollections of an 
Officer of Napoleon's Army, Tns. E. Jules Meras, (New York: Sturgis and Walton, 1911) 
25-27. 
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to sop up in bread or biscuit. The cook ladled the soup into the gamelles, each of which 
served five to eight soldiers. Often the meat was fished out and served separately with 
the soup to each soldier with bread. Each man ate a spoonful of soup from the communal 
gamelle and with the communal spoon in tum until finished. 107 
In French garrisons, the unit messed on the peace rates and used a mess fund from 
soldiers pay (25 c/man) and a government gratuity ( 15 c/man) and firewood. 108 In theater, 
however, garrisons were on war rations though they undoubtedly got to enjoy them both 
better prepared and in better surroundings. These rations included two types of breads 
including pain de munition made of% wheat and Y4 rye and often baked in a ring for easy 
carrying, and biscuit (pain biscuit) made of the same ingredient but· baked longer to 
evaporate all its moisture, giving the tell tale hardness associated with hardtack. 109 The 
pain de soupe, like crackers, is crumbled and dissolved in soup. 110 Meats included fresh 
and salt meats. At Barcelona, for example, the Commissaire des guerres occasionally 
added dried or salted fish to the ration. 111 
107Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 579-580. Only the Imperial Guard had mess 
bowls and spoons for each soldier. 
108Ibid., 576. Sargent Coignet of the Imperial Guard was charged with the NCO 
boarding house near Paris (BEQ) and managed the mess with a fund of 45.70 F. per day, 
including white bread (8.10 F.), wine (8.10 F.), and crockery (3.00 F.). He even got an 
additional 21.20 F. to purchase provisions in Paris. The Conseil d'Administration put at 
his disposal a carriage, four special duty soldiers, a chief cook, and several assistants. 
Coignet, The Narrative of Captain Coignet, 199. 
109Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 576-577. 
110Ibid., 577; Billings, Hardtack and Coffee, 113-114. 
111 SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
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Units and solders obtained their rations by distribution, forrage, theft, or purchase. 
The troops in Catalonia often foraged, but only in groups, to avoid being ambushed. One 
method was simple theft which commanders often allowed on a small scale, but when 
soldiers went over the boundary to marauding that they faced severe disciplinary action. 112 
112Several soldiers of the 4e Leger were court-martialed in 1811 and imprisoned at 
Perpignan. SHAT, C(8) 282, Armee de Catalogne, Etat-Major General, Registre de 
Correspondance Generale du 15 Fevrier 1811 au 31 Juillet 1811, No. 3, Marshal 
Macdonald to the Colonel of the 4e Leger, 20 June 1811. Similarly, pillage was court 
martialed. SHAT C(8) 129, CM, Marshal Macdonald to General Amey, Governor of 
Gerona, 25 June 1810. 
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§3. Subsistence: The Big Picture. 
The French forces in Catalonia required enormous daily quantities of food and 
drink. A French ration weighed 1.87 kg113 and units required 2.5% over and above their 
total troop strength. The Army required in 1807, 16.7 tons per day, at its height, in 1810, 
125.5 tons; and by the end of the war 40.9 tons. 114 These quantities were only partly 
available off the land and this source steadily decreased as the war dragged on, with the 
consequent destruction of Catalan agriculture. As we shall see the only way to feed the 
Army was by requisition from France. 
At the beginning of the occupation, the Spanish Captain General supplied the 
Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales. 115 The Emperor even wanted to feed the 
Pyrenees fortresses out of Spain too. This would prove futile as the French troops 
exhausted the poor Catalan countryside, and these same fortresses ultimately had to feed 
the Army in Catalonia. In May 1808, the Pyrenees fortresses of the Se, 9e, 1 Oe, and 11 e 
Division Militaire held 48,751.61 metric quintals (qx) of grain (7,520,259 rations of 
bread). Of this, the lOe Division Militaire had 15,017.51 qx (2,283,807 rations). 116 
113SHAT, C(8) 398, Etat du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810 and Doursther, 
Dictionnaire Universe!, 168, 398. 
114See Table 27. 
115SHAT, C(19) 7, VII Corps, No. 353, Ordonnateur en chef Rey to General Dejean, 
4 January 1809. 
116Perpignan had 10,985.39 qx (1,668,957 rtn); Carcassone had 951.74 qx (144,778 
rtn); Achs had 1,217.99 qx (187,782 rtn) and Toulouse had 1,862.39 qx (282,290 rtn). 
AN, AFiv 1174, Administration de la Guerre, ler Section. Bureau des Vivres, General 
Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 18 May 1808. 
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When the war expanded after June 1808, General Reille's division, reinforcing 
Duhesme's Corps, found little on the barren landscapes of Upper Catalonia. Only France 
could support it with the required 12,034 rations per day for his 11,725 troops. 117 General 
Gouvion Saint-Cyr, for example, requested for Figueras, 360,000 rations of biscuit enough 
to last 2,000 men six months and another 100,000 rations for five Pyrenees fortresses. 
He then requested another 200,000 rations for his own troops. 118 
Unfortunately, French dependence on the Catalan military abrubtly ended on 1 July 
1808, when the insurrection interrupted this source of supply. For Barcelona, General 
Duhesme ordered procurement for both daily needs and a siege supply, and used regular 
and contract requisition through the Junta of Barcelona. This, however, worked poorly 
because of a lack of ready cash. 119 The garrison magazines were by years end nearly 
empty, holding only a few days of provisions, 120 and the troops consumed it as fast as 
procured. Barcelona needed a large infusion of supplies from France. As early as May 
117SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Division du General Reille, 1 April 1809. 
118The fortress supplies were 30,000 rations each for Mont Louis and Bellegrade, 
10,000 each for Fort des Bains and Fort de la Gande, and 20,000 for Ville Franche. AN, 
AFiv 1174, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 3 August 1808. 
119Current production in the 1 Oe Divisoin Militaire was 300,000 rtn of biscuit. SHAT, 
C(l9) 7, No. 353, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey to General Dejean, 4 January 1809. 
12
°Ibid. Garde Regie Generale, Approvisionnements de Reserve, Place de Barcelone, 
Garde Magasin Billet, Situation de Magasins Militaires de la Citadelle et du Fort Mont 
Jouy, 1 January 1809; Garde Magasin Billet, Situation et Mouvements en Matiers 5 
January 1809; Billet, Situation et Mouvements, 20 January 1809; Billet, SitUation des 
Magasins Militaires, 20 January 1809. 
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1808, Perpignan had sent 148,409 rations, and on 2 December 1808 Port Vendre had sent 
19,932 rations and later 141.95 qx of provisions. 121 
In the field, General Gouvion Saint-Cyr had the same problems that Duhesme had 
in Barcelona, and similarly tried to supply his divisions through local authorities. During 
his famous December march from Rosas to Barcelona there was nothing obtainable 
locally and Saint-Cyr's divisions ate only what they brought. 122 He too, went to contract 
requisitioning, and obtained from Barcelona, two contractors, who procured 500 qx of rice 
for 35,820 F. 123 Barcelona also obtained, through one of its few successful requisitions 
from outlying towns, 2,132 qx of grain, 400 qx of flour, and 120 qx of legumes. 
Additionally, French ships brought several thousand quintals of grain, flour, and lentils 
through the corsair blockade. 124 
In Upper Catalonia the results were the same but General Reille could at least gain 
the bulk of his provender from France by land convoy, 125 though they occasionally 
obtained a supply windfall off the land. Near Figueras, for example, many of the olive 
121Ibid. 
122SHAT, C{l9) 7, VII Corps, No. 280, Ordonnateur Rey to General Dejean, 29 
November 1808, and No. 38, 27 December 1808. 
123SHAT, C{l9) 17, VII Corps No. 555, Ordonnateur Rey to General Dejean, 16 April 
1809; Barcelona, Jacques de Vincenza, Proces Verbal, Rice Provision nd.; Ordonnateur 
Rey and M. Vincenza, Marche, 11 April 1809; M Vincenza, Facture des Denrees, 15 
April 1809. 
124This shipment included 1,251 sacks of grain, 287 sacks of flour, 340 sacks of 
legumes, and 3,000 qx of oats. AN, AFiv 1174, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 
21 April 1809. 
125SHAT, C(8) 267, Registre de Correspondance du General Reille. See various 
letters. 
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growers abandoned their groves, which Gouvion Saint-Cyr captured, obtaining 13,770 
liters of oil. 126 
In mid-1809 the war shifted to Upper Catalonia with the Siege of Gerona. The 
resulting troop concentrations required continual resupply from France. General Verdier, 
siege commander at Gerona, requested from General Dejean 20,000 rations of food per 
day to support his troops,127 which strained the Departments of the lOe Division Militaire. 
The VII Corps Ordonnateur en Chef, Ordonnateur Rey, requested 10,000 qx mare of flour, 
a requisition of 7,000 qx of grain and 1,200 oxen (40 oxen/day). General Dejean tried 
to get these supplies, and, in fact, dispatched the flour immediately. He could not, 
however, get the other grain but strained to supply the meat, and all at the enormous cost 
of 395,750 F. 128 
Perpignan was drained nearly dry by the VII Corps' continuous requisitions. On 
30 November only 182,585 rations of bread remained in its storehouses. Up to January 
1810, it received another 1,021,400 rations, only to lose 420,000 rations to the VII Corps 
earlier in December 1809. By January 1810, Perpignan had only 783,985 rations. 129 
126 AN, AFiv 1174, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empreur, 3 May 1809. 
127He requested too, from the Ordonnateur of the 1 Oe Division Militaire, 200,000 
rations each of flour, meat, and rice, 100,000 rations of brandy and 10,000 decaliters of 
oats. AN, AFiv 1174, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 13 June 1809. 
128The 10,000 qx of flour cost 200,000 F. and the cost 1,200 bullock 195, 750 F. AN, 
AF iv 1174, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 14 October 1809. 
129 AN, AFiv 1174, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur 13 December 1809; 
Directeur General des Vivres de la Guerre, Bureau Particulaire, No. 1319, Conseiller 
d'Etat to General Dejean 12 December 1809; SHAT C(8) 34, VII Corps, No. 1262, 
Ordonnateur en Chef Rey to Marshal Augereau, 11 December 1809; No. 1260, Rey to 
Augereau, 11 December 1809. 
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The year 1810 was an even tighter one for the Army of Catalonia. Napoleon 
threw Marshal Augereau's new Army onto the mercy of a barren countryside in an 
attempt to make his outlying "Vice Royal" commands logistically independent and less 
of a burden on France. The attempt, however, failed. On 28 February 1810, three weeks 
after the Imperial Decree creating Catalonia as a "Vice-Royalty," 130 General Lacuee the 
new Minister Director of Military Administraton informed Napoleon that the areas of 
Catalonia occupied by the French Army were utterly exhausted, and there was no choice 
but to continue provisioning the army from France. General Lacuee, therefore, requested 
that Napoleon relax the logistical rules of the 8 February Decree, and authorize the 
provisioning from France at the expense of the military chest of the Army of Catalonia, 
paying from the salary funds of Augereau's soldiers. Unfortunately, the Army of 
Catalonia was as strapped of money as it was of food. 131 Within weeks Augereau ordered 
a new shipment of 5,000 qx of flour sent to Barcelona, which General Lacuee 
authorized. 132 Since 1808, then, the 1 Oe Division Militaire had provided to the Army of 
Catalonia 9,480,928 kg of provisions133at a cost of 4,530,168.98 F. 134 
130SHAT, C(8) 41, Imperial, Decree, 8 February 1810; Archives des Affaires 
Etrangeres, Correspondance Diplomatique, Vol. 672, Decree, 8 February 1810. 
131 AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 28 February 1810. 
132AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 14 March 1810. 
133This included 982,364 kg of biscuits, 70,622 kg of bread, 459,477 kg of grain, 
4,564,143 kg of flour, 131,026 kg of rice, 3,434 kg of legumes, 25,573 kg of salt (1,664 
kg of candles), 92,384 liters of brandy, 7,923 liters of vinegar, 5,588 (2,344,364 kg) oxen, 
2,593 (782,391 kg) of cattle and 5,464 (115,869 kg) sheep. AN, AFiv 1175, General 
Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 14 March 1810; General Lacuee, Etat Indicatif (ler) des 
Denrees Versees de la lOe Divison Militaire, (2e) de la Depense Resultant des ces 
Versement; March 1810. 
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The enormous costs required extraordinary funds. The Imperial Budget of 1810 
admitted the need and allowed for Catalonia a subsistence expenditure of 750,000 F. 
Unpaid expenses, however, were 3,393,382 F., leaving a cost overrun of 2,643,382 F. 
General Lacuee, therefore, requested to float a 2,000,000 F. draft off of the Funds de 
Reserve to pay these expenses. 135 The Army of Catalonia, however, seemed absolutely 
ravenous, and only a fortnight later, Marshal Augereau requisitioned yet another 6,000 qx 
of grain, 350 wagons to haul it, 1,200 oxen and 2,300,000 F. in extra money for June 
1810. 136 
Augereau's head logistician Ordonnateur en Chef Rey meanwhile tore his hair out 
over the continued provisioning of Barcelona, 137 the misconduct of a Commissaire des 
guerres in the Pyrenees-Orientales, 138 and dozens of other problems. On 9 June, Marshal 
Macdonald the new commander replaced Rey; who had covered himself in glory for the 
zealous management of the army's logistics. He was set the task of accomplishing the 
impossible and had just about managed it. Macdonald praised him in his order of the day 
134The costs include for biscuits 286,996.16 F., bread for 16,953.47 F., rice for 
84,689.95 F., legumes for 1,315.14 F., salt for 7,912.62 F., candles for 2,828.80 F., brandy 
for 44,349.26 F., vinegar for 1,915.47 F., meat for 2,063,919.48 F., and a food shipment 
to Barcelona on 15 February 1810 worth 255,694.04 F., Ibid. 
135The Fonds de Reserve held 4,306,000 F. AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport 
a l'Empereur, April 1810. 
136AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur 16 May 1810. 
137SHAT, C(8) 129, CM, Tome I, Macdonald to Rey, 24 May 1810; Macdonald to the 
Maritime Prefect of Toulon, 24 May 1810. 
138Commissaire des guerres Catalogne. SHAT, C(8) 129, Macdonald to General 
Lacuee, 24 May 1810. 
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" .the Marshal bore witness of his satisfaction of Ordonnateur Rey for his zeal and 
activity in managing the different services of the Army" .139 Rey's replacement was the 
equally competent and active Ordonnateur en Chef, Bourdon. Thrown into the fray, 
Bourdon's first task was to manage the huge convoys to Barcelona in addition to the 
thousand bee stings of normal operations. 
When Marshal Macdonald took command of the Army of Catalonia, he made 
every attempt to increase the efficiency and justice of requisitions. On 2 June 1810, less 
than a week after his arrival, he issued an Order of the Day, which established conditions 
for drawing requisitions. It specified that all of the country's resources were at the Army's 
disposal, but Macdonald resolved to take them in a way that would lessen the damage to 
the country and the misery of the populace. 140 
This Order of the Day centralized the requisition process. Only Intendance 
officers could requisition provender, and the Commissaire-Ordonnateur maintained a 
register of these transactions. 141 This, prohibited units from requisitioning on their own 
authority. He put teeth into this order by allowing communities to complain to the local 
139SHAT, C(8) 133, CM, Tome III, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, 2e Cahier, 
Order of the Day, 9 June 1810. 
140Ibid., Ordre du Jour, Arrete, 1 June 1810; Titre 2, Requisitions, 2 June 1810. 
141This Reconnaissance reveals these resources on a etendue des Terres, Classement 
des terres, Produits territoriaux, et Moyens de communications, isolating types of supply, 
their quality and value. Ibid., Thiebault, Manuel General, Model C. 
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military governor or commander any abuse, and the authorities would court martial and 
shoot any solider guilty of disobeying as a pillager. 142 
During Macdonald's campaign to support General Suchet's siege operations in 
Lower Catalonia, he was forced to fend for himself, for Suchet's magazines were only 
large enough to support the Army of Aragon. 143 Macdonald's divisions occupied 
cantonments near the Ebro with its headquarters at Cervera. These divisions fanned out 
on continual requisition missions. On 27 August, for example, General Severoli's division 
got 22 oxen, six hogs, eight mutton, and 7,000 qx of grain, and 1,000 qx of oats. 144 In 
September his foragers got another 2,000 qx of grain. 145 Simultaneously, a convoy with 
1,559 qx of grain arrived. 146 In fact, the overwhelming preoccupation of Macdonald's 
divisions over and above covering Suchet was procuring sufficient food and drink for the 
troops. 
The other preoccupation was how to pay for it. From the beginning of 
Macdonald's command the inability to pay for supplies out of contribution funds was 
undoubtedly as much of a shock to him as it was a pain to the Emperor. The lack of 
ready cash forced Macdonald to pinch pennies to a degree he never dreamed of. Freight 
142The Chief of Staff had audit authority. SHAT, C(8) 133, Ordre du Jour, 
Requisitions, 2 June 1810. 
143Suchet, War in Spain, 1:203-207. 
144SHAT, C(8) 276, Analyses de Rapports, Rapport no. 9 and 10, 22 September 1810. 
Simultaneously Suchet's Intendance got 20,000 qx of grain. Rapport Nos. 1 and 2, 23 
September 1810. 
1451bid., Report No. 2, 23 September 1810. 
146lbid., Report No. 5, 23 September 1810. 
226 
costs for hauling grain, at 70 centimes per month, per quintal, or 4/ 5 centime per ration. 
Costs of distributing rations at 3Yi centimes per ration, butchering 135,000 rations of meat 
at% centimes per ration (1,017 F.), and freight to haul 180,000 rations of forrage at 2 
centimes per ration; 147 or contacting meat procurement for 21 centimes per ration. 148 
The Ordonnateur en chef was also weighted down in the unavoidable details of 
the service. In August 1810, for example, he became embroiled in a complaint of General 
Severoli on the Intendance short weighing of rations at Barcelona and the resulting 
monetary indemnity owed to the troops en lieu of missed rations. 149 Elsewhere, the 
overworked Bourdon was faced with substandard rations issued to the hospital at Lerida, 
and so forth. 150 Amidst this welter of problems, Macdonald and Bourdon were forever 
faced with the Sisyphean task of supplying the army from France. By June 1810, a 
month into his command, Macdonald was utterly resigned to France as his logistical 
lifeline. 
147SHAT, C(8) 278, Rapports, 1810, No. 6, 30 June 1810. 
148SHAT, C(l9) 7, Bureau de Particular, ler Section, Administration de la Guerre, LS, 
General Lacuee to General Clarke, 21 June 1810. 
149Marshal Macdonald paid the division double indemnity for one day. SHAT, C(8) 
129, CM, Tome I, Macdonald to Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon, 13 August 1018. Other 
mundane problems which occupied Bourdon included the issue of using an Sous-
Inspecteur aux revues as a Commissaire des guerres, Mcdonald to Bourdon, 19 August 
1810. If a ration item is not distributed the soldier recieves a cash indemity. 
150Ibid., LS, Macdonald to Bourdon, 1 September 1810. 
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In mid-June then, he requested three months of siege rations for six of his 
fortresses, for 520,000 F. Barcelona for example, needed 2,850,000 rations of flour and 
216,000 rations of oats. 151 The hospitals also required resupply at a cost of 213,440 F. 152 
The 47,000 man 153 army consumed in May 1,395,000 rations and needed 1,457,000 
rations per month (8,150 qx) not including 1,477,580 rations of meat. 154 The Army only 
possessed a few days provisions in the magazines and needed this new provisioning or 
starve. 155 Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon applied to General Lacuee for yet another month's 
provisions and the long suffering Lacuee applied to the Emperor, as on 4 July to supply 
Catalonia for July and August. 156 Napoleon must have been frustrated too, over 
supporting the Army of Catalonia as it seemingly sat doing little other than eat. 
General Lacuee's frustrations must have been overwhelming, caught between 
Bourdon's demands and Napoleon's limits to fulfilling them. On 8 July, he adapted new 
151Barcelona had 8,000 men and 600 horses. The other fortresses included Figueras 
(4,000 men/500 horses); Rosas (400 men/50 horses); Las Medas (20 men); Gerona (3,200 
men/500 horses) and Hostalaich (1,000 men). AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport 
a l'Empereur, 13 June 1810. 
1521bid. 
153The 31 May strength was 47,519 men and 3,469 horses. SHAT, C(8) 370, 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
154These figures include an overage of 72,000 rations expended in May and an 
overage of 82,580 rations in the request. SHAT, C(18) 7, LS, General Lacuee to General 
Clarke, 21 June 1810. 
155By 31 May the Army had a good supply of flour, 1,488,800 kg. However, they 
only had 15,381 rations of biscuits, 13,380 liters (53,520 rations) of wine and 628 
animals, about twelve days supply. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 
May 1810. 
156AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 4 July 1810. 
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measures to manage the services of the Army of Catalonia hoping to break its costly 
logistical deadlock. He granted Bourdon's present provision request of one month 
supply, 157 but insisted on Macdonald expanding his area of operation to Taragonna so as 
to exploit local supplies. Taking a leaf out of Napoleon's book, he insisted that only by 
continued offensive operations can the Army of Catalonia assure its supplies. 158 He 
insisted too, on squeezing the occupied area of available resources all the harder. He 
demanded that Bourdon ruthlessly requisition from the Ampurdam, wine, vinegar and 
olive oil, which if not abundant was sufficient. 159General Lacuee made similar provisions 
for forrage, and provided sufficient regular transport. 160 
Funding was a particularly difficult problem. The French Empire had already paid 
1,287,798 F. for equipage and Intendance pay alone for 1808-1809. General Lacuee 
suggested that Marshal Macdonald would do well to exploit untapped financial resources 
of the province. He must try harder to make war pay for war. 161 The contribution system 
was, however, a failure from the beginning of the war due to over exploitation and 
157This included 66,000 qx mare of flour, 3,132 qx of rice 5,890,000 rations of meat, 
40 qx of salt, 193,000 liters of brandy, and 2,00 liters of vinegar. AN, AFiv 1175, 
General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 9 July 1810, LS (copy), General Lacuee to 
Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon, 8 July 1810; LS (copy), Lacuee to Ordonnateur of the lOe 
Division Militaire, 8 July 1810. 
158lbid. 
159Ibid. 
1600ther areas of supply discussed were clothing and hospital administration. Ibid. 
1611bid. 
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mismanagement in 1808 and expanding the range of contributions by military operations 
would still not pay off. 162 
By September, the situation had not improved. Macdonald was still caught in the 
toils of the grinding guerilla war and logistical costs mounted which could only be paid 
in the long run by France. By mid-1810 there was for the Army of Catalonia 8,290,000 
F. in available funds of which 4,473,841.83 F. was for subsistence alone. 163 Still, the 
army remained in its old positions, holding down the country and unable to strike into 
Lower Catalonia. The only good news was the safe arrival of provision ships at 
Barcelona in September and October carrying 16,435 quintals mare of supplies (and 1,678 
liters of wine). 164 
General Lacuee's well considered plan for it depended upon Macdonald's ability 
to undertake offensive operations to conquer Lower Catalonia, a task now left to Suchet, 
and restricting Macdonald to only a supporting role. Logistically then, the Army of 
Catalonia was, in January 1811, in no better position to support itself than the year before. 
The years 1811 and 1812 brought the same disappointments and the fall of 
Macdonald from his command. Prior to the disastrous capture of Figueras by the 
insurgents and the siege to retake the place, the 24,000 French troops in Upper Catalonia 
162Conard, Napoleon et de Catalogne, 221-236, 340-341, 246-282, 453; AN, AFiv 
1621, Plaq 1, Resume des Operations Militaires, Corps d'Armee des Pyrenees Orientales; 
Laffaille Memoirs, 124. 
163This included in bakery 1,380,000 F.; meat 1,276,000.00 F.; rice and legume 
145,334.73 F.; forrage 720,000 F.; transport 782,000 F.; and administration, 170,507.10 
F. AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 5 September 1810. 
164AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapports a l'Empereur, 15 November 1810 and 
17 November 1810; C(l9) 8, Lacuee to Clarke, 21June1810. 
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were supplied exclusively from the 1 Oe Division Militaire. Dry food alone amounted to 
30,430 qx, and the total cost for food, drink, and forrage was 464,518 F. for seven 
month's provision. 165 General Baraquey d'Hillier's Corps in Upper Catalonia virtually 
lived from hand to mouth, despite the provisions brought from France, for its 20,149 
troops only held about three to seven days provisions166 and remained precarious through 
the rest of 1811. It too, depended almost entirely on France, 167 over the next two years. 
The rest of the Army of Catalonia was in exactly the same position, holding about three 
days provision. 168 
The provisioning of Barcelona through the war was a high priority task for 
General Lacuee and Napoleon and they knew that the Army of Catalonia alone was 
165This required 28,000 qx of flour, 790 qx rice, 790 qx of legumes, 850 qx of salt, 
156,500 liters of brandy, 252,000 liters of vinegar and 542,500 decaliters of oats. AN, 
AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 30 April 1811. 
166Provisions on hand included 8,365 kg of grain, 658,592 kg of flour, 74,884 rations 
of biscuits, 34,593 rations of rice, 11,412 kg of legumes and 18,615 kg of salt. It also 
had 396 meat animals, 15,660.8 kg of salt meat, 25,322 liters of brandy, 6,236 liters of 
vinegar and 80,614 decaliters of oats. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en 
Haute Catalogne, 15 March 1811. 
167In August, at the end of the Figueras siege the 25,290 man/1,442 horse Corps had 
14,673 kg of meat, 189,202 kg of flour, 41,242 kg of biscuits, 23,525 kg of rice, 136 kg 
of legumes, 12,722 kg of salt, 19,946 rations of bread, 17,018 liters of brandy, 20,894 
liters of wine, 31,241 liters of vinegar, 44 kg of oil, 213 oxen, 50 cattle, 1,116 kg candles, 
27,222 kg of hay, 80,026 kg straw, 3,329 decaliters of oats, and 784 decaliters of bran. 
SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811. 
168SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1December1811 and 1 January 
1812. 
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incapable of supporting the city. In January 1811 several French land and sea convoys 
supplied Barcelona with 16,186 qx of provisions, 200 oxen, and 12,578 liters ofbrandy.169 
Napoleon was determined to hold Barcelona and supplied it with a will, through 
1811. In November, three naval convoys evaded the corsairs and land convoys pushed 
through the guerillas and brought 15,000 qx of provisions; enough for six months. 170 
Napoleon was, however, tiring of this costly logistical battle for a fortress which was a 
sink hole for one of his divisions. More than once he resolved but never executed a plan 
to blow up its fortifications, reinforce the citadel and Fort Monjuich leaving only a 
brigade as garrison. In any case, Napoleon continued to support Catalonia through the 
war, as expenditures mounted. The eighteen months of 1810-11 cost 1,023,918 F.,171 out 
of a Peninsular logistical budget of 12,290,000 F. 172 When he replaced Marshal 
Macdonald with General Decaen, the situation remained completely unchanged to 1814. 
169SHAT, C(l9) 8, Ministerial Note, 10 January 1811; Imperial Orders to resupply 
Barcelona, nd. 
170This included 10,000 qx of grain, 1,250 qx of rice, 2,000 qx of salt, 50,000 di of 
oats, oxen and even 600,000 F. in cash to defray garrison expenses. SHAT, C(l9) 8, 
General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 29 December 1811; AN, AF iv 1176, General 
Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, January 1813. 
171Monthly consumption of the Army was 4,000 qx of flour, 216 qx of rice, 120 qx 
of salt, 720 oxen, 50,000 di of oats, 22,500 I. of brandy and 36,000 I. of vinegar. In this 
period the Army obtained from France 104,620 rations of biscuits, 70,410 qx of flour, 
2,060 qx of rice 566 qx of salt, 849,580 di of oats, 12,671 head of beef and mutton, 
20,296 liters of wine, 135,591 liters of brandy, and 19,395 liters of vinegar. AN, AFiv 
1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 3 July 1811. 
172Ibid., LS, Lacuee to Napoleon, nd. 
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In January 1813 Barcelona received another of its many re-provisionings of 18, 750 
qx of grain, 2,475 qx of preserved meat, 56,250 liters of brandy and 240,000 dl of oats. 173 
The French treasury would expend 700,000 F. on grain for Barcelona alone for 1812174 
out of the enormous provisioning of the Army at 18,000,000 F. 175 The figures for 1813 
were staggering too. Napoleon spent 7,393,612.91 F. in the first six months of 1813 on 
a new approved annual budget of 8,000,000 F. 176 There seemed no end in sight but at 
least Napoleon had resigned himself to the fact that he could not make war feed war in 
eastern Spain. 
Feeding the Army of Catalonia strained the French Pyrenees districts to the 
breaking point. The Ordonnateur of the lOe Division Militaire requisitioned 15,200 qx 
of grain at the enormous cost of 599,692.50 F. 177 reflecting its scarcity and excessive 
requisitioning by the Army of Catalonia. The exhaustion of French departments is 
indexed in the difficulty of supplying the Catalan fortresses and the French Pyrenees 
fortresses with siege provisions in late 1813 and 1814. Napoleon supplied Perpignan with 
70 days provisions, Mont Louis with a month's provender, Bellegarde with 40 days, 
Collioure with 20 days and the Chateau de Lourdes with 60 days provision. The cost of 
173 AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 26 January 1813. 
174AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 9 April 1813. 
175AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 21 April 1813. 
176AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 16 June 1813 and 13 
August 1813. 
177See Table 28, AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 12 August 
1813. 
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this last ditch project was 278,177.96 F. 178 The second index of these difficulties was 
Marshal Suchet's order to stop baking three varieties of bread for the Army. He allowed 
two, the best white for hospitals and pain de munition. 179 The abandonment of the 15% 
p_ain ordinaire for officers reflected the growing scarcity of provisions and the need to 
economize. 
The Army of Catalonia was, through its history, an enormous drain in subsistence 
and money from France. The poverty of the country, the competing logistical demands 
of the opposed armies and the sheer ferocity of the insurgent war restricted French 
movements to areas picked clean of provender. This forced its dependency, since 1808, 
on France for provision, which France could ill afford. These demands slowly stripped 
the areas of the French Pyrenees of provender over the years, raising the prices of existing 
supplies and dislocating the local economy. Additionally, the lack of monetary 
contributions collected by the French threw the cost of provisions onto the French 
Treasury, dislocating the French economy. 
Napoleon and General Lacuee made a great, though unsuccessful, attempt to hold 
back the provisioning of the Army of Catalonia at Treasury expense by forcing Marshal 
Macdonald into the field, and onto fresh resources. The difficulties of supporting 
Barcelona, the lack of troops, the requirements of holding down the country and the more 
178These garrisons had the following strengths: Perpignan 3,500 men/I 00 horses, 
Mont Louis, 2,500 men, Bellegande 1,000 men, Collioure, 2,000 men, and Chateau de 
Lourdes 300 men. AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 3 September 
1813. 
179AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 22 September 1813. 
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than occasional military disasters which plagued the French Command there from 1810 
to 1813 virtually hamstrung the attempt, prohibiting extensive operations afield. The 
Army of Catalonia remained then a burden on France. Napoleon admitted this fact by 
placing this Army on the budget and there it remained until 1814. 
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§4. The Worms Eye View: Vivres-Viande. 
The second of the Intendance sections, vivres-viande, was responsible for the 
supply of fresh (on the hoot) and preserved meat and salt lard, by purchase, and 
requisition. 180 At the Corps and Army level this branch of the Intendance was part of the 
Services Reunis, or Subsistance Generale, managed by one of the three Regisseurs 
generaux in the Army headquarters under the Intendant General. 181 The Armee d'Espagne 
for example had two Regisseurs generaux des services generaux. 182 In the Corps d'Armee 
a Directeur Principal or Agents en Chef managed the Service Reunis as a Commissaire-
Ordonnateur or Commissaire des guerres under the overall control of the Corps 
Ordonnateur en chef. 183 The VII Corps and Army of Catalonia used a Commissaire-
Ordonnateur adjoint as Directeur Principal to manage subsistence. 184 
In the divisions the service was divided into its three separate Regies, under a 
Commissaire des guerres adjoint. The Regie des vivres-viande is headed by an Inspecteur 
or Controller, assisted by a Chef de Pare or Garde Pare. The vivres-viande personnel 
180Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 554; Thiebault, Manuel General, 546. 
181Thiebault, Manuel General, 570. 
182SHAT, C(8) 398, Armee d'Espagne, Personnel, Administration Generale de l'Armee 
d'Espagne, 15 December 1809; Administration Generale de l'Armee d'Espagne, 1 January 
1810; Armee d'Espagne, Personnel, Bureau d'Operations Militaires, LS, Intendant General 
Dennee to General Clarke, 19 February 181 O; Administration Generale de l'Armee 
d'Espagne, Etat, 1 November 1810. 
183Thiebault, Manuel General, 570. 
184SHAT, C(8) 398, Administration Generale de l'Armee d'Espagne, 15 December 
1809, 1 January 1810, and l November 1810. 
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(sous-employees) are organized into four man brigades, lead by a brigadier. These 
personnel were of three types, butchers (bouchers), drovers (touchers) and yard keepers 
. . ) 185 (romrumers . 
The garrison of Barcelona, under General Habert in 1814 had as head of the 
subsistence services Commissaire des guerres adjoint Roullon, chief of Administration 
Militaire, and assistant to garrison Commissaire des guerres Mongenot. The garrison 
Regie des vivres-viande had five men, headed by a Garde-Pare, and assisted by an Aide 
Garde-Pare with three sous-employees des vivres-viande. 186 
The Corps and division possessed animal parks or Pares de betail. The Ministry 
Instruction of 21 February 1795 specified that one bullock or ox provided 1,000 rations 
of fresh meat. The conventional military wisdom, however, dictated a rate of 800 rations 
per bullock, 600 per cow, 60 rations per sheep, and 60 rations per hog. 187 The meat 
requirements of the Army of Catalonia varied with its strength through the war from 
2,028 kg of beef and 1,623 kg of pork per day to a maximum of 15,229 kg of beef and 
185Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 83: 86; SHAT, C(8) 398, Etat du Nombre des 
Rations, 30 June 1810. 
186SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. The Emperor even militarized the 
Regie des vivres-viande in the Imperial Guard, manning it with soldiers. Its staff 
consisted of one Sergeant-Major, two Sergeant Park (yard) keepers (romainiers), one 
corporal and ten Butchers, and cow herders. Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 87. 
187SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus; Lechartier, Les Services de 
l'Arriere, 83. 
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12,183 kg ofpork. 188 The actual meat ration was .25 kg of fresh or salt beef, or mutton189 
or .2 kg of salt pork or lard. 190 
The preserved meats, that is, salt beef and salt pork were made by heavy salting 
(pickling), and packed in barrels. When the oxen was slaughtered, the butchers hung it 
up to cool for 24 hours. Once cooled they cut up the carcass into twenty-six, four pound 
pieces per every hundred weight of meat. The pieces of meat were rubbed in salt and 
stowed into bins with salt between the layers of meat, for five or six days. At the end 
of this time the meat was removed from the bins, again rubbed with salt, packed into 
barrels laced with salt and allowed to drain through their bung for 24 hours. A pickle of 
brine water was thens added to fill the cask. 191 The barrel was then bunged up and 
sealed. The barrel head was then marked "B" for beef, number of pieces in the cask, and 
the first two letters of the place and month of making it. 192 
Barrels of salt beef and pork weigh in the French Army about 100 kg and had a 
shelf life of three years. Another item was salt lard, or rendered pork fat cut in 'planks' 
or slabs and packed in 100 kg barrels of salt and brine. One of the odd preserved meats 
was salt fish, available in Catalan seaports. The garrison of Barcelona used salt fish 
188See Table 29. 
189Mutton was a favored meat in the Peninsula because of its abundance, and it was 
always eaten fresh. SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
190SHAT, C(8) 398, Etat du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810. 
191 Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 413. 
192For example, salt beef packed in Portsmouth in June with 63 pieces of meat with 
a total net weight of 300 lbs. is marked "B 63 PO m". Ibid. 413-414. 
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(herring) and Cod (Morue et Poisson sale) as a meat substitute. The ration was .25 kg. 193 
Salted or pickled herring is made by gutting, and washing in sea water, then salting, and 
packing the fish in wooden barrels of salt and brine water like sardines. Salt cod was 
made by splitting and salting the fish for five days, then exposing them to the sun, 
stacked, sweated, cleaned, resalted, and packed. 194 
The work of the Intendance was arduous, regardless of its compensations. Deputy 
Assistant Commissary Schumann of the British Army described some of his work, from 
four a.m. to eleven p.m.: "The whole day long I had to bake in the sun, recon up and 
calculate, weigh and measure, keep accounts and order fresh supplies." 195 Late at night, 
by the twinkle of far off watch fires he groped back to his peasant billet with its "two 
million fleas" 196 to sup on a soup of marrow bones, roast beef and grog. 197 
The management of bullock gave Schumann no end of trouble, and his drovers and 
'Gardes Pares' were not up to the job: 
193SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
194C. L. Cutting, "Fish Preservation," in A History of Technology, ed. Charles Singer, 
E. J. Holymyard, A. R. Hall and Trevor I. Williams, Volume IV, The Industrial 
Revolution c. 1750 to c. 1850. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958) 45-46. 
195Schumann described his other supply duties: 
"Supplies had arrived so plentifully from the provision ships lying in the 
harbour, that a veritable mountain of salt fish, oats, hay, straw, ship's 
biscuit, rum and wine had accumulated in one of the large barns of the 
farm; and on the following morning at four o'clock the headquarters of 
seven regiments were already standing at the door ... " 
Schumann, On the Road with Wellington, 35. 
196Ibid. 
197Ibid. 
My wild bullocks, which we killed for meat, also caused me great anxiety; 
for although they were shut up in a garden surrounded by a wall five feet 
high, they nevertheless used sometimes to jump this height like stags, and 
charging into the bivouacs, would send the tents, the huts, the sentry boxes 
and camp kettles all flying; or they would escape into the open country, 
or, after being surrounded by me and my men, supported by the military, 
would be shot at and killed at the end of a regular hunt. 198 
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When the time to slaughter bullock came, Schumann and his butchers were 
sweating under a broiling sun covered in flies to do their work. At ten a.m. daily they 
slaughtered twenty bullock. At their supply depot near Paco d'Arcus Portugal in 1808, 
they slaughtered, by hand, 600 bullock in two months: 
Every day at ten o'clock I had twenty bullocks killed - and their blood and 
entrails, which soon became putrid in the great heat, created the most 
appalling stench, not to mention the clouds of blow flies, which were so 
thick that every surface was black with them. In the end, I had pits dug 
in which I buried this offal. The Portuguese butchers. . . used a small 
instrument, which was half concealed by the hand, and had a blade not 
larger than a penknife into a wooden knob. With this, they approached the 
bullock in a coaxing manner, stroking him the while, and feeling for a 
slight depression in the back of the neck behind the torus and between the 
horns; then they would plunge their spike into this depression, and the 
bullock would drop to the ground as if struck with apoplexy; and in most 
cases would hardly stir a limb again. 199 
This was precisely the grind the French vivres-viande men encountered. The 
evidence of their backbreaking labor, like grain porters, those human beasts who hauled 
the 100 kg sacks of grain or flour, lay in some of the equipment used in butchering and 
distributing meat animals. In January and February 1812, Commissaire de guerres 
198Ibid., 36. 
199Ibid., 37-38. 
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Leamont at Figueras purchased service equipment including eight huge steelyards or 
balance scales capable of handling from 400 kg. to 1,015 kg. at a cost of 2,355.00 F., 
gauges and wool (80.00 F.) or lashing rope. 200 These heavy instruments were to weigh 
the carcasses prior to butchering and distribution. 
Meat was, in Catalonia, a difficult commodity to procure. At Barcelona it was, 
by early 1809, nearly impossible to obtain and limited to the hospitals. The garrison 
magazine had only 100 qx of lard and 21.59 qx of salt meat in January. The 
Commissaire-Ordonnateur stopped distributing meat in July 1808 and paying the soldiers 
one Real de Vellon indemnity en lieu of the ration, from the Barcelona Junta. 201 In Upper 
Catalonia, General Reille's division had in April 1809, 176 oxen and 45 sheep,202 or 
143,500 rations of meat. General Reille too, found it impossible to procure meat off the 
country and requested that the lOe Division Militaire provide it. General Verdier, 
besieging Gerona in mid-1809, also demanded 200,000 rations. 203 The whole VII Corps 
200SHAT, C(19) 9, lOe Division Militaire, Bureau de Vivres, LS, No. 140, 
Ordonnateur Duitrass to General Lacuee, 19 January 1812; Commissaire des guerres, de 
Pyrenees Orientales Jean Baptiste Angles and Contractor Joseph Vial, Process Verbal, 31 
December 1811; LS, No. 268, Ordonnateur Duitrass to General Lacuee, 11February1812; 
and Regie Generale des Services Reunis Section des Vivres et Liquides, Figueras, 
Commissaire des guerres Leamont, Proces Verbal, 29 January 1812. 
201 The Real de Vellon is a Spanish coin worth 23.93 centimes. Doursther, 
Dictionnaire Universel, 324; SHAT, C(l9) 7, VII Corps, No. 353, Ordonnateur en Chef 
Rey to General Lacuee, 4 January 1809; Regie General, Approvisionnement de Reserve, 
Garde Magasin Billet, Situation des Magasines Militaires de la Citadelle et du Mont-Jouy, 
1 January 1809; Situation, Magasins, 20 January 1809. 
202At 800 rations of meat per ox this was 140,800 rations and sheep were 60 rations 
making 2,700 rations. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Division Reille, 1 April 1809. 
203 AN, AFiv 1174, ler Section, Bureau des Vivres, General Dejean, Rapport a 
l'Empereur, 13 June 1809. 
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only had 355 animals by July. 204 The besieging Corps absorbed the bulk of the 
inadequate meat resources in Catalonia forcing Ordonnateur en Chef Rey to cancel rations 
and pay the soldiers one Real in lieu and draw as much as possible off France.205 
In October 1809, the repeated requests from Ordonnateur en chef Rey for meat 
from the lOe Divison Militaire got the attention of Minister-Directeur, General Dejean. 
Clearly, Catalonia was, one year into the war, nearly exhausted of meat animals. Marshal 
Augereau, ostensible Corps commander taking the waters at Perpignan for gout, echoed 
Rey's pleas. General Dejean requested from Napoleon a provision of 1,200 oxen at 
195,750 F. to provide the corps with 40 ox or 30,000 rations per day. 206 
This infusion of oxen would only provide 30 days rations, and at its end the VII 
Corps was again living hand to mouth. In December it only had 135 oxen (108,000 
rations) enough to last its 44,269 troops two days. 207 In 1810, Marshal Augereau, 
renewed the pleas for assistance from Paris. In February, however, Napoleon's Decree 
making the VII Corps into the Army of Catalonia and an independent "Vice Royalty" 
threw it onto its own resources. 208 This, naturally, was logistically unsustainable and 
Marshal Augereau resumed his requests for assistance only to get a chilly reception from 
an Emperor who unrealistically insisted that this army support itself. The Minster 
204SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. 
205SHA T, C( 19) 7, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, Rapport sur le Situation du VII Corps, 
5 September 1809. 
206AN, AFiv 1174, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 14 October 1809. 
207SHAT, C(8) 362 Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809. 
208SHAT, C(8) 41, Imperial, Decree, 8 February 1810. 
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Director, now General Lacuee, however, fully grasped Augereau's predicament and 
pleaded his case to Napoleon to resume logistical support. He argued that Catalonia 
simply had no meat animals due to its poverty and to insurgent depredations, and 
requested that France provide meat rations to the Army of Catalonia off of its Catalan 
funds. 209 
Napoleon's trepidations at supporting the Army of Catalonia off of France were 
understandable, if unrealistic, in the light of the meat provisions provided from 1808 to 
January 1810. These included 5,588 oxen, 2,593 cattle, and 5,464 sheep, amounting to 
9,226,410 rations of beef and 305,852 rations of mutton. 210 The cost of these provisions 
was 2,063,919.48 F., over nearly two years.211 By May 1810, the provision debt of 
2,300,000 F. came due on the Army of Catalonia, but Marshal Augereau could not pay, 
for money was as hard to come by as meat. 212 
The whole army required 1,477,580 rations per month. Since it was impossible 
to provide this much meat off France, let alone Catalonia, General Lacuee enacted greater 
efficiencies in the distribution system which currently wasted 82,580 rations a month. He 
209AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 28 February 1810. 
210This equaled 2,344,365 kg of ox, 782,391 kg of (cattle) beef and 115,869 kg of 
mutton. The beef ration included 7,038,048 rations of ox and 2,188,362 of beef. AN, 
AFi v 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l 'Empereur 14 March 181 O and General Lacuee, 
Etat Indicatif, (ler) des Denrees versees de la 1 Oe Division Militaire, March 1810. 
2111bid. 
212Pierre Conard's discussion in Napoleon et la Catalonge is authoritative on the 
problems of financing the improvised government, which he maintained was a fruitless 
effort. Barcelona received only 491,983,999 F. in 1808. Conard, Napoleon et la 
Catalogne, 453-454. 
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proposed to Napoleon (against Augereau's advice) contracting out the meat procurement 
service. Contractors would provide the animals and drive them to Perpignan. The 
Jntendance would oversee convoys, slaughtering and unit distribution to reduce loss of 
animals and meat wastage. 213 Every ration was as precious as gold. In January 1810, for 
example, there were only 144 cattle with the VII Corps, a mere 144,000 rations if 
stretched at 1,000 rtn./animal. This was enough for three days for the Corps' 44,552 
troops. 214 Augereau went to half rations in May and supplemented meat with rice to 
stretch the existing supply of 628 cattle and 385 qx of salt meat. 
Supplies were even drying up in the Pyrenees. In August only 20,000 rations 
reached Perpignan,215 and by October it only had 89 oxen, 28 cattle, 1,107 sheep, and 26 
hogs provided 95,980 rations, a mere 6% of their monthly requirement. General Lacuee 
meanwhile made an enormous effort and provided to the Army of Catalonia another 
5,890,000 rations of meat as 5,890 oxen,216 over four months provisions, by stripping 
portions of the French countryside. 
213The great convoys to Barcelona in 1810 provided considerable provisions to the 
garrison but at enormous cost to the French government. In June, a convoy brought 400 
oxen (400,000 rations) able to feed the garrison for well over a month. SHAT, C(19) 8, 
Bureau des Vivres, No. 50, General Lacuee to Napoleon, 21 June 1810. 
214SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810. 
215AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 9 July 1810. 
216The provision included 5,490,000 rations for the Army and 400,000 rations for 
French fortresses in Catalonia. AN, AFiv 1175, Letter, (copy) General Lacuee to 
Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon, 8 July 1810; Letter (copy) General Lacuee to the 
Ordonnateur of the I Oe Divison Militaire, 8 July 1810. 
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If the supply of meat was now uncontrollable by either Ordonnateur en Chef 
Bourdon or General Lacuee, so was its cost. The Ministry budgeted 300,000 F. for meat 
expenses, but it incurred 2,220,019.90 F. in debt in 1810 for 8,300 oxen from France. 
The French Treasury had to pick up the bill and only paid 1,276,000 F.217 The Army of 
Catalonia was incapable of paying such a huge sum, for its 9,840 head of beef in 1810. 
The next year was quite the same. Marshal Macdonald's troops only got 2,831 head, up 
to July 1811, some 1.6 million rations, a two month supply.218 
The 1 Oe Division Militaire in the last six months of 1812 gave a windfall of meat 
and provided 4,929,971 rations of meat to the Army of Catalonia. This included 3,352 
oxen, 1,259 cattle and 407 sheep, or 26,739 rations per day. This huge provision drained 
these departments nearly dry, and they would be unable to provide meat on such a scale 
again.219 
At the end of 1811, General Decaen began to stock his fortresses with masses of 
preserved meat, as a siege provision. Regardless of the problems of this type of 
provision, it was a preferred siege ration because it requires little maintenance. Unlike 
meat on the hoof, it did not require feeding at a rate of five or six times that of a man in 
gross weight, veterinary service, or slaughtering. 
217AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 5 September 1810. 
218AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 3 July 1811. In December 
1811 Barcelona received in a huge convoy, 500 oxen; SHAT, C(19) 8, General Lacuee, 
Rapport a l'Empereur, 29 December 1811. 
219The weight of these meat rations amounted to 1,515,811 kg of ox meat, 430,659 
kg of beef and 13,377 kg of mutton, totaling 5,020 animals, and 1,962,847 kg of meat. 
SHAT, C(19) 10, lOe Division Militaire, Bureau des Vivres, No. 128 Commissaire des 
guerres Duitraus to General Lacuee, 21 January 1813. 
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Commissaire des guerres Beraud at Figueras ordered from Perpignan a huge supply 
of meat including 109 barrels of salt beef (10,824 kg.), 82 barrels of salt pork (11,733.5 
kg.) and six vehicle loads of 1,198 planches of salt lard (8,415 kg.). 220 In January, the 
garrison also got from Perpignan 270 qx of salt meat for 45,650 F. 221 This was quite 
expensive and reflected the scarcity of this commodity on the market. 222 
The Intendance continued to procure at an almost frenetic pace to maintain 
existing stocks, frequently depleted by the garrison and by the thousands of troops in 
transit which drew off Figueras each month. In June 1812, for example, Commissaire des 
guerre Beraud got another 21 barrels of salt pork, 2,005.5 kg. 223 
220SHAT, C(l9) 9, Commissaire des guerres Beraud and Garde Magasin Glouteau, 
Section des vivres - pain et liquides, Proces Verbal, 16 December 1811; Proces Verbal, 
16 December 1811; Proces Verbal, 19 December 1811; Proces Verbal, 19 December 
1811; Proces Verbal, 21 December 1811; Proces Verbal, 28 December 1811. 
221 This included 100 qx of salt beef for 15,000 F. (150 F/qx), 90 qx of salt lard in 
planches for 16,650 F (185 F/qx) and 80 qx of salt pork for 14,000 F (175 F/qx). SHAT, 
C(l 9) 9, Bureau des Vivres, No. 44, Chef de Bureau Legere, Rapport au Ministre 
Directeur 8 January 1812; lOe Division Militaire, Bureau des Vivres, No. 5073, 
Commissaire des guerres Duitrass to General Lacuee, 20 November 1811; Commissaire 
des guerres Beraud, Proces Verbal, 16 November 1811. 
222Salt beef at 1.50 F/kg was nearly twice that of the same commodity at Danzig at 
the beginning of its siege in January 1813 which was 0.86 F/kg. Salt pork went for 1.75 
F/kg, and it was 0.64 F/kg at Danzig. Land was 1.80 F/kg and at Danzig 0.75 F./kg. 
These comparative prices show the dearth of meat supplies in France. Jacques David 
Martin de Campredon Defense de Dantzig en 1813. Journal de Siege Journal personnel 
et Notes du General de Division de Campredon Commandant le Genie du Xe Corps. 
Lettres Diverses, Ed. Charles Auriol, (Paris: Librairie Pion, 1888) 297; Doursther, 
Dictionnaire Universe!, 219. 
223This is net weight. Gross weight was 3,608 kg. Salt, brine and the barrel was 
44.4% of the weight shipped item. It would take three wagons to haul this meat. SHAT, 
C(19) 9, LS, No. 986, Commissaire des guerres Duitrass to General Lacuee, 10 June 
1812; Commissaire des guerres Beraud, Bordereau des Versemens 1 June 1812; Regie 
Generale des Services Reunis Section des Vivres-Pain et Liquides, Place de Perpignan, 
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At the very end of the war, January 1814, the Intendance continued to provision 
Figueras with all manner of provender in preparation for a siege as Marshal Suchet would 
soon withdraw to the French frontier. This included 1,200 qx of salt meat ( 500 qx of salt 
beef and 700 qx of salt lard) provided by contract from Reynaud et Cie., of Lyon at an 
even higher price of 230,000 F.224 
Ordonnateur en chef Bondurand ordered in March 1814 a huge provision convoy 
carrying 978,527.6 kg of food and 86,739 liters of liquids including 42,856.3 kg of salt 
meat, over a half million rations of food, enough to last the 1, 181 man225 garrison over 
a year.226 
As the war entered its last phase in 1813 the supply of fresh meat on the hoof 
nearly collapsed and lntendance officers made greater use of salt meat and paid meat 
indemnities. In January 1813 the Ministry sent to Barcelona 1,650 qx metric of salt beef 
Commissaire des and Garde Magasin Beraud Glouteau, Proces Verbal, 25 May 1812; 
Commissaire des guerre Beraud, Bordereau des Recettes, 1 June 1812; Commissaire des 
guerres Beraud, and Garde Magasin Glouteau Proces Verbal, 24 May 1812. 
224The price for the salt beef was 183 F/qx (1.83/kg) and increase of 18% and for salt 
lard 196 F/qx (1.93/kg) and increase of 5.6%. SHAT, C(19) 9, Administration de la 
Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, No. 1527, Chef de Bureau Legere, Rapport au Ministre-
Directeur, 10 November 1813; No. 1527, Draft; LS, No. 4253, Ordonnateur en chef 
Bourdon to General Lacuee 24, October 1813; and Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon and M. 
Reynard, Reynard et Cie., Marche pour la Foumiture de 1,200 quintaux metriques de 
viande salee destinee pour l'approvisionnement de siege du Fort de Figueras, 16 October 
1813. 
225SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
226SHAT, C(19) 9, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, L. No. 3439 
Ordonnateur en chef Bondurand to General Lacuee, 24 March 1814; General Palmoral, 
Commandant of Figueras, Proces Verbal de Verification, 1 March 1814. 
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and 825 qx of salt lard, and its total meat expenditure was 2,837,681.01 F. for the first 
six months of 1813. 227 
The situation in providing this item of supply then was always precarious. Nearly 
impossible to obtain in Catalonia, the Army was thrown back on France again to supply 
this provender, and to pay for it out of the French Treasury. 228 The Ordonnateurs en 
chefs in the Army of Catalonia made manful attempts to keep the troops provisioned, 
fighting the inefficiency of their own staffs, assailed by the ravages of the war and with 
their hand perpetually out to a very sympathetic General Lacuee who did everything in 
his power to assist the French High command in Catalonia, often in the face of an 
Emperor who expected the impossible and for someone else to pay for it. 
If the Ordonnateur en chef had difficulties with the Army of Catalonia, his 
subordinate Commissaire-Ordonnateur managing the oft blockaded Barcelona faced near 
impossibilities. In June 1812, the Barcelona Park had 142 oxen and 46 cattle just 
received from the Army Park at Gerona, and only two oxen were captured from the 
country. 229 
General Maurice-Mathieu, the Governor of Barcelona, and his Commissaire-
Ordonnateur, G. Raymondon made every effort to stretch existing supplies as far as 
possible for they could not be sure of a steady supply. One innovation was to establish 
227AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 27 January 1813. 
228AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 16 June 1813. 
229SHAT, C(19) 9, No. 163, Commissaire des guerre Raymondon to General Lacuee, 
10 June 1812; Rapport Mensuel, 10 June 1812. 
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a meat distribution schedule. In May, for example, fresh meat was distributed on fifteen 
days, salt meat and a cash indemnity distributed on eight days each. 230 
The Barcelona Commissaire-Ordonnateur, like General Lacuee, made use of a 
contractor (Sieur Closas) to provide fresh meat to the garrison for 32 centimes per eight 
once (mare) ration. 231 In October 1813, the garrison had 171 oxen, 156 cattle and 1,936 
sheep,232 and 877,760 rations of meat. 233 Through the year the Barcelona garrison 
received 1,095,000 kg of fresh meat at a cost of 1,314,000 F. This was a huge quantity 
of fresh meat, but the salt beef was so poor, rusty, or rotten that it was unhealthy for the 
troops. General Maurice-Mathieu insisted on using fresh meat as much as possible.234 
At the beginning of 1814, as the Army of Aragon and Catalonia retired, leaving 
Barcelona under blockade, the provision convoys ended. On 2 February General Habert 
the new Governor and Commissaire des guerres Mongenot235 requisitioned through the 
contractor, M. Closas, all of the available animals in and around the city. These included 
230Ibid. 
231Ibid. 
232SHAT, C(19) 9, Bureau des Vivres, No. 4479, Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon to 
General Lacuee, 2 November 1813, G. Raymondon; Etat de Situation des Magasins de 
la Ville et Forts de Barcelone, 21 October 1813. 
233SHAT, C(19) 9, G. Raymondon, Reduction en Rations, 20 October 1813. 
234Ration price was 30 centimes, for a 12,000 man garrison. General Lacuee assured 
Napoleon of the need for this expenditure and of the health reasons to use salt beef as 
little as possible. AN, AFiv 1176, Letter, General Lacuee to Napoleon January 1813; 
Bureau des Vivres, Letter, Commissaire des guerres Monbenoit, 24 January 1813; Budget 
de Barcelone pour l'Exercice 1813. 
235This staff consisted of a Gard Pare, Aide-Garde Pare and three Sous-Employes, 
SHAT, C(8) 371, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
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1,145 sheep, 364 horses and two cattle, building the Park to 47 oxen, 38 cattle, and 1,744 
sheep. Expenditures were in the first ten days of February and a rough ten day average 
was 18 oxen, four cattle, and 257 sheep. The magazines also had 32,712 kg of salt beef, 
108,204 kg of salt lard and 75,892 kg of salt or dried fish. Expenditures of these 
commodities were low, at 3,815 kg of beef, 1,542 kg lard, and 5,792 kg of fish. The 
most popular was preserved flesh, and certainly one of the most unusual and better tasting 
items in the French military diet. 236 
The magazines, because of the commander's discipline slowly decreased through 
May 1814. On 27 May, days before the French evacuation, the Park had eight oxen, 19 
cattle and 856 horses. 237 Of the preserved meats, only 41,692 kg of beef, 99,847 kg of 
lard, and 52,662 kg of fish238 undoubtedly, the garrison Ordonnateur purchased through 
M. Closas. 
Total expenditure of preserved meat was 180,378 rations of salt beef, 11,376 
rations of pork (lard) and 102,275 rations of salt fish. 239 Fresh meat distribution was 
383,041 rations at a cost of 147,391.37 F. 240 The garrison also owed a debt of 237,000 
236lbid. 
237The 856 horses were garnson animals and would be used for food m a last 
extremity. Ibid. 
238lbid. 
239Ibid. 
240Ibid. 
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F. to M. Closas at the beginning of the blockade, 241 and on the evacuation in June 1814 
owed 105,913.32 F. 242 Even during the stress of the collapse of the Empire, a blockade 
and the evacuation of that city, debts had to be and were paid as far as the military chest 
would allow. 
The administration of meat supply was a somewhat convoluted system, and was, 
like other logistical areas, laden with paperwork, and designed to manage both supplies 
and costs. Everything that came into the supply pipeline was scrupulously accounted for 
at every level from the Ministry of Military Administration down to the Garde Pares or 
Gardes Magasins. This required coordination by these various agencies of no mean 
degree. 
In September 1811, Commissaire des guerres, Jean Baptiste Beraud, the Army of 
Catalonia Commissaire at Perpignan, sent a convoy of 408 oxen and cattle to Barcelona. 
He received these animals at the army park there from the Commissaire des guerres of 
the 1 Oe Division Militaire, Commissaire des guerres Duitrass in four shipments. Beraud 
inventoried, examined, and receipted them on a proces verbal. In December he ordered 
them convoyed to Barcelona with other supplies, after arranging for the escort, etc. with 
the Chief of Staff and Ordonnateur en chef of the Army of Catalonia. 243 
241 SHAT, C(l9) 9, Bureau des Vivres, No. 1368, LS, Ordonnateur en chef 
Bonodurand to General Lacuee, 22 December 1813. 
242SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
243SHAT, C{l9) 7, lOe Divison Militaire, Bureau des Vivres, No. 185, Commissaire 
des guerres Duitaus to General Lacuee, 25 January 1812; Armee de Catalogne, Vivres 
Viande, Commissaire des Guerres Beraud, Proces Verbal de Vente, 29 December 1811. 
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Prior to shipment, three oxen and four cattle had died. he inventoried and shipped 
the other 401 (306 oxen and 102 cattle) animals. He then set to work on his mass of 
resulting paper. He drew up a proces verbal for the convoy, with his receiving documents 
of 27, 28, 29 August and 5 September, for the animals. The Proces Verbal de Vente 
accounted for the 408 beef and the loss of seven, explaining their loss, the disposition of 
carcasses, and their cost of 1,267 F. 244 
Beraud then obtained the fund authorization from the Receveur General de la 
Catalogne (M. Coquibert) at Perpignan to write off the debt from contribution funds held 
by the Receveur General. He wrote a letter to Payeur/Receveur, Julin, to authorize the 
release of the money on a Recette Generale des Contributions, which Commissaire Beraud 
sent to Commissaire Duitas to pay245 for the dead beef. 
The two Commissaires now completed their reports, requesting approval of the 
dispositions taken. M. Beraud reported to Acting Ordonnateur en chef Blanchard who 
reported the action to the Ministry. 246 M. Duitas too, reported the action directly to the 
Ministry as senior In ten dance officer in the 1 Oe Division Militaire. 247 At the Ministry, the 
244SHAT, C(l9) 7, Commissaire des guerres Beraud, Proces Verbal de Vente, 27 
December 1811. 
245Release funds from Receveur Julin. 
246SHAT, C(l9) 7, Army of Catalonia, LS, No. 3413, Ordonnateur Blanchard to 
General Lacuee, 27 January 1812. 
247SHAT, C(l9) 7, lOe Division Militaire, LS, No. 185, Commissaire Duitass to 
General Lacuee, 25 January 1812 and No. 520, Commissaire Duitass to General Lacuee, 
25 March 1812. 
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head of the Bureau des Vivres assembled these documents and drew up a complete report 
to General Lacuee requesting approval which he duly gave. 248 
At Barcelona the same actions occured, Ordonnateur Raymondon and his Garde 
Pare received and inventoried the 401 beef under the over sight of officers of the garrison, 
a veterinary and the Comite charge de la Surveillance which inspected and approved the 
shipment. The appropriate correspondence and proces verbal are drawn up and forwarded 
through the Ordonnateur en chef to the Ministry. 
Contract meat procurement is similarly complex in procedure. In November 1813, 
the Army purchased 1,200 qx of salt meat from Sieur Joseph Reynaud et Cie., of Lyon. 
Ordonnateur en chef Bondurand "let" the contact or Marche to provide the merchandise 
under very stringent specifications. The 700 qx of salt pork (or lard), for example, were 
50 kg of pigs without heads, feet and gutted then cut up and packed in brine; the barrel 
itself was carefully specified as to construction.249 
Once received, army Commissaire des guerres Jean Baptiste Beraud, would in 
twenty-four hours process payment papers for 230,000 F. off of the funds of the Army 
of Catalonia, but in case of a loss of goods, these will be paid off of the Administration 
de la Guerre on application of the Ordonnateur en chef. The payment is guaranteed by 
1 March 1814 to the sum of 74,158.22 F.250 
248SHAT, C(l9) 7, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, Rapport au 
Ministre-Directeur. 
249SHAT, C(l9) 9, Joseph Reynaud and Ordonnateur en Chef Bourden, Marche pour 
le Foumature de 1,200 quintaux metriques de viande sale destine pour 
l'approvisionnement de siege du Fort Figueras, 16 October 1813. 
250Ibid. 
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At Perpignan the action was processed, interestingly enough, not by the Section 
des vivres-viande but by Garde Magasin Glouteau of the Section des vivres-pain et 
liquides. He completed the proces verbal251 after inventorying the delivery of the salt 
meat in the presence of the installation Commissaire des guerres or the lnspecteur des 
Services reunis252 who verified the transaction. The Army Commissaire then completes 
the Bordereau des Versemens,253 recording the proces verbal to purchase the meat. Once 
the goods are received and inventoried, they are inspected by a Comite de Surveillance 
to assure their quality and, if passed, the Garde Magasin will complete a second proces 
verbal of receipt of the meat, 254 and the Commissaire des guerre, in tum, completes a 
Bordereau de Recette255 to complete the transaction. 
When convoyed to Figueras, Commissaire des guerres Catalogne and Garde 
Magasin de Reserve de siege et des vivres Onfroy256 completed a similar transaction. The 
enormous task of suporting the Army of Catalonia was one which the Ministry of Military 
Administration in Paris accomplished with great difficulty, and often against Napoleon's 
251This is Commissaire des guerres Angles. SHAT, C(19) 9, Commissaire des guerres 
Beraud and Garde Magasin Glouteau, Proces Verbal, 26 May 1812. 
2521bid. 
253SHAT, C(19) 9, Service-Reunis des Vivres Commissaire des guerres Beraud, 
Bondereau des Versemens, 1 June 1812. 
254SHAT, C(l9) 9, Regie Generale Section des Vivres-pain et liquides, Garde Magasin 
and Comite de surveillance, Proces Verbal, 24 May 1812. 
255SHAT, C(19) 9, Service-Reunis des vivres, Commissaire des guerres Beraud, 
Bondereau des Recettes, 1 June 1812. 
256SHAT, C(8) 411, Situation, Fort de Figueras, 1 June 1812. 
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opposition. The Emperor seemingly did not grasp the logistical difficulties involved. 
Certainly, he miscalculated the intensity of Catalan resistance more than once and 
overestimated the ability of his army to pacify the province. Logistically, however, 
Napoleon had two overriding concerns: one, money and the other, command attitude. 
In the first case, the French budget, indeed the French economy, was incapable of 
absorbing the enormous cost of Napoleon's armies. Hence, his continued use of 
contributions to make "war feed war," with a subsistence cost of 8,700,000 F. per year 
and pay accounting for a cost of over 33,300,000 F. per annum by 1810.257 The garrison 
of Barcelona alone had a budget of 1,022,221.60 F. from September 1813 to June 1814.258 
This amounted to .13% of the French war budget of 816,000,000 F. 259 
France simply could not pay these huge sums across the whole of the military 
establishment. Consequently, Napoleon demanded that his commanders use contributions. 
In 1808, Catalonia only yielded 405,079.99 F. and afterwards not even this amount.260 
The Peninsular War alone cost 70 million a year as military expenditures ballooned from 
460 million Francs in 1807 to 816 million in 1813. 261 The economic realities forced 
257SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1810; Lacroix and 
Dupieux, Le Napoleon, 165. 
258SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
259Lacroix and Dupieux, Le Napoleon, 14. 
26
°Conard, Napoleon et de Catalogne, 453. 
261Lacroix and Dupieux, Le Napoleon, 165; Louis Bergeron, France Under Napoleon, 
trans, R.R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1981) 38-40; L. de Lanzac de 
Laborie, Paris Sous Napoleon, Vol. II, Administration. Grands Travaux. (Paris: Librairie 
Pion, 1905) 62-64; C. B. A. Behrens, Society. Government and the Enlightenment. The 
Experiences of Eighteenth Century France and Prussia, (London: Thames and Hudson, 
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Napoleon to save every centime he could, and make economies wherever possible. He 
was reluctant to open the purse-strings for fear of breaking his budget and borrowing, or 
worse, having recourse to paper money. Hence, in Catalonia he had because the logistical 
difficulties of the command to expand financial subsidies to this perpetually strapped 
army. 
The second aspect of Napoleon's policy is his "command attitude." He certainly 
recalled his command of the Army of Italy in 1796-97 when it was in a similar logistical 
difficulty as the Army of Catalonia. The only solution was offensive movement which 
not only defeated the enemy, but in moving over fresh ground the army could continue 
to live off the land. Additionally, Napoleon certainly preferred aggressive commanders 
capable of attacking ... attacking ... attacking. It was only these men who were capable 
of solving their logistical problems. He was clearly disappointed in the whole series of 
commanders in Catalonia on this score except Gouvion-Saint-Cyr. This was the 
philosophy behind General Lacuee's policy to force Marshal Macdonald into the field. 
Unfortunately, the strategic realities of the Catalan war were not fully appreciated by the 
Emperor. Macdonald needed more and better troops to accomplish this task. In any case, 
this seems to have been the rationale behind Napoleon's policy towards logistically 
supporting the Army of Catalonia. He certainly miscalculated the nature of the war and 
Catalan resistance also, doing the war effort there an ultimate disservice. 
1985) 68-69. 
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§5. Protecting the Fon:e: Ration Quality Control 
One of the vital tasks in provisioning the Army of Catalonia was assuring the 
quality of its rations. During the difficulties and uncertainties of a campaign, food 
preservation and a high quality supply is of the utmost importance, for illness from bad 
food is very destructive to morale and the physical health of the troops. Adequate, 
healthy rations is a perennial concern with commanders. 262 
Meat was a sensitive food stuff, whether preserved or fresh, but particularly fresh. 
Beef on the hoof is subject to various illnesses which make their meat unfit for 
consumption. It consequently required inspection before distribution. This task in the 
Grande Armee fell to veterinarians and surgeons. If the animal sickens, the Vivres-
Viande Gardes Pares call in the military Artiste-Veterinaire who examined and diagnosed 
the illness to determine fitness for consumption, and if necessary, quarantined and 
numbered them "W6" for sick with an animal number. If an animal died the veterinarian 
examined the carcass for cause of death then condemns or passes it for consumption.263 
This procedure implies a type of ante and post mortem inspection system to determine 
irregularities before and after slaughter. 264 
During the Catalan war the problem of a wholesome meat supply was of great 
importance, all the way up to the Ministry. When procured the animals were undoubtedly 
262Furse, Lines of Communication, 279. 
263SHAT, C(19) 7, Division Quesnel, Pertes de Bestaux, 1811. 
264George C. Dunham, Military Preventative Medicine, 3d Ed. (Harrisburg, PA: 
Military Service Publishing Company, 1940) 43 8-450. 
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inspected for illness or injury that would require their rejection as food. If it took ill in 
the Parks they were quarantined pending veterinary treatment. When a beast died, an 
Artiste-Veterinare conducted a post mortem to find the cause of death, and whether the 
meat was fit for consumption, and either condemn the carcass or allow its distribution to 
the troops. 265 When this occurred the division or installation Commissaire des guerres 
reported by proces verbal to the Ordonnateur en chef who forwards it in tum to the 
Minister of War for Military Administration, explaining the circumstances of the death 
and requests to write the cost off on the government or require a negligent man to pay 
for it. 266 
Hostalrich, that isolated fortress and communications point between Barcelona and 
Gerona, had in 1811 its communications cut with all of the major French garrisons. 
Trapped thus, a bovine epidemic crackled through the Park killing 18 bullock and 24 
cattle, and with them, 17,988.5 kg of meat. 267 
265SHAT, C(l 9) 7, Division Quesnel, Pertes de Bestiaux 1811, Bureau des Vivres, No. 
554, Acting Ordonnateur in Chef Blanchard to General Lacuee, 31July1811; Armee en 
Haute-Catalogne, Division Quesnel, Vivres-Viande, Commissaire des guerres Roullon, 
Proces Verbal 29 May 1811; Certification of Distribution, General de Bridgade Palmorale, 
2 June 1811; Ministere de !'Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, No. 1258, 
Chef de Bureau Legere, Rapport au Ministre-Directeur, 23 September 1811; Leter, No. 
8732 General Lacuee to Ordonnateur Blanchard, 29 September 1811. 
266lbid., Letter, No. 7698, Acting Ordonnateur Blanchard to General Lacuee, 11 
October 1811; Commissaire des Guerres Fain, Division Quesnel, Proces Verbal, 8 October 
1811; Ministere de l'Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, No. 1427, Chef de 
Bureau Legere, Rapport au Ministre Directeur 24 October 1811; Letter, No. 3105, General 
Lacuee to Ordonnateur Blanchard, 31 October 1811. 
267ln December 1811 the Army of Catalonia had 24,740 troops. SHAT, C(8) 370, 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. See Table 30 Oman, Peninsular War, 
4:540-541. 
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When the contagion appeared, it was probably passed to the 49 animal Park by 
an admixture into the main heard of hogs from a convoy to Barcelona which bivouacked 
at Hostalrich on their way. The disease was assumed to have passed from the hogs to the 
Park infecting them with Rinderpest,268 judging from the virulence and lethality of the 
epidemic. 
When it appeared in early September, Commissaire des guerres Muguet, the 
garrison chief intendance officer obtained from Ordonnateur Bourdon the assistance of the 
Army Headquarters veterinarian, Artiste-Veterinarian Joseph Solignac. 269 The tactical 
situation, however, only allowed him to arrive in October. That month seventeen bullock 
and sixteen cattle died of Rinderpest and a group of military, Intendance and medical 
officers condemned the carcasses. Commissaire des guerres Muguet submitted seven 
proces verbal to Ordonnateur Blanchard reporting the epidemic,270 who in tum reported 
268Rinderpest or Cattle Plague is an acute febrile (fever producing) viral bovine 
disease. It is highly contagious and fatal. Its symptoms include sudden onset, croupous 
(severe cough), inflammation of the digestive tract, inflammation and erosion of mucous 
membranes of the mouth and bloody diarrhea. Infected animals transmit Rinderpest by 
contamination of food and water with urine, feces, salvia, eye and nasal secretions, and 
direct animal contact. Mortality varies from 25% -100%. It is highly epidemic and a 
epizootic infection will spread like wild fire. U.S. Army, Tm 3-216, Biological Warfare, 
86-87. 
269M. Bourdon was Ordonnateur en Chef of the Army of Catalonia and Commissaire 
des guerres Blanchard the Ordonnateur of Upper Catalonia. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation 
Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. 
270This team consisted of eight men including the Commander of Hostalrich, Chef de 
Battalion Voysin; Captain Lebel, 4e/16e Artillerie a pied; Captain Borianne and 
Lieutenant Colin, 102e Ligne; Surgeon-Aide-Major Durant in charge of the garrison 
military hospital; Marechal des logis Norris-Torrents; Hostalrich Garde Pare Herpin and 
Commissaire des guerres Felix Muguet. This board was joined by Artiste-Veterinare 
Solignac in October. SHAT, C(19) 7, Armee de Catalogne, Place de Hostalrich Mort et 
Maladie des Bestiaux 1811-1812. Armee de Haute-Catalogne, Place Hostalrich Section 
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to the Ministry.271 General Lacuee ordered the lntendance to redouble its efforts to 
prevent similar contagion in the parks. 272 
In the meantime, Veterinary Solignac arrived on the scene and examined every 
remaining bullock and cow in the Park. He discovered classic Rinderpest symptoms, such 
as inflamed intestinal tract, bloody feces, and foul urine. While he was there another 
eight bullock and three cattle died. Post Mortems revealed gangrene infection too. 
Solignac condemned the carcasses confirming the garrison board's findings, which he 
reported273 to M. Blanchard and the Ministry.274 Finally, the Veterinarian introduced a 
treatment for the remaining beasts, with positive results. 275 General Lacuee wrote this 
enormous loss to the government as unavoidable. 276 
des Vivres-Viande, Proces Verbaux A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. 
2711bid., Bureau des Vivres, No. 1009, LS, Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon to General 
Lacuee, 21 September 1811. 
2721bid., Administration de Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, No. 2910, L, Chef de Bureau 
Legere to General Lacuee and Margin Note Order, General Lacuee to Legere, 16 October 
1811. Once Commissaire-Ordonnateur Blanchard to Muguet's Proces Verbaux, he 
reported to the Ministry to write off the loss. 
2731bid., Place de Figueras, Armee de Catalogne, Report, Artiste-Veterinare Solignac 
to Ordonnateurs Bourdon and Blanchard, nd. 
274Ibid., Proces Verbal, H, October 1811; Bureau des Vivres, No. 8030, LS, 
Ordonnateur Blanchard to General Lacuee, 15 October 1811. 
275Ibid., Report, Solignac to Bourdon and Blanchard, nd. 
276Ibid., No. 1562, Chef de Bureau Legere, Rapport au Minstre-Directeur, 15 
November 1811; No. 1562, Draft Rapport, 8 November 1811, and No. 3355, Draft Letter, 
General Lacuee to Commissaire-Ordonnateur Blanchard, 22 November 1811. 
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This Rinderpest epidemic at Hostalrich was one of the most severe supply disasters 
of the war. In one blow the Army of Catalonia lost 42 head of beef and 37,705 rations 
of meat, enough to supply one days ration to the whole Army of Catalonia. The loss was 
particularly hard felt due to the scarcity of meat in Catalonia, for the Army rarely had 
possession of over 300 head. 
Handling meat on the hoof in convoys could be a difficult matter, particularly for 
inattentive Intendance officers. On 29 May 1811, General Quesnel's division escorted a 
supply convoy from Figueras to Barcelona including a herd of beef.277 Adjoint 
Commissaire des guerres Roullon of Division Quesnel assigned two of his Vivres-Viande 
employees to accompany the bullock convoy. En route, one bullock died of exhaustion 
and troops of the 29e Chasseurs a cheval obtained written permission from the convoy 
commander General de Brigade Palmoral to cut up and distribute the meat. 278 
The two Intendance employees were not present with the convoy at the time. 
They were off 'fiddling' in dereliction of duty and never knew of the bullock's death. This 
meat distribution was strictly illegal (without a post mortem). Once the loss was 
discovered during the inventory at Barcelona, Commissaire des guerres Roullon279 charged 
the two miscreants with dereliction of duty and requested that they repay the loss to the 
2770ften bullock, cattle or oxen in convoys hauled vehicles laden with supplies making 
the animals do double duty as transport beasts and meat on the hoof. Schaumann, On the 
Road with Wellington, 8-9. 
278SHAT, C(l 9) 7, Division Quesnel, Pertes de Bestiaux, 1811 Armee en Haute-
Catalogne, Division Quesnel, Vivres-Viande, Proces Verbal, General de Brigade Palmoral, 
Note, 2 June 1811; Commissaire des guerres Roullon, Proces Verbal, 2 June 1811. 
279lbid., Process Verbal, Sieurs Merci and Vendier, Report 2 June 1811. 
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government. 280The Ministry held the two employees liable both for dereliction and 
possibly endangering the health of soldiers.281 
Under such circumstances units will leap on the windfall of a fresh meat. The 
action of the troopers of the 29e Chasseurs was not at all unusual. Deputy Assistant 
Quartermaster General August Schumann told of a huge bullock herd for the British Army 
managed by drovers and university students from Salamanca, who threw their lot in with 
the British Army, fearing the French. 
The students, running behind the animals desperately tried to drive the slow oxen, 
"with their black gowns flying in the air". 282 Soon they reached a stone road crossing a 
marsh topped with beautiful green grass. This misled the hungry bullocks which went 
to graze, and they sank into the mud, fore legs first and hind quarters in the air. Others 
were just the opposite. The students panicked and fled while Schumann accosted a 
passing infantry division for help: 
but the men laughed in our faces, and drawing their knives, proceeded to 
cut from the haunches of those beasts whose hindquarters were uppermost 
in the marsh, large steaks and fillets of beef, whereat, the poor, martyred 
creatures which had their heads sticking in the mud began to bellow 
fiercely like miredrums. At length I could no longer endure the harrowing 
sight. . .I spurred my horse and road hastily away ... 283 
28
°Ibid., Commissiare des guerres Roullon, Proces Verbal, 2 June 1811. 
281Ibid., Bureau des Vivres, No. 5554, Ordonnateur Blanchard to General Lacuee, 31 
July 1811; Administration de la guerre, Bureau du Vivres No. 1258, Chef de Bureau 
Legere, Rapport au Ministre-Directeur, 23 September 1811; No. 1258 Draft Report; No. 
2732, Letter, General Lacuee to Ordonnateur Blanchard, 29 September 1811. 
282Schumann, On the Road with Wellington, 100. 
283lbid., 101. 
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Most of the losses of animals to disease were routine, as to both type of sickness 
and administrative procedures to deal with it. Anthrax, it seems, was the most prevalent 
disease effecting the cattle of the Army of Catalonia.284 There were, however, bovine 
epidemics which laid waste to French meat herds. 
At the beginning of September 1811, only days after the fall of Figueras after a 
bloody five month siege, the above noted bovine epidemic broke out at the Army Park 
at Hostalrich. There were set procedures for the Intendance to manage these cases. The 
interesting fact is, however, that these procedures and the documentation for them became 
uniform and standardized. The use of systematized procedures and standardized 
documentation was due in the French Army to the Emperor's desire to efficiently use 
existing funds, where the source and extent of funding may be in question. Uniformity 
in material and administration does, in fact, save money and time. Additionally, these 
'industrial' trends in this and all military administration becomes a necessary aspect of 
mass armies where the size and vast number of problems which commanders must 
continuously confront and solve threaten to overwhelm them. The systemization of 
procedures renders the most complex problems easier because it simplifies them. The 
systemized procedures used in Intendance quality control is but one example of the 
burgeoning industrialization of Napoleonic military force. 
284SHAT, C{l 9) 7, Place de Figueras, Vivres-Viande, Commissaire des guerres 
Leamont, Proces Verbal, 30 October 1811; C (19) 9, Pare de Port Moulin, Pertes des 
Bestiaux, 11August1811; Oman, Peninsular War, 7:539, Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 
3:239, 258. 
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§6 Transportanon 
Through the eighteenth century, French armies moved their huge baggage trains 
with requisitioned vehicles. Successive regulations since 1718 regulated the type and 
amount of transport allowed for units, the staff and for officers. 285 The enormous trail of 
followers nevertheless required an enormous transportation organization which otherwise 
immobilized the army. This 'system', of course, produced a disorganized mass of 
transport of various origins under the authority of various and often competing agencies. 286 
The Ministry of War made every effort to alleviate this by reducing or at least 
limiting the burden of baggage. Between 1690 and 1757 it issued seven unsuccessful 
Ordonnances to reduce this. 287 The Army continually procured its transport by contract, 
purchase, and requisition, and steadily increasing the burden .. 288 
The War of the First Coalition required an expanded transport system, which the 
Legislative Assembly achieved when it issued the Code des Charrois et des Services 
Reunis or law of requisitions which set requisition rates, but continued to use contract 
285 A. Pemot, Aper~u Historique sur le Service des Transports Militares, (Paris: Henri 
Charles - Lavauzelle, 1984) 66-67. 
286Thomas Carlyle, History of Frederick II of Prussia. Called Frederick the Great 
(New York: Publisher's Plate Printing Co. Nd) 3:103 and Richard Glover, Peninsular 
Preparation. The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1970) 257-258. 
287The contract transport drivers never went near combat and were always willing to 
abandon their charge at the first whiff of gunpowder. Kenneth, French Armies in the 
Seven Years War, 122-123. 
288Pemot, Transports Militaires, 73, 75-77. 
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transport service.289 It assigned a Commissaire des guerres to each army to manage the 
service des charrois. 290 By 1793 the Ministry of War had established a complete transport 
administration.291 In 1794 the Committee of Public Safety built on the service by ordering 
the construction of 6,000 wagons, and the manufacture of 12,000 harness. It also 
assembled a three member Military Transport Commission, and vehicle parks. 292 
In 1796, General Bonaparte, impressed with the need of a good transport service 
organized a pack mule division, to haul rations, forage, and artillery.293 For the Egyptian 
campaign, he used both naval and land transport, in tandem, which would also be used 
in Catalonia. 294 During the Empire, the French transport system underwent its most 
radical changes as Napoleon, realizing the many faults in a system alternately dependent 
on requisition and contract. Between 1803 and 1807 he created three transport 
289Femot, Transports Militaires, 80-81; Arthur Chuquet Les Guerres de la Revolution, 
Vol. 1, La Premiere Invasion Prussienne (11 Aout - 2 Septembre 1792) 4e Ed. (Paris: 
Plon-Nourrit et Cie., nd) 87; Maurice K. Wise, Requisition in France and Italy. The 
Treatment of National Property and Services, (New York: Columbia University Press: 
1944) 9. Code des charrois et des Services reunis, (Paris: Imprimerie du department de 
la guerre, 1792) 79-80, 85. 
29
°I>emot, Transports Militaires, 82-83; Code des Charrois, 23. 
291Auguste Herlaut, Le Colonel Bouchotte. Ministre de la Guerre en l'An II, (Paris: 
LeGrairie Poisson, {1946}) 58-62. 
292Penot, Transports Militaires, 87-88; Code des Charrois, 114. 
293CN, No. 116, Napoleon to Berthier, 4 April, 1796, 1:122-123, No. 120, Order of 
the Day, 5 April 1796, 1:124; No. 124, Napoleon to Berthier, 7 April 1796, 1:126-127. 
Pemot, Transports Militaires, 97-98. 
294CN, No. 2707, Order, 27 June 1798, 4:180-181. General Baraguey d'Hilliers, 
commanded the Flotilla. Pemot, Transports Militaires, 99. 
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organizations; the Artillery, Engineer, and the Transport Trains or Trains des Equipages 
(26 March 1807). 295 
The regulation of 5 February 1803 provided for two types of military transport, 
the transports a la suite and the transports auxiliaires. The former, also called convois a 
la suite, is the baggage transport for units and headquarters, including all the staff 
parapanalia, such as its administrative papers. A second variety of transport a la suite, 
is the transports directs or convois directs. This is the regular transport, either contract 
or in regular military transport units at the disposal of the Army commander to haul the 
necessaires of war. 296 The second major type of transport is the transports auxiliares or 
equipages auxiliares, the requisitioned transport used to complete various transport tasks 
and to make up for any lack in regular transport. 297 It may be requisitioned directly off 
the populace or on a requisition contract. 
This Corps transport system had its own administration and requisitioned its 
vehicles; and organized them into brigades under the Commissaire-Ordonnateur. First 
used in 1805, the Commissaires-Ordonnateurs organized the brigades from requisitioned 
equipment and men, forcibly conscripted, who were extremely prone to desertion. 298 
295lbid., 106; Lechatier, Services de l'Arriere, 186-188; CN, No. 12078, Order, 18 
March 1807, 14: 469; No. 12, 178, Napoleon to General Dejean, 25, March 1807, 
14:542-543; Georges Courget, "L'Arme du Train de l'Empire a nos Jours (1807-1878)", 
Revue Historigue des Armees No. 3 (special) Le Trains, p. 9. 
296Pemot, Transports Militaires, 109-110. 
297Ibid., 110. 
298Ibid., 111; AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, General Dejean, 
Rapport a l'Empereur, 7 June 1809. 
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Additionally Napoleon employed contract transport service provided by Compagnie 
Breidt. The French requisitioned 4,000 vehicles for this campaign.299 The 1806-07 
campaign brought a turning point to the French transport service. To supplement the 
regimental equipage, the Corps held one vehicle per regiment in its command, under the 
Commissaire des guerres, constituting a pare des vivres to revictual its units. Compagnie 
Breidt meanwhile hauled the bulk of supplies for the Army. 300 
The Corps trains then consisted of two types of transport. First, the equipage 
regular, including ambulances and vehicles to haul the required two days rations. Finally 
the Corps held requisition and other vehicles from Compagnie Breidt attached to the 
headquarters. 301 There is one final variety of regular equipage attached to the Corps 
headquarters, that of the Treasury; the Paymasters' money wagons to carry funds, and 
administrative papers. 302 
Prior to the Prussian war Napoleon went about procuring an enormous number of 
transport vehicles in France and established transport relays from Chalons and Soissons, 
to the Plaine. 303 The Transport system fell into disorder,304 and Napoleon quickly restored 
299CN, No. 9225, Napoleon to Prince Eugene Beauhamais 16 September 1805, 11: 
207-210; Pemot, Transports Militaires, 114. 
300Lerchartier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 93-100. 
301Ibid., 100-101. 
302Ibid., 103. 
303Pemot, Transports Militaires, 118-124. Napoleon calculated that each battalion had 
2,000 rations hauled by two Caissons (Calvary had one Caisson for 1,000 rations). To 
support his army of 210,000 men. Napoleon had 500 vehicles, 2,600 horses, and 1,500 
transport troops, from Compagnie Breidt. CN, No. 10758, Napoleon to Berthier, 10 
September 1806, 13: 163-164. 
267 
order and reorganized the service. After Tilsit, Intendant General Daru wrote to Napoleon 
strongly encouraging the creation of an army equipage train, for Breidt Cie. was 
insufficient to see the army through a military disaster. 305 The Emperor's Conseil 
d'Administration began work on organizing military transport battalions at a cost of over 
a million francs. Lacking this money, Napoleon made do with Breidt Cie. Another major 
transport problem, however, raised its head, in the depreciation of Breidt rolling stock, 
which in the last three months of 1806 virtually ruined French transport. 306 
By Spring 1807, Napoleon came to the conclusion that contract transport was ipso 
facto incapable of handling the severe transport demands of the Grande Armee, and the 
Breidt Cie. in particular, was deficient. The Inspectors, brigade captains and conductors 
were also culpable in the earlier collapse of the transport system through negligence and 
outright cowardice in the field, and Napoleon jailed a number of them.307 
On the wreck of the old service, Napoleon established a new military transport 
system, modeled on the artillery trains. 308 He decreed on 25 March 1807 the creation of 
eight Battalions de Train des Equipages under the Intendance, and administered like the 
304Pemot, Transports Militaires, 131. 
305Lechartier, Services de l'Arriere, 184; Pemot Transports Militaire, 134. 
306Lechartier, Services de l'Arriere, 184-187; Pemot Transports Militaire, 119, 124, 
130; CN No. 12178, Napoleon to General Dejean, 26 March 1807, 14: 542-543; No. 
12078, Order, 18 March 1807, 14:469. 
307CN. No. 12078, Order, 18 March 1807, 14:469. 
308Lechartier, Services de l'Arriere, 188-189. 
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artillery train. 309 An agent with the rank of captain commanded a battalion. The 
companies had 93 men, 161 horses, and 36 vehicles, and artillery forge for maintenance, 
exchange vehicle, tools, and so forth. 310 
3
°9Ibid., 189; Couget, "L'Arme du Train de l'Empire," 11. 
310The standard artillery campaign forge is a two or four wheeled vehicle. It had a 
flat bed with an iron fire box at one end and a large bellows at the other end and boxes 
for tools and coal. Terrence Wise, Artillery Equipments of the Napoleonic Wars, Men 
at Arms Series, Ed. Martin Windrow, (London: Sprey Publishing, 1979) 11-12. Louis de 
Toussard, American Artillerist's Companion or Elements of Artillery Treating of All Kinds 
of Firearms in Detail and of the Formation. Object. and Service of the Flying or Horse 
Artillery. Preceded by an Introductory Dissertation on Cannon , West Point Military 
Library, Ed. T. E. Griess, J. Luvaas, (Philadelphia: C and A Conrad and Co. 1809, reprint 
New York: Greenwood Press 1969) 2:453-454; Pemot, Transports Militaires, 150. 
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The Coips Transport System in Catalonia 
The Corps logistical transport system is a large and complex organization of land 
and sea transport. The former included the regular equipage, or regular transport units, 
and the auxiliary transport that is the headquarters, unit and requisition transport. 311 
Adequate auxiliary transport was always hard to come by in Catalonia. The 
guerrillas consistently interfered with requisitions and the populace took away their horses 
and vehicles. Transport was scarce in this poor country in any case. In December 1808, 
the VII Corps had 200 farm wagons, 600 draft horses and 408 pack mules. By July 1809 
this transport supply was decimated and Ordonnateur en chef Rey noted its scarcity.312 
This was an intractable situation for the French lntendance through the war. In August 
1809, Corps auxiliary transport was organized into eight brigades of 104 men, 52 pack 
mules, 220 draft horses, and 133 requisition vehicles (85 were French).313 Rey correctly 
noted that this was insufficient for Corps requirements but could get nothing more off the 
311 There were five types of unit transport, the small ration train, officer baggage, 
administrative baggage, ambulance and heavy regimental transport trains (equipment, 
clothing, etc.). SHAT, X(s) 76, Projet de Decret Imperial Relatif aux Transports directs 
et a la suite des Troupes, 1 April 1806; Lechartier, Les Services a l'Arriere, 102-103. In 
June 1810, Marshal Mcdonald used general officer pack mules to haul supplies. SHAT, 
C(8) 133, Armee de Catalogne, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, Order of the Day, 23 
June 1810. 
312SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. 
313SHAT, C(19) 7, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, Rapport des Situations, VII Corps, 5 
September 1809. 
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land. 314 Rey consequently applied to the Ministry of Military Administration for 
additional support, then to the Ordonnateur of the 1 Oe Division Militaire for the 
requisioned transport of French Departments, to haul 10,000 qx of flour waiting at 
Perpignan for lack of transport. He required an additional 152 wagons, 303 horses and 
207 mules.315 
By 1810 the Auxiliary transport had deteriated to near non-existence, jeopardizing 
supply movements. The only bright spot was that some French fortresses in Catalonia 
(like Figueras) were assembling vehicles. 316 The situation continued to deteriorate as 
Marshal Augereau desperately attempted to assemble sufficient transport to haul a gigantic 
cache of supplies from Perpignan to Barcelona.317 
Naturally, the French Departmental Prefects bitterly complained of such 
requisitions. The Minister Director, General Dejean, ignored them and ordered the 
requisition. He did realize that this would strip the 1 Oe Division Militaire of available 
transport but the VII Corps' need was overwhelming.318 
3140rdonnateur Rey noted that the Catalan conductors (drivers) deserted at the earliest 
moment leaving their horses and vehicles on the road. Their meager pay to was a 
contributing factor in desertion. Ibid. 
3151bid. 
316SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation VII Corps, 1 January 1810. 
317 AN, AF iv 1184, Bataillions du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 
1809. 
318AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, General Dejean, Rapport a 
l'Empereur, 4 October 1809. 
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This situation deteriorated into the first of several transport crises, as Marshal 
Augereau found to his chagrin. In January 1810, he had accumulated 14,000 qx of 
supplies at Perpignan and found his transport totally inadequate. He needed 100 wagons, 
and could requisition them for the exorbitant price of 6.00 F. per quintal of freight per 
day or for a wagon carrying twelve quintals of freight for 72.00 F./day. The Corps 
deducted 59.00 F. to offset pay and provisions. Total cost was 60,000 F. per month. 
Fortunately, Marshal Augereau's difficulties were in part alleviated by the transfer of two 
train battalions from Germany.319 
The cost of providing auxiliary transport to the Army of Catalonia for 1808 and 
1809 amounted to 578,262 F., of which only 98,100 F. was paid. It was madness to 
expect the Army of Catalonia to pay it. General Lacuee, therefore, urged the Emperor 
to continue his support and even send another train battalion,320 for the present stock of 
requisitioned vehicles were worn out or destroyed in action. Marshal Augereau had to 
make up the loss with artillery caissons. The Army only had 80 vehicles, barely the 
horses to pull them, and six mule brigades. Even the infusion of regular equipage did not 
replace previous losses. Consequently, General Lacuee requisitioned 350 French country 
wagons from the Pyrenees Departments. 321 
319Total cost was 216,000 F. per month. AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Etapes et 
Equipages, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 24 January 1810. 
320SHAT C(8) 41, Napoleon, Decree, 8 February 1810; AN, AFiv 1183, General 
Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur 14 March 1810. 
321 AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur 15 May 1810; AFiv 1183, 
General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 27 June 1810; SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee 
de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
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Marshal Macdonald, when he took command found himself saddled with the same 
intractable transport problem exacerbated by a terrific logistical burden. By June 1810, 
the auxiliary equipage was exhausted and the army desperately needed reinforcement. 
General Lacuee again came to the rescue by requisitioning 328 pack mules and 154 
muleteers from the Pyrenees Departments, over the howls of the Prefects. 322 General 
Lacuee, however, fully grasped the need to send a huge convoy of 10,270 qx of supplies 
to Barcelona. This, however, did not reduce the exasperation of the peasantry "robbed" 
by repeated requisitions and dragooned into service as muleteers.323 In the face of yet 
another requisition, the Prefect of the Pyrenees Orientales bitterly complained about the 
utter lack of transport, and urged the Ministry and Ordonnateur at Perpignan to understand 
that the locals were very disinclined to serve as army drivers only to suffer the dangers 
of Catalan insurgent attack. The possibility of being butchered on the road was hardly 
an incentive, particularly since the round trip from Perpignan to Barcelona took fifteen 
days. It was impossible to obtain the necessary 2,054 vehicles to haul this provender. 
General Lacuee therefore asked for another requisition of 600 pack mules, which by the 
beginning of 1811 would form a pack mule battalion. 324 
In 1811, General Baraguey d'Hilliers' Corps in Upper Catalonia had at its disposal 
a reduced regular transport and an almost non-existent auxiliary transport, particularly for 
322AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 25 July 1810; General 
Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 12 October 1810. 
323The peasants habitually hid their livestock and vehicles. 
324AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 21 October 1810; Rapport 
a l'Empereur, 30 January 1811. 
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the Siege of Figueras. The corps commander in fact limited his transport to hauling siege 
materials.325 General Quesnel du Torpt commanding a small division reinforcing his 
Corps, for example, was almost unable to move for lack of organic auxiliary transport, 
which was all but impossible to obtain off the land. 326 By the end of the siege there was 
only about forty vehicles left in the auxiliary transport park. 327 By this time too the 
Ministry of Military Administration reverted to the old contract system reminiscent of 
Briedt Cie. prior to 1807. Formed at Perpignan, a transport company hauled supplies into 
Catalonia and evacuated the sick and wounded.328 
General Decaen, taking command of the Army in September 1811 exploited the 
private contract transport because his auxiliary transport park nearly ceased to exist.329 
The Army did, however, receive a reinforcement of fifty-two requisitioned country 
wagons from the Ampurdam in November 1811. 330 In Barcelona meanwhile, transport 
there had too reverted to contract work for precisely the same reasons. The Entrepreneur, 
M. Closas, provided a park of eight vehicles for the service of the garrison at a rate of 
1,656 F. per month (6.90 F. per vehicle, per day). 331 His eight wagons (carrying 30 qx 
325SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 16 June 1811. 
326AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee Rapport a l'Empereur 24 April 1811. 
327SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 September 1811. 
328SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 October 1811. 
329SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 November 1811. 
330SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 November 1811. 
331Ration weight laid out by the contract were for a single ration of firewood two 
livres, bread one livre, rice five onces, legumes two onces, and meat eight onces. The 
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mare each)332 were unfortunately not up to the task and he provided another three 
wagons.333 
The Regular Equipage 
The regular transport consisted of the formal military vehicle and pack mule units. 
When Napoleon formed them to replace the contract service of Briedt Company on 26 
March 1807, he organized them into battalions of five companies. The battalion staff had 
a Captain, commanding, assisted by a Lieutenant (adjoint), Sous-Lieutenant Quarter 
Master and several specialist soldiers. The companies had a Sous-Lieutenant commanding 
assisted by a Marechal des Logis Chef, 80 men, 34 transport caissons, forage wagon, 
forge and 159 horses.334 
The battalions were placed under the authority of the Corps Ordonnateur who set 
the overall transportation mission, while an Inspectorate oversaw service administration. 335 
Battalion Conseils d'Administration were like that of an artillery train battalion and the 
whole ration weighed 3 livres, 15 onces per man, per day. The Catalan livre equals I Y2 
mare (12 onces) or .400 kg. The Catalon once equals .033 kg, (33.33 gm). SHAT, C(19) 
7, No. 163, Raymondon, Rapport Mensuel, 10 June 1812; Doursther, Dictionnaire 
Universe!, 218, 221, 368. 
332Thirty quintals mare equals 750 kg., one quintal mare equals 25 kg. Doursther, 
Dictionnaire Universe!, 250; SHAT, C(19) 9, Bureau des Vivres, No. 163, Commissaire 
des guerres Raymondon a General Lacuee, Rapport Mensuel, 10 June 1812. 
333These vehicles included a one horse wagon at 8.00 F./day, a two horse wagon at 
16.00 F./day and a three horse wagon at 24.00 F./day. SHAT, C(19) 9, No. 163, 
Raymondon, Rapport Mensuel 10 June 1812. 
334Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 189. 
335 AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 
1809. 
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Ordonnateur presided over it. The depots too, were organized around the battalion where 
recruits are obtained and equipped, and horses, vehicles, and equipment were maintained. 
In May 1808 there were several train depots, including the ones at Pau and Bayonne were 
for the armies in Spain. 336 The new battalions were equipped with the rickety vehicles 
that belonged to Breidt Company and Gayde Company, the old contractors, but in 1807-
08 the Intendant General of the Grande Armee ordered the manufacture of 1,149 wagons 
with harness, and the procurement of over 5,000 horses. 337 
The VII corps received four pack mule brigades in May 1809338 in response to the 
extraordinary difficulty of procuring auxiliary transport from the very beginning of the 
war. In Upper Catalonia, General Reille's division, using auxiliary transport, sustained 
tremendous losses in insurgent attacks,339 and it became increasingly difficult to procure 
it. Ordonnateur en chef Rey noted this trend in the Ampurdam, that the dwindling 
transport was barely adequate and losses were not replacable. 340 
336Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 195. 
337Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arriere, 195-196. 
338 AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 
1809. 
339General Reille's correspondence is replete with examples of attacks on his convoys. 
SHAT, C(8) 267, Registre de Correspondance du General Reille 4 July 1808 au 13 Mai 
1809. 
340SHAT, C(19) 7, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, Rapport et Situation de VII Corps, 5 
August 1809. 
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Meanwhile, the Ministry of Military Administration reorganized, streamlined and 
increased the equipage battalions, and pack mule brigades. 341 The new transport 
company would be under the command of a Lieutenant with a staff of two Marechaux des 
logis, one fourrier (farrier) and two brigadiers. The company had 80 soldiers, 160 horses, 
and 36 vehicles. 342 
In October 1809, the available VII Corps transport, straining under the burden of 
the siege of Gerona could only muster 48 vehicles, 297 horses, and 201 pack mules.343 
This was clearly insufficient to manage its huge requirements and General Dejean ordered 
for Ordonnateur Rey, a requisition of 152 vehicles, 303 draft horses and 207 pack mules 
from the seven Pyrenees Departments. 344 Prefects complained but Dejean ignored them 
for the VII Corps was in dire straits. 
By January 1810 the crisis deepened in the aftermath of the siege of Gerona. 
General Dejean's only alternative was to hire transport for 72.00 F./day and noted to 
Napoleon that it would be more cost effective to assign an equipage battalion to the VII 
Corps. He suggested transferring to the VII Corps the 2nd, 5th, or 12th Battalions 
341 AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 
1809. 
342AN, AFiv 1184, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 7 June 1809. 
343This is down from 200 farm wagons, 600 horses, and 408 pack mules at the end 
of 1808. AN, AFiv 1183, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 4 October 1809. 
344lbid. 
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currently in Germany. 345 This was particularly important as the VII Corps had already 
spent 578,262 F. on requisitioned transport from France in 1808-09.346 
Napoleon took the advice of General Dejean and his successor General Lacuee and 
in April 1810 ordered the 2e and 5e Bataillons du Train des Equipages to Catalonia. The 
2nd Battalion had 412 men, 632 horses, and 144 vehicles, and the 5th Battalion had 405 
men, 595 horses, and 142 vehicles.347 These battalions would march from Commercy to 
Perpignan by company through August 1810.348 
This was quite a slow movement considering the difficulties of the Army of 
Catalonia. Indeed, General Lacuee was enraged at Major-Inspecteur-General Theuerin 
then residing at Paris under the pretext of illness for not attending to his work, allowing 
this transfer to proceed at a snail's pace. General Lacuee promptly reported this to 
Napoleon in no uncertain terms and disciplined the Inspecteur. 349 
Once they arrived in Catalonia, however, Marshals Augereau and Macdonald 
encountered considerable problems. The 2nd Battalion retired to Perpignan to refit, after 
four months of grueling service on the execrable and guerilla infested Catalan roads that 
345lbid. 
346The Government paid off 98,110 F., leaving an outstanding debt of 480,152 F. 
AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 14 March 1810. 
347See Table 31. AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaire, 
Situation, 15 August 1810. 
348See Table 31. AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur 27 June 1810; 
General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 5 September 1810; UCN, No. 4165, Napoleon to 
General Clarke 17 April 1810, 3:531. 
349AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur 5 September 1810. 
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nearly destroyed it. By October, men and animals were utterly exhausted, the battalion 
numbering only 294 men. The Ordonnateur of the 1 Oe Division Militaire made a horse 
requisition from the Department of Arriege and recovered horses scattered on its march 
to Catalonia from Toulouse to Perpignan. General Lacuee finally withdrew the 2nd 
Battalion to Carcassonne to rest and refit. 350 
Marshal Macdonald, however, desperately needed this battalion to haul the large 
quantities of supplies to Barcelona, and to otherwise support his operations in Lower 
Catalonia. General Lacuee echoed these concerns when he wrote to Napoleon of the 
extraordinary difficulties of the Army of Catalonia. He noted that the drivers and vehicles 
hired (or dragooned) from the French Pyrenees districts were nearly impossible to find 
due to the dangers of service in Catalonia. They showed particular repugnance at having 
to drive vehicles along the Catalan roads, with the danger of death behind every tree. The 
roads themselves were in such a state of disrepair that they beat the wagons to pieces. 
Finally, the 10,270 qx at Perpignan required 2,054 vehicles to haul it. This necessitated 
both the recall of the 2nd Battalion and the request to requisition 600 pack mules.351 
By November 1810, the situation was somewhat alleviated with the arrival of the 
5th Battalion which was near full strength.352 This did not, however, solve Macdonald's 
transport problems, for revictualing Barcelona absorbed all the regular equipage. Even 
350AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, General Lacuee, Rapport a 
l'Empereur, 12 October 1812. UCN, No. 4729, Napoleon to General Lacuee 18 October 
1810, 3:838. 
351 AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 21 October 1810. 
352AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur 14 October 1810. 
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the 5th Battalion was wearing out. It had lost 69 wagons and 50 pack mules in Upper 
Catalonia and desperately requested the 600 mules. 353 
On 24 October Napoleon decided to withdraw the 2nd Battalion from Catalonia 
altogether, despite Marshal Macdonald's transport problems.354 General Baraguey 
d'Hilliers screamed over this loss, complaining to the Ministry that it was impossible to 
haul supplies to Gerona and that operations in Upper Catalonia would probably collapse 
without it. 355 
To compound this problem, insurgent activity virtually brought convoys to 
Barcelona to a halt by October 1810. 356 In 1811, the transport problem became so acute 
that any serious military setback would virtually paralyse the Army of Catalonia. The fall 
of Figueras was a disaster which did exactly that. The siege absorbed all the available 
regular transport, actually halting the movements of reinforcements coming to the aid of 
the Army at Catalonia. General Quesnel's division ground to a halt at Puycerda and could 
neither march nor feed itself without adequate transport and there was none to be had in 
353General Lacuee had noted in his report that he had just received another desperate 
letter from General Baraquey d'Hilliers. AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a 
l'Empereur, 21 November 1810; General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 30 January 1811. 
354AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 28 November 1810. 
355AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 5 December 1810. 
3560man, Peninsular War, 3:498-500. 
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his area. 357 Neither were more prov1s1ons from Perpignan obtainable without an 
immediate infusion of transport. 
By June the ravages of the siege had taken its toll on the 5th Battalion. Only its 
1st and 2nd companies were operational,358 with 20 vehicles capable of hauling 240 metric 
quintals. 359 The 3rd and 4th companies were in Figueras at the time of its fall in April 
and were captured with a loss of 33 wagons.360 This was considerable drop from its 
January strength of 120 vehicles. 361 As early as April, the now withdrawn 2d Battalion 
had meanwhile begun to recall the 200 horses it left behind in Catalonia, stripping 
Macdonald's Army of yet another all too scarce resource and drawing troops from the 9th 
and 12th Battalions to build a new six company 2nd Battalion.362 
357General Baraguey d' Hilliers requested two pack mule companies from a light 
transport battalion at Carcassonne with 92 pack mules each. AN, AFiv 1183, General 
Lacuee, Rapport a l 'Empereur, 24 April 1811. 
358SHAT, C(8) 3 70, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 16 June 1811. The 
countryside in Upper Catalonia was virtually exhausted. 
359 AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires Situation, 15 April 
1811; AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 20 November 1811. 
360AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 15 January, 
1811. 
361 The 5th Battalion numbered in April 405 men, 256 horses, 547 harness, and 181 
wagons in April. See Table 32. AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages 
Militaires, Situation, 1 June 1811 and 15 April 1811. 
362Horses sold for 360.00 F. each. The Battalion required 1,227 horses but only 
required 352 for actual purchase, totaling 126,720 F. Of course it took 200 from 
Catalonia. AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 9 April 1811. The 
whole Battalion would have by July 1811 788 men, 1,227 horses, 1,008 sets of harness, 
and 252 vehicles. AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 24 July 1811. 
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By August the decimated 5th Battalion's only assistance came from two companies 
of the 5th (bis) Battalion du Mulets de Bat,363 and seven requisition vehicles, a few 
horses, and pack mules, through 1811.364 Napoleon continued to withdraw support from 
the Army of Catalonia, regardless of its difficulties. In July 1811 they ordered two 
Departments of the 1 Oe Division Militaire to send 75 draft horses and 90 pack mules to 
the Army of Spain,365 adding, from Marshal Macdonald's and General Baraguey d'Hilliers' 
viewpoint, insult to injury. 
In November, Napoleon ordered the Se (bis) Battalion du Mulets de Bat and the 
Se (ppl) Bataillon du Train des Equipages Militaires to merge into a single battalion. This 
would help re-equip the now combat ineffective Se (ppl) Bataillon with only 21 vehicles 
and not a single horse. The battalion would expand to six companies with 800 men, 376 
draft horses and harness (plus 90 saddle horses), 84 vehicles, and 600 pack mules with 
harness. 366 
This new and more flexible battalion served the remainder of the war in Catalonia. 
When the Armies of Aragon and Catalonia combined in late 1813, it had the 5th and 11th 
363SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d' Armee en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811; 
AN, AFiv 1184 Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 1 June 1811. 
364SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 15 September 1811; Situation, 
Armee de Catalogne, 1October1811; Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 November 1811; 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee 
de Catalogne, 1 November 1811. 
365The new concentration at Bayonne amounted to 742 horses, 1,350 pack mules, 364 
sets of harness, and 1,088 troops. The 11 e Division Militaire even had a vehicle park 
with 81 Caissons. AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur 24 July 1811. 
366Animals would cost 219,300 F. with 418 horses at 450 F. and 60 mules at 520 F. 
each. AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 20 November 1811. 
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Train Battalions nearly at full strength in January 1814. Together they had 1,328 men, 
850 horses, 166 wagons and 247 pack mules.367 
The end of the war, Marshal Suchet's retirement to the French frontier and the 
invasion of France forced Napoleon to do a massive withdrawal of these transport assets 
from the Army of Aragon and Catalonia, till they were a mere shadow of their former 
strength numbering 244 men and 155 horses in January and 94 men and 122 horses by 
May 1814.368 
Pack Mule Transportation 
Catalonia was one of the most forbidding areas of Spain to haul goods. It's road 
were execrarble and there was only one main good road from Perpignan to Barcelona.369 
This demanded light transportation and the mule answered the charge. The Spanish 
regularly used them to haul commercial goods and there were 250,000 mules in Spain by 
1797.370 
367Complete strength would be 1,376 men, 1,118 horses, 600 mules, and 144 vehicles. 
The 5e Battalion numbered 943 men out of 991, had 407 horses out of 447, 247 pack 
mules out of 500 and 85 vehicles. AN, AFiv 1184 Situation des Bataillons du Train des 
Equipages Militaires et Brigades de Mulets de Bat, 1 January 1814. See Table 31. 
368See Table 31, SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, l'Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 
January 1814; Situation, l'Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814. 
3690man, Peninsular War, 1:303-305. 
37
°Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain, 130; Young, Travels, 2:311. 
Femand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism. 15th - 18th Century, Vol. 1, The Structures 
of Everyday Life, Tns, Sian Reynolds. (New York: Harper & Row, Perennial Library; 
1981) 341-342. 
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Wellington used them throughout the war,371 able to haul 200 lbs. per animal,372 
and had some 4,000 mules in the army,373 purchased for £18 - £25.374 The French 
command too, used pack mule transport from the beginning of the war. 375 General Reille 
used them extensively during his operations in Upper Catalonia in the latter half of 
1808,376 particularly to support General Duhesme's abortive second siege of Gerona.377 
General Gouvion Saint-Cyr made particularly good use of pack mules during his 
daring mountain march to relieve Barcelona after the fall of Rosas in December 1808, 
with which to haul his reserve ammunition (150,000 rds). 378 Since 1808, the Ministry 
371 Wellington, Dispatches, General Order, 8 August 1808, 3:57-58; General Order, 13 
August 1808, 3:73; General Order, 1 June 1809, 3:267; The adjutant General to Lt. 
Colonel Arentschildt, 1st Hussans, 19 G. L. 16 June 1809, 3: 299; General Order, 19 June 
1809, 3:307. 
372lbid., Wellington To Commissary General, J. Murray, 30 June 1801; General Order, 
4 July 1809, 3:343-344. 
373lbid., Wellington to the British Ambassador to the Court of Spain, 8 August 1809. 
374lbid., Wellington to Commissary General J. Murray, 7 September 1809; 3 :481-482; 
Wellington to Vice Admiral G. Berkeley, 23 September 1809, 3:518; Wellington to G. 
Berkeley, 28 September, 1809, 3:527; General Order, (AGO), 13 December 1809, 3:645; 
Wellington to Vice Admiral G. Berkeley, 22 January 1810, 3:690; Wellington to 
Lieutenant General Hill, 5 March 1810, 3:765; Wellington to the British Army 
Commander in Chief, 28 September, 1809, 3:528-530; Wellington to Brigadier General 
R. Craufund, 29 September 1809, 3:530-531. 
375SHAT, Anon., Journal Detaille des Mouvements de l'Armee Fran~aise en Catalogne, 
Depuis le Mois de Juin 1808, jusqu'en 1810, 7. 
376SHAT C(8) 267, Registre de Corresondance du General Reille, Reille to Marshal 
Berthier, 13 July 1808; Reille to Berthier, 27 July 1808. 
377lbid., Reille to Berthier, 4 August 1808. 
378Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 56; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencig, 
3:354-356; Oman, Peninsular War, 2:60-61; Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:445-449; 
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requisitioned from the French Pyrenees Departments, pack mules (mulets de bat) for the 
transport of the VII Corps. 379 
The Ministry organized them into brigades 'auxiliary' to the regular train units. 380 
Initially there were ten pack mule brigades each with 54 conductors and 102 mules, 
totalling 540 conductors and 1,020 mules. He strongly recommended that these units use 
conscripts at .50 F./diem as opposed to 1.50/diem, a 66% savings on a 8,100 F./month 
pay expenditure as opposed to 24,300 F./month.381 
General Dejean expectedly recommended to Napoleon the purchase of the 1,020 
pack mules at 280 F. each for 285,600 F. instead of hiring for 61,200 F./month which 
would pay for them in a little over four months.382 The mules came from the Pyrenees 
Departments and the Brigades du Bat would consist of an officer, seven non-
commissioned officers, 70 soldiers, a trumpeter, harness maker, two farriers, 120 pack 
Vacani, Storia, 1:249-250 and 2:256-257; Arteche y Moro, Guerra de la Independenci~ 
4:257-260. 
379 AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Etapes, General Dejean, 
Rapport a l'Empereur, 8 February 1809. 
380AN, AFiv 1183, Inspection des Brigades de Mulets de Bat, lnspecteur Bandesson 
to Ministre Directeur General Dejean, 12 January 1809; Inspecteur Bandesson, Rapport, 
9 January 1809. 
381This was a daily wage of 270 F. to 810 F. AN, AFiv 1183 Administration de la 
Guerre, Bureau des Etapes, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 8 February 1809. An 
initial report by Inspecteur Bandesson, investigating this case strongly recommended the 
purchase of the required 600 mules at 250 F. a head at 150,000 F. (reimbursed to the 
Departments) as opposed to hiring them at 730 F./annum, totaling 438,000 F. for these 
mules. 
382The yearly hire rate for these mules was 734,400 F. to hire. Ibid. 
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mules and nine saddle horses. 383 These brigades were to be under the operational control 
of the train battalions, though they were separate units. 384 Napoleon, however, declined 
to organize these pack mule units, in favor of a separate unit and the train battalions 
would only provide administrative support, such as pay, clothing, weapons, masses 
' 
discipline, and service administration. 385 These units were finally organized in early 1809 
into nineteen brigades, of which twelve were assigned to Spain and four, the l 6e, l 7e, 
l 8e, and l 9e Brigades de Mulets de Bat to the VII Corps in May 1809 totaling 173 men 
and 337 pack mules386 averaging 43 men and 84 mules.387 
By August the brigades only had 116 men and 205 mules between388 showing a 
manpower loss of 33% and mules of 40%. From 1810 to 1811 the attrition continued 
with frightening rapidity due to enemy action, wear and tear and cannibalizing of men and 
mules by the two Batailons du Train to replace their own losses. 389 
383See Table 35; Ibid., Minute de Decret Imperial, Projet de Decret portant Creation 
of Organization de Compagnies de Mulets de Bat, nd, (8 February 1809). 
384AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 
1809. AN, AFiv 1183, Minute de Decret Imperial. 
385Ibid. 
386See Table 36, AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, 
Situation 30 May 1809. 
387See Table 34; Ibid. 
388See Table 34; SHAT, C(8) 362, VII Corps, Rapport de la Situation, Mouvements 
et Emplacement du Corps d' Armee pendant le Mois d'Aout 1809, Ordonnateur en Chef 
Rey, 5 September 1809. 
389See Table 34, AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillion du Train des Equipages Militaire, 
Situation 15 June 1810. AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaire, 
Situation, 15 April 1811. 
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These strength shortfalls particularly in mules was due to the enormous 
expenditures for transportation in Spain. 390 The expenses for purchasing remounts were 
enormous. The Ministry of Military Administration from 1808 to March 1809 already 
bought 31, 709 horses, and Napoleon was disinclined to continue at this level of 
purchases. 391 An added expense then was the purchase of additional pack mules for the 
decimated brigades VII Corps, which had by October 1809 only 201 mules. 392 General 
Dejean consequently requested of the Emperor to purchase 207 pack mules from the 
Pyrenees Departments393 to bring the Corps transport back up to operational strength. 
Even General Clarke requested the purchase of 400 draft mules for Spain but Napoleon 
stubbornly refused to purchase them. 394 
390AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre Bureau des Etapes, Convois, 
Transports d'Equipages militaires, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur 14 March 1810. 
391 AN, AFiv 1181, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau de Forages et Remontes, Chef 
de Bureau Beaumet, Etat de l'Effectif en Hommes et en Chevaux au ler Aout 1808; 13 
August 1808; Chef de Bureau de Forages et Remontes, Beaumet, Etat de l'Effectif en 
Chevaux de Troupe, 14 March 1809. 
392The VII Corps also had 600 draft horses and 200 farm vehicles which attributed 
down to 297 horses and 48 vehicles. AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, 
Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, General Dejean, Rapport a l'Empereur, 4 October 1809. 
3931ncluding 152 vehicles and 303 horses. Ibid. 
394AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, General Dejean, Rapport a 
l'Empereur, 24 January 1810. Napoleon writes to General Clarke: "I shall buy no mules 
this year; I have had expenses enough." UCN, No. 3951, Decision, 21 January 1810, 
3:421-422. No. 4023, Extract from Minutes of the Session of the Council of War 
Administration held by His Majesty, 14 February 1810; 3:458. 
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In the Army of Catalonia the mule brigades continued to decrease from 337 to 
126, while manpower fell from 173 to 120 muleteers. 395 These dire losses would destroy 
them. General Lacuee consequently requested the purchase of 250 horses or mules for 
the Army of Catalonia. Napoleon again refused on the grounds that "The War 
Administration should have in Poitou more [mules] than it knows what to do with. "396 
This was particularly true since there was a recently purchased shipment of 1,600 mules 
at Potiers for the Army of Spain. 397 
This administrative 'wrangle' between General Lacuee and Napoleon was of no 
help to the Army at Catalonia. Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon, clearly saw that this was 
an exercise in futility, and he took the bull by the horns and requisitioned from five 
Pyrenees Departments in the 9e, 1 Oe, and 11 e Divisions Militaires398 154 muleteers and 
328 pack mules to make up previous losses.399 The Prefects complained to General 
395AN, AFiv 1183, Bataillon du Train, Situation, 15 June 1810. See Table 34. 
396UCN, No. 4242, Decision, 19 May 1810, 3:572. Quite a stinging rebuke from 
Napoleon. 
397General Lacuee requested Napoleon's authorization for the harness purchased for 
these mules. He forwarded this action informally and requested that Napoleon overlook 
this. The Emperor replied: "This visa must be supplemented by an equivalent bill it is 
important not to omit so necessary a formality, especially when so large a number of 
mules is in question." 
UCN, No. 4433, Decision 19 July 1810, 3:661-662. 
398Jones, The Longman Companion to the French Revolution, 224-229. 
399See Table 34; This was in fact a feat on Ordonnateur Boudons part for mules and 
muleteers were always scarce in the French Pyrenees, as the English Traveler Henry 
Swinburne found on his way form Perpignan to Barcelona in 1775: "There was such a 
scarcity of mules that we were forced to comply with ... exorbitant demands ... for ten 
horses ... " Henry Swinburne, Travels Through Spain in the Years 1775 and 1776: in 
which several monuments of Roman and Mourish architecture are illustrated by accurate 
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Lacuee that the supply of mules and muleteers was exhausted and that to squeeze more 
men and animals out of them would severely injure agriculture, already in dire need of 
transport. Since harvest was near, their loss would be doubly crippling. Additionally, the 
Prefects chaffed at receiving such requisition orders from an army Ordonnateur, for they 
were Imperial Prefects and answered to the French Ministries and the Emperor, not to 
army commands. In any case, General Lacuee looked favorably on Ordonnateur 
Bourdon's requisition action and requested Napoleon's approval. 400 Requisitions from 
France were particularly necessary since they were nearly impossible in Catalonia,401 due 
to over requisitioning by both adversaries. 402 The VII Corps auxiliary transport, for 
example, obtained off of the land one auxiliary brigade with 42 draft mules.403 
horses ... " Henry Swinburne, Travels Through Spain in the Years 1775 and 1776; in 
which several monuments of Roman and Mourish architecture are illustrated by accurate 
drawings on the spot, 2d. Ed, 2 vols. (London: P. Elmsly, 1787) 1 :4. 
400AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Etapes, Transports, 
Convois et Equipages Militaires, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 25 July 1810. 
401 AN, AFiv 1183, VII Corps, Letter No. 1232, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey to Marshal 
Augereau, 3 December 1809. 
402SHAT, C(8) 35, Ministere de la Guerre, Bureau du Genie, General Clarke, Rapport 
a l'Empereur, 29 October 1809; Armee d'Espagne, 7e Corps, Siege de Gironne, Rapport 
General du Genie sur le Siege de Gironne, General Comte Sanson, 20 September 1809; 
AN, AFiv 1621 Plaq 3 (III), Armee d'Espagne, Siege de Gironne, Rapport de l'Artillerie 
et du Genie, 1 September, 1809, General Taviel and Chef de Bataillon Paris, Rapport, 4 
September 1809; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations de l'Armee de Catalogne, 
224-226, 241-244; Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:583-589, 594-595, General Verdier, 
Rapport a General Clarke, 3 September 1809, 718-722; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:42-45; 
Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:284-286. 0. Espanet, Notes on the Supply of an 
Army During Active Operations, Tns., H.F. Kendall and H.G. Sharpe (Kansas City, MO: 
Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co. 1899) 100. 
403SHAT, C(8) 362, VII Corps, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, Rapport sur la Situation du 
7e Corps d'Armee d'Espagne, 5 September 1809. 
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By late 1810, the mule and muleteer shortage became critical, particularly as 
Marshal Macdonald needed to haul 10,270 metric quintals of provender from Perpignan 
to Barcelona. The French voituriers404 (carters) from the Pyrenees Orientales refused to 
haul freight into Catalonia for fear of insurgent attack, for any price. Indeed, the Prefect 
stated that it was impossible to hire any who would not abandon their vehicles after the 
first days of the march, taking the horses back to France; even if sufficient numbers were 
obtainable. He noted that the ravages of the insurgents in the French Cerdagne were 
infamous, where they murdered, looted, and terrorized the country.405 
To enable Marshal Macdonald to haul these supplies Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon 
requested that General Lacuee purchase 600 pack mules without which they could not 
haul critical supplies to Barcelona. 406 General Lacuee reported his urgent request to 
Napoleon thrice,407 but the Emperor held firm on his prohibition to buy mules. General 
Lacuee it seems, could go no further with the Emperor. 
When the convoy arrived at Figueres, General Baraguey d'Hilliers, wrote two 
dispatches to General Lacuee, stating that he could move no further. It was impossible 
to hire mules or muleteers from Perpignan. Furthermore the lack of good fodder, 
404A voiturier is a wagoner, driver, carter or carrier who hauls freight. Swinburne, 
Travels 1 :4. 
405AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, 
General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 21 October 1810. 
406Ibid. 
407AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, 
General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 28 October 181 O; General Lacuee; Rapport a 
l'Empereur, 21 November 1810. 
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exhaustion, and sickness had decimated his two equipage battalions. There were only 50 
pack mules left which could stand field service, and they could only haul 50 quintals. 408 
Finally, the condition of the late autumn roads was a nightmare. 409 He correctly held that 
the only resources to haul these supplies under these near impossible circumstances was 
the requested 600 pack mules. General Lacuee was so adamant in his report to Napoleon, 
that he wrote a post script quoting two very desperate dispatches from Baraguey 
d'Hilliers, arguing for the fourth and fifth times the absolute necessity for more mules. 410 
Under the weighty arguments of Generals Lacuee and Baraguey d'Hilliers411 
Napoleon acquiesced to the purchase of the pack mules, in January 1811, a full year since 
General Lacuee began requesting them. He purchased 500 at Carcassonne for delivery 
on 1 April 1811 and the other hundred for delivery on 15 April. 
On delivery, General Lacuee drafted muleteers and formed a new battalion. The 
dangers of Catalonia were well known throughout the Pyrenees and the temptation to 
408The two Equipage battalions only mustered 69 horsed wagons. Ibid. 
409Swinbume, Travels, 1:4; AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur 
21 November 1810. 
41
°Ibid. 
411 General Comte Baraguey d'Hilliers had a sterling reputation from his successful 
conduct of the counterinsurgent operations in the Tyrol against Andraes Hofer had gained 
him an excellent reputation with Napoleon; Six, Dictionnaire, 1:49; F. Gunther Eyck, 
Loyal Rebels, Andreas Hofer and the Tyrolean uprising of 1809 (Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1986) 75. 
291 
desert with mules in hand must have been near overwhelming. This demanded the 
strictest discipline, rapid and orderly movements and the most efficient administration.412 
This new Bataillon Leger des Equipages Militaires was composed of a battalion 
headquarters staff, six companies and a depot, the whole with ten officers, 56 
noncommissioned officers, 306 soldier muleteers, eighteen workers, 68 saddle horses and 
552 pack mules, or 92 mules per company (390 men and 620 animals). 413 The depot, 
built on the single battalion regiment model was specially geared as a veterinary 
'hospital'414 and depot, a maintenance depot for the repair and maintenance of harness and 
equipment and the center for unit administration. 415 General Lacuee recommended to the 
Emperor special personnel arrangements due to the unique circumstances of the Catalan 
theater. The battalion officers and NCOs should come from the French train battalions. 
The 5e Bataillon des Equipages had a overage in personnel due to earlier losses, and 
Lacuee ordered these men obtained by conscription from mule districts (Pyrenees). 
Finally, he had the mule battalion partly integrated into the 5e battalion des Equipages for 
unit administration maintenance.416 
412General Lacuee states "que ce mode assure plus de surveillance, plus d'ordre plus 
de celeaite dans les mouvemenst, plus de regularite et d'economie dans I' Administration." 
AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, General 
Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 30 January 1811. 
413See Table 34; Ibid. 
414This was not a centralized veterinary hospital as with the AEF in WWI, Louis 
Merillat and Del win Campbell, Veterinary Military History of the United States, (Kansas 
City, MO: The Harver-Glover Laboratories, 1935) 2:799-801, 807-809, 812-823. 
415 AN, AF iv 1183 General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 30 January 1811. 
416Ibid. 
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The mules were quite expensive. The 58 horses cost 360 F. each or 24,480 F. 
while its 552 mules cost 550 F. each at 303,500 F.417 Napoleon had already spent an 
enormous sum on remount horses. In June 1811 Napoleon had purchased 16,162 cavalry 
and artillery remounts418 for 7,272,900 F. The thirteen transportation battalions by 1811 
had 4,686 horses419 at a value of 2,108,700 F. and the fifteen pack mule brigades (1810) 
had 1,158 mules420 at an invested value of 602,160 F. This expenditure of some ten 
million francs of which some eight million is annual expense amounted to 1.3% of the 
French war budget.421 There is no wonder that Napoleon was reticent at further purchases 
unless the desperation of the requirement demanded them, as in Catalonia 1810-11 for 
which the Ministry formed a whole battalion at great but justifiable cost. 
In April 1811 the four original Pack Mule Brigades ( l 6e, 17 e, l 8e, l 9e) continued 
their rapid decay from brutal overuse and exhaustion to 80 men and 77 mules, a total loss 
of 53.8% from 1809 in men and for mules of 77.2%.422 The Pack Mule Battalion had not 
been completely organized by April when Marshal Macdonald befell a catastrophe with 
417AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee Rapport a l'Empereur 30 January 1811 and 
Administration de la Guerre, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 9 April 1811. 
418AN, AFiv 1181, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau de Remontes et Forages, 
Situation des Remounts, 20 June 1811. 
419 AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 15 January 
1811. 
420AN, AFiv 1183, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaiers, Situation 15 June 
1810. 
421Figure calculated on the budget of 1811; Lacroix and Dupreux Le Napoleon, 165. 
422See Tables 34, 35 and 36; AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages 
Militaires, Situation, 15 April 1811; and Situation, 30 May 1809. 
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the sudden capture of Figueres on 9 April 1811. 423 This disaster forced Napoleon to 
reinforce Baraquey d'Hilliers Corps in Upper Catalonia with General Plauzonne's, and 
rush in General Quesnel du Trupt's Division de la Cerdagne already assigned to 
Catalonia, 424 and provide two companies of the Pack Mule Battalion, which he had 
organized with such pain and care, was essential to the operations of the Army of 
Catalonia temporarily to move the division into the theater. 425 
The organization of the Bataillon Leger des Equipages Militaires, called the 5e 
Bataillon (bis) du Train des Equipages Militaires certainly alleviated some of Marshal 
Macdonald's and General Decaen's transport problems, but it and the other units had 
meanwhile continued to suffer great losses requiring replacements and remounts, 
particularly with mules for the regular transport battalions being refitted into the 11 e 
Division Militaire, requiring 600 horses and 1,350 mules from the lOe, I le, 12e, 20e, and 
21 e Divisions Militaire. 426 
423Guillot's garrison was 1,593 men in March 1811. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, 
Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 15 March 1811; Oman, Peninsular War, 4:491-494. 
424CN, No. 17644 Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 April 1811, 22:103; No. 17665, 
Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 April 1811, 22:103; No. 17665, Napoleon to General 
Clarke, 28 April 1811, 22:118. 
425SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne 15 March 1811. 
The division's battalions were scattered on the Pyrenees frontier of the Pyrenees 
Orientales. AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, General Lacuee, Rapport a 
l'Empereur, 24 April 1811. 
426See Table 32. AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Etapes, 
Convois, Transports et Equipages Militaires General Lacuee, Rapport a l'E.mpereur, 24 
July 1811. 
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§7. The Convoy System and Catalan Insurgency 
The hallmark of the Peninsular War was it's ruthless insurgent operations. In 
Catalonia these took on a more vicious and regularized form. The Catalan military force 
was divided into two: the regular army and the insurgents. The regular Catalan army 
was grafted off of the old royal army, specifically the five regiments, of Estramadura, 
Ultonia, Borbon, Colonel Wimpfen's Swiss and the Spanish and Walloon Guards, about 
6,000 troops. 427 At the beginning of the rebellion in June 1808, these units went over to 
the insurgents, to form the cadre of the insurgent or Catalan Army. The mercenary units 
however embraced the insurgents with particular trepidation. Wimpfen's Swiss Regiment, 
the Spanish and Walloon Guards and a cavalry regiment in Barcelona remained loyal to 
the Catalan Captain General, Lieutenant General Count Ezpeleta, who was by treaty allied 
to the French corps commander occupying Barcelona, General Duhesme. 428 
Soon after the beginning of the insurrection in May, 1808, Spanish troops began to desert 
in small bodies. General Duhesme, uneasy about a possible organized uprising in 
Barcelona backed by the army, delighted at the desertions and turned a blind eye to them, 
even when the Borbon Regiment deserted in toto, "with trumpets blaring and flags 
flying". 429 These deserters scattered throughout Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia to join 
4270man, Peninsular War, 1:303; Napier, Peninsula War, 1:90. 
4280man, Peninsular War, 1:303-307, Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogue, 44-45. 
429 AN, AFiv 1621, Plaq 1, General Duhesme, Resume des Operations Militaires, 
Corps d'Armee des Pyrenees Orientales; Guillaume-Philibert Duhesme, Memoires de 
Duhesme. de Vaughan. de D. Maria Ric. et de Contreras; Collection Complimentaire des 
Memoires Relatifs a La Revolution Fran~ais, Tome III, (Paris: Chez G. L. Michaud, 1823) 
15-19; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:307-308; Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne. 75-76, 136 
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newly forming insurgent bands and intact units formed the nucleus of the provincial 
army.430 In July, General Vivres, Captain General of the Balearic Isles, sent his garrison 
of eight regiments, about 10,000 men, to Spain under General Del Palacio. Some 5,000 
of these went to Catalonia. 431 
By July, the "period of patriotic anarchy"432 ended as regular military units 
congealed into an army under General Del Palacio, elected the new Captain General of 
Catalonia by the non-Provincial Junta. 433 The other portion of the Catalan forces were the 
insurgents which rose virtually overnight in a patriotic frenzy to combat the French, and 
nowhere was the insurgent movement so ferocious or successful as in Catalonia. Even 
General Clarke, Minister of War, remarked to Napoleon on the intensity of Spanish 
resistance. 434 
The Catalan insurgent movement was composed of two groups, the Miguelets and 
Sometenes. The Miguelets were a leve en masse of the military age males first used by 
Laffaille, Memoires 24-26; and Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 2:98-100. 
4300man, Peninsular War, 1:308. 
431These regiments were the Regiments of Grenada, Soria, Bourbon, Swiss Regiment 
of Beschard, Light Infantry of Barcelona, No. 2, Light Infantry of Aragon No. 2, Militia 
Battalion of Majorca, 6th Hussans (Husares Espafioles) and Artillery. Oman, Peninsular 
War 1:323-324. 
4320man, Peninsular War, 322. 
4330man, Peninsular War, 1:327; Arteche, Guerra de la Independenci!!, 2:622. 
434General Clarke said "On peut regarder en general tous les habitants de ces 
provinces comme autant d'ennemis du nom fran9ais." AN, AFiv 1618, LS, General 
Clarke to Napoleon, 20 June 1809; Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 101. 
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Phillipe V during the war of the Spanish Succession. 435 They were called out in battalions 
called Tercios of 1,000 men and formed light infantry, cavalry and auxiliary artillery. 
They were also brigaded with line troops as companies in a single regiment436 The 
second insurgent groups was the Sometenes, or local militia, which turned out when the 
Someten or Toscan sounded. They served with distinction in the Peninsular campaigns 
of 1793-95. Catalonia then more than any other Spanish province was prepared, if 
anything by temperament to offer ruthless resistance to the French invasion.437 
The Catalan commanders, regular and irregular, were not drawn from the irregular 
ranks,438 but from the regular army. General Vivres, Governor of the Balearic Isles, 
became the first Captain-General of Catalonia. Aged and incompetent, he masterminded 
the first blockade of Barcelona and the defeat at Cardadeau. His best field commander 
was the talented but inexperienced and unlucky, General Theodore Reding, lately the 
commander of the 1st Division at Baylen. An excellent field commander, he commanded 
at the Battle of Cardadeau and was killed at Valls in 1809. 
The commander of Gerona during its long resistance of three sieges was General 
Mariano Alvarez de Castro. He is arguably the best single commander of the war, and 
certainly one of the two best. He was a veteran of the war of 1793-95 and commander 
of the Citadel of Barcelona when General Duhesme took it by ruse in 1808. Personally 
435They are named after the Catalan Condottiere Miquelot de Prats's light infantry 
called Almogavares, which was renamed Miquelets. Oman, Peninsular War, 1:306. 
436Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 102-103. 
4370man, Peninsular War, 1:306. 
438Like Francesso Espoz y Mina or the Empiconado. 
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he was a "severe, taciturn man of a puritan state of mind. "439 He took extraordinary care 
to assure the viable defense of Gerona and conducted it with a discipline sorely missed 
at Sarragossa, and an elan and skill that stymied Generals Duhesme, Gouvion Saint-Cyr 
and Verdier for months and held down one and a half corps. Even his enemy, General 
Fournas, admitted, "His soul was great, able to make any sacrifice, full of admirable 
constancy ... "440 
One regiment of the garrison at Gerona, the Ultonia Regiment or the Regiment of 
Ulster, filled with Irish and some English "Wild Geese" gave to the resistance several 
Irish commanders of note. Among these were General Henry O'Donnel, the best guerilla 
leader of the Catalan war. Henry O'Donnel was a bold, sagacious and energetic 
commander, and possessed the greatest native talent of any commander of the war. He 
grasped the nature and essential uses of insurgent forces and also understood that it was 
only with regular forces that they could win the war. 441 His northern raid which destroyed 
an entire French brigade after a dangerous march around superior French forces was as 
daring and successful as Saint-Cyr's action at Cardadeau. This action in September 1810 
virtually ruined Macdonald's operations in Lower Catalonia. 442 
Lesser lights included General Rovira, the captor of Figueras in 1811, General 
Sarsfield, a wheelhorse of the insurgent movement, and General Luis Lacy, the hated but 
4390man, Peninsular War, 2:22. 
440Artech, Guerra de la Independencia. 5:458. 
441 0man, Peninsular War, 3:317. Wild Geese were the Irish Jacobites who went over 
to the continent on the abdication of James II in 1688 and later. 
442Ibid., 3 :496-500. 
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ever active Captain-General, who dominated the war after 1812, and masterminded several 
terrorist coups including the poisoning of the Barcelona garrison and the infernal machine 
which blew in the fortifications at Lerida. Finally there was Baron Eroles who made 
destructive raids into France across the Pyrenees and the regular/insurgent leaders Don 
Juan Claros and Baron Milans who continuously attacked the French, keeping them 
forever off balance. The insurgent operations in Catalonia took on a size and ferocity 
which even by 20th Century standards are astounding, and the insurgents displayed a 
characteristic aggressiveness and talent from the very beginning of the war. 
On 4 June 1808, General Duhesme sent the untalented and ever unlucky General 
de Brigade Francois-Xavier, Baron Schwartz (1762-1826) commander of his 2nd Cavalry 
Brigade, with a brigade,443 on a punitive expedition to Manresa to punish the rebellion 
there, levy a fine of 750,000 F. and destroy its powder mill. He would then move on to 
Lerida and subdue and garrison that town, then march on to Sarragossa. 444 An impossibly 
tall order in reality. 
General Schwartz left Barcelona on 4 June, and at the Bruch pass on the road to 
Manresa, he met serious opposition on 6 June. A body of several hundred Sometenes 
barred his way but Schwartz took a battalion pushed them aside and went on, to Manresa, 
443Schwartz's brigade consisted of 3e-2e Swiss (580 men) ler, 2e-ler Ligne 
Napolitaine, (1,944), ler-ler Velties Italian (519) and 3e Prov. Cuirassiers (204) the whole 
five battalions and squadron totaled 3,247 men. Oman, Peninsular War, 1:304 and 
Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia. 2:86. 
444AN, AFiv 1621, Plaq 1, Resume des Operations Militaires; Oman, Peninsular War, 
1:310; Laffaille Memoires, 27; Lopez, Guerra de la Independenci!!, 2: 101; Arteche, Guerra 
de la Independenci!!, 2:85; CN, No. 14028, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 30 May 1808, 
17:241-242, No. 14029, Napoleon to Marshal Murat, 30 May 1808, 17:242-244. 
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as the Sometenes retreated towards Manresa rece1vmg reinforcements from other 
insurgents and regulars. The insurgents barred the route again. General Schwartz threw 
out his tirailleurs beginning a furious fire fight. Soon, more Catalan reinforcements 
arrived and joined the fray. His Neapolitan infantry, some of the worst in Europe made 
no headway, then wavered, on the verge of collapse. He abandoned the expedition, a mere 
12 miles from Manresa and decided to return to Barcelona. 
Schwartz withdrew, forming his brigade into a huge square reminiscent of 
Napoleon's, at the Battle of the Pyramids. He put his cavalry and artillery in the center 
and began a laborious retreat to Barcelona, covered by his tirailleurs and harassed the 
whole way by clouds of Sometenes. Having marched six miles, the village Esparraguera 
lay in their path, barricaded by armed inhabitants, who opened a hot, small arms fire on 
the front of the square. Schwartz's troops, already demoralized by the galling Sometene 
attacks began to waver, and break ranks. To prevent a disaster he broke his square in 
two and went round the sides of the village. On the far side of the village his troops 
were completely disordered and fled headlong into Martonrel to regroup, then back to 
Barcelona. 445 
445AN, AFiv 1621, Plaq 1, General Duhesme, Resume des Operations Militaires; 
SHAT C(8) 10, Resume; Duhesme, Memoires, 12; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:310-311; 
Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, 2:85-95; Napier, Peninsular War, 1 :47-48; Laffaille, 
Memoires, 28-29; General Foy, Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule sous Napoleon 
(Paris: Baudouin Freres, 1827) 4:141-142; Vacani, Storia delle Campagne, 1:374-376; 
Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 2: 101-102; Francisco Xavier Cabanes, Historia de las 
Operaciones del Exercito de Catalona de la Guerra de Usurpation. Campana Primer!!, 
(Barcelona 1815), 24-26; David Gates, The Spanish Ulcer. A Histoiy of the Peninsular 
War, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1986) 59; Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 
75-79. 
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This initial action, was indicative of the scale of the irregular war in Catalonia. 
It was also ferociously brutal, as General Reille found to his chagrin in the Ampurdam 
in 1808. His reinforcing division of 8,3 70 troops446 began arriving piecemeal in July. If 
many of Duhesme's troops were poor, Reille's were completely green with only a 
sprinkling of good men. 
Reille got to witness the insurgent war at its worst in the latter half of 1808. He 
entered Catalonia at the head of 1,600 troops. He swept aside some Sometenes, and 
dashed on to Figueras. 447 He went on to Rosas, defended by Don Juan Claros, at the head 
of a guerilla band. This intrepid leader was a retired Captain who called the peasantry 
to arms in Upper Catalonia. Claros' band fought Reille's attack off and the French retired 
as a British ship hove to and began to land marines to stiffen the defense. Reille cut his 
way back to Figueras pursued the whole way by Sometenes which inflicted some 200 
casualties on the French.448 
The Sometene bands in Upper Catalonia kept up a continuous ruthless guerilla war 
against Reille regularly operating by the hundreds and often by the thousands. They 
446This division included the 113e Ligne (Tuscan) (1,300), Garde National, Pyrenees-
Orientales (560) ler Bataillon Provisoire de Perpignan (840), 2e Bataillon Provisoire (840) 
Mixed battalion of troops from the 16e and 32e Ligne and 2e Suisse (1,100); Mixed 
battalion of the 7e and 93e Ligne (840); Mixed battalion of the 2e, 56e, and 37e Ligne 
(840); 5e Legion de Reserve, Genoble (500) Bataillon Valaison (Valais) (1,800); Two 
squadrons, Tuscan Dragons (250); Two Escadrons de Marche (300); 4e Artillerie a pied, 
and 2e Artillerie a cheval (200) Oman, Peninsular War, 1:320; CN, No. 14092, Order, 14 
June 1808, 17:304-305; No. 14150, Napoleon to Berthier, 2 July 1808, 17: 345-346; No. 
14151, Napleon to Reille, 2 July 1808, 17:346-347; No. 14168, Napoleon to Reille, 8 July 
1808, 17:357-358. 
4470man, Peninsular War, 1:321 and Foy, Guerre, 4:165-166. 
4480man, Peninsular War, 1:321. 
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harassed his outposts day and night, butchered his stragglers, and his supply lines were 
prey to continual attack. His conscripts, scrapped together and thrown into Catalonia 
were utterly unprepared for this type of war. 449 
A lucrative target for insurgent attack then was Reille's supply columns. Attacks 
were so frequent that Reille was obliged to use one or more battalions to escort his 
convoys. On I 0 July, for example, a band of 600 'brigands' (to use Reill e's word) 
attacked a subsistence convoy escorted by the Bataillon V alaison and two Battalions de 
March. The band, composed of mountain smugglers fell on the column and its 1,200 odd 
man escort but was beaten off with a few casualties.450 That same day, another band of 
a thousand insurgents attacked a convoy of 200 sick, returning to France, escorted by a 
battalion of the 32e Leger. The insurgents captured the convoy, beat off the escort, and 
slaughtered the sick.451 
These were the same scenes that one young conscript Louis Gille described at 
Manzanares, in Andalusia, a country crawling with guerilla bands, butchering isolated 
soldiers, massacring hospitals, etc. He wrote of the dismembered corpses, and men 
thrown live into cauldrons of burning oil after horrible mutilations. Captain Charles 
Francois told of how the insurgents tore out the nails and cut off the eyelids of one 
captured officer then sawed him in half and fed the remains to the hogs. 452 Francois wrote: 
4490man, Peninsular War, 2:41. 
450SHAT, C(8) 367, Registre de Correspondence du General Reille, Letter, Reille to 
Berthier, 16 July 1808. 
451Ibid., Letter, Reille to Berthier, 27 July 1808. 
452Rudorff, War to the Death, 102. 
I have seen ... officers and men, even women, cut open from the groin to 
the stomach, and the breasts cut off, other with their private parts cut off 
and placed in the mouth, others burned alive up to the shoulders, their 
parts in their mouths, others hanging from the feet in chimneys, their heads 
burned; finally at Valdepefias, I have seen fifty-three men buried up to the 
shoulders around a house serving as a hospital where 400 men were 
massacred, cut into pieces and thrown into the streets and courtyards. . . 
Brave General Rene ... was sawn in half in front of his wife after seeing 
her dishonored, after which the child was cut in two before its mother who 
was then sawn in half like her husband. 453 
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These are scenes of barbaric horror that only Francisco Goya could capture in The 
Disasters of War. One anonymous staff officer noted in his journal that a sixty wagon 
convoy escorted by four bataillons de marche, of green conscripts fresh from the depots, 
barely withstood a bold insurgent attack on 25 July. 454 
The insurgent bands were so bold that they frequently attacked across the Pyrenees 
into France terrorizing the populace. In June and July 1808, repeated attacks by insurgent 
bands, particularly that of Don Juan Claros induced Napoleon to dispatch reinforcements 
to defend the frontier. These included the columns from the Basses Pyrenees, Haute 
Pyrenees, Arriege, Pyrenees Orientales, and Turin.455 These were levies of the National 
Guard and other available troops thrown together for this emergency, which were finally 
formed into Division Reille. 456 In July, for example, General Martin, Prefect of the 
453Ibid., 103. 
454SHAT, Anon., Journal Detaille. 
455SHAT, C(8) 355, Supplement a l'Etat d'Emplacement de l'Armee d'Espagne, 
Defense de la Frontiere, nd. 
456 AN, AF iv 1607, Supplement a l'Etat d'Emplacement de l'Armee d'Espagne, Defense 
de la Frontiere, nd. 
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Pyrenees-Orientales ordered the formation of a 560 man Bataillon de Gardes Nationalux 
levied from the arrondissements and towns of his department. 457 
The insurgents raided into France practically till the end of the war, taking levies 
of money, food, and transport from French peasants. Baron Eroles commanding a 
division was one of the more daring Catalan commanders. In November 1811 he 
embarrassed General Decaen, freshly arrived in Catalonia replacing Marshal Macdonald. 
Eroles raided the French Cerdagne with 3,000 troops defeating two National Guard 
battalions near Puigcerda and levied a requisition of thousands of sheep and cattle and a 
heavy money contribution from the populace. Napoleon was furious and ordered a huge 
levy of National Guards in the lOe and Ile Divisions Militaire to stem this threat. 458 
This then was the nature of the insurgent war in Catalonia. Together with 
aggressive regular forces they kept the Army of Catalonia continuously occupied with 
holding down the country. The French were barely able to undertake any significant 
offensive operations for lack of adequate force and extraordinary logistical difficulties. 
The insurgents then played a prominent part in virtually hamstringing the French 
457SHA T C(8) 10, General, Prefet Martin, Arrete Concemant !'Organisation d'un 
Bataillon de Gardes Nationaux, destine a la defense de la frontiere. 1 July 1808. 
458Napoleon said: " .. .j'ai juge convenable de reunir dans la 1 Oe Division Militaire 
une division de Reserve composee d'infanterie, de cavalerie et d'artillerie, qui mette une 
fois pour toutes mes frontieres a abri des incursions des brigands." CN, No. 18531, 
Napoleon to General Clarke, 29 February 1812, 23:260-261. On 8 March the Emperor 
wrote again to General Clarke: " ... renouvelez l'ordre au general Reille de se porter sur 
Berga et sur la Cerdagne fran~aise pour deloger les insurges. II n'est que trop vrai qu'ils 
se nourissement de France, et qu'ils sont cantonnes a Puycerda, d'ou ils ne bougent point." 
CN, No. 18557, Napoleon to Berthier, 8 March 1812, 23:296; Oman, Peninsular War, 
5:93. 
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occupation. It would be in the logistical arena that we would see the insurgent movement 
do the most damage. In Catalonia the army lived on convoys, particularly in Barcelona 
whose division sized garrison required far more than the local countryside could provide. 
The distinguishing feature of the convoy system in Catalonia was insurgent activity which 
was so severe and ruthless that any convoy required a brigade and often more to get it 
through the inevitable gauntlet of guerillas. 
Even Commanding Generals needed heavy escorts for their movements,459 for in 
Catalonia he was a lucrative target. The Guide company was simply insufficient to deal 
with brigade or division level insurgent attacks, as Marshal Macdonald found to his 
dismay. By March 1811, Napoleon was quite pleased with Suchet's recent reduction of 
Tortosa and just as displeased with Marshal Macdonald's troublesome and unproductive 
operations. He consequently stripped the three districts of Lerida, Tarragona and Tortosa 
from Macdonald and awarded them to Suchet. He also ordered Macdonald to surrender 
three full divisions to Suchet,460 including General Frere's crack French division, General 
Pino's Italian/French division and General Pignatelli's Neapolitan division, totaling 12,670 
men (1,782 horses) with the colors, (effectives numbered 22,858 men and 2,091 horses). 461 
459Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 92-93; Thiebault, Manuel General, 504. 
46
°CN, No. 17443, Napoleon to Berthier, 9 March 1811, 21:456-458; Oman, 
Peninsular War, 4:485; Vacani Storia della Campagane, 3:32-33; Suchet, War in Spain, 
2:3-10. 
461 General Frere's division had two brigades (Lorency and Ficatier) and 4,987 men, 
715 horses present under arms (7,897 men, 927 horses effectives) General Pino's Division 
had three brigades (Fontane, Palombini and Eugene) and 5,577 men, 577 horses present 
(10,285 men, 701 horses effectives) and General Pignatelli's Division had one brigade 
(Ferrio) and 2,106 men, 490 horses present (4,676 men, 463 horses effectives). SHAT, 
C(8) 3 70, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1810. 
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Suchet's III Corps became the Army of Aragon with 43,000 troops. Napoleon 
ordered Suchet to reduce Tarragona and Macdonald, with his much smaller force, to 
undertake secondary though independent operations, that is, to occupy Cardona, Berga, 
and Urzel in Upper Catalonia and to capture the Monastery of Montserrat. Napoleon did, 
however, send Macdonald another division, under General Quesnel, due to arrive later that 
spring. 462 Marshal Macdonald now had to return to Barcelona, and required an adequate 
escort capable of cutting its way through the gauntlet of insurgents. His normal 
headquarters element was not a Guides Company which normally undertook the task of 
the Commanding General's bodyguard but an entire brigade. The Troupes Attachees au 
Grand Ouartier General consisted of three battalions of the l 6e Leger and a detachment 
of Gendarmes totaling 2,048 troops. 463 
A brigade was, however, scarcely enough to get Macdonald to Barcelona alive. 
Consequently, the Marshal got the loan of two divisions of 7,000 infantry and 700 cavalry 
and marched on 30 March 1811 via Manresa to avoid any major engagements. Still, this 
column had to cut its way through a thick line of Sometenes and General Sarsfield's 
regular Catalan troops. These clouds of insurgents clung to Macdonald's flanks, harassing 
them the whole way to Manresa. Macdonald stormed and burned the barricaded town and 
marched on to Barcelona, in a grueling three day march which cost him 600 casualties, 
fighting the whole way. When the exhausted column reached Sabadel on the River 
462CN, No. 17448, Napoleon to General Clarke, 10 March 1810, 21:459-460; 
Macdonald, Recollections 2:17; Laffaille, Memoires, 251-253; Oman, Peninsular War, 
4:485; Napier, Peninsular War; 3:220. 
463SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1810. 
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Llobregnt, Macdonald went on to Barcelona with only his personal escort brigade while 
the escort column cut its way painfully back to Lerida on 9 April. A smaller escort 
would have been cut to pieces. This was the difficulty which faced the French 
commanders in Catalonia in the simplest movements. 464 
When Macdonald took command of the Army of Catalonia in June 1810, he 
found, like Augereau before him, that his first task was a logistical one. Barcelona in 
particular required revictualing or would starve. One must keep in mind that the 
storehouses there not only supplied the garrison, but troops going through Barcelona for 
operations in Lower Catalonia. Consequently, it required revictualing more often. 
Augereau had in February brought to the city a huge convoy from Gerona escorted by 
8,000 men in fresh reinforcements from France. It took over a month to assemble the 
convoy and Augereau only marched in March.465 
On 13 March he left Gerona with some thousand wagons filled with a huge load 
of flour, and other supplies carried by pack mules, carriages, caisons and a 
conglomeration of other vehicles. 466 The convoy was probably fifteen miles long. 
Marshal Augereau personally marched with the escort which included General Severoli's 
4640man, Peninsular War, 4:486; Napier, Peninsular War, 3:220. 
4650man, Peninsular War, 3:291; CN No. 16272, Napoleon to General Clarke, 19 
February 1810; 20:232; No. 16275, Napoleon to General Clarke, 21 February 1810, 20: 
233-234. No. 16276, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 21 February 1810, 20:234-235; 
Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:104-106. 
466Ibid., 3:293. The road from Gerona to Barcelona is quite a good one, particularly 
south of Gerona. It was certainly the best high-road in Catalonia and was capable of 
handling the huge convoy. SHAT, Anon., Journal Detaille des Mouvemens.de l'Armee 
Fran~aise en Catalogne. 
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(Pino) Italian division and General Rouyer's German division, totaling 16, 103 men. 467 
General Pierre Augereau, with Souham's French division marched on a parallel route with 
the main column, passing the still unconquered fortress of Hostalrich under blockade by 
General Mazzuchelli's brigade. 468 This Italian brigade rejoined Division Severoli and left 
a mixed brigade under Colonel Devaux to continue the blockade while the main body 
went on to Barcelona.469 In early April, Marshal Augereau returned to Gerona with this 
convoy, mostly of empty vehicles and a huge quantity of confiscated property, escorted 
by Augereau's (Souham) French Division. 470 
Marshal Macdonald, when he took command immediately saw the necessity of 
throwing more provisions into Barcelona. From June to August 1810, he sent three huge 
467General Frere's division was 6,693 men (961 horses) under arms, Division Severoli 
was 6,309 men (457 horses) and Division Rouyer had 3,100 men (116 horses) the whole 
force totaling 16,103 troops and 1,534 horses; SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de 
Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
4680man, Peninsular War, 3:293; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 2:213-215; Arteche, 
Guerra de la Independencia, 8:272-273; SHAT, C(8) 42, Chef d'Escadron d'Artillerie 
Clement, Blocus d'Hostalrich, Journal du Bombardement, 17-20 February, Rapport, 21-22 
February 1810, Rapport, 22-23 February 1810; LS, Chef d'Escadron Clement to General 
Taviel, 22 February, LS, Clement to Marshal Augereau, 23 February 1810; Armee de 
Catalogne, Sous-Chef d'Etat-Major, Colonel Lelong, Ordre du Jour, 28 February. Armee 
de Catalogne, Commandant de Genie, Chef de Bataillon Paris, Rapport du Genie sur les 
Operations relatives au Blocus d'Ostalaich [sic], 23 January 1810. 
4690man, Peninsular War, 3:295; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:104-106. 
470Up to 1810 the convoys to Barcelona were much smaller affairs. In 1808, General 
Reille's division often detached troops to escort them, and his correspondence with 
Marshal Berthier is replete with small convoy missions, such as the one in Upper 
Catalonia escorted by the Valaisan Bataillon in July 1808. Oman, Peninsular War, 3:297-
298; Artreche, Guerra de la lndependencia, 8:203, 282-283; Lopez, Guerra de la 
Independencia, 5:112-113; Laffaille, Memoires, 244; SHAT, C(8) 267, Registre, de 
Correspondence du General Reille, L, General Reille to Marshal Berthier, 16 July 1808; 
C(8) 485, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808. 
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convoys into the city. In June the provender which Augereau sent was nearly exhausted, 
and he sent a second convoy in July471 escorted by Frere's and Pino's divisions. 472 The 
Army of Catalonia also needed to victual other garrisons and commands besides 
Barcelona. These convoys too needed considerable escorts. In fact the intense Catalan 
insurgent activity forced Macdonald to use overwhelming force to complete the simplest 
and smallest logistical missions. For all practical purposes it robbed the French Marshal 
of the strategic initiative. He was so compelled to fritter away his forces on often huge 
escorts, that this mission denied him the force necessary to undertake consistent offensive 
operations. 
On 3 July, for example, Macdonald ordered General Amey, commanding the 
W estphalian brigade in General Verdier's division (Upper Catalonia), to escort a convoy 
to the small French garrison at Bagnoles carrying 2,400 rations of bread.473 A 892 man 
brigade, or four battalions were needed to haul about 40 carts! This was the harsh reality 
of the Catalan War. In July too, Macdonald sent a second huge convoy to Barcelona. 
Heavily escorted it stretched for miles along the Gerona-Barcelona high road. The 
increased activity of the Royal Navy and Spanish corsairs along the coast made water 
471 0man, Penninsular War, 3:311. 
472Ibid., 3:312; SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
473SHAT, C(8) 129, CM, L, Marshal Macdonald to General Amey, 3 July 1810. 
These 2,400 rations weighed 1,800 kg (at .75 kg/rtn.) or 18 quintals. This convoy must 
have been composed of local ox carts like the Portuguese two-wheeled carts. They must 
have carried no more than five quintals or about a 1,000 lbs. This required about 40 
carts, a tiny convoy that required a whole brigade of four battalions, the Infanterie Legere 
Westphalien, 2e Ligne Westphalien, 3e Ligne Westphalien, and 4e Ligne Westphalien, 
totaling 892 men. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation. Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
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transport all but impossible. Macdonald was consequently boxed into the comer of a 
second and third over land convoy (in August, escorted by three divisions) much to 
d. . 474 Napoleon's 1sappomtment. 
The first of Macdonald's convoys, that of June, was a model for these huge 
operations, and showed the remarkable efficiency of Macdonald's staff in putting them 
together. Marshal Macdonald's tactical method of getting one through was to use 
overwhelming force deployed in the bataillon carre formation, invented by Napoleon. 475 
Macdonald used four divisions and two brigades for this convoy operation. One whole 
division would serve as the advanced guard, in brigade elements, while another division 
took up the convoy flanks. A brigade actually escorted the convoy and another brigade 
brought up the rear.476 Macdonald undertook this operation quite systematically. He 
planned the convoy for 11 June and concentrated four divisions and two brigades, with 
the mass of vehicles and animals, setting all Upper Catalonia abuzz with military 
movements. 
4740man, Peninsular War, 3:312, 494-495 .. 
475Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 154-155; Petrie and Nofi, ed., Napoleon 
at War, 28-29; A.F. Becke, Napoleon and Waterloo. The Emperor's Campaign with the 
Armee du Nord. 1815. A Strategical Study, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and 
Co., Ltd., 1914) 1:160-161. 
476Like Napoleon's use of the heavy advanced guard that is any of his Corps d'Armee, 
Macdonald used a large force roughly half of his troops for this task. It was capable of 
not only guarding the front of the main body but of sweeping small forces off the field 
and seriously engaging large ones to allow the convoy to punch through its way. 
Clausewitz on the contrary used the smaller 18th Century advanced guard which can only 
guard an advancing front or movement. It was a generation behind the Napoleonic 
System. Marshal Macdonald took a leaf from Napoleon's book and used a smaller scale 
carre in a very interesting adaption. Clausewitz, On War, 302-311. 
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The order of battle of the operation included the whole of the French command 
in Upper Catalonia, that is the bulk of General Frere's division (Brigade Salm) with 4,600 
troops (leaving Brigade Lorenez behind with some 2,100 troops), General Guillot's with 
5,514 men, Pignatelli's division of 3,732 troops, Rouyer's division of 3,100 troops, 
Severoli's division with 6,309 men and the headquarters detachment of 1,049 men.477 This 
convoy then would use 24,594 troops or 89.1% of his disposable force of 27,919, to haul 
supplies leaving a mere 3,325 troops to occupy Upper Catalonia. Indeed those in hospital 
(8, 769 men) far outstripped the rear forces! 
The initial phase of this operation began on 1 June 1810. It was the convoy 
concentration. Macdonald ordered escort and combat units to jumping off positions478 
such as General Frere's division ordered from La Bispal to Gerona479 and General 
Rouyer's division in support.480 
Marshal Macdonald also ordered Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon to concentrate a 
herd of 400 bullock at the Park at Gerona,481 and the commander of the 4e-3e Ligne to 
guard the herd. 482 Macdonald then placed the Bataillon V alaisien at the Ordonnateur's 
477See Appendix 37. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31May1810. 
478SHAT, C(8) 335, Registre de Correspondance, Ordre de Mouvement, 1June1810. 
479Ibid., Macdonald to General Frere, 4 June 1810. 
480Ibid., Macdonald to General Rouyer, 5 June 181 O; Macdonald to Chef de Bataillon 
Blanch, Battalion Valaison, 6 June 1810. 
481Ibid., Macdonald to Ordonnateur en Chef Bourdon, 6 June 1810. 
482Ibid., Macdonald to Commander, 4e-3e Ligne, 7 June 181 O; Macdonald to Bourdon, 
7 June 1810. 
311 
disposal. 483 The Marshal also began to assemble the troops attached to his headquarters, 
including the 3e Leger, 3e Provisoire Cuirassiers,484 and the Gendarmerie, totaling 1,049 
men.485 
Marshal Macdonald and General Guilleminot, his Chief of Staff, then set about 
organizing the second phase of this huge operation, the security of Upper Catalonia, 
which would be stripped of troops by the movement to Barcelona. On 8 June, Macdonald 
ordered General Frere to split his 6,699 man division in two for this operation. The larger 
half, General Jean Baptiste Salm's (1755-1811) brigade, of 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry 
under Frere's personal command was slated for escort duty. The smaller (2,009 men) half 
under General Guillaume de Latrille, Baron Lorencez (1772-1855) to establish a series of 
coast-artillery posts to guard against invasion.486 The escort would, after receiving four 
days rations, take its pack mules, ambulance (but leaving its heavy baggage), and march 
to Hostalrich on 10 June on the main Gerona - Barcelona high road. 487 Macdonald 
ordered General Pignatelli, commanding the 3,732 man Neapolitan Division488 to march 
483lbid., Macdonald to Commander, Bataillon Valaisien, 6 June 1810. 
484lbid., Macdonald to Colonel Giery, Commander, 3e Provisaire Cuirassiers, 7 June 
1810. 
485The headquarters attachment included 3e Leger, 849 men, 3e Provisoire Cuirassiers, 
139 men, and 118 horses, and the Gendarmerie Imperiale, 61 men, 23 horses. SHAT, 
C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
486Division Frere had 6,699 men and 961 horses present. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, 
Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; SHAT C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald to General 
Frere, 7 June 1810. 
487SHAT, C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald to Frere, 7 June 1810. 
488SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
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out on 8 June from Figueras in advance of the convoy (leaving on 11 June) clearing the 
countryside from the road to the coast, link up with a brigade of General Guillot's 5,514 
man division489 occupying Hostalrich. General Guillot would with a reconnaissance in 
force likewise clear the main Gerona - Barcelona high road to Hostalrich and on 
Pignatelli's arrival then march on to Barcelona, and thus assure the passage of the convoy. 
Macdonald ordered Division Guillot's other brigade, under General Amey to march out 
inland towards Olot then to Hostalrich by 10 June, clearing the countryside on the way. 490 
Macdonald finally ordered General Devaux's brigade to sweep down along the coast 
clearing the country then concentrate at Hostalrich with the rest of Guillot's division.491 
General Guillot's division then would fan out in a reconnaissance in force pushing aside 
everything in its way and clearing the country of insurgents. General Rouyer's 3, 100 man 
German division492 would take up the task of convoy rear guard.493 General Severoli 
would precede the advanced guard of the convoy in two successive brigade elements of 
Brigade Mazzuchelli then Brigade Polimbini.494 
489General Guillot took command of General Verdier's division composed of the 
troops; which had besieged Gerona in 1809. It consisted of French, Berg, and 
Westphalian units, and had 5,514 men and 110 horses, in three brigades, under Generals 
Amey, Guillot and Devaux. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 
1810; C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald to Pignatelli, 8 June 1810. 
490Ibid., Macdonald to General Amey, 8 June 1810. 
491 lbid., Macdonald to General Devaux, 8 June 1810. 
492SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
493SHAT, C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald to General Rouyer, 8 June 1810. 
494lbid., Macdonald to Severoli, 8 June 1810, Macdonald to Severoli, 9 June 1810. 
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The general operational scheme was the advance of Division Guillot fanning out 
on the Gerona-Hostalrich road and precipitation on that fortress. Division Pignatelli in 
two brigades followed on to Hostalrich by the 11th and relived Severoli's division which 
marched on to Barcelona. 
The actual convoy would march from Gerona on 10 June, preceded by General 
Mazzucheli's brigade from Division Severoli which would occupy San Celoni by day 
break of 11 June; a grueling 35 mile march in one day. 495 Macdonald surely planned to 
execute this convoy as quickly as possible in extraordinary forced marches. 496 Following 
495SHAT, C(8) Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, Ordre de Mouvement pour le 11 
June 1810, 10 June 1810. C(8) 335, Registre, Ordre de Mouvement, 10 June 1810. 
496Clausewitz noted that a fifteen mile march is a good day's work, and an average 
day's march was ten miles. He also notes that forced marches may be 25 or 30 miles a 
day at most for a single march and 20 per day for successive marches. An 8,000 man 
division making a 25 mile march will need sixteen hours with several hours rest while a 
30 mile forced march required at least twenty hours. This is quite a strain with an 80 lb. 
pack. Clausewitz, On War, Ed and Tns. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton NJ 
Princeton Univ. Press 1976) 319. Though soldiers of this period marched enormous 
distances, averaging some 1,000 miles in four months. The Grande Armee covered 700 
miles for the Austerlitz campaign, averaging 18-20 miles/day. Although the staggering 
marching feats of Crawford's Light Division at 62 miles in twenty-two hours to reach 
Talavera in 1809 occurred these were unusual cases for they would virtually destroy the 
combat capacity of a unit. Richard Holmes, Firing Line, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985) 
115-116. Such a march as Macdonald ordered of 30-35 miles on the first leg and 25 
miles for the second leg next day was with full pack of two shirts, two pair shoes, nails 
and soles, canvas pants, gaiters, cleaning utensils, linen and lint for wounds, four biscuits, 
ten lbs. flour weighing 33 lbs. The rest of his kit included a bread sack of two loaves of 
breach (four days), cartridge box with 50 cartridges and some extra ammo, three flints, 
screwdriver, belts, musket great coat. The whole weighed some 65 lbs, and near 80 lbs. 
if he carried cooking pots and the other ration items, such as rice, salt, wine, lard or a 
chunk of preserved meat. Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 217; SHAT, C(8) 398, Etat 
du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810. Thirty five miles carrying this was quite an 
achievement even at the age of stupendous walking. Johnson, The Birth of the Modem, 
702-703. 
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behind Brigade Mazzuchelli was Brigade Polombini which took possession of the 
Trentospassos, and San Celoni and held it for the arrival of the main column, while 
Mazzuchelli dashed on to Barcelona in a 25 mile march. 497 
Polombini's brigade formed the advanced guard reinforced with 200 cavalry and 
artillery. The convoy column itself consisted of 125 transport vehicles carrying 150,000 
kg of supplies and 405 bullock, (405,000 rations or 101,250 kg of fresh meat).498 This 
was enough meat to last the 6,502 man garrison of Barcelona about 62 days. 499 
General Taviel, the army artillery commander, had command of the convoy and 
its immediate escort was Brigade Salm. The head at the column behind the advanced 
guard consisted of 50 troopers of the 3e Prov. Cuirassiers and the regimental artillery at 
the 3e Leger. The convoy column was a series of successive elements, that is, six 
elements of 20 vehicles and sixteen elements of 25 bullock each. Brigade Salm was 
divided between these elements with six infantry companies and artillery at the head, and 
between the vehicle elements, bodies of two to four infantry companies and 20-40 cavalry 
(platoon) with two bodies of 40 and 100 cavalry at the end. Immediately following was 
the bullock elements with one to three infantry companies and bodies of 40 cavalry 
497SHAT, C(8) 133, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, Ordre de Mouvement, 10 
June 1810; C(8) 335, Registre, Ordre de Mouvement, 10 June 1810. 
498SHAT, C(8) 133, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, Ordre de Mouvement, 10 
June 1810; C(8) 398, Etat du Nombre des Rations. 
499SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
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interspersed with the tail brought up by three infantry companies and 40 cavalry (platoon). 
The rear guard of the convoy was General Rouyer's division.500 
The general convoy regulations were strictly enforced by Generals Salm and 
Taviel, such as the positioning and march order of troop escort units and convoy 
elements, (like the pack mules), dispersed amongst the escort units. Other tactical 
procedures included the use of flank guards drawn from the escort. In case of attack, the 
flank guards would counterattack at the bayonet and if the enemy attacks with larger than 
battalion strength, the column would halt while the escort beats the enemy back. General 
Frere's troops at the head of the column will fly to the assistance of the stricken troops. 
Finally, crossing the Trentospassos, Mazzucheli's brigade will hold the pass to allow the 
column to pass and take up position of rear guard afterwards.501 
Marshal Macdonald, accompanying the convoy as overall Corps commander, 
reached Granollers twelve miles from Barcelona on 12 June and wrote the Movement 
Order for the last leg of the journey. Generals Severoli and Frere fanned out and secured 
the mountain heights above Barcelona to allow the convoy to enter the city unmolested. 
General Severoli, with Brigade Polimbini marched out of Granollers on 13 June at 0200 
to occupy Mollet on the main Barcelona road, Mongada on the road to Sabadell, north 
of Barcelona and the mountain pass to Caldan. General Frere took the 2er Leger, 42e 
500See Table No. 37. SHAT, C(8) 133, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, Ordre de 
Mouvement, 10 June 1810. 
501Ibid. 
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Ligne, cavalry and artillery to the rear of Brigade Polimbini, round Barcelona to hold 
Ripullet on the main Sabadal and Caldan mountain roads. 502 
Marshal Macdonald anchored the defense on Polimbini's security force. In an 
insurgent attack will hold the enemy at bay till Salm's and Mazzuchelli's brigades came 
to their assistance.503 General Taviel, with the convoy, following Salm's troops along the 
high road in tum followed up by Mazzuchelli in the rear replaced Polimbini's and Frere's 
troops letting the convoy move into Barcelona in the following order: The artillery, 
GQG, bullock, and vehicles. The escort protected the column's flank into Barcelona. 
Once at the citadel, General Salm detached 240 troops from the 3e Leger to guard the 
convoy.504 The convoy was a complete success, considering the fact that no insurgents 
dared to attack such a formidable force which swept the country clean twice over before 
the long convoy toiled its way to Barcelona. 
Once the supplies were discharged, the convoy made its cumbersome return 
journey to Gerona on 15 June. Naturally the previous reconnaissances in force made by 
Divisions Guillot and Pignatelli dashed back to Upper Catalonia, sweeping the country 
of insurgents to seal off the returning convoy.505 General Frere led the convoy to 
Hostalrich with an infantry batailion, a cavalry squadron, and artillery. Division Severoli 
followed Brigade Polombini forming the convoy escort. At Hostalrich the convoy 
502Ibid., Ordre de Mouvement, 12 June 1810. 
503From the 3e-3e Leger, 7e Ligne and 3e Prov. Cuirassiers, in Salm's brigade. Ibid. 
504The Battalion Commander detached 200 men to guard the vehicles and 40 to guard 
the Bullock. Ibid. 
505Ibid., Ordre pour la continuation du Mouvement du 15 Juin 1810, 15 June 1810. 
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bivouaced, while Severoli's and Mazzuchelli's brigades bivouaced towards Gerona and 
the garrison there made food distributions. 506 
The convoy continued on its way on 16 June according to Macdonald's last 
Movement Order for this operation. Frere led the convoy out, past Severoli's brigade 
occupying its earlier positions, which took on the rear of the convoy and the GQG, at its 
head, back to Gerona. 507 
On the completion of this huge convoy, Macdonald issued a complete meat and 
rice ration to the troops in Upper Catalonia,508 and trumpeted the convoy's success in an 
Order of the Day on 19 June, especially noting that the insurgents concentrated at the 
mountain passes to attack after the previous reconnaissance in force operations, but the 
order and discipline of the convoy and its escort of Divisions Frere and Severoli 
dissuaded the insurgents and enabled the convoy to get through without a fight. 509 At the 
end of November, Marshal Macdonald threw another large convoy into Barcelona, and 
followed the same expensive, though successful, operational scheme. 510 
506Ibid. 
507The attached 3e Leger and Gendarmerie, escorted the Army HQ baggage. Ibid. 
508Ibid., Ordre du Jour, 17 June 1810. 
509Ibid., Ordre du Jour, 19 June 1810. 
510Ibid., Ordre de Mouvement, 20 November 1810; Ordre de Mouvement, 21 
November 181 O; Ordre, 21 November 181 O; Ordre de Mouvement, 22 November 181 O; 
Ordre de Mouvement, 23 November 181 O; Ordre de Mouvement, 23 November 181 O; 
Ordre de Mouvement, 23 November 181 O; Ordre de Mouvement, 24 November 181 O; 
Ordre de Mouvement, 25 November 181 O; Ordre de Mouvement, 27 November 181 O; and 
Ordre du Jour, 28 November 1810. 
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The convoy then was the primary logistical instrument to supply the Army of 
Catalonia. Upper Catalonia was a simple matter with its shorter distances, and chain of 
French fortresses along the line of communications. It was certainly a more difficult 
supply line from Figueras and Gerona to Barcelona for these convoys required heavy 
escorts and were often attacked.511 The convoys to support Barcelona, then were some 
of the most taxing operations of the war and were an absolute plague to the French 
command, virtually bringing the French prosecution of the war to a standstill for days and 
even weeks at a time. Here, the insurgents were quite successful in temporally disjointing 
French operations and the occupation. 
511In an interesting side note, in case of loss of goods transported in convoy the 
commander may be held personally liable. A convoy in 1808 lost 1,400 F. in goods 
belonging to the 14e Ligne and 2,475 F. to the lOe Leger. The convoy commander was 
court martialed but acquitted of responsibility and the Emperor indemnified the regiments 
for their loss. UCN, No. 1890, Decisions, 18 May 1808, 2:203. 
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§8. The Sea link. 
Waterways were often used as part of the lines of communications during the 
Napoleonic Wars, and were particularly useful in the movement of cumbersome cargoes, 
like grain, forage or siege materials.512 Lord Wellington, too used sea and river transport 
to support his army in the Peninsula. 513 During the Catalan war, the Mediterranean was 
the waterway used to supply French seacoast garrisons, particularly Barcelona, and the 
Army of Catalonia got merchant transport service, to perform this logistical task. 
In 1806, Napoleon's use of water transport to support the Grande Armee in Prussia 
and Poland set a standard for the French armies. 514 The lntendance had responsibility for 
the water transport service and employees from the equipages auxiliaire managed it. The 
size of this operation also necessitated the use of contracts, (marches) of which the 
Intendance completed 152. Many were urgent ones (marches speciaux) to haul high 
priority supplies. 515 The Commissaires des guerres and Inspecteurs des transports 
organized waterway navigation. The French sent some 1,500 boats to haul every type of 
supply from May to June 1807. Water transport was inexpensive, indeed it possessed an 
512Furse, Lines of Communication in War, 419, 429. 
513Wellington Dispatches, Wellington to the Commissioners of Transport, 22 
September 1813, 7:14; Wellington to General Freye, 22 September 1813, 7:14. 
514Lechartier, Services de l'Arriere, 478-480; CN, No. 12790, Napoleon to General 
Rapp, 21June1807, 15:355; No. 12818, Napoleon to Comte Daru, 24 June 1807, 15:368-
369; No. 12634, Napoleon to General Lemarois, 23 May 1807, 15:261-262. 
515Lechartier, Services de l'Arriere, 481-486; CN, No. 12645, Order, 24 May 1807, 
15:266; No. 12645, Napoleon to Prince Jerome 24 May 1807, 15:265. 
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economy of 90% less by weight of freight hauled than over land transport. Water 
transport in Germany and Poland only cost two to seven centimes per quintal of freight. 516 
Its only problem was that boat convoys, like land ones were vulnerable to partisan attack. 
Water transport was quite dangerous. 
In Spain, Marshal Suchet used water transport extensively. During his operations 
for the conquest of Lower Catalonia supported by Marshal Macdonald, he used the River 
Ebro as his Aragonese line of communication.517 The French command in Catalonia too, 
made extensive use of sea transport to haul vast amounts of supplies, particularly to 
supply Barcelona, which the Army's land transport could not cope for lack of resources 
and enemy interference. 518 In 1810 the garrison averaged 6,292 troops and 272 horses. 519 
It consumed daily, 6,921 rations of food and 272 rations of fodder, 520 that is 7,763.3 kg 
of food, 3,028 liters of liquids, and 5,954.1 kg of fodder. 
In August 1810, the Army of Catalonia had two transport battalions with 288 
vehicles,521 capable of hauling 432,000 kg of supplies, enough to last twelve days. To 
516CN, No. 12782, Napoleon to Tallyrand, 20 June 1807, 15:352; No. 12641, Note, 
Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 24 May 1807, 15:264; Lechartier, Services de l'Arriere, 
485-486. 
517Suchet, War in Spain, 1 :205-214. 
518SHAT, C(8) 335, Correspondance de l'Etat-Major general Registre d'ordres dujour. 
Ordre de Mouvement, 10 June 1810. 
519This average was taken from extant Situation Reports of 1810. SHAT C(8)362, 
Situation, VII Corps, 1 January - 10 May 1810. 
520SHAT, C(8) 398, Administration de la Guerre, Etat du Nombre des Rations. 
521 AN, AF iv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaries, Situation, 15 June 
1810. 
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haul one months supply of provender would require virtually every vehicle and pack 
animal the army had, virtually immobilizing it. 
Sea transport, despite the very real danger of Spanish corsair activity, was the most 
efficient transport, certainly to supply Barcelona. A single ship could haul some 40,000 
kg of freight, two days provender at a cost 2 centimes per quintal,522 as compared with 
the 6.00 F. per quintal523 cost of over land shipping. That day's ration then of 19,110.7 
kg (191.1 qx) cost a mere 3.82 F. by sea and 1,46.60 F. over land. 
The cost effectiveness of sea transport for the Army of Catalonia became evident 
to the General Dejean in 1809. That October, he ordered with the coordination of the 
Ministry of Marine, three ships to haul supplies to Barcelona. At that time, the VII Corps 
was fully embroiled in the Siege of Gerona and needed all available logistical support for 
Upper Catalonia. 524 Considering the cost and material considerations of overland transport 
to Barcelona, sea transport was the most rational alternative. 525 
522SHAT, C(l9) 8, Agde, 1811, Etat des Batimens charges le 27 October an 1810, 
pour Barcelona. 
523AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Etapes et Equipages, General Lacuee, Rapport a 
l'Empereur, 24 January 1810. In Barcelona, a six horse wagon cost 24 F./day and freight 
cost 1.60 F. per quintal. SHAT, C(19) 8, Armee de Catalogne, No. 163, Commissaire des 
guerres Raymondon to General Lacuee, 10 June 1812. 
524In a letter to General Dejean, Napoleon was quite mystified on the dispatch of these 
ships: "I do not understand the meaning of this sending of three vessels to Barcelona. 
Who ordered it? Send me a copy of the orders." UCN, No. 3699, Napoleon to General 
Dejean, 31 October 1809, 3:295; No. 3702, Decision 31 October 1809, 3:299-300. 
525UCN, No. 4165, Napoleon to General Clarke, 17 April 1810, 3:531; No. 4207, 
Napoleon to Lacuee, 4 May 1810, 3:550; No. 3951, Decision 21January1810, 3:421-422; 
No. 3958, Minutes of Council General of Finance, 24 January 1810, 3:429-430; No. 3990, 
Imperial Note 2 February 1810, 3:440-441; No. 4000, Imperial Note, 7 Feb,ruary 1810, 
3:443-44. 
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From the beginning of the Peninsula War, Napoleon naturally saw the logistical 
advantages of sea transport, and charged Vice Admiral Denis Decrees, Due de St. 
Germain (1761-1820), Minster of Marine, to secure coasts of France. 526 He ordered him 
to refit ships at Toulon, and ready fifty warships and 116 transports. 527 
In early 1810, General Lacuee contracted merchant vessels from the French ports 
of Agde, Port de Sete, and Port Vendres, to haul supplies to Barcelona and Rosas. In 
May, Marshal Augereau, feeling the full weight and disruption of supplying Barcelona 
overland528 obtained from the Ministry of Military Administration an order that French 
warships safeguard his water supply convoys. 529Toulon was the base to maintain Naval 
526CN, No. 13754, Napoleon to Vice Admiral Decres 17 April 1808, 17:16-17; No. 
13786, Napoleon to Decres, 27 April, 1808, 17:43-44; No. 13854, Napoleon to Decres, 
11 May 1808, 92-94; No. 14907, Napoleon to Decres, 16 March 1809, 18:356. 
527CN, No. 13873, Napoleon to Decres, 12 May 1808, 17: 107-108. No. 13874, 
Napoleon to Decres, 12 May 1808, 17:109; No. 13952, Napoleon to Marshal Joachim 
Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, Lieutenant General of the Kingdom of Spain, 21 May 1808, 
17:176-179; No. 13982, Napoleon to Decres, 25 May 1808, 17:198; No. 14005, Napoleon 
to Decres, 28 May 1808, 17:218-220. No. 14008, Napoleon to Deeres, 28 May 1808, 
17:221-222. No. 13877 Napoleon to Decres, 13 May 1808, 17: 112-114. No. 13937, 
Napoleon to Murat, 19 May 1808, 17:164, No. 13938, Napoleon to Murat, 19 May 1808, 
17:164-166; No. 13998, Napoleon to Murat, 26 May 1808, 17:212-213; No. 14025, 
Napoleon to Decres, 30 May 1808, 17:235-237; No. 14263, Napoleon to Decres, 19 
August 1808, 454. 
528This was 1,759,999.9 kg of flour, and 25,714.3 kg of oats. SHAT C(8) 398, Etat 
du Nombre des Rations, I August 1810. This was based on a garrison of 8,000 men and 
600 horses (as opposed to actual strength of 7,222 men and 198 horses). AN, AFiv 1175 
Administration de la Guerre, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 13 June 1810; SHAT 
C(8) 362, Situation, Army of Catalonia, 15 June 1810. It would take 1,191 standard 
transport wagons to haul this vast store of supplies. AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, 
Rapport a l'Empereur, 3 July 1811. 
529CN, No. 14005, Napoleon to Decres, 28 may 1808, 17:218-220; No. 13995, 
Napoleon to Decres, 26 May 1808, 17:206. 
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communications in the Mediterranean, 530 support strategic operations, support French 
commands holding coasts and fight British naval depredations. On 20 May a convoy of 
ships hauling 2,044 quintals of flour (898,036 rations) and other supplies, from Rosas to 
Barcelona. Despite its escort of a 20 gun sloop,531 the Catalan corsairs attacked and 
captured two ships off Bagau. The sloop counterattacked and captured one corsair ship 
and took back 24 sacks (3,744 kg) of stolen grain. 532 Another small convoy required an 
escort of gun boats to get it through. The corsair dangers induced Marshal Augereau to 
order Ordonnateur en chef Rey to suspend convoys to Barcelona till adequate naval 
protection was available. Marshal Macdonald even temporarily continued Augereau's 
53
°CN, No. 14482, Napoleon to Decres, 17 November 18108 18:65-66, No. 14521, 
Napoleon to Decres, 28 November 1808, 18:86, No. 14746, Napoleon to Decrees, 27 
January 1809, 18:244-245; No. 14630, Napoleon to Decres, 31December1808, 18:163; 
No. 14677, Deere to January 1809, 18:190-192; No. 14674, Napoleon to General Clarke, 
10 January 1809, 18:188; No. 14675, Napoleon to Clarke, 10 January 1809, 18:188-189; 
No. 14676, Napoleon to Clarke, 10 January 1809, 18:189-190; No. 14907, Napoleon to 
Decres, 16 March 1809, 18:356. 
531 A 20 gun Chaloup or Sloop is a sixth rate, double decked, three masted warship. 
They were often outfitted with oar ports to allow them to maneuver like a galley. Peter 
Goodwin, The 20-Gun Ship Blanford, Anatomy of the Ship Series, (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1988) 7-8. 
532A sac or sack of grain or flour weighed 159 kg or 325 lbs. Doursther, Dictionnaire 
Universe!, 473; Zupko, French Weights and Measures, 159. The sacks were quite 
valuable at 2.65 F. each in 1809. AN, AFiv 1180, Bureau des Fourrages et remontes, 
Chef de Bureau, Commissaire des guerre Bujardim Beaumet, Aper~u, de la depense pour 
les Approvisionnement en Fourrages, 1 January 1809. The porters or 'forts' who labored 
under the backbreaking weight of these sacks heaped over their backs. It naturally 
required great physical strength. The Abbe Galiani remarked that it "almost strains the 
nuance between man and beast of burden." Stephen L. Kaplan, Provisioning Paris, 
Merchants and Millers in the Grain and Flour Trade during the Eighteenth Century (Ithica 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1984) 385, 511, 544. 
324 
policy till naval escorts were available. 533 The French command realized the necessity of 
sea transport. The flour lost to the corsairs in the most recent sea convoy would have 
required 13 7 vehicles and 822 horses to haul it, more than the Army of Catalonia could 
manage with regular transport. 
In the spring of 1809, Napoleon, became painfully aware of the vulnerability of 
the garrison of Barcelona to insurgent blockade. The blockade of late 1808 taught him 
the necessity of keeping that garrison adequately supplied by every means, land and sea. 
On 29 March 1809 he ordered Vice Admiral Honore Ganteaume (1755-1818) Commander 
of the Mediterranean squadron, to outfit a division of five ships of the line, two frigates 
and two bricks at Toulon and enough transports to haul 30,000 qx mare grain, flour, and 
rice, three million pounds of power534 and a million cartridges. He stressed the urgency 
of this convoy, noting that if part of the supplies were available immediately, that is, 
12,000 qx of grain, flour, and rice, 1.5 million pounds of powder and 500,000 cartridges, 
the Navy must race on to Barcelona. In 1810-1811 the use of sea transport peaked with 
a cooperative effort between Marshal Macdonald, the Prefects of the Maritime 
533 AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur 13 June 1810; SHAT C(8) 
335, Ordres, Macdonald to Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, 28 May 1810. 
534CN, No. 14970, Napoleon to Vice Admiral Ganteaume, Commander, Mediterranean 
Squadron, 29 March 1809, 18:401-402. The Quintal Marc (qx mare) is a hundred weight 
mare. The mare equals .250 kg. Napoleon specified that the mare equal 16 onces 
(instead of eight) or .4895 kg. This 30,000 qx equals 1,468,500 kg. Doursther, 
Dictionnaire des Poids et Mesures, 214, 221, 250, 280, 368. Napoleon actually used the 
term milliard which equaled 1,000 lbs. mare or Y2 tonneau (489.5 kg). It is.also known 
as ten quintals mare. Zupko, French Weights and Measures, 111. 
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Departments on the Mediterranean, to include Port Vendres, Agde, and Sete, Marseille, 
and Toulon. 
In May 1810, Marshal Macdonald arranged his first sea convoy of a Cabotage or 
coasting vessel and five armed Felorques from Toulon. He also requested from Admiral 
Decres an eight sloop escort,535 which was indicative of the grave danger to French 
coastal shipping. On 28 May, Marshal Macdonald requested an escort for two more 
coasters from Frigate Captain Hurtel, naval commander of the Port Vendres flotilla. 536 
At this same time Macdonald was preparing a huge convoy to Barcelona which would 
virtually force a suspension of active operations for the corps size escort required for it, 
just to get it through to Barcelona, and this operation dominated the whole period from 
7-21June1810.537 The Army of Catalonia could not effectively function with such vast 
disruptions three or four times a year. The cost effective method would be to haul these 
supplies by sea with a strong naval escort, allow an uninterrupted continuation of land 
operations, and to accomplish this, Macdonald enlisted the aid of the Ministry of Marine 
and French merchants to expand and protect the sea transport system.538 
535This convoy is provided by the Maritime Prefect of Toulon. SHAT, C(8) 129, CM, 
Macdonald to the Maritime Prefect at Toulon, 24 May 1810. 
536SHAT, C(8) 335, CM, Rapport, Detachement pour le Ravitaillement de Barcelone, 
10 June 1810. 
537lbid. 
538In October 1809 much of the provender used during the siege of Gerona was sea 
borne. This included 116,688 rations of biscuit, 11.87% of the 982,364 rations hauled 
(1808-10) virtually all of the 459,477 kg of grain, 194,086 kg of flour, 4.29% of the 
4,528,439 kg of flour, and 74,039 kg of rice or 56.51 % of the 131,026 kg shipped. AN, 
AFiv 1175, Administration de la Guerre, ler Section Bureau des Vivres, General Lacuee, 
Etat Indicatif des Denrees Versees, 2e, Depense resultante de ces Versements de Denrees, 
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The corsair problem, like the insurgent one on land, was a significant one for 
French Mediterranean shipping. Private ship masters, often impoverished by the exactions 
and economic ravages of the continental blockade, raided merchant shipping to sell or 
trade their captured cargos. The French resorted to it in response to the British naval 
blockade, and the economic difficulties of Napoleon's Continental System. Of course, 
smuggling was a major activity to both sides of the economic war and formed a large 'sub 
economy' in England and France. 
The Berlin and Milan Decrees of 1806 closed all French and allied ports to British 
shipping while the British tightened their existing blockade further restricting French 
shipping. The first effect was a rise in marine insurance rates, particularly for neutral 
carriers, while the French and their allies were doubly squeezed between the British 
blockade and Imperial restrictions on trade to neutral and even allied ports. 539 
This state of affairs encouraged French corsair activity in raiding English shipping 
despite its dangers and relative unprofitablity. The only men to prosper under the 
Continental System were those like Raymond Durand, a French merchant in Barcelona 
during the Peninsular War, who sold to both the Army of Catalonia and to the insurgents 
and supplemented his business with a large scale smuggling operation. 540 
March 1810. 
539Fatrick Crowhurst, The French War on Trade. Privaterring 1793-1815 (Aldershot 
Scolar Press, 1989) 19-20; F. E. Melvin, Napoleon's Navigation System: A Study of 
Control During the Continental Blockade, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1919) 
13, 133. 
54oYves Roustit, "Raymond Durand, Commercant a Barcelona (1808-1814)" Estudios 
de Historia Modema, (1956-9) vi, 313-409. 
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The drag on French shipping of the British blockade induced Napoleon to attempt, 
unsuccessfully to use warships to haul trade in 1808. The Royal Navy, of course 
continued to bottle up French ports. 541 The beginning of the Peninsular War shut off 
much French trade in Spain with the extension of the British blockade, and Barcelona in 
particular suffered. The Spanish merchants and other seafarers on the Mediterranean coast 
felt the same impulse as the French to move towards privateering to make up for the loss 
in trade and attack the hated French at the same time. 
The situation worsened in 1809 when the Americans broke trade ties with France. 
The U. S. Congress passed the non-intercourse act declaring that French shipping in 
American ports would be confiscated. Napoleon, however, eased trade restrictions within 
the framework of the Continental System. In general, the Continental System was 
remarkably successful, causing a deep trade crisis in Britain between 1810 and 1822. 542 
This very success, however, led to an economic intensification of the necessity for the 
Spanish to engage in privaterring, for corsairs could raid French Mediterranean commerce 
to resell valuable military commodities to the Spanish armies or merchants, particularly 
as the Continental System destroyed the complex commercial network used throughout 
Europe, and made commerce raiding for revenue and interest an attractive altemative.543 
The Spanish corsairs operated within their territorial waters through the French 
Revolution, capturing neutral shipping. They would lie in wait at ports and on the 
541 Crowhurst, The French War on Trade, 20-21. 
542lbid. 
5431bid., 36. 
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departure of merchant ships they would pounce and bring them back as prizes. 544 French 
piratical depredations outweighed Spanish ones during the Quasi-War (1798-1801) but 
Spanish corsairs regularly attacked neutral shipping for ransom and sale of cargoes. 545 
The Ship Master Eban Shillaber noted that fifteen to eighteen Spanish privateers at 
Malaga were always waiting to pounce on merchant ships. They even joined the French 
in preying on American shipping in the Mediterranean.546 On 10 January 1799, for 
example, the corsair packet St. Roselia twice engaged an American slave sloop, the ten 
gun, 75 man Spanish ship overpowered the eight gun American ship (crew of fourteen 
men) ran her aground drowning all aboard but 27 slaves, then picked her clean.547 
The Royal Navy was the other threat to French supply shipping to Catalonia. Vice 
Admiral Lord Collingwood, commanding the Mediterranean squadron began to cruise the 
Spanish coast in 1808, between Toulon and Cadiz. He blockaded Toulon bottling up the 
544American vessels were subject to such depredations, often with the connivence of 
French diplomatic consuls, which according to the American Secretary of State, Timothy 
Pickering acted as a virtual Admiralty Court in the seizure of shipping. Navy 
Department, Naval Documents Related to the Quasi War between the United States and 
France. Naval Ooerations from Februazy 1797 to October 1798 (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1935) 20-21, 22, 32, LS, Secretary of State Timothy 
Pickering to Samuel Sewall, Committee of Commerce and Manufacturing 27 December 
1797. 
545lbid., LS, U. S. Commercial Agent Stephen Cathalon, Jr. to Secretary Timothy 
Pickering, 24 May 1798, 79-81; LS, Stephen Cathalan to Timothy Pickering, 31 May 
1798, 97-98. LS, D. Humphres, U. S. Minister of Spain to Secretary Pickering, 9 October 
1798, 507. 
546Naval Documents, LS, Eben Shillaber to Elias Hasket Derby, 22 March 1977, 
2:501. 
547Naval Documents, Extract from logbook of Captain Casach, 10 January 1799, 
2:227-228. 
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French squadron there and preventing them from escorting French supply ships from 
Marseilles to Catalonia.548 This French squadron included thirteen ships of the line and 
seven frigates and Collingwood had some twenty line vessels and smaller ships to patrol 
the Catalan Coast. He not only patrolled, he offered assistance to the Catalan 
. t 549 msurgen s. 
His most lucrative operations, however, were the attacks against French supplies 
to Barcelona, coming in single ships, slipping out of the Languedoc ports to dash to 
Barcelona, coasting and slipping past British warships. For some months, the terror of 
the Catalan coast was Thomas Cochrane, Lord Dundonald (1775-1860), Captain of the 
Imperieuse. Lord Collingwood sent this 'Sea Wolf from Cadiz in June 1808 to cut the 
French supply line in Barcelona. 550 
By August 1808, Cochrane had spread terror and destruction along the Catalan 
coast,551 to the delight of the insurgents. He attacked French coastal installations between 
Marseilles and the Pyrenees, destroying coast artillery batteries, port facilities, and 
telegraph stations. in the hope of diverting French troops to coastal defense. A favored 
target was French shipping which the Impereuse ran aground and Cochrane's Marines then 
burned. He even captured the French Semphore telegraph code without the knowledge 
548Piers Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean 1803-1810, (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1957) 281-283. 
5490man, Peninsular War, 1:44-57. 
550Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, 283. 
551Donald Thomas, Cochrane. Britannia's Last Sea King, (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1978) 130-131; J. W. Fortescue, Donald, English Men of Action Series (London: 
Macmillan and Co. 1895) 52. 
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of the French and gave the code as a 'present' to Lord Collingwood at the end of his 
Mediterranean cruise. 552 
Cochrane attacked Port Vendres the strongly defended French port in the Pyrenees 
Orientales, with the assistance of the HMS Spartan. By a brilliant ruse, they induced an 
advancing French column to move away from Port Vendres and the two frigates turned 
loose a furious bombardment on the town and port, then destroyed the coastal batteries 
and wharved ships. 553 
Lord Cochrane's tiny squadron continued to harass French coastal installations 
causing both destruction and severely damaging French morale. In November - December 
1808 he assisted the insurgents in the defense of Rosas with three frigates, Imperieuse, 
Fame, and Magnificent, in one of the most daring amphibious defense operations of the 
war.554 
552Thomas, Cochrane, 132; Fortescue, Dundonald, 53. 
5530n this occasion Cochrane displayed one of the finest feats of seamanship and 
naval gunnery ever recorded. A French cavalry squadron, advancing back to Port Vendres 
to repel the British Marines there, dashed up (north) the coast road. Cochrane's ship 
tacked parallel to them. As the French troopers caught up, Cochrane dropped his port 
anchor, the Impereuse swung round on the pivot and fired a starboard broadside at the 
cavalry virtually destroying the squadron. Thomas, Cochrane, 133; Fortescue, Dundonald, 
130-134. 
554Thomas, Cochrane, 134-145; Fortescue, Dundonald, 55-61; Edward Hughes, Ed., 
The Private Correspondence at Admiral Collingwood, Publications of the Navy Records 
Society, Vol. XCVIII (London: Navy Records Society, 1957) 259-260; LS No. 167, 
Collingwood to his Sister, 17 December 1808; James Henderson, the Frigates, An 
Account of the Lesser Warships of the Great French Wars 1793-1815 (New York: Dodd 
Mead and Co., 1970) 92-93. 
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The only way to haul supplies to Barcelona through the gauntlet of corsairs and 
Royal Navy, was by convoys. 555 Naval convoys consisted of a grouping of merchant ships 
under the protection of naval or armed merchant ships. British trade in the Baltic, for 
example, made very extensive use of convoys. Vice Admiral Sir James Saumarez (1757-
1836) commander of the Baltic Fleet, noted in 1808 that Baltic convoys were occasionally 
so large that it was impossible to protect them. Convoying trade was a full-time occupation 
on the Baltic station.556 Since the convoys were still subject to attack,557 Saumarez established 
a fortnightly convoy system to escort merchant ships through the Baltic lanes, or the 'Belt' 
through a gauntlet of French corsairs. 558 In the Mediterranean, Vice Admiral Sir William 
Henry Dillon commanding the HMS Leopard convoyed four transports from England to 
555 A 65 ship convoy from Havana to Europe, escorted by a ship of the line in August 
1798. Naval Documents, Quasi-War, Armed American Merchantmen, 1798, 2:172. 
556 A. N. Ryan, Ed. The Saumarez Papers. Selections from the Baltic Correspondence 
of Vice Admiral Sir James Saumarez. 1808-1812, Navy Records Society Series Vol. 110 
(London: Navy Records Society 1966); Letter No. 53, Saumarez to Admiral William 
Wesley Pole, 21 November 1808 and 53a, Enclosure, Explanation by Saumarez, 552-58. 
557The Saumarez Papers, No. 54, Run Admiral Richard Goodwin Keats to Pole, 27 
November 1808, 58. 
558The Saumarez Papers, No. 57, Pole to the Partners of the Merchant firm Emes, 
Moller and Emes, 7 March 1809, 65-67; No. 68, Admiral Keats to British Minister 
Plenipotentiary Anthony Merry, 11 March 1809, 67-68; No. 59, Emes, Moller, and Emes 
to Pole, 16 March 1809, 68; No. 60, Admiralty Secretary John Barrow to Saumarez, 4 
April 1809; No. 60a Goldschmid to Barrow, 3 April 1809; No. 61, Isaac Solly of Isaac 
Solly and Sons to Sir Thomas Boulden, Royal Navy Comptroller, 8 April L809, 70-71; 
No. 62, Saumarez to Lord Hood, 15 April 1809, 71-72. 
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Catalonia for the Anglo Sigilian Invasion in 1812,559 got a close look at Gibralter's Spanish 
smugglers come corsairs: 
"Beneath the walls may be seen an assemblage of small craft. Amongst 
them lay the Spanish smugglers, felucca rigged, with a heavy gun 
concealed under their deck hamper. . . these vessels take in their cargoes 
at the rock and watch their opportunity of landing it on the neighboring 
coast.56o 
The Royal Navy in 1812-13 so dominated the Catalan coast that Dillon hauled 
men and material with near impunity.561 The French convoys had to contend with both 
this and the corsair threat; but this was an acceptable risk considering the critical lack of 
land transport, insurgent dangers, and the inability of the Army of Catalonia to hold points 
of occupation and deploy sufficient troops to escort land convoys; not without paralyzing 
itself. Hence, the French command used sea transport despite the danger.562 
In May 1808, French merchant ships brought 5,987.87 qx of wheat to Barcelona 
and another convoy from Port-Vendres brought 19,932 rations of oats and a third on 2 
559William Henry Dillon, A Narrative of my Professional Adventures (1790-1839) Ed. 
Michael A. Lewis, Navy Records Society Series, Vol. XCVII, (London: The Navy 
Records Society, 1956) 2:193-196. 
560Ibid., 2: 198. 
561Ibid., 2:203-212, 228-23 5. 
562During the War of the Spanish success in the French suffered from the same naval 
transport problems. Admiral Sir John Leake commanding the British fleet off Barcelona 
in spring 1708 attacked a French escorted convoy of 90 transports carrying supplies to the 
Army of the Due d'Orleans. The attack netted 75 transports and many of those that 
escaped fell prey to the Spanish. Stephen Martin-Leake, The Life of Sir John Leake. Rear 
Admiral of Great Britain, Ed. Geoffrey Callender, Navy Records Society Series Vol. Lill, 
(London: The Navy Records Society 1919) 2:209-211; David Francis, The First Peninsular 
War. 1702-1713, (New York St. Martin's Press, 1975) 266. 
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December 1808 of one ship, with 125 ,431 quintals of supplies. 563 These convoys were 
lucky to elude Lord Cochrane's squadron, otherwise occupied at Rosas and got through.564 
This state of affairs soon changed for the worse. In October 1809, a French 
convoy escorted by the Toulon squadron (three ships of the line) under Admiral Fran~ois, 
Baron Baudin (1774-1842), prepared to sail to Barcelona, but the British squadron kept 
it bottled up at port. The French, however slipped out past the two British Frigates on 
guard. Admiral Collingwood meanwhile laid off Cape Sebastien waiting the convoy's 
arrival. When the French spotted Collingwood's larger squadron, the convoy dashed on 
to Barcelona with Collingwood's ships (in three divisions) at their heels.565 At Rosas Bay 
the British caught up with and attacked the French convoy burning five transport ships, 
taking five, and ran the rest of them aground. The British ran the French ships of the 
line, the Robuste, 84 Lion, 74 and Bon~e 74, aground near Sete. The French sailors then 
burned one of these vessels, 566 and the other two later escaped undamaged back to 
Toulon. 567 
563These provisions included 36 qx of lard, 16 qx of salt beef, 7.85 qx of cheese, 
65.42 qx of haricots and 16.68 qx of salt. SHAT, C(19) 7, VII Corps, No. 353, 
Commissaire-Ordonnateur en Chef Rey to General Dejean, 4 January 1809. 
5640man, Peninsular War, 1:54-57. 
565Collingwood, Correspondence, No. 191, Collingwood to his Sister, 1 November 
1809, 301-303. 
566Ibid. 
567Ibid., No. 191 and No. 196, Collingwood to Vice Admiral Purvis, 15 December 
1809, 308-310. 
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The French, like the British, established a system of commerce defense through 
naval escorted convoys or using naval ships to haul goods themselves. This was 
particularly true of hauling supplies to Catalonia from French or Catalan ports, including 
Agde, Port Vendres, Toulon, and Rosas, from which the convoys assembled and with 
escort sailed to Catalonia with some modicum of safety. 
The period of 1810-1811 was the high water mark of sea transport to Barcelona, 
at the same time that Marshals Augereau and Macdonald were throwing huge land 
convoys into Barcelona. The smaller ports, Port-Vendres, Sete, Agde, and Rosas were 
particularly useful and they were the least guarded by the British568 and the convoys only 
had to contend with the corsairs. 
In November 1810 an eleven ship convoy left Port Vendres carrying 384,091 kg 
of flour to Barcelona. The corsairs attacked it and captured two ships, burned two more 
off Palamos and another was lost, probably captured. The rest of the now dispersed 
convoy continued on. Four ships actually got through to Barcelona with 150,613.2 kg of 
flour and a fifth put in at Rosas. 569 Of their convoy only five ships survived, bringing in 
178,153.2 kg of flour, while the other six ships were lost (55%) with 205,937 kg of flour 
568The large ports, Toulon and Marseilles were closely blockaded by the Royal Navy 
and practically nothing gout out in 1810-1811. 
569See Table 38; SHAT, C(19) 8, Port Vendres, 1810-1811 Frigate Captain Hurlet, 
Port Vendres Squadron, Etat des Batiments charges le ler Novembre 1810 au comte du 
Gouvemement et destines a faire partie d'une expedition, 28 November 1810. 
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or 53.6% of the cargo.570 A second five ship convoy later got through unscathed with 
170,548 kg of grain and 9 ,600 kg of flour. 571 
Frigate Captain Hurlet, Naval Flotilla Commander at Port-Vendres sent four 
convoys to Catalonia with more success in the spring of 1811. The first convoy, initially 
of eight ships with 134,186 kg of supplies sailed for Barcelona on 25 February 1811. 
Two ships were unable to sail and remained. The six remaining vessels, under pressure 
from corsair attack put into Rosas. 572 The other two ships made it to Rosas on 11 
April. 573 The third convoy was forced into Palamos under corsair pressure574 while the 
fourth remained at Port Vendres. 575 Another fifteen ship convoy sailed to Barcelona on 
22 April carrying 719,082 kg of supplies. Enroute, it came under attack and split in two; 
ten ships dashed back to Port Vendres and five put into Agde.576 Not one ship got 
through to Barcelona. 
57
°Ibid. 
571 SHAT, C(19) 8, Port Vendres, Captain Hurlet, Etat des Batiments arrives a 
Barcelone, 28 November 1810. 
572See Table 39; SHAT, C(l 9) 8, Captain Hurlet, Etat des denrees qui ont ete versee 
dans les Magasins de Rosas, 19 April 1811; Etat des Batiments faisant partie de 
!'Expedition ordonnee pour Barcelone dans la 1 Oe Division Militaire, nd. 
573Ibid. 
574Ibid. 
575See Table 40. Ibid. It carried 273,572 kg of supplies. 
576See Table 40. SHAT, C(19) 8, Captain Hurtel, 9e Division Militaire (convoys), 22 
April 1811. 
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In all, Port-Vendre sent out 29 ships to Barcelona in 1810-11, hauling 962,316 kg 
of flour and oats. Of these only four ships got through with 123,073 kg of flour. Seven 
shiploads got to Rosas, another seven returned to Port-Vendres and one got to Palamos. 
Ten ships fell to enemy action losing 333,504 kg of provender.577 Only 45% of the ships 
got through and 16% of the cargos. This was a terrible success rate for any series of 
military operations and at enormous cost. Its only military justification was the dire need 
of the troops the relative lack of transport and the difficulties of remolding all current 
operations around supporting the Barcelona resupply effort. 
The Port Agde operations to Barcelona were more successful. In January 1811, 
a convoy of seven ships got through to Barcelona, carrying 361,370 kg of supplies,578 and 
another eleven ship convoy got through with 470,524 kg of flour and rice.579 The 32 
ships from Agde hauled 1,358,119 kg of provisions and fifteen ships with 509,577 kg of 
supplies was lost to the corsairs. This was 37.5% of freight carried;580 still a grim but 
better success rate than the Port-Vendres convoys. Only the convoys from Port Sete gave 
577See Table 41. SHAT, C(l9) 8, Port Vendres, 1810-1811, lOe Division Militaire, 
Commissaire des guerres Diutrass, Etat General des Chargements effecues a Port Vendres 
pour le Ravitaillement de Barcelone pendant le 4e trimestre 1810 et !'premier trimestre 
1811, 25 May 1811. These provisions included 749,070 kg of flour (12,348 sacks), 
213,246 kg of oats (4,598 sacks). 
578See Table 42; SHAT, C(19) 8, Agde, 1811, Mayor Douby of Port Agde, Resume 
des Operations faites dans le Port d'Agde depuis le Premier Janvier 1811 jus qu'au 
Premier Fevrier, pour le Ravitaillement de Barcelone, 2 February 1811. 
579See Table 43; SHAT, C(18) 8, 9e Division Militaire Departement de l'Herault, 
Agde, Mayor Dauby, Etat des Navires charges au Port d'Agde qui sont partis pour 
Barcelone, 18 Mars 1811, 19 March 1811. 
580Ibid. 
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a ray of sun to Marshal Macdonald and General Lacuee. Of nine ships sent, only three 
fell to corsairs, with a loss of 100,679 kg of supplies, a mere 29.8% loss rate! 581 
The provender then, which actually got through to Barcelona was an even smaller 
amount counting ships diverted to other ports582 or returned to the originating port for later 
shipment. Only 638,722 kg of provisions got through from Agde (47%).583 The success 
rate for supply shipments to other Catalan ports like Rosas was much better, mostly 
because it was a much shorter trip, and it was a safe haven for ships to Barcelona under 
corsair pursuit. In October 1809 Rosas received 791, 781 kg of provision valued at 
277,071.08 F.584 
The daily requirements of providing to the garrison of Barcelona 8,000 rations of 
food and 600 rations of fodder relentlessly pressed Marshal Macdonald. Immediately 
after taking command he tried with only partial success to throw 2,850,000 rations of 
flour and 216,000 rations of oats into the city.585 This attempt was nearly as fruitless as 
581Ibid. 
582There were, for example, eight ships of a total freight tonnage of 472,596 tons 
which were transferred to Port Vendres to load and ship on 16 January 1811. SHAT, 
C(l9) 8 Agde, 1811, Mayor Dauby. Etat de l'Approvisionnement de Barcelone, 7 March 
1811. 
583See Table 44; Ibid. 
584This included 116,686 rations of biscuits, 459,477 kg of wheat, 194,086 kg flour,a 
nd 74,039 kg of rice. This cost respectively 34,159.97 frs. for biscuit, 137,843.10 frs. for 
wheat, 58,225.80 F. for flour, and 46,848.21 F. for rice. AN, AFiv 1175, Administration 
de la Guerre, lere Section, Bureau des Vivres, General Lacuee, Etat Indicatif, lere des 
Denrees versees a la 1 Oe Division Militaire sur l'Armee de Catalogne, 2e: de la Depense 
resultant de ces versements de denrees. March 1810. 
585AN, AFiv 1175; General Lacuee, Rapport, a l'Empereur, 13 June 1810. 
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Augereau's last convoy which lost 204,400 kg of flour inducing him to suspend sea 
transport till the arrival of adequate naval escort. 586 
The 'unrestricted' corsair war got so bad that when a ship got through it was a 
celebratory moment. On 26 and 27 October 1810 two ships, the Ste. Vierge and La 
Vierge Misercordia with 98,639 kg of wheat (12 days rations) from Agde arrived at 
Barcelona on 3 November 1810 and returned safely.587 General Lacuee triumphantly 
reported the event to Napoleon.588 
This was certainly an exception for at that same time Frigate Captain Hurlet 
refused to dispatch five other ships because of corsairs prowling the coastal waters.589 He 
even stated to the Ordonnateur of the 1 Oe Division Militaire that overland convoys were 
safer.59° Captain Hurlot's argument was from one perspective valid for there were 
insufficient escorts unlike overland. Marshal Macdonald had the troops to handle an 
overland convoy if he were willing to tolerate its disruption of his opertions for nearly a 
month at a time. Napoleon, however, still made use of sea transport and in October sent 
586A 20 gun sloop. AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 13 June 
1810. 
587SHAT, C(19) 8, Agde, 9e Division Militaire Department of Herault, Commissaire-
Ordonnateur Serrot, Etat General des Approvissements expedier a Port d'Agde pour le 
Ravitaillement de Barcelone, 10 May 1811. 
588AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 15 November 1810. 
589 AN, AFiv 1175, Copy of a Letter of the Ordonnateur of the 1 Oe Division Militaire, 
to Ministre-Directeur Lacuee, 10 November 1810. 
590Ibid. 
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111,894 qx mare of supplies to Barcelona and of these sent 95,180 kg (85%) by sea from 
Toulon, Agde, Sete, and Port Vendres.591 
Adjudant-Commandant Carrion-Nisas, Commandant at Toulon, graspmg the 
logistical impass which gripped the Army of Catalonia and French Ministries wrote to the 
Minister of War suggesting a solution to the current method of sea transport, by hiring 
commercial shippers for the job. He proposed that merchants haul supplies strictly as a 
commercial proposition, in exchange for an exception to the Berlin Decrees, allowing 
them to transship colonial goods back to France. 592 This would allow merchants to take 
advantage of the hitherto denied profit of free colonial trade and give them an incentive 
to haul military provender. 
One of these merchants, Jean Baptiste Boyer Fonfrede of Toulouse responded to 
the Imperial Decree of 17 May 1810 to facilitate the resupply of Barcelona by commercial 
merchant shipping. He wrote to General Lacuee that no one would brave the extreme 
dangers of the Mediterranean if the commercial advantages were not lucrative enough. 593 
He proposed to the Minster Director to contract two Greek ships594 to haul grain, flour, 
591This included 105,000 qx mare of flour, 4,242 qx mare of rice, 2,652 qx mare of 
salt. The ships hauled 90,000 qx of grain and flour, 3,350 qx of rice, 1,830 qx of salt. 
AN, AFiv 11175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 17 November 1810. 
592Ibid. 
593AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 1 August 1810. 
594Greek shippers were more than willing to haul these supplies. The rigor of the 
British blockade bottled up Greek and Ottoman ships at Marseilles and Toulon, leaving 
the shipmasters idle and without income. Any commercial occupation was therefore 
welcome. The Greek shippers were also quite daring. In 1807, an expedition (convoy) 
of forty Greek ships carrying cotton and other goods ran the British blockade from 
Smyrna to Marseilles, losing six ships. Pierre Echinard, Grecs et Phillenes a Marseille 
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and rice to Barcelona, for the right to import by land or sea, and equal quantity of 
colonial goods from Spain, such as sugar from Havana or Vera Cruz, Indigo from Caracas 
or Guatemala, cotton, untanned hides, dye, cocoa, vanilla, and cochineal. 595 
The current cost of hauling these supplies had now become prohibitive unlike in 
1806-1809 as noted above, and included a flat freight charge of 0.36 F. per kg of cargo, 
that is 360.16 F. per metric ton plus a freight surcharge of 17.00 F. per ton (tonnage). 
In October 1810, ten ships left Agde for Barcelona with 343.612 metric tons of grain and 
flour for a freight charge of 123,755 F., 596 while the average price for the grain was 
351.08 F. per metric ton. 597 Transport was now more expensive than the actual goods, 
not including the freight charge per tonneau or special gratifications. For example, the 
ship La Ville de Port Maurice hauled 25,064.55 kg of grain and flour at a cost of 13,309 
F. or 530.99 F. per metric ton. The shipper also received a 44 ton freight charge of 17.00 
de la Revolution Frans;aise a l'Independance de la Grece, (Marseille: l'Institut Historique 
de Provence, 1973) 54-55. 
595Cochineal is a brilliant red dye made by drying and pulverizing the bodies of 
female cochineal a tropical American insect. AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuee, Rapport 
a l'Empereur, 1 August 1810. 
596See Table 45, SHAT, C(19) 8 Agde, Etat des Batiments charges le 27 Octobre an 
1810 pour le compte du Govemement destines a faire partie d'une expedition ordonnee 
pour Barcelone. 
597This included 286.94 F. per metric ton for grain (459,477 kg purchased for 
137,843.10 F.) and 356.24 F. per metric ton of flour, (4,564,143 kg purchased for 
1,625,950.40 F.). AN, AFiv 1175, Etat Indicatif, (2e) de la depense de ces versements. 
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F./ton or 748.00 F. plus a gratification of 600.00 F. and other repreations of 290.70 F. 
Total shipping costs then were 14,947.70 F. or 596.37 F. per ton.598 
The idea ofM. Boyer Fonfrede and Adjudant-Commandant Carrion-Nisas then was 
a welcome one to an Emperor who paid transport through the nose even with other 
commercial advantages to the shippers. On 2 October 1810, Boyer-Fonfrede wrote to 
General Lacuee and proposed this method to ship 16,500 metric quintals of provisions to 
Barcelona. 599 
Boyer-Fonfrede obtained two Greek ships at Marseilles, for he was unable to 
procure French shippers to take such risks. The Greek shippers would haul these 
provisions but demanded Marine insurance of 50% of the value of their ships, and in case 
of their capture or destruction, the contracting merchant, Boyer-Fonfrede would assume 
financial burden for the loss of the cargo.600 
The cargo was reduced to 10,000 qx marc601 of grain and 1,000 qx mare of rice 
at a price of 18.00 F./qx mare for grain and 37.50 F./qx mare for rice. Sacks were 
598This was a particularly expensive shipper, probably because he sailed an armed 
sloop. The Assumption, a 126 ton ship hauled 94,839.338 kg of grain and flour 
(89,259.338 kg grain and 5,580 kg of flour) at a cost of 23,359 F. or 246.30 F./metric ton 
plus freight of 122 tonneau at 15.50 F./ton or 1,891.00 F. a gratification of 1,000.00 F. 
and reparation expense of 87.50 F. The total cost was 26,337.50 F. or 277.71 F./metric 
ton. SHAT, C(19) 8, Agde, Etat des Batiments, 27 October 1810. 
599This included 15,000 metric quintals of wheat and 1,500 metric quintals of rice. 
600The financial responsibility would otherwise fall to the ship owner/captain and on 
his death, his estate. 
601The French mare used in commerce is here used and equals .250 kg. Doursther, 
Dictonnaire Universel, 250. 
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additional charge of 35,500 F. The total cost of the convoy was 253,000 F.602 Insurance 
charges were 280,000 F. and freight loss charge of 100,000 F. This 380,000 F. however, 
fell to M. Boyer-Fonfrede as a business expense.603 The loading charge (portage) at both 
ends was 12.00 F./qx mare. The freight charge was 12.00 F./qx mare (10,132,00 F.) to 
haul the goods from Marseilles to Gerona, and a higher additional charge of 30.00 F./qx 
mare, 330,000 F., from Gerona to Barcelona. These charges were negotiated down to a 
flat freight charge of 6.00 F./qx mare or 66,000 F., and a flat portage charge of 1.00 F./qx 
mare or 11,000 F. This negotiation reduced the total cost form 1,059,500 F. to 978,000 
F.604 plus a 15,000 F. export fee on the price of the grain, and the 330,000 F. in freight. 605 
In return for hauling this provender, the Emperor gave to Boyer-Fonfrede the right 
to import 5,500 qx of colonial merchandise for net profit of l,058,200F.606 This deal was 
602This includes 180,000 F. for the wheat and 37,500 F. for rice. SHAT, C(19) 8, 
Letter (copy) Jean Baptiste Boyer-Fonfrede to General Lacuee, 2 October 1810. 
603This 380,000 F. insurance charge was an enormous 175% of the value of the freight 
(217,500 F.) and this was in addition to the 50% rate for the value of the ships. The 
enormous charge was undoubtedly because of the great risk of these shipments to loss, 
at about 50%. No marine insurance underwriter would take such a risk at even a 50% 
premium rate. Add to this the imperfect calculation of risk current during the 18th 
Century and one has a· recipe for financial ruin. G. Clayton, British Insurance, 
"Monographs on British Economic Institutions Series", E. V. Morgan Ed., (London: Elek 
Books, 1971) 49; Also see chapter 2. 
604See Table 47. SHAT, C(l9) 8, General Lacuee, Report, 27 October 1810. 
605This export fee was 12,500 F. for the what (1.25 F./qx mare) and 2,500 F. for the 
rice (2.50 F./qx mare). Ibid. 
606The colonial goods ere .500 qx of cotton, 1,500 qx crude sugar, 1,500 qx of sugar, 
600 qx of coffee, 100 qx of indigo, 30 qx of cochineal, 400 qx of dye (compeche) and 
870 qx of leather. Gross import profit is 1,969,345 F., minus the old import cost of 
911,145 F. leaving Boyer-Fonfrede with 1,058,200 F. See Table 46. Ibid. 
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certainly lucrative for both parties. The Emperor got the grain through at a reasonable 
cost, where charges were 74.1 % of the total cost and Boyer-Fonfrede made an enormous 
profit in imported goods. These goods were certainly present in Catalonia and in 
Barcelona in particular607 for purchase. 
A second merchant who supplied the Army of Catalonia through the war was 
Raymond Durand (1768-18-?). He was the most active and successful merchant 
supplying the French. He began business under General Duhesme and his Ordonnateur, 
M. Augier. 608 When the war began, he became Vice President of the Junta of Commerce. 
His shipping company engaged in legal and illegal commerce and held a working 
relationship with all of the French army commanders of Barcelona. 609 he shipped by land 
and sea and was ever ready to float a military contract to haul military freight. 610 
It was sea transport, though, where he had his most lucrative business. Many of 
the ships hauling supplies from French and Catalan ports to Barcelona were contracted 
by the House of Durand, from various ports, such as Port Vendres, Nouvelle, Sete, Rosas 
6070ne Sieur Camps at Figueras had five quintals of coffee, in June 1810 (Arrete No. 
11); and Sieur Farinos had seven quintals of sugar (Arrete No. 17). SHAT C(8) 185, 
Bulletin des Actes du Gouvemement General de la Catalogne (Barcelona: Chez J. Alzine 
et P. Barbrera, 1810) 1 :23-24. 
608Roustit, "Raymond Durand, Commercant a Barcelone ( 1808-1814 ), 319-3 25; 
Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 120-121. Laffaille, Memoires, 133. 
609Roustit, "Raymond Durand," 351-355. 
61
°Ibid., 355. 
344 
or Genoa.611 In return, for these shipments, Durand exported to France colonial goods, 
such as sugar, coffee or indigo, as Boyer Fonfrede did in 1811. The House of Durand, 
in fact, contracted sixty-seven ships to French ports hauling colonial goods.612 Between 
September 1811 and 18 March 1812, he exported to France 2,938 qx/c of sugar, 144 qx/c 
of coffee, 1,011 qx/c of dye, 706 qx/c of cotton and 423 qx/c of wood. The whole was 
valued at 549,560 F. in goods. 
This was a growing commercial concern for seven commercial houses including 
Perret, Thorndike Arabet Gautier et Cie., Dodero, Pollan, Compete et Cie., and, of course, 
Durand. Through the war they exported to France, across the dangerous sea lanes, a vast 
quantity of goods valued at 1,967,982 F.613 This method of supplying the garrison of 
Barcelona was then expensive and risky, but the only efficient means available. 
Once transported, the logisticians at the receiving port sent the provisions to the 
magazines and accounted for it the same as any other received supply. In April 1811 
eight ships from Port-Vendres and Sete arrived at Rosas carrying 35,363 kg of grain, 
153,780 kg of flour (2,563 sacks), 2,195 kg of rice (30 sacks) according to ships 
manifests. 
611 SHAT, C(l9) 8, Etat des Batiments expedies pour Barcelone depuis ler Octobre 
1811jusqu'au20 Mars 1812; LS, Adjutant Commandant Carion-Nisas to General Lacuee 
20 March 1812; Etat des Batiments expedies pour Barcelone depuis 1 Octobre 1811 jusqu' 
au 31 Mai 1812 LS, Carrion-Nisas to General Lacuee, 15 June 1812. 
612Roustit, "Raymond Durand", 406-407. 
613This included 11,548 qx/c of sugar; 5,230 qx/c of dye; 1,691 qx/c of cotton; and 
3,179 qx/c of various rare woods. Ibid., 404-405. 
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The unloading and movement to the citadel magazine was witnessed by officers 
of the garrison, who assured their proper execution. The Garde Magazine and his workers 
managed storage and accounting. The team of experts examined the cargo for the 
required quality. In this case they found losses due to defective sacks and rats who ate 
into the supplies. They found a loss of 3,830 kg of the cargo, for which the French 
government was not required to pay.614 
Sea transport then was the supplement to land transport and the use of both 
together was the only way to feed the Army of Catalonia in general and Barcelona in 
particular. Alone, neither were sufficient to supply the Army, unable to provide for all 
of its own logistical wants. In either system, the severity of insurgent and corsair 
depredations so interfered with logistical movement that a large part of supplies, 
particularly those hauled by sea were lost. 
Sea transport, regardless of its poor return rate of 45% - 70% delivered goods, was 
nevertheless absolutely essential, without which the Army of Catalonia would have to 
virtually suspend military operations to protect the convoys thus ending the Army's role 
as a military force and making it into a logistical one. Sea transport then was a valid 
economy of force measure. 
614SHAT C(l9) 8, Denrees Debarquees a Rosas pour le Service de l'Armee, 16 April 
1811. 
CHAPTERV 
THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1808-1810. 
The establishment of a coherent military government, and the maintenance of the 
local administrative apparatus is critical to the pacification and governing of a country. 1 
The French government in Catalonia suffered from problems which seriously hampered 
the occupation and the war effort. Its abuse of power, destructiveness, cruelty and 
corruption irreparably poisoned relations between the French and the populace from the 
very beginning of the war. 
The organization of administrative services m the Division and Corps 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales was incomplete at the beginning of the war;2 and 
General Duhesme partly completed them in February 1808.3 He depended then on the 
Captain General of Catalonia to support the Corps, and even needed his superior, Marshal 
Joachim Murat, (1767-1815), to have the Paymaster General provide him with 250,000 
1Paul Thiebault. Manuel General du Service des Etats-Majors. Generaux et 
Divisionnaires dans les Armees Actives. 7e subdivision de la lere Division de la Premiere 
Partie, (Paris: Chez Magimel, 1813) 11-13, 14-18. 
2SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 
December, 1807. C(8) 5, Letter, General Lechi to General Clarke, 5 January, 1808; Letter, 
General Duhesme to Clarke, 8 February, 1808. Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 91. 
3Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 39, 91. 
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F. for expenses.4 Napoleon even sent a Commissaire des guerres to Barcelona to organize 
Duhesme's administrative services. 5 General Reille's hastilly assembled division also 
suffered a lack of organization,6 and even the new VII Corps, concentrating at Perpignan 
in August, 1808 had an administrative apparatus as incomplete as Duhesme's before it. 
When General Gouvion Saint-Cyr took command he found it in abysmal condition. 
This haphazard organization was tragically reproduced in the military government. 
Prior to May 1808, General Duhesme's Corps was only an unwelcome guest supported 
by Captain General Count d'Ezpeletta. 7 Napoleon did not expect a long occupation and 
made no clear provisions to govern the kingdom. 8 
4Murat, Lettres et Documents, No. 3072, Murat to General Duhesme, 12 March, 1808, 
5:330-331. Murat assumed titular control ofDuhesme's Corps on 26 February 1808. No. 
3029, Murat to Duhesme, 26 February 1808, 5:291-292. 
5
" .•. on the 5th of March no war commissary had reached the division of the Oriental 
Pyrenees. Choose the nearest one at hand .. .in the 10th Military Division, and send him 
to Barcelona." UCN, No. 1693, Napoleon to General Dejean, March 10, 1808, 2: 109. 
6CN. No. 14172, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 9 July 1808, 17:360-362. No. 14256. 
Note Pour les Ministres de la Guerre et de l'Administration de la Guerre. 17 August, 
1808, 17:443-448. No. 14257. Napoleon to Eugene Napoleon, Vice-Roi,, 17August1808, 
17:448-449. AN, AFiv 1607. Letter. Marshal Berthier to Napoleon, le 30 June 1808. 
Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 90-91, 304-305. CN, No. 14092, Ordres 14 June 1808, 
17:304-305; No. 14141. Ordres, 29 June 1808, 17:338-339; No. 14151. Napoleon to 
General Reille, 2 July 1808, 17:346-347; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations., 
18,25. 
7Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 118. 
80ne major cause of the disorganization of the French staffs and the poor quality of 
troops sent to Spain was the sheer contempt which Napoleon regarded the Spanish State 
and its Army. He considered it a weak poorly led kingdom which even a poor French 
Army could quickly subdue. Rudorff, War to the Death, 70-71. 
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The great insurrection of May 1808 transformed the situation, as Insurrectionary 
Juntas rose, violently overthrowing provincial governments. 9 In Catalonia, the 
insurrection spread like wildfire10 and the Captain General, terrified by the surly attitude 
of the populace of Barcelona, relinquished his command in June to General Duhesme, and 
remained only as a figure head. 11 As the Royal provincial government collapsed, General 
Duhesme established a hastily improvised government in its stead, which was a Junta of 
Barcelona notables representing the nobility, clergy and merchant class whose main 
purpose was to support his Corps with supplies and money. 12 
General Duhesme's first task was to prevent revolt in Barcelona, disarm the 
populace of the city and place a representative of the French command on the Junta. 13 
In July 1808, he began forced requisitions and contributions, alienating the populace, 
increasing numbers of civil servants, went over to the insurgents. 14 By August the 
insurrection in Catalonia was in full bloom and General Duhesme, was at odds with the 
Catalan civil service which protested his high handed actions. He responded to this 
passive resistance by tightening his grip on the city. He forced its cooperation, turning 
9Georges Roux, La Guerra Napoleonica de Espagfi~ Colecci6n Au~tral; (Madrid: 
Espasa-Calpe, 1971) 69-72. 
1
°Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, Vol. 2, Primera Campagna de 1808, 17. 
11 General Duhesme demanded a "transf erat une auto rite superieure" Conard, Napoleon 
et la Catalogne, 119. 
12Ibid., 102. 
13Laiffaille, Memoires, 135-136. 
14Conard, Napoleon et le Catalogne, 123. 
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the Captain General into a rubber stamp, and ultimately assumed the supreme command 
himself. 15 
As the insurrection deepened, Duhesme's position became ever more tenuous. 16 
He and the garrison commander, General Lechi squeezed Barcelona more rigorously, for 
supplies which intensified the insurgency,17 demanding ever harsher repression. They 
even tried to fill vacant civil posts with expatriate Frenchmen to begin a working 
government. On Gouvion Saint-Cyr's arrival in December, Duhesme remained 
commandant of Catalonia, and Ordonnateur en chef Rey, took the financial reins of the 
• 18 province. 
The Provincial Captain General held supreme executive and military power, and 
the Intendant, supreme administrative and financial powers. 19 The Provincial districts or 
Corregidats (such as Barcelona, Figueras) were headed by appointed Corregidors who held 
full administrative and judicial authority which they exercised through the Alcaldes 
15Lafaille, Memoires, 135-136. Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 205-209. 
16
"Ma position sera aussi tres difficile a Barcelone ou je n'aurai ni grain, ni argent, 
ni viande et un peuple a contenir que le besoin mettra au desespoir". Letter, Duhesme to 
Marshal Berthier, 12 August 1808, Quoted in Conard Napoleon et la Catalogne, 124. 
17AN, AFiv 1607, General Duhesme, Journal des Operations des Pyrenees-Orientales. 
18Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 150-159. 
19The Intendant also had control of recruiting for the Army billeting and maintenance 
of troops. Barie! Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain, Vol. I, The Challenge 
to the Old Order. (New York: New York University Press, 1965) 33. The Captain 
General also had an executive council on Audience over which he presided, which 
advised him and administered different areas of the province. Conard, Nagoleon et la 
Catalogne, 10-11. 
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Mayores, (a combination mayor and judge). 20 The Corregdor, as the local Royal 
representative was subordinate to the Captain General in political and military matters, 
but superior to the Royal Intendant in administrative and financial ones.21 For General 
Duhesme the Corregidor was the interface between the populace and the French 
command. 
With the accession of King Joseph Bonaparte there was a concerted Royal effort 
to reestablish the links between Madrid and the provinces, which the insurrection had cut. 
In February 1809, King Joseph appointed a Royal Commissioner, a Francophile Catalan 
and Royal pensioner, Don Joseph Garriga to reestablish the Royal administration on a 
French model and firmly establish Madrid's authority in Catalonia. 22 
The key to Royal power in Spain was its command relationship with French corps 
commanders, but Napoleon undermined this by continuously sending orders directly to 
French commanders instead of through King Joseph and his Chief of Staff, Marshal Jean 
Baptiste Comte Jourdan (1762-1833). Indeed, the Emperor established a special Bureau 
in the Ministry of War to handle the administration and control of the army in Spain. 
Corps commanders too, habitually worked with Paris, as had Generals Duhesme and 
Saint-Cyr. Even when Marshal Berthier informed him that any further orders would be 
20Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modem Spain, 1:33; Conard, Napoleon et la 
Catalogne, 154-156; Richard Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958) 11. 
21 Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 154-156. 
22Ibid, 160; Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, Memoires et Correspondance du Roi 
Joseph, Ed. Albert Du Casse. 2nd Ed. (Paris: Perroitin, 1859) 5:200-209; CN, No. 14543, 
Allocution de l'Empereur, en Reponse aux Felicitations du Corrigidor de .Madrid, 9 
December 1808, 18: 107-109. 
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issued from Madrid, 23 Saint-Cyr ignored this and continued to work with the Ministry of 
War in Paris, just as General Duhesme and Reille had before. In fact, the only order 
Marshal Jourdan sent to the VII Corps, General Saint-Cyr politely declined to comply.24 
Ordonnateur en chef Rey too was ostensibly under the authority of the Royal 
Intendant General, M. Dennie25 but Rey, like Saint-Cyr ignored Royal direction.26 For 
example, an Imperial Decree of 4 December 1808 abolished feudal and seignoral rights, 
the inquisition, certain taxes and reduced the convents. General Saint-Cyr actioned this 
decree,27 but admited his allegiance to Napoleon only.28 
When the Royal Commissioner arrived in March 1809 to reform Catalan 
government, he met with a chilly indifference from General Saint-Cyr's staff which 
23Ibid., 162-163; Jean Baptiste, Comte Jourdan, Memoires Militaires du Marechal 
Jourdan, Ed. Vicoumte de Grouchy (Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1899) 129-130. 
24
"Sire, I have always considered the VII Corps ... was to subdue Catalonia. There will 
be a lengthy occupation of the province and [I] will be unable to concur with joint 
operations ... ", AN, AFiv 1621, LS, Gouvion Saint-Cyr to King Joseph, 25 June 1809. 
25SHAT, C(8) 398, Armee d'Espagne, Intendant General Denniee. Administration 
Generale de l'Armee d'Espagne, Personnel, 15 December 1809 
26Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 171. 
27AN, AFiv plaq 2512 and 2524, Decret, 4 and 12 December 1808. 
28In June 1809, General Clarke admonished General Saint-Cyr to subdue Catalonia 
following the example set in Basque by "rendering from each city ... persons responsible 
for the conduct of others ... the VII Corps would gain tranquility in the rear. The certainty 
that commune property would be respected ... would produce the same calming effects as 
in Navaire and Biscay." General Clarke to General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 3 June 1809, 
quoted in Conard Napoleon et la Catalogne, 173-174. Saint-Cyr replied: "the measures 
that you proposed ... which was applicable to the north is completely impractical here, 
where not a single inhabitant rests in the areas occupied by the Army". Quoted in 
Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 174. 
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stymied and eventually destroyed the effort to reestablish a viable Royal government. 
Indeed, King Joseph admonished Garriga (in a desperate attempt to gain some influence 
on the French Staff), to facilitate the logistical support of the VII Corps. This not only 
rendered him administratively impotent but made him into a virtual organ of Saint-Cyr's 
administration. 29 
The French military government of Catalonia from 1808-1810 then was a 
stumbling attempt to support the occupying corps and leave actual government to a 
supposedly intact apparatus. General Duhesme and the Emperor only anticipated grafting 
French reforms onto the existing structure. Napoleon also anticipated a quick end to 
Spanish resistance. When Catalan civil servants began deserting their posts, and the 
administrative structure faltered, Duhesme and Saint-Cyr had little to replace it with 
leaving the makeshift government stillborn. 
The fundamental error was not anticipating during the first months of the war that 
a strongly imposed military government was necessary, as in the conquest of Naples in 
1806, in which the Marshal, Andre Massena (175 8-1817), in the face of a vicious 
insurgent war pacified and imposed a harsh military30 then regularized civil government 
on the French model. 31 A similar insurgent war emerged in Catalonia and a successful 
occupation required military success, and efficient government. General Duhesme was 
29Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 177-182. 
3
°Edouard Gachot, La Troisieme Campagne d'Italie (1805-1806), 2nd Ed., Histoire 
Militaire de Massena Series (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1911), 247-248. 
31 0wen Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms, (New York: The Free Press, 1965) 
70-77. 
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clearly negligent in not quickly organizing a viable if improvised government within the 
first three months of the war. It was only during Saint-Cyr's command that he began to 
do so. Essentially, the government was designed only to support the VII Corps. Efficient 
administration was secondary, which effectively nullified it as an instrument to govern the 
rebellious province. 32 
When Marshall Augereau took command of the VII Corps he fully turned his 
attention to governing the rebellious province. In December 1809 then, he investigated 
its governmental apparatus for its organization and its ability to support the army. 33 He 
was completely dissatisfied with the Royal government, its chaotic administration, and 
particularly with the Royal Commissioner, Joseph Garriga.34 He blamed this situation, 
with some reason, on Saint-Cyr and his old enemy General Duhesme.35 Suspecting 
serious government malfeasance, Augereau established an invistagative Administrative 
32Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 139-140, 203-206. 
33SHAT, C(8) 35, LS (copy), Marshal Augereau to the Director General des Douanes 
de Perpignan, 6 December 1809. 
34SHAT, C(8) 35, LS, Marshal Augereau to General Clarke, 6 December 1809. 
35SHAT, C(8) 49, LS, Augereau to Clarke, 24 August 1810, Conard, Napoleon et la 
Catalogne, 389. 
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Commission on 27 February 1810.36 He understood that the previous military regime was 
both inefficient and corrupt, the Royal government was worthless. 37 
Meanwhile, on 8 February 1810, Napoleon created by decree four independent 
military governments. Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre and Biscaye. He upgraded the 
occupying Corps to Armies and designated their commanders as military governors. These 
governments were, henceforth, independent of Madrid and answered only to Paris, like 
Vice Royalites. 38 The decree promoted the VII Corps to the Army of Catalonia, and the 
province, the independent government of Catalonia, with Marshal Augereau as governor, 
responsible for provincial administration and the complete support of the army. Finally, 
Napoleon declared Catalonia in a state of siege and authorized martial law.39 
This decree was promulgated as much to satisfy the demands of Napoleon's 
military budget as for any strategic consideration. Available funds were always a critical 
factor in many of Napoleon's actions and policies. He saw too, that Madrid was incapable 
of either managing the outlying provinces or combat the insurgents. Napoleon 
361t was intended "de rechercher les moyens de diminuer les charges du peuple sans 
nuire au Tresor Public". Its members were Commissaire des guerres Grobert (President), 
Chef de bataillon Fouque, Payeur Lehodey, Captain Pelletier and Administrateur des 
domaines Lapasset. SHAT, C(8) 42 Arrete, 27 February 1810; C(8) 44, General Rey to 
General Clarke, 26 March 1810; Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 389-390. AN, F (7) 
6352, Letter, Adjutant Commandant Ordonneau to Marshal Augereau, 3 April 1810; 
SHAT C(8) 40, Letter Augereau to Clarke, January? 1810, N.D. 
37SHAT C (18) 42, LS, Augereau to Clarke, 16 February 1810. 
38SHAT, C(8) 41, Napoleon, Decree (copy) 8 February 1810. 
39See Appendix III, SHAT, C(8) 41, Napoleon, Decree, 8 February 1810; Decree 
(Extrait) 8 February 181 O; Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Correspondance 
Diplomatique, Vol. 672 Napoleon, Decret, 8 February 1810. 
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specificallly ordered Marshal Augereau to establish a provisional administration in 
Catalonia on the heels of his decree. He reasserted Augereau's command independence 
of Madrid as a Vice-Roy, and authority to impose martial law, that is, place Catalonia in 
a state of siege. 40 In his reply to its receipt, Marshal Augereau pledged that he would 
establish a viable military government discipline the present governor and forward to the 
Ministry of War, plans to implement the Imperial decree. 41 
Marshal Augereau, now established his Commission Administrative which was to 
investigate the policies and actions of the incumbent command, and to study the whole 
structure of the province, its commerce, taxes, government administration, and judiciary. 
It would catalogue all of its resources so as to allow the new government to properly 
administer the province and most importantly support the army.42 
40Napoleon wrote to General Clarke: 
Vous lui ferez connaitre que, si les communications sont ouvertes, ii doit se 
concerter avec Madrid, mais qu'il ne fait partie de l'Armee d' Espagne; que l'armee 
qu'il commande est l'Armee de Catalogne, et qu'il ne doit recevoir des ordres que 
de moi; qu'il doit meme etablir une administration provisoire clans le pays, faire 
arborer, au lieu de l'etendard espagnol; l'etendard francais et Catalan, et ne souffrir 
aucune espece de communication entre les habitants et le Roi. 
CN, No. 16275, Napoleon to General Clarke, 21 February, 1810, 20: 233-234; No. 
16272, Napoleon to General Clarke, 19 February 1810, 20: 232. 
41Marshal Augereau made a vailed reference to Generals Duhesme and Lechi and 
Police Chief Casanova, and the beginning of his vendetta against them. SHAT, C(8) 41, 
LS, Marshal Augereau to General Clarke, 24 February 1810. 
42SHAT, C(8) 42, Arrete pour la creation d'une Commission Administrative Provisoire 
du Gouvemment de Catalogne, 27 February 1810. General Thiebault discusses at length 
in the Manuel General gathering the appropriate information on the occupied country, 
cataloguing it onto a series of 'Tableaux' on matrix charts. These were 1) the communes, 
population, artisans and produce; 2) means of transport; 3) agricultural produce; 4) 
industry and commerce; 5) government institutions and 6) government administrators. 
Theibault, Manuel General, 96-97, Models A-F. 
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While the comm1ss10n gathered the needed information on the province and 
investigated General Duhesme,43 Marshal Augereau prepared to establish his new 
govemment.44 On 25 February he proposed to the Minister of War the organization of 
Catalonia into four Divisions Militaires: 45 1 er Division Militaire of Upper Catalonia at 
Gerona and in Lower Catalonia, the 2e, 3e and 4e Divisions Militaire headquartered at 
Barcelona, T arragona and Lerida respectively. 46 These geographical divisions were 
designed to administer the district in support of the army and pacify the country. Each 
division militaire was based upon a fortified headquarters. 47 
Augereau naturally tried to regularize contributions, improving on the virtual 
rapine used by Duhesme. He appointed a Receveur, headquarted at Barcelona, with 
branches in the Corregiments which were to collect contributions,48 and a commissaire de 
police to begin organizing a new government administration.49 
43SHAT, C(8) 41, LS, Augereau to General Clarke, 23 February 1810; See Chapter 
II, § 5. 
44SHAT, C(8) 41, LS, Augereau to Clarke, 24 February 1810. 
45 SHAT, C(8) 42, LS, Augereau to General Clarke, 25 February 1810. 
46This breakout of districts was premature on Augereau's part for it would be a year 
before Tarragona and Lerida would be conquered, and then by General Suchet, to fall 
under the authority of the Army of Aragon, SHAT, C(8) 42, Marshal Augereau to General 
Clarke, Projet de Repartition du Gouvemement de Catalogne en Quatre Divisions 
Militaires, 25 February 1810; C(8) 41, LS, Augereau to Clark, 24 February 1810. 
47Ibid; C(8) 40, Arrete, (Receveur) n.d. (February 1810?); C(8) 35, Augereau to Clark, 
6 December 1809. 
48SHAT, C(8) 42, Marshal Augereau, Arrete, 27 February 1810. 
49SHAT, C(8)41, LS, Augereau to Clarke, 24 February 1810. 
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The Marshal, however, opened his new government with cruel repression, by 
issuing a hanging law on 28 December 1809 which declared any insurgent caught under 
arms would be summarily hanged as a bandit. Indeed, Generals Souham and Pino erected 
a line of gallows on the road between Gerona and Figueras hanging every insurgent 
caught. 50 
Augereau, despite his laudatory attempts to create a working military government 
was certainly the least capable of its Governors. His inability to pacify the country, 
support his army, gain decisive results in the field and embarassing personal vendettas led 
to his dismissal from command by May 1810.51 
Comparatively, Augereau organized his governmental operations very much like 
General Suchet did in Aragon, who imposed monetary and 'in kind' contributions, 
established a finance administration with a Receveur and fostered an efficient civil 
government. 52 Suchet, however, managed to subdue Aragon and Augereau did not. This 
critical factor made his government unworkable. Additionally, the cruelty of his 
occupation short circuited any attempt at pacification. His many hangings, right out of 
Goya's The Disasters of War, were particularly horrifying. The punishment of towns and 
villages accused of helping insurgents with huge levies over and above the normal heavy 
contributions, only inflamed Catalan hatred. For example, he fined thirteen towns 
500man, Peninsular War, 3:288; Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 1 :429; Lopez, Guerra 
de la Independencia; Arteche, Guerre de la Independencia; 8:221 and 225. 
51 0man, Peninsular War, 3 :311. 
52Suchet, War in Spain, 2:313-316. 
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373,100 F. in the first months of 1810.53 Augereau also paid the price in hatred for the 
misdeeds of the Duhesme regime, such as the Canton Murder54 and other excesses 
revealed by the Commission administrative. 55 Augereau's command then was a failure 
on both the operational and the administrative level. 
In any case, a dissatisfied Emperor replaced the aging Marshal with Marshal 
Macdonald in the hopes that this Scots fire eater could break the rebellious province. 
When he took command, he found that his task was a daunting one. Not only did 
Augereau fail to pacify Catalonia and establish a government, he found enormous 
logistical problems which taxed both Catalan and French resources. Marshal Macdonald 
would have to move heaven and earth to correct these problems with limited resources. 
The new Marshal attacked this challange vigorously and began organizing his 
government only days after arriving in Catalonia. His first act was to issue an Order of 
the Day to declare his intent to re-establish discipline in the army, end arbitrary levies 
guarantee the safety and well being of the populace and establish an efficient and just 
53SHAT, C(8) 34, Arretes, Palames, Belcane, Bagus, Albuns, Olot nd. 
540n 15 December 1808 two of Duhesme's police commissioners in Barcelona 
murdered a Catalon citizen one Joseph Canton attempting to extract alleged hidden 
contribution. This caused a huge scandal, inflaming the city. This was the worst charge 
that Augereau levied against Duhesme and the garrison commander General Lechi. AN, 
F (7) 6554, Letter, Beaumont-Brivazac to Savaray 30 June 1812, AFiv 1625, Commission 
Administrative, Rapport, 11 January 1809; BB(18) 73, Memoire, General Lechi to 
Marshal Berthier, 24 December 1810, Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 314-320; See 
Chapter II § 5. 
55SHAT, C(8) 42, Commission Administrative to Marshal Augereau, nd. 
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government. 56 Macdonald was as good as his word, as he threw himself into forming a 
new government. On I June 1810, he issued another Order of the Day establishing and 
enforcing tight discipline in the army, rules for levying requisitions and public security.57 
During a huge convoy to Barcelona to revictual the garrison, for example, 
Macdonald kept a firm hand on his often unruly troops. 58 He ordered the arrest and court 
martial of the commander of the 2e Ligne Napoleon for financial misconduct.59 In 
another case, he received a complaint from a local woman along the march route from 
whom soldiers of General Severoli's division had stolen a goat. Macdonald ordered 
Sever6li to either replace it or reimburse the cost of the animal and punish the soldier. 60 
By mid June, Macdonald began organizing his government, with the Regie des 
Domaine Nationaux en Catalogne, to manage provincial tax levies province. 
Headquartered at Barcelona, and under his direct authority, it was organized with a 
56SHAT, C(8) 281, Registre des Ordres du Jour 28 May to 30 October 1810, Ordre 
du Jour, Arrete Concernant des repression d'abus, 28 May 1810. Macdonald in this 
instance followed directly in Augereau's footsteps whose Chief of Staff General 
Guilleminot issued a similar document, General Guilleminot Ordre du Jour, 25 April 
1810. 
57SHAT, C(8) 133, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, 2e Cahier, 31 October 1810 
to March 1811, Ordre du Jour, 1 June 1810, C(8) 281, Registre, Ordre du Jour, 1 June 
1810. 
58Particularly the Neapolitan units. 
59SHAT, C(8) 33 5, Registre, Marshall Macdonald to General Pignatelli, 17 June 1810. 
60SHAT, C(8) 335, Registre, Marshal Macdonald to General Severoli, 15 June 1810; 
Lieutenenant General Sir Thomas Picton (1758-1815) underwent a similar experience 
during the Salamanca Campaign of 1812, when he caught one of the soldiers of the Irish 
Connaught Rangers stealing a goat. William Gratton, Adventures with the Connaught 
Rangers. 1809-1814, (London: 1901; reprint edition London: Greenhill Books, 1989) 20-
21, (page references to reprint edition). 
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Directeur-General two Administrateurs Generaux, who actually administer the 
organization, and several Administrateurs, who sat in council to deliberate matters before 
the Director General. He also established a Secretarial-General to administer the central 
office, with four bureaus de correspondance and one of compatabilite.61 The Corregimens 
too had its office with a Directeur, Inspecteur. Verificateurs62 and Receveurs. 63 
Marshal Macdonald's organization actually built an administrative structure to 
finance the army and government from the ground up instead of grafting new faces on 
to the old royal organization. He was the first then to form a viable civil administration 
in Catalonia, albeit along lines envisioned by Marshal Augereau. He organized his 
government with a military administration consisting of an artillery, engineer and 
administrative/logistical staff, gendarmerie, and arrondissement and fortress commands. 
The civil government also had a central administration (Conseil) with Arrondissements 
and offices of finance, justice, police, administration, commerce and marine.64 
The civil and military government was organized in four Arrondissements. The 
Ter, headquartered at Gerona, the Llobregnt at Barcelona, the Ebre at Reuss and the Segre 
61This office was separate from the Intendants des finances which was strictly a civil 
functionary, and who would regularly work with this new Regie des Domaine, SHAT, C 
(8) 50, Reglement sur l'Organisation de la Regie des Domaines en Catalogne, 18 June 
1810. 
62The Verificateur is the local manager of the work in the Corregimens, Ibid. 
63The Receveurs actually carry out the collections, Ibid. 
64See Appendix III, SHAT, C(8) 50, Marshal Macdonald, Projet d'Organisation de la 
Province de Catalogne en Divisions Militaires, 24 June 181 O; 
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at Urgel.65 At its inception, however, Macdonald manned only a portion of this 
government organization, choosing personnel in time. 66 
Macdonald appointed officers for his government from the Imperial government. 
Many were his personal aquaintances, while others came highly recommended by the 
Minister of War, General Savaray, Due de Rovigo, or Intendant General Daru. There 
was, for example, an Imperial Prefect as the Civil Intendant of the Arrondissement of 
Gerona and two Sous-Prefets, as Civil Intendants and a Judge as Commissaire de Justice. 
There were also landlords, administrators of the Imperial police officials, etc.67 These 
French officials though highly recommended, gave Macdonald's government a decidedly 
colonial flavor for there were, unlike earlier the French military government no Catalan 
officials in the upper administration, at least not in June 1810. 68 
The Augereau-Macdonald government was modeled on a trunkated image of the 
Imperial government though certainly not on the scale of the Napoleonic satelite 
kingdoms.69 The Catalan government did, however, closely resemble General Thiebault's 
651bid. 
66Manning the government posts is a problem universally encountered problem among 
military governors in Catalonia whose citizens were naturally loath to participate as 
Afrancescados in the French occupation of their country, as collaborators or traitors. Ibid. 
67lbid. 
68lbid. 
69See Appendix III; Connelly, Napoleon's Satelite Kingdoms, 237-241, 250-253. 
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schematic Military Government in his Manuel General,7° or the French Colonial 
Government, established by General Louis-Hubert Lyautey in Morocco in 1912.71 
In any case, Macdonald tried to fill his central and arondissement government with 
experienced Frenchmen, recommended by notables of the Imperial Government and who 
were known quantities to himself. He had seen first hand the difficulties of previous 
governments. He needed an efficient and trustworthy administration, and it was clearly 
his intent to build one. To maintain his personnel in these offices he i~sued arretes 
proclaiming their salaries and the budgets for their bureaus such as the Commissaire 
Ordinaire at Gerona and Figueras.72 He even paid promptly the existing functionaries 
such as the Inspector of Forests at Gerona and La Bispal.73 
Macdonald opened his government with a flurry of eight arretes or decrees from 
23 May to 10 June, and on 22 May he began publishing a Bulletin of Government Acts. 
On 27 May he decreed measures to end military abuse (arretes No. 3),74 the establishment 
of the Intendance of Gerona (No. 5 and 6),75 and the creation of a local National Guard 
70See Appendix III; Thiebault, Manuel General, 73 Subdivision, ler Division, ler 
Partie, 14-17. 
71 Alan Scham, Lyautey in Morocco. Protectorate Administration 1912-1925 (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1970) 61-69; Douglas Porch, The Conquest of Morocco. 
A Savage Colonial War (London: Papermac, 1986) 294-295. 
72See Appendix III; SHAT, C(8) 60, Macdonald, Arrete 17 November 181 O and Copy. 
73See Appendix III; SHAT, C(8) 60 Macdonald, Arrete 17 November 1810. 
74SHAT C(8) 185, Bulletin des Actes du Gouvernement General de la Catalogne 
(Barcelona: Chesz J. Alzine et P. Barrera, 1810), 1 :2; 
75Ibid, 1:5 
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for towns and villages of over 200 people (No. 7). 76 Other areas included commercial and 
individual acts. In the former case, Macdonald established economic policy, such as the 
importation of French manufactured goods (No. 8) bringing Catalonia into the fold of the 
Continental System and using commerce to support the Army. 77 Some arretes acted on 
individual cases such as reimbursing the price of five quintals of coffee (No. 11 ),78 or the 
sequestration of personal goods as a punitive measure against collaboration with the 
insurgents or nonpayment of contributions (No. 21). 79 Other acts include payments to the 
Provincial Receveur,80 currency valuations (No.53),81 and criminal arrests, particularly of 
corrupt members of the government (No.61). 82 Normal government functions, included 
actions on passports (No.87),83 the appointments to and meetings of the local Juntas,84 and 
obtaining money or supplies for the army (No.75 and 76). 85 
76Ibid, 1:6 
77Ibid, 1:11; Roustit, "Raymond Durand", 339-341. 
78Ibid, I: 13 
79Ibid, 1:24 
8
°Ibid. 
81Ibid, I :32 
82Macdonald made efforts to render his government trustworthy, such as his arrest of 
the Directeur des Domaines at Gerona, Ibid, 1:35. 
83Ibid, 1:40 
84Ibid, I :24 
85Ibid, 1:37-38 
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For the first time, a French commander seriously governed Catalonia as his 
correspondence and/arretes reveal. He applied to the Corregidor at Gerona as to the 
provision of forrage for General Frere's division,86 the use of local corvee workers,87 or 
cutting timber in dangerous woods along supply routes, where convoys were frequently 
attacked by insurgents88 or the reimbursement of confiscated goods for the army. 89 In this 
way he highlighted the legitimacy of his government. 
The results of Macdonald's government was the blunting of the harshness the war 
from previous French commanders. He was determined to pacify the province with just 
and efficient government, stripped of scandal, cruelty and with military victory. It was, 
however, the military side which finally defeated him, for he never subdued the 
insurgents. While covering Suchet's siege of Tortosa the insurgent activity was intense 
enough to force the Marshall to use summary executions in September 1810.9° From the 
end of 1810 through 1811, the Army of Catalonia, was inundated in the grim business of 
counter insurgency, while engaged in the thankless task of supporting Suchet's victorious 
sieges of Tortosa, Tarragona, Lerida and Mequininza. He suffered here a series of 
86SHAT, C(8) 129, CM-I, Macdonald to the Corregidor of Gerona, 30 May 1810. 
87lbid, Macdonald to M. Piazcola Commander of the Arrondissement de Cadagues, 
5 June 1810. 
88lbid., Macdonald to the Corregidor of Gerona, 9 June 181 O; Macdonald to General 
Amey, Governor of Gerona, 9 June 1810; Macdonald to General Pignatelli, 9 June 1810; 
and Macdonald to General Guillet, Governor of Figueras, 9 June 1810. 
89Ibid., Macdonald to M. Luppe, Intendant of Finances of Gerona, 19 June 1810, and 
MacDonald to General Amey, 19 June 1810. 
900man, Peninsular War, 3:496. 
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setbacks. In September he occupied the plains of Lower Catalonia, continuously harassed 
by the insurgents, which occasionally attacked and destroyed French cantonments, and 
units, making every movement hazardous. Macdonald responded with Augereau-like 
reprisals, burning villages and summarily shooting captured insurgents. 91 He even sent 
General Severoli on a destructive, though fruitless, raid for provisions returning with little 
except casualties.92 Meanwhile, the insurgent commander, General O'Donnel raided Upper 
Catalonia, held by the very capable General Baraguey d'Hilliers, and destroyed a French 
brigade at La Bispal, capturing its commander, the ever unlucky General Schwartz and 
1,183 troops on September 14.93 Two of Macdonald's brigades (Brigades Eugenio and 
Salm) also met a sharp check at Cardona on 21 October in Lower Catalonia.94 
Once he got news of the disaster at La Bispal, Macdonald temporarily returned to 
Upper Catalonia to assist Baraguey d'Hilliers reconsolidate the French hold in 
November.95 In January 1811 the insurgents cut up a 650 man French calvary foraging 
party near Lerida and infliched yet another severe check on Macdonald at the action of 
91 lbid. 
92Ibid., 3:496-497. 
93Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:342-344. 
94Vaciani, Storia della Campagne, 2:631-632, Oman, Peninsular War, 3:499-500. 
950man, Peninsular War, 3:501-502. 
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Pia near Lerida on 15 January, losing some 600 men.96 The insurgents even attempted 
in March though unsuccessfully, to capture Montjuich at Barcelona.97 
The disastrous fall in April of Figueras and the succeeding four month siege was 
the last straw for the Emperor who relieved Macdonald replacing him with General 
Decaen. The sheer weight of the ever ruthless insurgent war which Macdonald was 
unable to successfully contain, despite valiant efforts nullified the work of his 
government. Even the Emperor served to 'conspire' against him by placing many of his 
troops at General Suchet's disposal. 
Despite its ultimate failure, Marshal Macdonald's administrative and government 
reforms added a new dimension to the war effort and set the province on a path to 
pacification. He left a workable government to his successor, who made no fundamental 
changes and operated with success to the end of the war. Like Suchet, famous as the best 
administrator in Spain, Macdonald made a substantial contribution of no less value to the 
French War effort and which in fact kept the French occupation intact with no appreciable 
reinforcement of the Army. 98 
The last stage of the military government fell under the commands of General 
Decaen and Marshal Suchet. Both employed the government administration that Marshal 
96Ibid, 4:241-244. 
97Ibid., 4:244-245. 
98Though Macdonald clearly failed in his field operations, critical to the occupation, 
Richard Humble's assessment that his efforts contributed little to the French War effort 
is certainly wrong. Macdonald's government was certainly one of the best French military 
governments in Spain and made continued occupation and the support of the Army of 
Catalonia possible till 1814. Richard Humble, Napoleon's Peninsular Marshals. 207-208. 
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Macdonald established and neither made any fundamental changes in it. The only change 
that did occur though only on paper was in September 1811, after Macdonald finally 
reduced Figueras at the end of a four month siege. Napoleon attempted formally annex 
Catalonia to the French Empire.99 He even had the official proclamation drawn up100 and 
drew up a preliminary provincial organization which divided the province into four 
departments, the Ter (Capital at Gerona), Montserrat (Barcelona), Bouches-de-l'Ebre 
(Lerida) and Segre (Puigcerda). He ordered the appointment of Prefects and Catalonia 
administered (such as Justice) in the name of the Emperor. 101 Of course, this meant 
nothing for Catalonia remained unsubdued and the bulk of the province not even under 
French occupation. 
~iot de Melito, Memoires of Count Miot de Melito. Minister. Ambassador. 
Councillor of State. and Member of the Institute of France. Between the Years 1788 and 
1815, Ed. General Fleischmann, trans. Cashel Hoey and John Lillie, (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1881) 582; Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Correspondance 
Diplomatique Espagne, Vol. 672, Letter, Marshal Berthier to King Joseph 5 September 
1811. 
100The Proclamation was actually drawn up in January 1811. Napoleon had this 
project in the back of his mind for sometime. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:215. 
1011bid, 5:97. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Army of Catalonia was called upon to subdue the most rebellious province 
in Spain. To accomplish this, it required crack troops led by the best generals and an 
adequate supply system providing the necessaries of war. 
In the first case the actual forces of the French army in Eastern Spain hampered 
the French war effort. The quality of troops brigaded into General Duhesme's Corps 
d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales at the beginning of the war were so poor and led 
inevitably to difficulties in the field. Only the most experienced and best led soldiers 
could cope with the demands of the ferocious insurgent war, the virtual conscripts, which 
General Duhesme and more so General Reille led, could not. The conscripts, which the 
utterly untalented and luckless, General Schwartz, led at the engagement of Bruch in June 
1808 were simply incapable of handling the mass insurgent movement intent on their 
destruction. The Italian units were filled with green soldiers, fresh out of the depots. The 
Neapolitan troops were far worse. At their best, mere lazzaroni sweepings and at their 
worst out and out criminals which King Joseph of Naples was ridding his country. By 
1810 their quality worsened and Napoleon in a fit of pique against King Joachim of 
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Naples withdrew these riff raff. 1 One can but imagine the disciplinary agonies General 
Floristano Pignatelli encountered in commanding the Neapolitan Division.2 
General Severoli's Italian Division, unlike its Neapolitan counterpart, did creditable 
service in Catalonia. Marshal Macdonald sorely missed it when Napoleon transferred it 
to Suchet's Army of Aragon in 1811. 
The hodgepotch of German troops from the newly formed Rhenish and 
W estphalian realms were transferred to the VII corps for the Siege of Gerona and served 
bravely in Catalonia until 1813 when the demands of the war in the east drew off the 
Westphalians. The treason of Colonel Medor in Soult's Army of Spain led to the virtual 
disarming and transfer in disgrace of the Nassau Regiment in the Army of Catalonia, not 
for any misdeed, but as a precaution during the difficult days of 1813 which saw the 
defection of all of Napoleon's German allies. This was a tragic story of honor maintained 
at the twilight of the Empire. 
The problems of this polyglot force were mainly administrative. They were the 
stuff of funding of units, different languages, troop replacements, unit masses and 
provision of equipment, all things that are more or less under the control of a French 
commander. They were a worry to a whole series of commanding generals as is evident 
in their extensive correspondence with Paris. 
During the war the organization of the army greatly influenced its ability to 
conduct the war. At its beginning General Joseph Lechi built the Division d'Observation 
1UCN, No. 4304, Decision, 14 June 1810, 3:603-604. 
2SHAT, C(8) 3 70, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
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des Pyrenees Orientales on a virtual shoestring, and he never completed the organization 
of its staff until after the war broke out. The Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees 
Orientales, later assigned to the fiery General Guillaume Duhesme, who was versed in the 
realities of insurgent warfare and independent command, was also a recently tested 
veteran of the campaigning in Naples both in 1799 and in 1806, as well as 4th Division 
commander in Italy 1805. 
He marched into Catalonia with the greenest of troops and only a sprinkling of 
veteran and these mostly non-French.3 The insurrection caught Duhesme and Napoleon 
utterly by surprise. The ferocity of the resistance and its universality was nothing like 
Duhesme had experienced in Naples. His Corps, swallowed up in Barcelona was virtually 
cut off from France and clearly too small to conduct any offensive operations nor could 
it hold down the occupied areas and maintain the line of communications to France. 
Napoleon responded to Duhesme's pleas and sent General Reille to lead in a new 
division, scrapped together of troops even worse than Duhesme's. Division Reille had not 
only depot scrapings but a large mixture of unwilling national guard conscripts. This 
division too was swallowed up in Upper Catalonia and could barely maintain its 
communications with France since it continuously fought insurgents' attacks against its 
convoys. Its only offensive operation, the second siege of Gerona was an out and out 
failure which cost lives, prestige and tightened the noose around Barcelona. If anything 
was now painfully clear, Duhesme's Corps was too small and too green to handle its task. 
3Napoleon was aware of the poor quality of Duhesme's troops and cautioned him to impose 
the harshest discipline. CN, No. 13496, Napoleon to General Clarke, 28 January 1808; 16:281-
282. 
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against Generals Duhesme and Lechi were the faults that Napoleon tolerated the least -
he hated a complainer. These combined failings resulted in Augereau's dismissal from 
command. 
The VII Corps and Army of Catalonia underwent a profound change over 1809-10. 
It grew in size and prestige but the bifurcation that characterized the rest of the war 
between a field and arrondissement army began, though informally. 
In May 1810 the newest commander in this meat grinder took over Marshal 
Macdonald, lion hearted, good natured, honest and freshly handed his baton. He took on 
his task with a will, reordered the province, established a military government and set to 
the sisyphean task of resupplying Barcelona. 
Like his predecessors, he found Catalonia, almost impossible to manage. He 
organized his army for the field and occupation completely in 1810. This was the only 
way to hold the country and continue field operations. There were, however, logistical 
and secondary support operations to Marshal Suchet's conquest of Lower Catalonia, which 
must have galled Macdonald greatly. 
What Macdonald needed, however, was fresh troops to feed his "two armies." 
This was the only thing to break the deadlock between occupation and conquest. Troops, 
however, were not forthcoming, and the army was, in fact, reduced and later slashed by 
two divisions loaned to Suchet. This effectively ended any chance of offensive operations 
by Macdonald. All he could hope to do was to hold his posts, subdue part of the country, 
and supply his army. 
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Macdonald's command also collapsed under the weight of continued logistical 
problems and disasters in the field, such as Figueras. By August 1811 Napoleon would 
replace the now disgraced Macdonald with General Decaen, recently Governor of French 
India. Talented, politically adept and experienced, Decaen suffered from precisely the 
same problems of his predecessors. He, however, had the very difficult problem of the 
Anglo-Sicilian invasion of 1813 which finally destroyed his credit with Paris, leading to 
his fall. His army of Catalonia remained structurally unchanged from 1811-1813 but 
continued to shrink. 
General Decaen's successor, Marshal Suchet, combined the two armies of Aragon 
and Catalonia. His operations were characterized by the slow relinquishing of French 
occupied eastern Spain as the army retired on the Pyrenees, and the army shrank as a 
result of Napoleon's demands for even more troops to bolster his eastern front and the 
French frontier of the 1814 campaign. 
The major headache for each and every French commander in Catalonia was 
logistics. It is here that Napoleon's standing dictum "let war feed war" fell flat. Catalonia 
was a particularly poor country and simply could not support two contending armies and 
masses of insurgents in the best of times, but with a dramatically reduced agricultural 
output, due to the ravages of war, continual requisitions and the displacement of the 
populace, it was impossible. 
The successive Ordonnateurs en chef, Augier for Duhesme, Rey for St. Cyr, 
Bourdon for Mcdonald and Decaen and Bonderand for Suchet, were particularly talented 
and hard working. This was especially true of Ray and Bourdon, who nearly worked 
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themselves to death to secure adequate supplies, haul them, and pay for them. This was 
an uphill battle fought often against Imperial interference. 
The procurement of supplies was only partly done off the land which was both 
halting an unsure, particularly off long occupied ground. This threw the Army of 
Catalonia onto France and the Pyrenees districts of the 1 Oe Division Militaire in particular 
for continued supplies. France was quite hard pressed to support the enormous demands 
of the army. Its dependence became so consuming that General Lacuee, the Minister-
Directeur, bowing to repeated Imperial storms put his foot down and restricted his hitherto 
generous support of the Army of Catalonia. He demanded offensive movement as the 
tonic for lack of supplies. New ground to support would provide adequate new supplies 
and money to pay for the army. 
This 1811 policy certainly took a leaf from Suchet's book, but the Army of 
Catalonia lacked adequate forces and was incapable of launching such offensives. Nearly 
half of the army was needed for occupation services and a large portion of the 'Armee 
Active' too was required to fight the insurgent war, leaving about a division capable of 
offensive operations The collapse of this plan finally threw the Army of Catalonia onto 
the resources of France for the rest of the war. 
Hauling these supplies was another problem which forever plagued the logisticians. 
From 1808-1809 there was an utterly inadequate auxiliary equipage service. Not only was 
provender scarce in Catalonia but transport was too. The VII Corps lived virtually from 
hand to mouth in this respect and only the infusion of some pack mule brigades kept the 
corps from logistical paralysis. This too provided inadequate and Napoleon under General 
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Lacuee's continual prompting gave way to the transfer of two equipage battalions to 
Catalonia. 
These units did grueling service there along some of the worst roads in Europe. 
Their operations virtually destroyed these battalions, and it was only the continual 
intercession of General Lacuee that caused the one battalion to remain in Catalonia until 
1814, operational. 
The land convoys to the ever hungry Barcelona consumed a vast quantity of time 
and troops. They virtually suspended military operations and consumed vast quantities 
of transport, mostly auxiliary transport stripped form the screaming Prefects of the 
Pyrenees Departments. Some of these enormous convoys required 1,000 wagons and 
three divisions to escort, an index of the ferocity of the war. The sea transport used to 
feed the Army of Catalonia, and Barcelona in particular, suffered from the same 
drawbacks except that they expended naval resources. The same intensity of the war here 
was certainly evidenced by the near 50% loss rate of ships and many tons of supplies. 
The insurance rates and transport costs became so great that they were more costly than 
the actual cargo. The sea transport service was only partly successful due to the Corsair 
and British naval interference, but even a 50% success rate kept the garrison fed. 
The cost of this support was enormous. Since the army could never depend on 
local contributions it had to depend on French funding. For subsistence alone we speak 
of millions of francs per annum, a cost that France could ill afford and which Napoleon 
was loath to pay. It was the cost that caused many of the headaches of the Ordonnateurs. 
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Commanders and Ordonnateurs worked ceaselessly to support the army under the 
worst military circumstances. It was their work and that of the French staffs at every 
level that kept the war effort alive and the army undefeated until 1814 and the fall of the 
Empire. The lack of troops and logistical support from France made winning the war 
impossible in the long run, but the Herculean efforts of the staff and command in the 
Army of Catalonia staved off defeat and made the occupation unbreakable, under the most 
difficult circumstances. For this the French commanders, logisticians and staffs can be 
said to have done a genuinely creditable job at managing their war. Little glory accrued 
to them, but they doggedly held on to Catalonia under conditions that would have 
destroyed most armies. 
This dissertation has examined in detail the structure, operations and logistics of 
the Army of Catalonia which fought one of the most harrowing series of campaigns of 
the Napoleonic Wars. This work is, in point of fact, a unique treatment of this area of 
Napoleonic studies. At present there is no adequate operational or logistical treatment of 
the war. The studies of the nineteenth century were simply operational ones and rarely, 
if ever, touch upon the aspects of the organization of the Army of Catalonia and its 
impact on the operations of the war. 
The historians who address this aspect of the war (at all) include Sir Charles Oman 
in his A History of the Peninsular War, Juan Lopez's Guerra de la Indepencia 1808-1814, 
and Gomez de Arteche y Mono's enormous Guerra de la Independencia are the best of 
the narrative histories of the war. Oman, in particular, discussed the Army of Catalonia 
per se but not in detail. More recently, Scott Bowden's Armies at Waterloo and 
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Napoleon's Grande Armee: 1813 and Scott Bowden and Charles Tarbox's Armies on the 
Danube: 1809 all presented analyses of Napoleonic Armies. They only offer, however, 
an examination of the Grande Armee for a single campaign, not a whole war, and nor do 
they explore the force structure of the Army and its influences on the conduct of 
operations. 
In the area of logistics no one examines this critical area at all in any substantive 
way. The studies of the French Army, such as Elting's Swords Around a Throne, do 
examine the French logistical system but not in the light of any sustained military 
operation. This study, on the contrary, remedies this historical deficiency by not only 
examining the logistical structure of the Army of Catalonia but treating the logistical 
organization in action, that is, the process of logistical support operations to the Army of 
Catalonia. 
It examines, in tum, the logistical structure used in the Corps d'Armee and the 
Army of Catalonia in particular. Our discussion proceeds to a bird's eye view of the 
whole structure in its operation during the Peninsular War. Then, we proceed to a worm's 
eye view, the examination of a single area of logistical support - meat procurement and 
supply. Finally, I examine the problem of military transportation in Catalonia which 
effected the scheme of operations as profoundly as any factor of the war. 
In the area of logistics, then, this study breaks completely new ground by proving 
the difficulties of Napoleonic supply in Spain, and its profound effect on the conduct of 
operations. Secondly, the discussion on supply in Catalonia provides some desperately 
needed perspective on the notion of Napoleonic armies living off of the land, which were 
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traditionally held as the standard logistical system of the Grande Armee. It demonstrates 
that such supply was, in Catalonia, impossible, and the needs of the Army necessitated 
the establishment of formal lines of communication from France. 
The area of transportation is one which is not discussed to any extent in the 
modem literature as, for example, only briefly by Elting and that from a strictly 
organizational perspective. Georges Lechartier in his Les Services de l'Arriere a la 
Grande Armee en 1806-1807 and A. Pemot's Apers;u Historigue sur le Service des 
Transports Militaires, both treat of transportation more extensively, discussing its 
organization, and land and water transport. This dissertation goes further in examining 
the transport problem in Catalonia both at the ministerial and army level and in describing 
these operations within the perspective of the overall strategic thrust of the war. No other 
historian examines Napoleonic logistics as completely. This portion alone fills a wide gap 
in our knowledge of the organization and logistical operations. 
The last chapter on the French Military Government of Catalonia is a unique 
treatment of the organization of military government. The dissertation discusses the 
theoretical schema of a military government as laid down in General Paul Thiebault's 
Manual General du Service des Etats-Majors. Then it examines the military and political 
background of the French occupation and the establishment of an improvised government 
and its failure, leading into the establishment of a formal government. Only Connelly in 
his Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms discusses the organization and politics of the various 
Napoleonic Kingdoms, but never below the royal level, while Conard in ;his unfinished 
Napoleon et de Catalogne only discusses the improvised government. This dissertation 
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fills another gap in the history of the period by discussing provincial government as 
organized by the French command and discusses it in terms of the strategic necessities 
of the occupation, the pacification of the province and the support of the army. 
This dissertation makes an important contribution to the field of Napoleonic 
military history. First, it discusses a rarely considered area of the history of the 
Peninsular War, the war in Catalonia, which is of itself one of great importance. Second, 
I discuss the French military organization, operations, logistics and military government 
in a detailed and balanced manner, which gives unique insights into this area of history 
which other historians have neglected. Third, this dissertation discusses the war in terms 
of the above mentioned functions of the Army of Catalonia, 5 adding a unique perspective 
on the war. Finally, its conclusions and criticism of French policy in Catalonia (both 
military and political) offer a balanced view of how the Napoleonic military system 
worked and the practical and often intractable problems it faced. 
In these ways then, this unique perspective and handling of a little known area of 
Napoleonic history sheds light on the workings of Napoleonic armies and has added 
materially to our knowledge of how Napoleon managed his wars, and on the art of war 
in general. 
5Don Alexander in his Rod of Iron discusses the war m Aragon m the light of the 
counterinsurgent policy of the French occupation. 
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TABLE 1 
Infantry Regiment Staff 
and Unit Organization1 
Position 
Colonel 
Major 
Chefs de Bataillon (Bn. Cdr.) 
Adjudants-Major (Bn. XO) 
Quartier-ma!tre Tresorier (Quartermaster: Paymaster) 
Officier Payeur (pay officer) 
Porte-Aigle (Eagle Bearer) 
Chirurgien-Major (surgeon major) 
Aides-Chirurgiens (assistant surgeons) 
sous-aides (under assistant surgeons) 
Adjudants sous-officers (assistant adjutants) 
2e et 3e Port-Aigle 
Tambor-Major (Drum Major) 
Caporal-Tambor (corporal drummer) 
Musiciens dont un chef (bandsmen and bandmaster) 
Ma!tres Ouvriers (master craftsmen) 
TOTAL 
The Regimental Battalions 
1 er,2e et 4e Bataillon de guerre-
Compagnie de Grenadiers 
Compagnie de Voltigeurs 
Compagnie de Fusiliers 
3e Bataillon de guerre-
Compagnie de Fusiliers 
Bataillon de Depot 
Compagnie de Fusiliers 
Compagnie Supplementaire detachee 
Five Battalions 
(108 officers and 3,862 men) 
8 companies 
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Number 
1 
1 
4 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
5 
IO 
2 
1 
1 
8 
.A 
50 
1 
1 
4 
6 
3 
1 
2 
1CN, No. 13574. Decret. 18 February 1808, 16:338-341; H.C.B. Rogers, Napoleon's 
Army, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1974)61-62. 
Chef de Bataillon 
Adjutant-Major 
Marechal des Logis Chef 
TOTAL 
Position 
Capitaine 
Lieutenant 
Sous-Lieutenant 
Marechal des logis 
Sergeant 
Table 1 - continued 
The Battalion Staff 
Infantry Company3 
Caporal-Fourrier (Quartermaster Corporal) 
Caporal 
Soldats 
Tambor 
TOTAL 
2Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 61. 
3CN, No. 13574. Decret. 18 February 1808, 16:338-341. 
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1 
1 
i 
52 
Number 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
8 
121 
_z_ 
140 
I Colonel 
1 Major 
2 Chefs d'Escadron 
2 Adjudants-Majors 
1 Payeur-Quartremaitre 
1 Surgeon-Major 
TABLE 2 
Cavalry Regimental Staff4 
Total Regimental Strength: 800-900 men 
1 Aide-Major 
2 Sous-Aides-Major 
1 Brigadier-Trompettier 
1 Vetemary-Surgeon 
6 Maitres (tailor, saddler, 
cobbler, breeches maker, 
and spur maker) 
Cavalry Company Organization 
1 Captain 
1 Lieutenant 
I Sous-Lieutenant 
1 Marechal-des-logis-chef 
4 Marechaux-des-Logis 
1 Fourier 
8 Brigadiers 
1 Trumpeter 
82 Troopers 
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4Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 40; Bukhari, Emir, Napoleon's Cuirassiers and Carabiniers, 
Men-At-Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1977)4. 
Qrade/Position 
Colonel 
Chefs de Bataillon 
Adjudants 
Quartermasters 
Regimental Sergeants Major 
Surgeon Major 
Drum Major 
Corporal Drummer 
Bandsmen 
Master Craftsmen 
TABLE 3 
Artilleiy Regimental Staff5 
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Number 
1 
4 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
8 
3 
5Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 75-77; Nofi, Napoleon at War, 58-61; Elting, Swords 
Around a Throne, 258-259; Robert-Wilkinson-Latham, Napoleon's Artillery, Men-At-Arms 
Series, (London: Osprey, 1975)13-16; S. J. Park and G. F. Nafziger, The British Military; 
Its System and Organization 1803-1815, (Cambridge, Ontario: FAFM Co., Inc., 1983) 
40. 
~ Amount 
Shovels 3,589 
Pickaxes 3,280 
Billhooks 316 
Axes 295 
Pouches de Sappe 6 
Iron Wedges 18 
Sledge Hammers 24 
Large Iron Pincers 6 
Materials 
Packets (Spare Iron) 
Iron (Barrels) 
Iron Ingots (Barrels) 
Poliveaux 
Brick (Cubic Meters) 
TABLE 4 
Engineer Park6 
~ 
Sand Bags 
Baskets 
Cord Bundles 
Scaling Ladders 
Iron Stitching (Bale) 
l 6cm Nails (Kegs) 
8cm Nails (Kegs) 
Wagons 
Amount 
7 
70 
81 
20 
10 
388 
~mQYnt 
220,000 
10,000 
160 
200 
20 
8 
20 
2 
6Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:654; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Division de General 
Reille, 1 April 1809; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1July1809; SHAT; C(8)362, 
Situation, Siege de Girone, 15 September 1809. 
~ 
TABLE 5 
The Allied Contingents 
Anny of Catalonia 
Men 
Berg Contingents: Brigade Army, Division Verdier7 
1st-1st Regiment du Berg 751 
2d-1 st Regiment du Berg 723 
1st-2d Regiment du Berg 722 
2d-2d Regiment du Berg 723 
TOTAL 2,919 
Berg Contingent-September 18098 
1st 577 
2d 
--2.21 
TOTAL 1,168 
2nd Westphalian Division-Divisions General Graf Morio9 
1st Brigade-Brigade General Boemer 
2d Berg (2 battalions) 1,092 
4th Berg (2 battalions) 929 
2d Brigade-Oberst von Ochs 
3d Berg (2 battalions) 1,554 
1st Berg Light Battalion 323 
1 st,2d/1 st Artillery Regiment 120 
Cuirassiers _li 
TOTAL 4,030 
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Horses 
12 
10 
15 
1.§. 
63 
24 
21 
45 
26 
12 
21 
12 
14 
12 
97 
7SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Division de General Reille, 1 April 1809; Belmas, 
Joumaux des Sieges, 2:663. 
8Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges, 2:612. 
9SHAT, C(8)362, Situtation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; von Pivka, Napoleon's German 
Allies, 1: 15-16; von Pivka, Armies of the Napoleonic Era, 256-258. 
Table 5 - continued 
Division Pignatelli 10 
ler Leger Napolitain 
ler Ligne Napolitain 
2e Ligne Napolitain 
ler Chasseurs it cheval Napolitaine 
2e Chasseurs it cheval Napolitaine 
TOTAL 
1,076 
1,685 
2,172 
240 
_JM 
5,357 
Saxon Inf antiy Regiment1 1 
(1806) 
6 
18 
13 
232 
64 
338 
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The 4th Prinz Clemens Infantry Regiment had two battalions of two grenadier and four 
line companies each. 
REGIMENTAL STAFF 
Position Number Position Number 
Colonel 1 Fahenjunker (Cadets) 2 
Lieutenant Colonel 1 Stabfourrier 
Majors 2 (Staff Quartermaster) 1 
Adjutants-Majors 2 Drum Corporal 1 
Regimental Quartermaster 1 Musicians 1st Class 8 
Auditeur (Regimental Judge) 1 Musicians 2d Class 12 
Regimental Surgeon 1 Armorers 2 
Assistant Surgeon 1 Provost 1 
TOTAL 38 
The Companies 
Captains 1st Class 6 Surgeons 5 
Captains 2d Class 4 Corporals 100 
Lieutenants 10 Drummers (grenadier) 6 
Unterlieutenants 20 Drummers (musketeer) 24 
Feldwelel 10 Sappers (grenadier) 4 
Sergeants 20 Sappers (musketeer) 16 
Fouriers 10 Grenadiers 360 
Surgeons 5 Musketeers 1,440 
Total 2,043 
10SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809; Situation, VII Corps, 1 
January 1810. 
11Nafziger, Weiolowski and Devoe, Poles and Saxons of the Napoleonic Wars, 153. 
Command 
Commander 
Executive Officer (detail) 
Gendarmes a cheval 
Commander 
Cavalry 
Total 
Total 
Gendarmes a pied 
Commander 
Infantry 
Total 
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TABLE 6 
Gendannerie d'Espagne 
Force Structure12 
1 Chef d'Escadron 
1 Lieutenant 
10 eight man brigades 
1 Lieutenant 
1 Sous-lieutenant 
1 Marechal des logis-chefs 
2 Marechaux des logis ordinaires 
1 fourier 
6 brigades 
30 gendarmes13 
38 cavalry14 
2 trumpeters15 
82 soldiers 
10 twelve man brigades 
1 Lieutenant 
2 Sous-lieutenants 
1 Marechal des logis-chefs 
2 Marechaux des logis ordinaires 
1 fourier 
6 brigades 
50 gendarmes 
58 infantry 
2 trumpeters 
123 soldiers 
12Martin, La Gendarmerie Frans;aise, 19; Charon, "Gendarmerie Imperiale" 322. 
13Gendarmes drawn from units of the Legions de l'Interieur, both horse and foot. 
14Gendarmes drawn from cavalry and infantry regiments. 
15Trumpeters drawn from the cavalry and infantry contingents. 
Superior Officers 
Commander: 
Executive Officers: 
TABLE 7 
Legion de Catalogue 
Organization 
21 June 1810 16 
1 Colonel 
2 Chefs d'Escadron 
Company (Marshal Moncey's version) 
Commander 1 Captain 
Lieutenance Leaders 
Quartermaster 
Cavalry 
Infantry 
Total 
Company (Ministry version) 
Commander 
Lieutenance leaders 
Quartermaster 
Cavalry 
Total 
5 Lieutenants 
1 Sous-Lieutenant 
2 Marechaux des logis a cheval 
3 Brigades a cheval 
25 Gendarmes a cheval 
10 Marechaux des logis a pied 
15 Brigades a pied 
125 Gendarmes a pied 
187 Men 
1 Captain 
5 Lieutenants 
1 Sous-Lieutenant 
1 Marechal des logis a cheval 
4 Brigades a cheval 
25 Gendarmes a cheval 
8 Marechaux des logis a pied 
17 Brigades a pied 
125 Gendarmes a pied 
187 Men 
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16SHAT, X(t)l71, Ministere de la Guerre, 2eme Division, Bureau de la Gendarmerie 
Imperiale, Chef de Bureau Pryve, Rapport fait au Ministre, 21 June 1810. 
Table 7 - continued 
The Lieutenance 
Commander 
Cavalry 
Infantry 
Total 
Gendarme brigade 
Gendarme Sous-Officer or veteran 
Soldiers drawn from the line 
Total 
Legion Totals 
Four Companies @ 187 men 
Superior Officers 
Total 
Gendarme contribution to the Legion 
Horse 
foot 
Total 
Line contribution to the Legion 
horse 
foot 
Total 
Total 
Gendarme detachment in Catalonia 
Staff 
Total 
1 Lieutenant 
1 Sous-Officer a cheval 
5 Gendarmes a cheval 
2 Marechaux des logis a pied 
3 Brigades a pied 
25 Gendarmes a pied 
37 Men 
2 
4 
6 
748 
3 
751 
40 
200 
240 
80 
400 
480 
720 
28 
3 
751 
393 
Unit 
Commander 
Major 
1 er Compagnie 
2e Compagnie 
3e Compagnie 
4e Compagnie 
5e Compagnie 
6e Compagnie 
(ler,2e Compagnies) 
Commander 
Lieutenants 
Quartermaster 
Cavalry 
Total 
(3e,4e,5e,6e Compagnies) 
Commander 
Lieutenants 
Quartermaster 
Cavalry 
Infantry 
Total 
TABLE 8 
Legion de Catalogne17 
2 January 1811 
Quantity /Grade 
Colonel le Marchant 
Chef d'Escadron 
Chef d'Escadron Casabianca 
Chef d'Escadron Lenoir 
Capitaine Richard 
Capitaine Sempe 
Capitaine Niderlinder 
Capitaine Castlenau 
1 Chef d'Escadron 
5 Lieutenants 
1 Sous-lieutenant 
2 Marechaux des logis chef 
2 Brigadiers a cheval 
27 Gendarmes a cheval 
1 Trumpeter 
6 Marechaux des logis a pied 
14 Brigades a pied 
218 Gendarmes a pied 
2 Drummers 
279 
1 Captain 
4 Lieutenants 
1 Sous-lieutenant 
1 Marechal des logis a cheval 
2 Brigades a cheval 
20 Gendarmes a cheval 
1 Trumpeter 
5 Marechaux des logis a pied 
10 Brigades a pied 
263 Gendarmes a pied 
2 Drummers 
210 
17SHAT, X(f) 171, Extrait des Minutes de la Secretaire d'Etat, 2 January 1811. 
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~ 
ler Legion 
9e Legion 
4e Dragons 
24e Dragons 
24e Chasseurs 
26e Chasseurs 
29e Chasseurs 
12e Legion 
27e Legion 
28e Legion 
7e Leger 
I le Ligne 
13e Ligne 
23e Ligne 
24e Ligne 
26e Ligne 
35e Ligne 
53e Ligne 
60e Ligne 
62e Ligne 
79e Ligne 
84e Ligne 
92e Ligne 
95e Ligne 
106e Ligne 
l 18e Ligne 
120e Ligne 
122e Ligne 
5e Ligne 
18e Ligne 
TABLE 9 
Recruits to the 3e Compagnie 
Legion de Catalogne 
1 April 1811 18 
Marechal Corporal 
des Logis Brigadi!ilr Pvt. 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
2 
I I 
I 
4 
1 
I 2 
I 
4 2 2 
2 I 
I 
I 
2 4 
I 3 9 
3 
3 3 8 
2 
2 10 3 
3 5 5 
I 
I 4 4 
2 I 
I 
I 3 12 
2 
2 2 
395 
Total 
2 
I 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
4 
1 
3 
I 
8 
3 
I 
I 
6 
13 
3 
14 
2 
15 
13 
I 
9 
3 
I 
16 
2 
4 
18SHAT, X(f) 171, Proci~s Verbal d'Organisation de la 3e Compagnie de Gendarmerie 
de la Legion de Catalogne, I April 1811. 
~ 
I er Compagnie a cheval 
2e Compagnie a cheval 
3e Compagnie a pied 
Staff 
Commander 
Quartermaster 
TABLE 10 
Organization Legion Catalan 
October 1811 19 
Strength 
I Captain 
I Lieutenant 
I Marc~chal des logis chef 
4 Brigades 
24 Gendarmes 
1 Captain 
1 Lieutenant 
I Marechal de logis chef 
3 Brigades 
20 Gendarmes 
1 Captain 
I Lieutenant 
1 Marechal de logis 
2 Brigades 
I Trumpeter 
3 8 Gendarmes 
1 Colonel 
1 Major 
2 Chefs d'Escadron 
2 Chefs de Bataillon 
1 Lieutenant 
396 
19SHAT, X(t)l70, Ministere de la Guerre, 2e Division Bureau de la Gendarmerie, 
Chef de Bureau Pryve, Rapport fait au Ministre de la Guerre, 14 October 1811. 
~ 
Colonel 
Adjudant-Major 
Aumonier21 
Captain 
Lieutenant 
Sous-Lieutenant 
Sergeant Major 
Sergeant Fourrier 
Corporal 
Appointes 
Drummer and Fife 
Soldiers 
Infirmiers 
Total 
TABLE 11 
Compagnie Municipale 
Barcelona 180820 
Number 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
6 
9 
14 
6 
92 
13 
150 
397 
20AN, AFIV 1118, Bureau de l'Inspection, General Clarke, Rapport a l'Empereur, 2 
July 1811. 
21 Normally Napoleon only allowed Chaplains in his allied and foreign units regardless 
of the orgin of their organization, e.g., the Swiss units in French employ. 
TABLE 12 
Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales22 
General de Division Comte Joseph Lechi 
~ Strength 
ler Brigade-General Millossewitz 
2e-2e de Ligne Italien 708 
3e-4e de Ligne Italien 554 
2e-5e de Ligne Italien 798 
ler Velites Royaux 422 
2e Brigade 
3e-2e de Ligne Suisse 448 
3 e- l 6e de Ligne 773 
ler-ler de Ligne Napolitain 968 
2e-ler de Ligne Napolitain 944 
Regiment Provisional de Chasseurs/Dragons 
1 Cie. Chasseurs Roy aux Italiens 150 
1 Cie. Dragons Italiens 150 
lCie. Dragons Napoleon 150 
1Esc.-2e Chasseurs Napolitains 160 
Cavalry Brigade General Bertrand Comte Bessieres 
Regiment Provisional de Cuirassiers 
1 Cie/5e-4e Cuirassiers 118 
1 Cie/5e-6e Cuirassiers 111 
1 Cie/5e-7e Cuirassiers 102 
1 Cie/5e-8e Cuirassiers 109 
Regiment Provisional de Chasseurs a cheval 
1Cie/4e-14e Chasseurs a cheval 122 
1Cie/4e-15e Chasseurs a cheval 106 
1Cie/4e-19e Chasseurs a cheval 100 
1 Cie/4e-23e Chasseurs a cheval 82 
398 
22No staff had yet been formed for the division, which lacked an Inspecteur aux 
revues, Commissaire des guerres, Chef d'Etat-Major, a brigade and Division Artillery 
commander. SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees-Orientales, 15 
December 1807. 
Table 12 - continued 
Artillerie 
11 eCie Artillerie Italien 
1 Cie Train d'Artillerie Italien 
6e/6e (bis) du Train 
Cannon 
four 8pd and eight 4pd cannon (a pied) 
two 8pd and four cannon (a cheval) 
Division Total 
79 
74 
61 
7,887 
399 
TABLE 13 
Artillery Structure: Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales23 
:umt 
1 le/ler d'Artillerie a pied 
one Co/3e d'Artillerie a pied 
one Co/2e d'Artillerie a cheval 
one Co/du Train d'Artillerie Italien 
6e/6e Bataillon (bis) 
du Train d'Artillerie 
Strength 
76 men 
100 men 
120 Horses 
230 horses 
80 vehicles 
Man:h Columns 
Artillerv 
four 12 pdr 
eight 4 pdr 
two 8 pdr 
four 4 pdr 
62 caisons 
Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales24 
Column 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
~ 
ler Ligne Napolitaine 
2e and 4e Ligne Italien 
Se Ligne ltalienne, Velites Roy aux 11 e Cie 
Arrival Date 
14 January 1808 
15 January 1808 
Artillerie Train d'Artillerie Italien 17 January 1808 
Chasseurs Dragoon Provisional regiment 
Cavalry Brigade 
6e/6e (bis) du Train 
18 January 1808 
19 January 1808 
400 
23SHAT, X( d)3 54, Artillerie, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees, 1808, 6e Division 
Bureau de l'artillerie, Ministere de la Guerre, Rapport a l'Empereur, 1 January 1808. On 
4 January, General Gassendi wrote to General Gerard, outlining his switch of the 6e/7e 
du Train to the 6e/6e (bis) du Train, the purchase of 1,000 horses and concentrating this 
unit at Perpignan on 25 January. Ibid. Chef de la 6e Division, Bureau d'Artillerie au 
General Gerard, Chef de la 3e Division, 4 Janvier 1808. 
24SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 December 
1807. 
TABLE 14 
Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, Barcelona25 
Commander: General de Division Duhesme 
Chief of Staff: Chef d'Escadron Ordonneau 
Artillery: Colonel Fabre 
Engineers: Captain Menard 
1st Division: General Chabran 
Men llorses 
1st Brigade: General Goullus 
3e-2e Suisse 
3e-16e Ligne 
7e Ligne 
2d Brigade: General Nicolas 
3e-2e Ligne 
3e-37e Ligne 
3e-56e Ligne 
3e-93e Ligne 
DIVISION TOTAL 
2d Division: General Joseph Lechi 
1st Brigade: General Millossewitz 
TOTAL 
V elites Roy aux 
2e-2e Ligne 
3e-4e Ligne 
2e-5e Ligne 
2d Brigade: General Lechi 
EM,1er,2e,3e-1er Ligne Napolitaine 
DIVISION TOTAL 
Regiment Wimpffen (attached) 
DIVISION TOTAL 
603 
708 
1,905 
605 
563 
819 
795 
6,168 
521 
776 
607 
863 
2,767 
2,028 
4,795 
2,108 
6,903 
5 
6 
14 
4 
4 
7 
5 
45 
14 
9 
5 
5 
33 
17 
50 
50 
401 
25SIIAT, C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 
1808. 
Table 14 - continued 
Cavalry: General Bessieres 
1st Brigade: General Bessieres 
3e Regiment Provisoire de 
Cuirassiers 
Regiment Provisional de Chasseurs 
2d Brigade: General Schwartz 
Chasseurs Prince Royal 
2e Regiment de Chasseurs 
Calvary Total 
Artillery 
1 er Artillerie de Division 
7e/2e d'Artillerie Legere 
6e/6e (bis) du Train 
2e Artillerie de Division 
11 e Artillerie a Pied 
1 er Train d' Artillerie de la Garde 
Artillery Total 
Two twelve pounder cannon 
Two eight pounder cannon 
Twelve four pounder cannon 
Two six pounder howitzers 
Corps Total 
Totals 
Present under arms 
Detached 
Prisoner of war 
Furlough 
421 
485 
520 
396 
1,822 
123 
90 
79 
68 
360 
15,253 
13,521 
1,089 
594 
4 
44 
428 
486 
455 
399 
1,768 
96 
199 
104 
399 
2,262 
2,145 
117 
402 
TABLE 15 
Division Reille26 
Commander: General de Division Honore Charles Comte Reille 
(1775-1860) 
Brigades: Generals Dialier, Guillot and Joba 
Unit Men Horses 
4e- l 6e Ligne 1,007 6 
Bataillon V alaison 456 
5e Legion de Reserve 666 4 
Bataillon de Perpignan 447 
4e-2e Ligne 795 3 
4e-56e Ligne 947 6 
ler,2e-l 13e Ligne 1,409 2 
Gendarmerie 103 38 
28e Chasseurs a cheval 173 173 
2e Chasseurs Napolitains 260 286 
2e Artillerie a cheval 53 
Train d'Artillerie 10 19 
Train de Requisition 43 75 
ler-32 Leger 463 75 
Cannoniers Veterans 64 
Cannoniers Gardes-Cotes 20 
TOTAL 6,915 602 
26SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Division de General Reille, nd. 
403 
TABLE 16 
VII Corps 
5 December 180827 
Staff 
Commander: Colonel General Gouvion Saint-Cyr 
Chief of Staff: General Louis Emmanuel Rey (1768-1846) 
Artillery: General Ruty 
Engineers: General Sanson 
Gendarmerie: Captain Casabiana 
Wagonmaster General: Adjudant-Sous Officer Provost 
lnspecteur aux revues: Sous Inspecteur aux revues Soutras 
Ordonnateur en chef: Commissaire Ordonnateur Rey 
Division Reille: General Reille 
Brigades: Generals Joba and Guillot 
Unit 
16e Ligne 
5e Legion de Reserve 
Chasseurs Eclaireurs 
Bataillon V alaison 
28e Chasseurs a cheval 
Gendarmerie 
32e Leger 
2e Ligne 
56e Ligne 
113e Ligne 
2e Chasseurs a cheval 
1 Oe/4e Artillerie a Pied 
2e Artillerie a cheval 
TOTAL 
959 
940 
613 
326 
328 
90 
635 
782 
938 
889 
443 
122 
82 
6,987 
27SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808. 
Horses 
3 
6 
1 
230 
33 
5 
9 
5 
7 
335 
74 
698 
404 
Table 16 - continued 
Division Chabot General Louis, Baron Chabot (1757-1837) 
Ier,2e-3e Ligne Napolitan 1,546 13 
Division Pino: General Pino 
Brigades: Generals Mazzuchelli and Fontane, Adjutant Commandant 
Balabio. 
Unit 
2e Leger 
4e Ligne 
Chasseurs Royaux 
ler Leger 
6e Ligne 
7e Ligne 
Dragons Napoleon 
Velites Royaux 
Se Ligne 
Artillerie a Pied 
Artillerie a cheval 
Train 
Sappers 
Total 
Men 
1,929 
1,991 
569 
1,752 
2,369 
712 
534 
122 
521 
96 
92 
155 
96 
10,398 
Horses 
535 
506 
84 
252 
1,377 
405 
Table 16 - continued 
Division Souham: General Joseph, Comte Souham (1760-1837) 
Brigades: Generals Dumoulin and Verger 
Unit 
ler Leger 
4e-3e Leger 
42e Ligne 
4e-7e Ligne 
4e-67e Ligne 
4e- l l 2e Ligne 
24e Dragons 
13e/4e Artillerie a Pied 
Se Artillerie a cheval 
6e Artillerie a cheval 
lSe Ouvriers 
4e (bis) du Train 
Se (bis) du Train 
TOTAL 
2,208 
833 
3,131 
S32 
812 
781 
706 
63 
32 
10 
s 
86 
39 
9,238 
Horses 
18 
3 
18 
7SS 
3 
32 
10 
149 
72 
1,060 
406 
Table 16 - continued 
Division Duhesme: General Duhesme, General Joseph Lechi 
Brigades: General Joseph, Comte Chabran (1763-1843), Fran9ois 
Baron Goullus (1758-1833), Jean Baron Nicholas (1765-1833), 
Millosewitz Fran9ois-Xavier, Baron de Schwartz (1762-1826), and 
Bertrand, Baron Bessieres (1773-1854) 
Unit Men Horses 
3e-2e Suisse 787 5 
7e Ligne 2,234 21 
4e-16e Ligne 97 4 
2e-2e Ligne 
4e-37e Ligne 889 5 
3e-56e Ligne 96 1 
3e-93e Ligne 1,006 7 
Bataillon de Reserve 594 4 
7e/3e Artillerie a cheval 120 91 
6e/6e (bis) du Train 101 166 
Velites Royaux 486 16 
2e-2e Ligne 728 9 
3e-4e Ligne 571 5 
2e-5e Ligne 826 5 
ler Ligne Napolitan 1,668 17 
11 e/ Artillerie a Pied 78 8 
Train d'Artillerie de la Garde 61 100 
3e Provisoire Cuirassiers 446 340 
3e Provisoire Chasseurs 657 543 
Regiment Prince Royal 486 331 
2e Chasseurs Napolitains 89 65 
Total 12,020 1,743 
407 
Table 16 - continued 408 
Unit Men Horses 
Artillery 
12e,13e/4e Artillerie a Pied 181 
10e,l le/7e Artillerie a Pied 219 10 
3e Compagnie d'Ouvriers 56 
3e/3e de Pontonniers 95 
6e Artillerie a cheval 22 22 
9e Artillerie a pied Italien 50 
1 er/ Artillerie a cheval Italien 23 18 
ler,2e,3e,5e,6e/4e (bis) du Train 226 330 
6e du Train 10 19 
Total 1,293 1,123 
Engineers 
2e/3e Sappeurs 127 7 
4e/1 er Sappeurs 97 2 
7e/2e Sappeurs 101 4 
Total 325 13 
Total 42,503 6,155 
Present Under Arms 34,172 5,439 
Detached 2,827 716 
Hospital 5,116 
Prisoners of War 387 
Furlough 1 
Commander: 
Chef de l'Etat-General: 
Commandant d'Artillerie: 
Directeur du Pare: 
Commandant du Genie: 
Chef d'Attaque: 
Ordonnateur: 
Inspecteur aux revues: 
TABLE 17 
Armee de Siege VII Corps 
1 July 180928 
General de Division Comte Verdier 
Adjutant Commandant Requin 
General de Brigade Baron Taviel 
Chef de Bataillon Charrue 
General de Division Sanson 
Chef de Bataillon Fleury 
M. Raet 
M. Gauti 
Division Verdier: General Verdier 
Men Horses 
Brigade Joba-General Joba 
32e Leger 
7e Ligne 
16e Ligne 
Detachement V alaisan 
28e Chasseurs a cheval 
Brigade Guillot-General Guillot 
2e Ligne 
56e Ligne 
113e Ligne 
Brigade Amey-General Amey 
Rgt. de W urtzburg 
ler Berg 
2e Berg 
Be. des Princes 
Gendarmerie 
Division Total 
1,042 
864 
990 
309 
183 
717 
893 
1,101 
1,703 
1,559 
1,548 
802 
20 
11,729 
11 
6 
3 
2 
176 
6 
5 
6 
35 
19 
54 
19 
8 
350 
409 
28SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. Belmas, Joumaux des Sieges 
faits OU Soutenus par les Fran£ais dans la Peninsule, de 1807 a 1814; (Paris: Chez Firmin 
Didot Freres et Cie 1836), 2:651-652. Numbers are for effectives, including Present 
Under Arms, Hospital, detached, etc., that is Grand Totals. 
410 
Table 17 - continued 
Division Mario: General de Division Mario 
Men Horses 
Brigade Bomer-General Bomer 
2e Ligne 1,092 26 
4e Ligne 929 12 
Brigade Ochs-General Ochs 
ler Leger 323 7 
3e Ligne 1,554 21 
Cuirassiers 12 12 
Division Total 3,910 78 
Division Lechi: General Lechi 
Brigade Millossewitz-General Millossewitz 
Velites Royaux 541 13 
5e de Ligne Italien 1,372 9 
Chasseurs Prince Royal 385 225 
Brigade Zenardi-General Zenardi 
ler de Ligne Napolitaine 1,295 11 
2e de Ligne Napolitaine 1,470 8 
2e Chasseurs Napolitaine 434 369 
Det. d'Artillerie 28 35 
Det. du Train 51 60 
Division Total 5,576 730 
Artillery /Engineers 
2e,5e,12e/3e Art. a pied 357 21 
10e,12e,13e/4e Art. a pied 353 19 
4e, l 4e/6e Art. a pied 158 12 
ler,2e/ler Art. 
Westphalien 128 14 
Art. du Due de Berg 44 3 
Depot Art. a Pied 15 0 
3e,9eCos Ouvriers 
d'Artillerie 50 5 
2e Art. a cheval 74 62 
1 er de Pioneers 176 1 
12e du Train 251 416 
2e (bis) du Train 66 123 
4e/13e (bis) du Train 98 100 
5e Co. Mineurs 98 16 
2e/3e de Sappeurs 
4e Co. Sappeurs Italien 
7e/2e Sappeurs 
Grand Total 
Table 17 - continued 
115 
94 
80 
23,382 
12 
4 
4 
1,970 
411 
TABLE 18 
Anny of Catalonia29 
31May1810 
Commander: Marshal Macdonald, Due de Tarente 
Chief of Staff: General Guilleminot 
Artillery: General Taviel 
Engineers: Lieutenant Colonel30 Toumadre 
Gendarmerie: Captain Casabianca 
Wagonmaster General: Adjuint Officer Provost 
Inspecteur aux revues: Inspecteur aux revues Porte 
Ordonnateur en chef: Commissaire Ordonnateur Rey 
Division Frere: General Frere 
1st Brigade: General Augereau 
2d Brigade: General Loreney 
Unit Men Horses 
ler Leger 1,928 19 
7e Ligne 3,567 20 
4e Ligne 2,716 19 
93e Ligne 966 6 
3e Provisoire de Chasseurs 
a cheval 468 272 
24e Dragons 815 740 
Artillerie a pied 90 4 
Sappeurs -1Q1 __ 4 
Total 10,655 1,084 
29SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, l'Armee de Catalogne 31 May 1810. 
412 
30The grade of Lieutenant Colonel is called Colonel in second in the French system 
and is applied to regimental level commanders and major staff heads, like the Engineer 
Commandant. They are in essence a "second in command." 
Division Severoli: 
1st Brigade: 
2d Brigade: 
3d Brigade: 
Unit 
ler Leger 
6e Leger 
7e Ligne 
2e Leger 
4e Ligne 
Dragons Napoleon 
Chasseurs Royaux 
Sappeurs 
Train 
Artillerie a cheval 
Artillerie a pied 
Total 
Division Verdier: 
1st Brigade: 
2d Brigade: 
3d Brigade: 
32e Leger 
2e Ligne 
16e Ligne 
56e Ligne 
Bataillon V alaisaon 
Regiment Wurtzbourg 
ler Regiment de Berg 
2e Regiment de Berg 
Bataillon des Princes 
Table 18 - continued 
General Severoli 
General Mazzuchelli 
General Palombini 
Men 
1,690 
1,445 
812 
1,877 
1,698 
262 
75 
110 
130 
80 
~ 
8,265 
Horses 
252 
70 
87 
52 
_1 
468 
General de Division Verdier 
General Amey 
General Guillot 
Adjudant Commandant Devaux 
856 16 
843 5 
690 3 
987 4 
343 2 
1,330 32 
928 24 
858 21 
211 6 
4e Bataillon Tour d'Auvergne 286 4 
Regiment Leger Westphalien 204 7 
2e Ligne Westphalien 388 12 
3e Ligne Westphalien 555 12 
4e Ligne W estphalien 542 _l1 
Total 165 
413 
Table 18 - continued 
Division Pignatelli: General Pignatelli 
Unit Men 
Ier Leger Napolitain 1,076 
ler Ligne Napolitain 1,685 
2e Ligne Napolitain 2,172 
ler Chasseurs a cheval Napolitain 240 
2e Chasseurs a cheval Napolitain 184 
Total 5,357 
Division Rouyer: 
1st Brigade: 
General Rouyer 
General Schwartz 
Horses 
6 
18 
13 
232 
..M 
333 
2d Brigade: Colonel de Second de Chamband 
4e de Saxe 
5e de Confederation du Rhin 
6e de Confederation du Rhin 
Total 
1,658 
1,313 
1.005 
3,976 
60 
38 
...£2. 
123 
Barcelona: General Lacombe St. Michel 
Unit Men Horses 
Se Ligne Italien 1,177 16 
Chasseurs des Montagnes 331 7 
4e-37e Ligne 804 5 
4e-67e Ligne 915 6 
2e Suisse 347 4 
Det/79e Ligne 329 4 
4e-1 l 2e Ligne 559 
Companie Municipale 161 
Sappeurs Royaux 113 
I er de Nassau 1,270 
Cuirassiers 316 99 
Artillerie et Train Italien _lfil2 20 
Total 6,502 164 
GQG 
3e Leger 942 21 
3e Prov. Cuirassiers 358 269 
Gendarmerie Imperiale ___@_ 23 
Total 1,368 312 
414 
415 
Table 18 - continued 
Artillerie: General Noury 
3e Artillerie a Pied 319 15 
4e Artillerie a Pied 231 13 
6e Artillerie a Pied 188 10 
7e Artillerie a Pied 102 5 
2e Artillerie a cheval 143 110 
Se Artillerie a cheval 26 9 
3e Companie d'Ouvriers 55 5 
9e Companie d'Ouvriers 22 
3e Bataillon de Pontoniers 80 5 
Pionniers 78 
Artillerie W estphalienne 59 4 
Artillerie de Berg 89 4 
12e Bataillon Principal du Train 112 84 
4e Bataillon (bis) du Train 492 447 
13e Bataillon (bis) du Train 234 106 
Total 2,170 817 
Engineers: 
Unit Men Horses 
Seller Bataillons de Mineurs 85 2 
7e/2e Bataillons de Sappeurs 120 ~ 
Total 205 6 
Present Under Arms 33,127 3,096 
Absent With Pay: 
Embarked 
Detached 2,278 373 
Absent Without Pay: 
Hospital 2,799 
Prisoners of War 2,292 
Furlough, etc. 23 
Total Effective Strength 47,519 3,469 
Division Quesnel 
Commander: 
Chief of Staff: 
Commissaire des guerres: 
1st Brigade: 
lmit 
3e-3e Ligne 
ler,3e-32e Leger 
4e-2e Ligne 
3 e-60e Ligne 
4e-29e Chasseurs a cheval 
Total 
2d Brigade: 
ler,2e-23e Leger 
3e-79e Ligne 
4e-37e Ligne 
Baraillon V alaison 
3e-2e Suisse 
Regiment du Wurtzbourg 
20e Chasseurs a cheval 
Artillery 
Train 
Total 
Division Total 
Brigade Dummoulin: 
ler,2e,4e-3e Ligne 
3 e-24e Dragons 
Total 
Brigade Clement: 
ler,2e,3e,4e-67e Ligne 
Detachment/24e Dragons 
Total 
TABLE 19 
Annee Active 
Corps d'Annee en Haute Catalogne 
15 March 181131 
General Quesnel du Torpt 
Adjudant Commandant Nogues 
M. Lapiniere 
General Garreau 
Effective Strength 
Men HQrs~s 
673 2 
689 17 
483 6 
910 2 
232 190 
2,987 207 
General Palmarol 
1,348 4 
639 2 
856 4 
275 2 
412 3 
551 28 
12 
15 16 
4,108 59 
7,095 276 
General Dummoulin 
3,723 
_lU 211 
4,036 211 
General Clement 
2,585 
_n 32 
2,617 32 
416 
31SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne, 15 March 1811. 
Brigade Lefebvre: 
2e,3e-102e Ligne 
Detachment/24e Dragons 
Total 
Total-Armee Active 
ler Arrondissement Territorial: 
4e-16e Leger 
Bataillon W estphalien 
Detachment/24e Dragons 
Depot-1 er Leger Italien 
Depot-3e Leger Italien 
Depot-4e Ligne 
Depot-Se Ligne 
Depot-6e Ligne 
Depot-1 er Leger Westphalien 
Depot- I er Ligne 
Depot-3e Ligne 
Depot-Bataillon de Tarn 
Depot-18e Leger 
Total 
2e Arrondissement Territorial: 
4e-112e Ligne 
4e-La Tour d'Auvergne 
Depot-1 er Leger 
Depot-Se Ligne 
Depot-7e Ligne 
Depot-112 Ligne 
Depot-23e Ligne 
Depot-42e Ligne 
Depot-S6e Ligne 
Depot-81 e Ligne 
Depot-93 Ligne 
Chasseurs de Montagne 
4e Compagne d'Infirmeries 
Total 
Table 19 - continued 
General Lefebvre 
Effective Strength 
~ IfOrses 
1,640 
_A§ 
1,686 
15,554 
General Guillet 
537 
328 
34 
197 
194 
200 
288 
82 
297 
301 
lSS 
24 
_lli 
2,8SO 
16 
42 
58 
657 
8 
11 
32 
1 
3 
SS 
Adjudant Commandant Mollard 
291 2 
147 3 
200 
33 
167 
37 
44 
234 
17 
67 
66 
47 
~ 
1,405 s 
417 
Table 19 - continued 
Corps Artillery: General Noury 
Effective Strength 
~ Men Horses 
5e/3e Artillerie a pied 89 7 
3e/2e Pontoniers 82 4 
3e,9e/Ouvriers d'Artillerie 26 2 
Detachment/4e (bis) du Train 91 73 
Detachment/9e (bis) du Train 53 3 
Detachment/12e (bis) du Train 42 34 
1 er,2e/ Artillerie Westphalienne 44 
lerNalaisan 44 
Depot-Artillerie a pied et cheval 17 3 
3e/12e Artillerie a pied 
12e/4e Artillerie a pied 
Detachment/Be (bis) du Train 
4e/6e Artillerie a pied 
Detachment/ Artillerie du Berg 
Total 
Engineers: 
4e,5e/l er Mineurs 
2e Sappeurs 
3e Sappeurs 
Total 
Recapitulation 
Present Under Arms 
Absent With Pay 
Embarked 
Detached 
Absent Without Pay 
Hospital 
Prisoners of War 
Leave, etc. 
Effective Total 
70 7 
92 7 
51 
30 5 
36 
767 145 
Chef de Bataillon Michel 
106 4 
1 
--1 
111 4 
15,812 
1,268 
2,051 
487 
_ill 
20,149 
731 
18 
749 
418 
TABLE 20 
Annee de Catalogne32 
1 December 1811 
Command Group 
Commander: 
Chief of Staff: 
Assistant Chief of Staff: 
Artillery: 
Engineers: 
Gendarmerie: 
Waggon Master General: 
Inspecteur aux revues: 
Ordonnateur en chef: 
Division Lamarque 
Commander: 
Chief of Staff: 
llnit 
ler,2e,3e-l le Ligne 
ler,2e,3e-67e Ligne 
ler,2e,3e,4e-29, Chasseurs a cheval 
Miquelets 
ler,2e,3e,4e-3e Leger 
4e,60e Ligne 
Det-1 er Leger 
2e-20e Chasseurs a cheval 
Det- l 8e Leger 
Det-5e Ligne 
Det-7e Ligne 
Det-23e Ligne 
Det-42e Ligne 
Det-56e Ligne 
Det-Nassau 
4e- l 6e Ligne 
3e-81e Ligne 
Total 
General de Division Comte Decaen 
General de Brigade Baron de Plauzonne 
Adjutant Commandant Monistrol 
General Taviel 
Major Michel 
Chef d'Escadron Lenoir 
Beauregard 
M. Prisye 
Commissaire-Ordonnateur Bourdon 
General Baron Lamarque 
Adjutant Commandant Behr 
Effective Strength 
Men 
2,355 
1,893 
649 572 
102 
2,845 
944 
529 
202 
33 
120 
478 
17 
346 
21 
258 
377 
_ill 
10,936 
Horses 
23 
19 
49 
5 
1 
210 
8 
887 
32SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, l'Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. 
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Brigades 
Brigade Clement: 
Brigade Hamelinaye: 
Brigade Vigier: 
ler Arrondissement Territorial 
Mont Louis/Rosas: 
~ 
2e-Chasseurs de Montagne 
ler-Bataillon de Lande 
ler-Bataillon de Haute-Garonne 
3e-2e Suisse 
ler-ler Wutzbourg 
Total 
2e Arrondissement Territorial-
Figueras: 
Chief of Staff: 
Brigade Lefebvre: 
Brigade Beurmann: 
ler,2e-23e Leger 
3 e-24e Dragons 
ler-32e Leger 
1 er-Westphalien 
Bataillon de Tarn Garonre 
Bataillon de Gear 
Gendarmerie a pied 
Depot Italien 
ler,2e,3e-79e Ligne 
Total 
Table 20 - continued 
General Clement 
General Hamelinaye 
Adjutant Commandant Vigier 
General Gareau 
Effective Strength 
Men 
824 
453 
663 
143 
--2.ll 
2,595 
Horses 
General Quesnel de Torpt 
Adjudant Commandant Nogues 
General Lefebvre 
General Beurmann 
1,812 14 
338 201 
527 9 
415 15 
483 
640 
46 
413 
2.371 -12 
6,448 262 
3e Arrondissement Territorial Gerona: Adjutant Commandant Dumolard 
3e-8le Ligne 
2e,3e-102e Ligne 
Miquelets 
ler,2e/Gendarmerie a cheval 
Total 
6e Legion, Gendarmerie Imperiale 1,163 155 
420 
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Artillery: 
Effective Streng!h 
Unit Men Horses 
5e,12e/3e Artillerie a pied 236 10 
12e,l 7e/4e Artillerie a pied 228 10 
4e/6e Artillerie a pied 97 5 
3e,92/0uvriers d'Artillerie 20 2 
ler,2e/Artillerie Westphalien 35 5 
3e/4e Bataillon du Train 102 106 
4e/9e Bataillon du Train 75 34 
4e/13e Bataillon du Train 98 83 
1 er Pionniers V olontaire Etrangers 48 
Depots _Q 
Total 949 255 
Engineers 
4e/l er Bataillon de Mineurs 91 10 
7e/2e Bataillon de Sappeurs _J_Q _]_ 
Total 101 13 
Corps Totals 
Present Under Arms 13,900 1,246 
Absent With Pay-Detached 2,004 324 
Absent Without Pay-Hospital 8,738 
Absent Without Pay-Furlough 4 
Absent Without Pay-Prisoners of War 84 
Absent Without Pay-Court Martial __ 7 
Total Effectives 24,740 1,660 
TABLE 21 
Anny of Catalonia 
16 July 181233 
Commander: General Decaen 
Chief of Staff: 
Artillery: 
General de Brigade Hamelinaye 
General de Brigade Prost 
Engineers: Major Michel 
Gendarmerie: Collonel Galliot 
Waggon Master General: M. Beauregard 
Inspection aux revues: 
Ordonnateur en chef: 
Inspecteur aux revue Prisye 
Commissaire Ordonnateur Bourden 
Division de Segre 
Commander: General Quesnel 
Brigades: Generals Garreau and Beaurmann 
1 er,2e-20e Ligne 
ler,2e,3e-102e Ligne 
3e-l 16e Ligne 
ler-3e Bayonne 
ler-ler Wurtzbourg 
3e-2e Suisse 
ler-3e Berg 
Chasseurs de Montagne 
5e/6e Legion de Gendarmerie 
29e Chasseurs a cheval 
Total 
Division en Haute Catalogne 
Commander: General Lamarque 
1st Brigade: General Esprit 
ler,2e,3e-3e Leger 
ler,2e,3e-79e Ligne 
2e,4e/29e Chasseurs a cheval 
Total 
2d Brigade: Colonel Petit 
ler,2e,3e-5e Ligne 
ler,2e-67e Ligne 
Miquelets de St. Coloma 
5e/29e Chasseurs a cheval 
Total 
1,067 
612 
968 
465 
859 
410 
181 
109 
5,571 
2,028 
2,168 
116 
4,312 
2,439 
1,471 
131 
78 
4,119 
33SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812. 
Horses 
24 
90 
114 
119 
119 
12 
83 
95 
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Table 21 - continued 423 
Arrondissement de Figueras: General Lefebvre Men HQrS~S 
ler,2e,3e,4e-60e Ligne 2,821 
Det/67e Ligne 70 
Det/79e Ligne 72 
Art/79e Ligne 69 
Det/81 e Ligne 17 
Art/3 e Leger 59 
Det/8e Leger 9 
Det/23e Leger 7 
Det/3 2e Leger 5 
ler Bn Tarn et Garonre 435 
ler Bn du Gear 388 
2e,6e/6e Legion de Gendarmerie 444 57 
1 er Bn W estphalien 332 
Det/29e Chasseurs a cheval 91 89 
Total 4,759 146 
Arrondissement de Gironne: Adjudant Commandant Vigier 
Det/5e Ligne 117 
Det, Art/11 e Ligne 328 
Det/42e Ligne 21 
Det/67e Ligne 13 
3e-8le Ligne 447 
Det/1 er Leger 10 
Det/3e Leger 205 
3e-8e Leger 523 
Det/23 e Leger 104 
ler,3e,4e/6e Legion de Gendarmerie 540 79 
3e-32e Leger 754 
ler Guides Catalans 57 37 
Det/29e Chasseurs 52 45 
Total 3,171 174 
Division Total 16,361 534 
Table 21 - continued 
Division en Basse Catalogne 
Commander: General Maurice Mathieu 
Brigades: Generals Nicholas, Devaux 
3e,4e-18e Ligne 
3e-20e Ligne 
ler,2e-ler Leger Nassau 
Det/Chasseurs de Montagne 
Compagnie Municipale 
1 er Chasseurs Miquelets 
Det/l er Leger 
Det/l 6e Ligne 
Det/20e Ligne 
Det/42e Ligne 
Det/60e Ligne 
ler,3e,4e-l 15e Ligne 
3 e/24e Dragons 
Det/6e Legion de Gendarmerie 
Total 
Garrison of Tarragonna: General Bertoletti 
Men 
1,295 
746 
1,725 
52 
153 
80 
68 
25 
182 
214 
65 
2,323 
248 
61 
7,235 
ler-20e Ligne 491 
ler,2e,3e-7e Ligne Italien 2,001 
ler Gendarmerie Espagnole 68 
Partisans 3 8 
Total 2,598 
Garrison of Lerida 
2e,3e,4e-20e Ligne 
ler,2e,3e-42e Ligne 
Det/60e Ligne 
Art/7e Ligne Italien 
ler,2e,3e/Chasseurs Royaux Italiens 
Total 
Division Total 
Brigade de Reserve 
ler,2e,3e-lle Ligne 
ler,2e-23e Leger 
Miquelets 
1 er,6e/29e Chasseurs a cheval 
Total 
1,758 
1,788 
202 
62 
506 
4,316 
14,249 
2,049 
1,378 
156 
213 
3,796 
Horses 
185 
11 
196 
42 
64 
12 
308 
426 
622 
20 
217 
237 
424 
Table 21 - continued 425 
Artillery Men HQrSf:S 
2e,5e,12e,l 7e/3e Artillerie a pied 432 
12e.13e. l 7e/4e Artillerie a pied 326 
ler,4e/6e Artillerie a pied 219 
1 Oe/7 e Artillerie a pied 119 
3e/9e/Ouvriers d'Artillerie 79 
7e/2e Artillerie a cheval 28 25 
1 er,2e/ Artillerie W estphalien 29 
8e, 1 Oe/1 er Artilleries Italien 126 
ler,2e,3e,6e/4e Bn (bis) du Train 205 228 
ler/Pionniers Voluntaires Etrangers 38 
1 er/1 er Bn du Train ltalien 63 10 
Total 1,756 258 
Engineers 
4e/1 er Bn de Mineurs 78 
7e/2e Bn de Sappeurs 64 
1 er/Sappeurs Roy aux 43 
Total 185 
Recapitulation 
Line Infantry 23,988 172 
Light Infantry 6,443 
Gendarmerie 1,226 171 
Foreign Battalions 5,543 12 
National Guard 1,438 
Cavalry 1,413 1,136 
Artillery 1,756 261 
Engineers 185 
Irregulars 530 69 
Total 40,816 1,659 
Present Under Arms 33,792 1,723 
Detached 1,030 45 
Hospital 5,830 
Furlough 91 
Prisoners of War 1,071 
Court Martial 2 
Effectives 40,816 1,659 
Staff: 
Commander: 
Chief of Staff: 
Artillery: 
Engineers: 
Gendarmerie: 
Vaguemestre General: 
Inspecteur aux revues: 
Ordonnateur en chef: 
Division de Segre: 
llnit 
EM,ler,2e-102e Ligne 
3e-l l 6e Ligne 
Chasseurs de Montagne 
29e Cohorte35 
30e Cohorte 
3le Cohorte 
Det/l er Hussards 
Total 
TABLE 22 
Army of Catalonia34 
1 January 1813 
General Decaen 
General Hamelinage 
General Prost 
Colonel Szoard 
Colonel Gailliot 
M. Beauregard 
M. Prisye 
M. Bourdon 
General Quesnel 
General Gareau 
Effective Strength 
525 
116 
Men Horses 
1,266 
410 
685 
604 
778 
115 
4,375 115 
34SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1813. 
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35Napoleon often invoked Roman history in naming troops, such as velite or units. 
The cohort, named after the Roman 600 man battalion. In 1813 he conscripted 80,000 
National Guards by Senatus Consulture ( 11 January 1813) into cohorts of some 900 men 
then reorganized them into 88 battalions divided between 22 line regiments. He formed 
veteran cadres for these cohorts drawn from NCOs four Imperial Guard Regiments from 
Spain. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 866-867; Flavius Vegetius Renatus, The 
Military Institutions of the Romans, Tns. John Clark, Ed. Thomas Phillips (Harrisburg: 
The Military Service Publishing Co., 1944) 40-43; Hans Delbriick, Historv of the Art of 
War, vol. 1. Warfare in Antiquity, Tns. Walter Renfroe (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1975) 415. 
Division en Haute-Catalogne: 
I st Brigade: 
~ 
EM,ler,2e,4e-60e Ligne 
EM,ler,2e,3e,4e-l 15e Ligne 
2e-3e Berg 
Det/2e Hussards 
Chasseurs du l' Ampurdam 
Total 
2e Brigade: 
EM,ler,2e,Art-67e Ligne 
ler-32e Leger 
Chasseurs Gironne 
3e,7e/29e Chasseurs a cheval 
Total 
Arrondissement de Figueras: 
Commandant d'Armes: 
Art/Se Ligne 
Det,Art-11 e Ligne 
3e-60e Ligne 
Art/79e Ligne 
Depot-81 er Ligne 
3e-102e Ligne 
3e Provisoire de Bayonne 
(3 le & 26e Leger) 
Det/23 e Leger 
ler Westphalien 
ler Bataillon du Tam Garonne 
I er Bataillon du Gear 
Det/29e Chasseurs a cheval 
3 e-81 e Ligne 
Total 
Arrondissement de Girone: 
Det/Se Ligne 
Det/11 e Ligne 
Det/42e Ligne 
Det/60e Ligne 
Det/67e Ligne 
Det/79e Ligne 
Det/115e Ligne 
!er/Guides Catalanes 
Dets-3e Leger 
Table 22 - continued 
General Lamarque 
General Beurmann 
Effective Strength 
Men llorses 
1,996 
1,772 
635 
50 52 
204 30 
4,669 82 
Colonel Baron Petit 
1,195 
589 
141 20 
112 110 
2,093 130 
General Lefebvre 
General Palmoral 
44 
305 
704 
53 
24 
578 
931 
5 
303 
461 
289 
23 27 
378 
4,098 27 
General Lamarque 
50 
66 
13 
167 
68 
120 
85 
103 37 
376 
427 
Det/3 2e Leger 
Det/l er Leger de Nassau 
1 er-1 er W urtzbourg 
Dets/3 e Berg 
Det, Depot-29e Chasseurs 
a cheval 
Total 
Division Total 
Table 22 - continued 
90 
247 
432 
161 
117 
2,095 
12,955 
94 
131 
370 
Division en Basse-Catalogne (Barcelona): General Comte Maurice Mathieu 
1st, 2d Brigades: Generals Devaux and Baron Nicolas 
Effective Strength 
Unit Men llorses 
EM,Ier,2e,3e-5e Ligne 
Depot/7e Ligne 
Depot/I I e Ligne 
Depot/I 6e Ligne 
Depot/20e Ligne 
3e-23e Ligne 
Det-42e Ligne 
EM,Ier,2e,3e-79e Ligne 
Det/1I5e Ligne 
Det/l er Leger 
3e,4e-18e Leger 
Det/23e Leger 
2,209 
13 
8 
I4 
45 
534 
5I5 
I,821 
104 
18 
I,245 
17 
50 
I,533 
38 
114 
153 
Det/7e Ligne Italien 
EM,ler,2e-Ier Leger de Nassau 
Det/Chasseurs de Montagne 
Chasseurs de Barcelone 
Compagnie Municiple 
2e,6e/29e Chasseurs a cheval 
Total 
I9I I80 
Garrison of Tarragonna: 
I er-20e Ligne 
EM,ler,3e-7e Ligne ltalien 
Partisans 
Gendarmerie Espagnole 
Det/1 er de Chasseurs Italiens 
Total 
Garrison of Lerida: 
Art/20e Ligne 
EM,ler,2e,3e-42e Ligne 
Det,Art/60e Ligne 
Art/7e Ligne ltalien 
Det/1 er Chasseurs ltaliens 
Total 
8,632 180 
General Bertoletti 
499 
638 
57 
14 
26 
1,294 
General llenriot 
46 
1,153 
155 
52 
174 
I,580 
27 
27 
I60 
160 
428 
Table 22 - continued 429 
Division Total 11,506 367 
Brigade de Reserve: General Esprit 
EM,ler,2e-23e Leger 1,457 
Elite,5e/29e Chasseurs a cheval 165 165 
Total 1,622 165 
Effective Strength 
lmit Men Horses 
6e Legion de Gendarmerie: 
Colonel Gaillot 1,225 162 
Artillery 
2e,5e,12e,l 7e/3e Artillerie a pied 390 
12e,13e,l 7e/4e Artillerie a pied 286 
1 er,4e/6e Artillerie a pied 173 
1Oe,11 e/7 e Artillerie a pied 188 
7e/2e Artillerie a cheval 28 21 
3e,9e/Ouvriers d'Artillerie 90 
1 er,2e/ Artillerie Westphalien 29 
3e/3e (Ppl) du Train 103 258 
3e/4e (bis) du Train 256 363 
ler/ler du Train Italien 81 18 
1 er/Pionniers Etrangers 30 
Total 1,654 660 
Engineers 
4e/1 er Mineurs 69 
7e/2e Sappeurs 57 
Det/Train du Genie 34 42 
Branches 
Line Infantry 17,524 
Light Infantry 3,797 
Gendarmerie 1,225 162 
Spanish Battalions 1,190 
Foreign Regiments 4,051 
Chasseurs a cheval 808 763 
Hussars 165 167 
Foot Artillery 1,066 
Horse Artillery 28 21 
Artificers 90 
Pionners 30 
Artillery Train 440 589 
Miners 69 
Sappers 87 
Engineer Train 34 42 
Cohorts 2,067 
Irregulars 
Present Under Arms 
Detached 
Hospital 
Furlough 
Prisoners of War 
Court Martial 
Effectives 
Grand Total 
Table 22 - continued 
856 
29,132 
17 
4,169 
11 
46 
3 
33,497 
87 
1,881 
1,881 
430 
TABLE 23 
Anny of Aragon and Catalonia 
15 January 181436 
General in Chief: Marshal S uchet 
Chief of Staff: 
Artillery: 
General Baron Saint-Cyr Nugues 
General Baron V alee 
Engineers: Major Plagniot 
Waggonmaster General: 
Inspecteur aux revues: 
Adjudant Sous-Offcier Touma! 
Inspecteur aux revues Pryse 
Ordonnateur en chef: Ordonnateur Bondurand 
Unit 
1st Division: General Musnier 
1st Brigade: General Paris 
1 er,2e-1 er Leger 
1 ere,2-121 e Ligne 
2d Brigade: General Pannitier 
1er,2e-114e Ligne 
10e Ligne 
Total 
2d Division: General Mesclop 
1st Brigade 
1er,2e-7e Ligne 
1er,2e-44e Ligne 
2d Brigade 
1er,2e,3e-116e Ligne 
8le Ligne 
Total 
3d Division: General Gudin 
1st Brigade: General Esteve 
ler,2e-14e Ligne 
1er,2e-l6e Ligne 
2d Brigade: General Ordonneau 
ler,2e,3e-ll 7e Ligne 
2e-3e Leger 
2e- l le Ligne 
Total 
1,442 
1,502 
1,337 
4,281 
1,646 
1,503 
2,347 
5,496 
1,289 
1,283 
867 
3,439 
Horses 
36SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
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4th Division: General Millet 
1st Brigade 
1 er,2e-18e Leger 
1ere,2e-5e Ligne 
2d Brigade 
1ere,2e,3e-20e Ligne 
1ere,2e,79e Ligne 
Total 
Table 23 - continued 
5th Division: General Lamarque 
1st Brigade: General Nogues 
1ere,2e-23e Leger 
1ere,2e-67e Ligne 
2d Brigade: General Beuremann 
1ere,2e,3e-60e Ligne 
1ere,2e-115e Ligne 
Total 
Division de Cavalerie: General Digeon 
1st Brigade: General Delort 
1 er,2e,3e,4e-13e Cuirassiers 
1er,2e,3e-24e Dragons 
29e Chasseurs: General Guillemet 
1er,2e-29e Chasseurs a cheval 
2d Brigade: General Meyer 
1er,2e,3e,4e-4e Hussards 
1er,2e,3e-12e Hussards 
Total 
Arrondissement de Haute-Catalogne: General Habert 
1,355 
1,222 
2,577 
963 
1,196 
1,228 
1,449 
4,836 
744 
734 
492 
890 
579 
3,439 
Figueras: General Palmoral/Rosas: Chef d'Escadron L'Huillier 
Det-32e Leger 250 
Det-lle Ligne 120 
3 e-60e Ligne 73 0 
Det-79e Ligne 40 
Bataillon Provisoire de Bayonne (31e Leger and 520 
26e Ligne) 
Gendarmes de Tarragonne 80 
Total 1,740 
733 
736 
468 
849 
613 
3,399 
432 
Table 23 - continued 
Arrondissement de Gironne: Colonel Broyer (incl. Montlouis, Hostalrich and 
Palamos) 
Det-23e Leger 
Det-32e Leger 
Det-1 le Ligne 
Det-60e Ligne 
Det-67e Ligne 
Det-79e Ligne 
Det-115e Ligne 
ler,2e-143e Ligne 
Bataillon Provisoire de Bayonne 
Chasseurs de l'Ampurdam 
Guides Catalans 
Chasseurs de Gironne 
Total 
Arrondissement de La Bispal 
Det-32e Leger 
Brigade de Cerdagne: General Esprit de la Tour 
334 
18 
23 
127 
96 
91 
211 
1,375 
100 
240 
128 
228 
2,971 
234 
3e-8le Ligne 583 
1er,2e-102 Ligne 1,3 03 
Total 1,886 
Gouvermement de la Basse-Catalogne/Barcelona: General Habert 
Brigades: Generals Lefebvre and St. Clair 
3e,4e-18e Leger 
lere,2e-5e Ligne 
3e-42e Ligne 
lere,2e,3e-117e Ligne 
3e,4e-143e Ligne 
Det-79e Ligne 
Artillerie-3e Leger 
Chasseurs de Barcelone 
Compagnie Municipale 
Total 
Engineers 
4e/1 e Mineurs 
4e/2e Mineurs 
7 e/Sappeurs 
4e/4e Sappeurs 
4e Train du Genie 
Total 
1,248 
1,864 
557 
2,013 
1,592 
124 
49 
74 
131 
7,652 
108 
86 
140 
106 
45 
485 
41 
50 
40 
132 
64 
64 
433 
Table 23 - continued 434 
Equippage 
5e Bataillon du Train 328 278 
11 e Bataillon du Train 353 440 
9e Brigae de Mulets de bat 61 90 
Total 742 808 
Gendarmerie 
Diverses Legions 38 43 
6e Legion de Gendarmerie 206 112 
Total 244 155 
Infirmiers 
4e Cie d'Ambulance 94 
5e Cie d'Ambulance 304 
Total 398 
Artillery 
7e/2e Artillerie a Cheval (1st Division) 65 63 
7e/5e Artillerie a Cheval (2d Division) 88 68 
14e/3e Artillerie a Cheval (3d Division) 100 
5e/3e Artillerie a Cheval (4th Division) 95 
13e/4e Artillerie a Cheval (5th Division) 105 
l 7e/3e Artillerie a Cheval (Cerdagne) 96 
20e/4e Artillerie a Cheval (Pare) 115 
2e/Ouvriers (Pare) 47 
9e/Ouvriers (Pare) 10 
2e/1 er Pontoniers (Pare) 18 
2e/2e Artillerie a pied (Barcelona) 101 
12e/2e Artillerie a pied (Barcelona) 103 
11 e/7e Artillerie a pied (Barcelona) 94 
3e/Ouvriers (Barcelona) 20 
9e/Ouvriers (Barcelona) 5 
12e/4e Artillerie a pied (Figueras) 117 
l 7e/4e Artillerie a pied (Figueras) 23 
3e/Ouvriers (Figueras) 43 
l 7e/4e Artillerie a pied (Gerona) 90 
Total 1,335 131 
Table 23 - continued 435 
Artillery Trains 
2e/3e (Ppl) du Train (1st Division) 104 150 
5e/3e (Ppl) du Train (2d Division) 108 162 
6e/3e (Ppl) du Train (3d Division) 113 165 
3e/4e (bis) du Train (4th Division) 135 166 
3e/3e (Ppl) du Train (5th Division) 92 159 
3e/4e (bis) du Train (Cerdagne) 27 41 
4e/3e (Ppl) du Train (Pare) 122 177 
2e/4e (bis) du Train (Pare) 139 190 
3e/4e (bis) du Train (Barcelona) 16 31 
3e/3e (Ppl) du Train 11 21 
3e/4e (bis) du Train 7 13 
Total 874 1,275 
Grand Total 43,799 5,964 
Recapitulation 
Staff 176 
Infantry 20,629 
Cavalry 3,439 3,399 
Artillery and Train 2,209 1,406 
Engineers 485 64 
Cerdagne 1,886 
Upper Catalonia 5,939 132 
Lower Catalonia 7,252 
Gendarmes 244 155 
Equipage 1,140 808 
Grand Total 43,799 5,964 
TABLE 2437 
Anny of Aragon and Catalonia 
General in Chief: 
Chief of Staff: 
Artillery: 
Engineers: 
Gendamerie: 
Inspecteur aux revues: 
Ordonnateur en chef: 
~ 
1May1814 
Marshal Suchet 
General Saint-Cyr Nugues 
General Valee 
Chef de Bataillon Reville 
Chef d'Escadron Corso 
Inspecteur Prisye 
Ordonnateur Bondurand 
1st Infantry Division: General Lamarque 
Brigades: General Millet 
lere,2e,Art-5e Ligne 
3e/4e Ligne 
lere,2e,3e-60e Ligne 
I ere,2e- l 2 le Ligne 
Total 
2d Division: Garrison of Barcelona: General Habert 
I st Brigade: General Lefebvre 
3e,4e-l 8e Leger 
3e-42e Ligne 
I ere,2e-44e Ligne 
Total 
2d Brigade: General St. Clair 
I ere,2e,3 e-11 7 e Ligne 
3e,4e-14e Ligne 
Total 
Det/4e Hussards 
Gendarmerie 
Artillery 
2e,12e/3e Artillerie a pied 
1 le/7e Artillerie a pied 
3e Cie Ouvriers 
9e Cie Ouvriers 
Det/4e (bis) du Train 
Art (3e Leger) 
Art (5e Ligne) 
Total 
1,945 
648 
2,120 
2,019 
6,732 
1,212 
716 
1,408 
3,336 
1,993 
1,501 
3,494 
85 
35 
202 
91 
10 
15 
37 
60 
90 
505 
Horses 
88 
26 
64 
64 
37SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, I May 1814. 
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Engineers 
7e/2e Sappeurs 
4e/1 er Mineurs 
4effrain du Genie 
Total 
Navy 
4e/Infirmeriers 
Compagnie Municipale 
Division Total 
Table 24 - continued 
Reserve: General Mesclop-Montpillier 
ler,2e-14e Ligne 
ler,2e,6e-l 14e Ligne 
Total 
Cavalry: General Meyer 
ler,2e,3e,4e/29e Chasseurs a cheval 
ler,2e,3e-24e Dragons 
Total 
Gendarmerie 
Equippage 
5e Bataillon du Train 
11 e Bataillon du Train 
9e Brigade de Mulets de Bat 
Total 
68 
25 
4 
97 
147 
70 
153 
7,912 
1,816 
2,246 
4,062 
754 
689 
1,380 
192 
664 
334 
53 
1,080 
Infirmeries 220 
5e Cie d'Ambulance 
Division des Pyrenees Orientales: General Paris 
Brigades: General Lafite and Colonel Roqumaurel 
2e,Art-3e Leger 835 
1 ere,Art-11 e Ligne 972 
6e-44e Ligne 3 86 
3e-8le Ligne 742 
4e-186e Ligne 366 
6e,7e-l l 7e Ligne 646 
Total 3,947 
Artillery 
14e,5e/3e Artillerie a pied 202 
20e/l er Artillerie a pied 115 
2e,3e/Ouvriers 79 
2e Pontonniers 18 
l 7e/3e Artillerie a pied 97 
l 2e/4e Artillerie a pied 116 
Total 626 
3 
3 
181 
795 
535 
1,541 
104 
320 
361 
80 
761 
437 
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Artillery Train 
3e,4e,5e,6e/3e (Ppl) du Train 512 642 
2e/4e (bis) du Train 204 238 
Total 1,342 880 
Engineers 
4e, 7 e/2e Mineurs 204 
4e/Train du Genie 10 
Total 214 
Grand Total 19,315 3,305 
Recapitulation 
Staff 83 
Infantry 14,741 
Cavalry 1,443 1,541 
Artillery and Train 1,342 880 
Engineers 214 19 
Gendarrnerie 192 104 
Equippages 1,080 761 
Infirmiers 220 
Grand Total 19,315 3,305 
TABLE 25 
Fortress Commands in Aragon and Catalonia 
1 April 181438 
~ 
Figueras: General Palmoral 
lere,2e-143e Ligne 
3e/5e-3 le Leger 
Depot d'Isales (Barcelona) 
Det/60e Ligne 
Art/11 e Ligne 
13e,l 7e/4e Artillerie a pied 
3e/Ouvriers 
7e/2e Sappeurs 
4e/2e Mineurs 
4e/Pionniers Volontaires 
4e/3e (Ppl) du Train 
5e/Infirmiers Militaires 
Total 
Hostalich: Chef de Bataillon Voisson 
Cie/1l5e Ligne 
Cie/l l 6e Ligne 
Cie/143e Ligne 
ler/4e Artillerie a pied 
7e/2e Sappeurs 
Det/5e Cie Infirmeriers 
Total 
Tortosa: General Robert 
ler-1 le Ligne 
2e-20e Ligne 
4e- l l 4e Ligne 
4e-l l 7e Ligne 
ler-3e Leger 
3e-5e Leger 
Malades 
Cie/Cavalry 
4e/3e Artillerie a pied 
6e, l 4e/6e Artillerie a pied 
2e/Ouvriers d'Artillerie 
2e/l er Pontonniers 
4e/4e Sappeurs 
4e/2e Mineurs 
Total 
675 
355 
61 
182 
42 
164 
31 
26 
10 
16 
15 
30 
1,607 
103 
99 
102 
50 
1 
5 
360 
602 
424 
702 
675 
582 
630 
900 
73 
42 
73 
43 
45 
47 
23 
4,780 
Horses 
25 
25 
61 
61 
38SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armee d'Espagne et de Catalogne, 1 April 1814. 
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Saguntum: General Rouelle 
4e-8le Ligne 
3e-l 14e Ligne 
I 8e/3 e Artillerie a pied 
4e/4e Sappeurs 
4e/2e Mineurs 
Total 
Table 25 - continued 
Pensicola: Chef de Bataillon Bardous 
Y2 Ciell 6e Ligne 
Det/l 6e Leger 
Det/l 8e Ligne 
Det/45e Ligne 
Det/51 e Ligne 
Det/54e Ligne 
7e/5e Artillerie a pied 
4e/4e Sappeurs 
4e/2e Mineurs 
Total 
Denia: Chef de Bataillon Bin 
le/117e Ligne 
7e/5e Artillerie a pied 
4e/2e Mineurs 
Total 
Venasque: Chef de Bataillon Fouques 
6e/6e Artillerie a pied 
2e,3e/Chasseurs de Montagnes 
Total 
388 
375 
89 
17 
10 
1,179 
54 
25 
43 
52 
95 
89 
45 
6 
4 
413 
97 
10 
6 
113 
6 
194 
200 
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Grade 
Etat Major 
Marshal 
General en Chef 
Colonel General 
General de Division 
General de Brigade 
Adjutant Commandant 
Aide-de-Camp 
Colonel 
Chef de Bataillon/Escadron 
Captain 
Lieutenant 
Intendant General 
Inspecteurs aux revues 
Inspecteur 
Sous-Inspecteur 
Sous-inspecteur 2e Classe 
Commissaires des guerres 
Commissaire Ordonnateur en 
chef 
Commissaire-Ordonnateur 
Commissaire des guerres 
Ad joints 
TABLE 26 
Rations, Imperial Rate 
August 181039 
Rice 
Breads Legume 
24 24 
16 16 
10 10 
8 8 
6 6 
3 3 
3 3 
2 2 
2 2 
2 2 
10 10 
6 6 
3 3 
2 2 
8 8 
3 3 
2 2 
2 2 
441 
Salt Meat Fuel Forrage 
24 24 24 24 
16 16 16 16 
10 10 10 10 
8 8 8 
6 6 8 6 
3 3 6 4 
3 3 6 4 
2 2 4 3 
2 2 4 3 
2 2 4 2 
10 10 10 10 
6 6 8 6 
3 3 6 4 
2 2 4 3 
8 8 8 8 
3 3 8 4 
2 2 6 3 
2 2 4 2 
39SHAT, C(8) 398, Administration de la Guerre, Etat du Nombre des Rations allouees 
a chaque grade 30 June 1810 X(s) 114, Armee de Portgual, Reglement pour le service des 
Etapes et Convois Militares, 1 July 1810. 
Table 26 - continued 442 
Rice 
Grade Breads Legume Salt Meat Fuel Forrage 
Medical 
Chief Surgeons, Physicians, 2 2 2 2 6 3 
Pharmacists 
Surgeon-majors foot/horse 2 2 2 2 4 Y2 
Aides, Sous-Aides 2 2 2 2 4 I 
Ambulance Medical Men 2 2 2 2 4 I 
Administration 
Payeurs generaux 3 3 3 3 8 4 
Directeurs Generaux des services 
reunis 
Regisseurs (subsistance) 
Inspecteurs Generaux (clothing, 
transport) 
Inspecteurs principaux des 
services reunis 2 2 2 2 6 3 
Agents en chef, Directeurs 
principaux (subsistance, 
hospitals, transport, and printing 
presses) 
Postes Militaires (lnspecteurs 
and Directeurs en chef) 
Payeurs divisionnaires 2 2 2 2 4 2 
Caissier du Payeur General 
Chefs aux constructions des 
vivres 
Directeurs de Correspondance et 
de comptabilite des services 
reums 
Caissiers 
Gardes Magasins principaux 
Inspecteurs/Controleurs 
(subsistance, clothing, transport) 
Economes divisionnaires 
Inspecteurs/Directeurs - Poste I Y2 1 Y2 1 Y2 1 Y2 4 2 
Table 26 - continued 443 
Rice 
Grade Breads Legume Salt Meat Fuel Forrage 
Chefs de parc/Gardes pare 
(vivres viande) 
Gardes Magasin/Commis 
(subsistance, clothing, hospital) 
Economes, Directeurs - hospitals 
Chef de pare brigade, Adjudants 
Sous-Adjudants (Transport) 
Controleurs, Caissiers, 
Employes - Postes 
Employes des Postes 2e and 3e I I I I 2 I 
Classe 
Other Employes, commis I I I I 2 
V aguemestre (by Grade) 
Boulangers, Equippage 
employes 
Charretiers, Romainiers, 
Butchers, Drovers, Workmen 
Sous-Employes-Poste 
Artillery I I I I 2 I 
Gardes, conducteurs 
Engineers 
Gardes, porters 
Other Staff Employees I I I I 2 
Installations 
Commandants d'Armees ler 3 3 3 3 6 3 
Classe 
2e Classe 2 2 2 2 4 2 
3e-4e Classe 2 2 2 2 4 I 
Adjudants de Place (by Grade) 
Secretaries I I 2 
Troop Units 
Colonels (en second) Majors 3 3 3 3 6 3 
Infantry 
Artillery, Cavalry, Engineers 3 3 3 3 6 4 
Table 26 - continued 444 
Rice 
Grade Breads Legume Salt Meat Fuel Forr~e 
Chef de Bataillon - Infantry 2 2 2 2 4 2 
Artillery, Engineer 2 2 2 2 4 3 
Chef d'Escadron 2 2 2 2 4 3 
Quartermasters - Infantry 2 2 2 2 4 I 
Engineer, Cavalry, Artillery 2 2 2 2 4 2 
Adjudants - Major, Infantry I Yz I Yz I Yz I Yz 4 I 
Engineer, Cavalry, Artillery 2 2 2 2 4 3 
Captains Infantry I Yz I Yz I Yz I Yz 4 
Engineer, Artillery, Cavalry 2 2 2 2 4 2 
Lieutenants - Infantry I Yz I Yz I Yz I Yz 4 
Engineers, Cavalry, Artillery 2 2 2 2 4 2 
Officers de veterans; by rank as 
Infantry, Aumoniers, Ministers, 
Judges of foreign units 2 2 2 2 4 2 
Trains-Artillery, Engineer 
Equippage 
Inspecteur Generaux, Major 3 3 3 3 6 4 
Inspecteur Ordinaire, Captain 3 3 3 3 4 3 
Adjudants-major, Quartermaster, 
Lieutenents 2 2 2 2 4 2 
Veterinarians 
Noncommissioned officers I I I I 2 
Corporals, Brigadiers, Soldiers I I I I I 
Infirmiers: 
Centeniers, Sous Centeniers I Yz I Yz I Yz I Yz 4 
Noncommissioned officers I I I I 2 
Soldiers I I I I I 
Table 26 - continued 445 
Rations40 
~ Weight Volume (I) Measure Number 
Bread 7'll hg 
Biscuit 5'll hg 
Salt lard 2 hg 
Rice 3 hg 
Legumes (dried) 6 hg 
Salt 1160 kg 
Wine \l.i 
Brandy 1/16 
Vinegar /20 
Forrage41 
Oats A 8'll 
B 8'll 
c 9'll 
D 8'll 
Hay A 7 kg 
B 5 kg 
c 7 kg 
D 5 kg 
4
°Rations are measured in hectograms, i.e. 100 grams or 3 ounces, 8 4/ 9 drachmes 3.83 
ounces, liters and kilograms. 
41Forrage rations are measured by the type of horse or mule. 'A' denotes Cuirassiers, 
Carabiniers, Dragons, light Artillery and Guides. 'B' denotes Chasseurs, Hussars, Artillery 
and Engineer train and equippage saddle horses. 'C' denotes Artillery and Engineer Train, 
equippage and other draft horses. 'D' denotes mules. 
Table 26 - continued 446 
Straw A 5 kg 
B 5 kg 
c 4 kg 
D 4 kg 
~ Measure Weight Number 
Firewood Winter 11 stere42 150 20 hg 
Summer 1/ 300 stere 10 hg 
Coal Winter 10 hg 
Summer 5 hg 
Peat Winter 10 hg 
Summer 5 hg 
Candles43 
42The stere was a cubic measure for firewood and equaled one cubic meter (1.30802 
cu. yds. or 3 5 .3165 8 cu. ft.). A corde of wood is the now common measure and equaled 
3.058 steres or 108 cubic feet, or a stack 12 feet high and 3 feet long. 
43The Barcelona Ration, SHAT C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus~ Candle 
ration varied but was about 0.01 kg or 1 gm per ration. 
447 
TABLE 27 
Total Daily Subsistence Requirements 
Anny of Catalonia 
1807 - 181444 
Division/Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees - Orientales 
No. Date Men Rations Rtn Weight Tons 
I. 15112/0745 7,887 8,094.5 15,159.6 kg 16.7 
2. 28/05/0846 15,253 15,656.5 29,317.7 kg 32.3 
VII Corps 
3. 5/12/0847 42,503 43,622.5 81,694.9 kg 90.1 
4. 610110948 48,518 49,796 93,256.3 kg 102.8 
5. 1/07/0949 54,794 56,237 105,319.4 kg 116.1 
6. 1/12/0950 44,269 45,440 85,089.2 kg 93.8 
7. 1/01/1051 44,552 45,725.5 85,633.2 kg 94.4 
Army of Catalonia 
8. 31/05/1052 47,519 48,770.5 91,336.1 kg 100.7 
44SHAT, C(8) 398, Etat du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810. 
45SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 
December 1807. 
46SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 
1808. 
47SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808. 
48SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 6 January 1809. 
49SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. 
50SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809. 
51 SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810. 
52SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
Table 27 - continued 
No. Date Men Rations Rtn Weight 
9. 1/10/1 os3 45,348 47,568.5 89,085.3 kg 
10. 1/12/10s4 59,232 60,792 113,849.6 kg 
Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne 
11. 15/04/11 SS 20,149 20,680 38,728.3 kg 
12. 1/08/11 s6 25,290 25,956 48,609.8 kg 
Army of Catalonia 
13. 1/12/11 S7 24,740 25,391.5 47,442.7 kg 
14. 1101112ss 24,906 25,562 47,871.7 kg 
15. 16/07/12s9 40,816 41,891 78,952.3 kg 
16. 1/12/1260 35,680 36,620 68,580.4 kg 
17. 1/01/1361 33,497 34,379 64,384.5 kg 
18. 30/06/1362 23,925 24,555 45,986.2 kg 
19. 1/11/1363 26,520 27,216 50,969.0 kg 
53SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 October 1810. 
54SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1810. 
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Tons 
98.2 
125.5 
43.0 
53.6 
52.4 
52.8 
86.5 
75.6 
71.0 
50.7 
56.2 
55SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811. 
56SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811. 
57SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. 
58SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 Janaury 1812. 
59SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812. 
60SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1812. 
61 SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1813. 
62SHAT, C(S) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 30 June 1813. 
63SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 November 1813. 
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No. Date Men Rations Rtn Weight Tons 
Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne 
20. 15/0111464 43,799 44,952.5 84,185.9 kg 92.8 
21. 1/05/1465 19,315 19,824 37,125.3 kg 40.9 
Bread, Biscuit, Rice, Legumes, Salt (kg) 
No. Bread (wt) Biscuit Legumes Rice Salt 
1 6,070.8 4,452.0 4,856.7 2,428.4 134.9 
2 11,742.4 8,611.1 9,393.9 4,697.0 260.9 
3 32,716.9 23,992.4 26,173.5 13,086.8 727.0 
4 37,347.0 27,387.8 29,877.6 14,938.8 829.9 
5 42,177.8 30,930.4 33,742.2 16,871.1 937.3 
6 34,080 24,992 27,264 13,632 757.3 
7 34,294.1 25,149 27,435.3 13,717.7 762.1 
8 36,577.9 26,823.8 29,262.3 14,631.2 812.8 
9 35,676.4 26,162.7 28,541.1 14,270.6 792.8 
10 45,594 33,435.6 36,475.2 18,237.6 1,013.2 
11 15,510 11,374 12,405 6,204 344.7 
12 19,467 14,275.8 15,573.6 7,786.8 432.6 
13 19,043.6 13,965.3 15,234.9 7,617.5 423.2 
14 19,171.5 14,059.1 15,337.2 7,668.6 426.0 
15 31,418.3 23,040.1 25,134.6 12,567.3 698.2 
16 27,465 20,141 21,972 10,986 610.3 
17 25,784.3 18,908.5 20,627.4 10,313.7 573 
18 18,416.3 13,505.3 14,733 7,366.5 409.3 
19 20,412 14,968.8 16,329.6 8,164.8 453.6 
20 33,714.4 24,723.9 26,971.5 13,485.8 749.2 
21 14,868 10,903.2 11,894.4 5,947.2 330.4 
64SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
65SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814. 
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No. Fresh/Salt Meat Salt Lard Wine (It) Vinegar (It} Brandy (It} 
1 2,023.6 1,618.9 2,023.6 1,011.8 505.9 
2 3,914.6 3,131.3 3,914.6 1,957.1 978.5 
3 10,905.6 8,724.5 10,905.6 5,452.8 2,726.4 
4 12,449 9,959.2 12,449 6,224.5 3,112.3 
5 14,059.3 11,247.4 14,059.3 7,029.6 3,514.8 
6 11,360 9,088 11,360 5,680 2,840 
7 11,431.4 9,145 11,431.4 5,718.2 2,859.1 
8 12,192.6 9,754.1 12,192.6 6,096.3 3,048.2 
9 11,892.1 9,513.7 11,892.1 5,946.1 2,973.0 
10 15,198 12,158.4 15,198 7,599 3,799.5 
11 5,170 4,136 5,170 2,585 1,292.5 
12 6,489 5,191.2 6,489 3,244.5 1,622.3 
13 6,347.9 5,078.3 6,347.9 3,173.9 1,587 
14 6,390.5 5,112.4 6,390.5 3,195.3 1,597.7 
15 10,472.8 8,378.2 10,472.8 5,236.4 2,618.2 
16 9,155 7,324 9,155 4,577.5 2,288.8 
17 8,594.8 6,875.8 8,594.8 4,297.4 2,148.7 
18 6,138.8 4,911 6,138.8 3,069.4 1,534.7 
19 6,804 5,443.2 6,804 3,402 1,701 
20 11,238.1 8,990.5 11,238.1 5,619.1 2,809.5 
21 4,956 3,968.8 4,956 2,478 1,239 
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TABLE 28 
Grain Requisitions 
lOe Division Militaire66 
August 1813 
De12artrnent Grain Quan. Price Cost Freight Total 
Ge rd Wheat 4,500 33.33 145,485 49,320 194,805 
Rye 1,500 21.77 32,655 16,440 49,095 
Herault Wheat 4,500 35.73 160;785 37,260 198,045 
Rye 1,500 21.43 32,145 12,420 44,565 
Haute· Wheat 750 29.83 22,373 4,433 26,805 
Garonne, Rye 350 23.12 8,092 2,069 10,161 
Aude Wheat 750 36.12 27,090 3,139 30,229 
Rye 350 28.86 10,101 1,465 11,566 
Pyrenees- Wheat 350 38.88 13,608 13,608 
Orientales, Rye 150 30.74 4,611 4,611 
Arriege Wheat 350 34.93 12,226 12,226 
Rye 150 26.52 3,978 3,978 
Total 15,200 473,148 126,545 599,693 
66AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 12 August 1813; Etat des 
Requisitions Faites pour la Subsistance de l'Armee de Catalogne, August 1813. Carriage, 
freight and total costs rounded to nearest Franc. 
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TABLE 29 
Meat Requirements 
Anny of Catalonia 
1807 - 1814 
Period Strength Rations Fresh/Salt Beef Salt Pork/Lard Mutton 
12/0767 7,887 8,111 2,028 1,623 2,028 
05/0868 15,253 15,686 3,922 3,138 3,922 
12/0869 42,503 73,709 10,927 8,742 10,927 
01/0970 48,518 49,894 12,474 9,979 12,474 
07/0971 54,794 56,348 14,087 11,270 14,087 
12/0972 44,269 45,524 11,381 9,105 11,381 
01/1073 44,522 45,785 11,447 9,157 11,447 
05/1074 47,519 48,867 12,217 9,774 12,217 
10/1075 46,348 47,663 11,916 9,533 11,916 
12/1076 59,234 60,914 15,229 12,183 15,229 
67SHAT, C(8) 485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 15 December 
1809. 
68SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 
1808. 
69SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808. 
70SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 6 January 1809. 
71 SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. 
72SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809. 
73SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810. 
74SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 31 May 1810. 
75SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 October 1810. 
76SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1810. 
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04/11 77 20,149 20,721 5,180 4,145 5,180 
08/11 78 25,290 26,008 6,502 5,202 6,502 
12/ll 79 24,740 25,442 6,361 5,089 6,361 
0111280 24,906 25,613 6,404 5,081 
07/1281 40,816 41,768 10,442 8,354 
12/1282 35,680 36,692 9,173 7,136 
0111383 33,497 34,448 8,612 6,890 
ll/1384 26,520 27,272 6,818 5,455 
0111485 43,799 43,800 10,950 8,760 
05/1486 19,315 19,863 4,966 3,973 
The calculation of the above figures are based on the strength of the Barcelona garrison on 
27 February 1814, at 8,111 officers and men, consuming 8,341 rations per day. Rations 
consumed then are 2.758% higher or a factor of 1.0283565.87 
77SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne, 15 March 1811. 
78SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armee en Haute-Catalogne, 1 Augsut 1811. 
79SHAT, C(8) 3 70, Situation Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. 
80SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1812. 
81 SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 16 July 1812. 
82SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1812. 
83SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1813. 
84SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 30 June 1813. 
85SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
86SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814. 
87SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
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TABLE 30 
Bovine Epidemic88 
Hostalrich 1811 
Process Verbal Bullock Cattle Animal# Series# Weight 
aw 
A 2 34 1 880 
2 38 3 1,115 
2 53 3 930 
1 51 2 531 
1 53 2 482 
2 59 2 776 
1 11 3 402 
Total 5,125 
B 1 10 1 469 
1 16 1 539 
2 19 3 1,013 
2 51 1 713 
1 11 3 402 
Total 3,150 
c 65 5 539 
D 1 10 3 396 
1 12 3 377.5 
1 15 3 391.5 
1 16 3 374.5 
1 25 3 351 
Total 1,890 
E 60 1 545 
F 1 55 2 495 
1 16 3 374 
88SHAT, C(19) 7, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, ler Section, No. 
1562, Chef de Bureau Legere Rapport au Ministre-Directeur, 15 November 1811; Draft 
of Report No. 1562. 
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Process Verbal Bullock Cattle Animal# Series# Weight 
{kg} 
I 17 3 347 
Total 1,216 
G I 27 1 515.5 
1 43 2 440 
1 12 3 377.5 
14 3 381 
1 20 3 351 
Total 2,065 
H 1 38 1 463.5 
2 8 3 724 
1 10 3 396 
1 14 3 381 
1 15 3 391 
2 18 3 755 
1 6 3 348 
Total 3,458.5 
Grand Total 18 24 17,988.5 
Depot de Pau 
Commander: Lieutenant Hanet 
Station: Pau 
Situation 
TABLE 31 
Bataillons du Train des 
Equipages Militaires 
Situation89 30 May 1809 
Horses Vehicle Harness Hosp. 
Effectives 5 277 282 45 7 28 
Situation 15 June 181090 
2e Bataillon - En Route from Commercy 
Commander: Captain Macord 
Staff Off. Men Total 
Effectives 2 11 13 
ler Co. 1 109 110 
2e Co. 1 108 109 
3e Co. 1 113 114 
4e Co. 1 99 100 
Totals 
Present 6 419 425 
Absent 8 21 
Effectives 8 438 446 
Horses Vehicles 
8 
168 36 
165 36 
166 36 
149 36 
644 141 
12 3 
644 144 
Harness Hosp. 
152 
152 
152 
144 
592 
8 12 
600 
456 
POW 
1 
89 AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires. Situation, 30 May 
1809. 
90 AN, AF iv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires Situation, 15 June 
1810. 
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5e Bataillon (Enroute from Commercy) 
Commander: Captain Goubert 
Staff 
Effectives 4 9 13 12 
ler Co. 1 101 102 127 36 152 
2e Co. 1 109 110 157 36 152 
3e Co. 1 103 104 155 36 152 
4e Co. 1 104 105 152 36 152 
Totals 
Present 8 398 406 595 142 600 
Absent 5 28 8 2 8 22 1 
Effectives 8 426 434 603 144 608 
Depot 4 256 260 123 4 
Situation 
15 August 181091 
2e Bataillon (Catalonia} 
Commander: Captain Macord, Lieutenant Larochette 
Staff 1 15 16 13 
ler Co. 1 102 103 162 36 152 
2e Co. 1 107 108 164 36 152 
3e Co. 1 110 111 159 36 152 
4e Co. 105 106 134 36 152 
Total 
Present 5 407 412 632 114 608 
Absent 4 32 28 
Effectives 8 436 444 632 144 608 
5e Bataillon (Catalonia} 
Commander: Captain Grobert 
Staff 4 8 13 12 
ler Co. 1 90 102 127 36 152 
2e Co. 1 104 110 157 36 152 
91 AN, AFiv 11184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation 15 August 
1810. 
Table 31 - continued 458 
3e Co. 101 104 155 36 152 
4e Co. 1 100 109 152 36 152 
Total 
Present 8 398 406 595 142 600 
Absent 5 28 8 2 8 22 1 
Effectives 8 426 434 603 144 608 
Depot 4 246 250 50 7 38 
Situation92 15 January 1811 
2e Bataillon (Narbonne and Figueras) 
Commander: Captain Macord 
Lieutenant Larochette 
Unit Staff ler Co. 2e Co. 3e Co. 4e Co. Total 
Personnel 15 104 86 66 100 371 
Horses 13 87 82 72 88 342 
Vehicles 33 27 28 36 124 
Harness 122 122 87 170 501 
5e Bataillon (Catalonia) 
Commander: Captain Grabert 
Personnel 12 102 110 104 100 428 
Horses 12 50 61 79 46 248 
Vehicles 24 36 36 24 120 
Harness 96 152 152 96 496 
Depot (Pau) 
Commander: Lieutenant Caplet 
Personnel 262 
Horses 48 
Vehicles 7 
Harness 28 
92 AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillon du Train des Equipages Militaires Situation, 15 January 
1811. 
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Situation93 
15 April 1811 
2e Bataillon (Commercy)94 
Commander: Captain Macord 
Unit Staff ler Co. 2e Co. 3e Co. 4e Co. Total 
Personnel 7 18 24 49 
Horses 10 35 39 84 
Vehicles 3 9 8 20 
Harness 12 34 36 82 
5e Bataillon (Catalonia) 
Commander: Captain Goubert 
Personnel 9 118 111 90 77 405 
Horses 64 67 61 64 256 
Vehicles 54 44 16 17 181 
Harness 130 145 127 127 547 
Depot (Pau) 
Commander: Lieutenant Caplet 
Personnel 130 
Horses 66 
Vehicles 7 
Harness 76 
93 AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires Situation, 15 April 
1811. 
940nly detachments of the companies remained in Catalonia. Only troops in Catalonia 
are listed the bulk of the Battalion was at the Depot of Commercy to refit. 
Table 31 - continued 460 
Situation95 
Armee d'Aragon et Catalogne 
January 1814 
5e Bataillon 
Unit Staff ler 2e Co. 3e Co. 4e Co. 5e Co. 6e Co. Depot Total 
Co. 
Personnel 9 127 165 173 174 162 124 8 942 
Horses 4 204 16 15 16 15 137 407 
Mules 44 55 94 94 287 
Vehicles 42 42 1 85 
95 AN, AFiv 1184, Situation des Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires et 
Brigades des Mulets de Bat a loyer attaches aux Armee d'Espagne d'Aragon et de 
Catalogne, 16 December 1813 and 1 January 1814. 
Officers 
NCO 
Men 
Saddle Horses 
Draft Horses 
Vehicles 
Harness 
Mules 
Mules Harness 
Officers 
NCO 
Men 
Saddle Horses 
Draft Horses 
Vehicles 
Harness 
Mules 
Mule Harness 
TABLE 32 
Combined Se Bataillon 
du Train 
(Se ppl) Bataillon and 
Se (bis) Bataillon" 
Effectives 
5e (bis) 
8 
64 
299 
57 
540 
599 
Complete Battalion 
6 Cos. 4 Cos. 
17 13 
93 65 
690 461 
99 67 
376 188 
84 42 
376 188 
600 450 
600 450 
5e (1ml) 
2 
32 
154 
21 
77 
6 Cos. 
7 
237 
42 
376 
63 
299 
60 
1 
Total 
10 
96 
453 
57 
21 
77 
540 
599 
Needed 
4 Cos. 
3 
8 
10 
188 
21 
111 
96AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee Rapport a l'Empereur, 20 November 1811. 
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TABLE 33 
Draft Animal Provision 181197 
Div. Mil DeQartment Furnished Required 
Horses Mules Horses Mules 
lOe Gers 50 60 
Ht. Pyr. 25 30 
Bs. Pyr. 30 50 
lle Landes 10 30 
Giron de 20 30 
Deux Sevres 75 200 
12e Vendee 75 200 
Vienne 80 200 
Charenlien 55 44 25 
20e Chareute 75 101 
21e Ht. Vienne 47 20 55 
Total 407 745 180 225 
Provision by TyQe 
DeQartments Purchase Other With Unit 
Horses 407 180 45 110 
Mules 745 255 350 
Total: Horses 765 
Mules 1,350 
97 AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Etapes, Convois, 
Transports et Equipages Militaires, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 24 July 1811. 
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TABLE 34 
Pack Mule Brigades 
VII Corps 
30 May 180998 
(Brigades de Mulets de Bit) 
Unit Commander Officers TrooQs Total Mules 
16e Brigade Ss. Lt. Armieu 1 42 43 89 
17e Brigade Ss. Lt. Simon 1 31 32 62 
18e Brigade Ss. Lt. Daudier 1 47 48 91 
19e Brigade Ss. Lt. Gase l 49 50 95 
Total 1 169 173 337 
Avg Strength 1 42 43 84 
98AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train, Situation, 30 May 1809. 
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Army of Catalonia99 
15 June 1810 
Unit Commander Officers Men Hosp POW Total Mules 
16e Brigade Ss. Lt. Armieu 1 26 4 31 
17e Brigade Ss. Lt. Simon 23 1 25 
18e Brigade Ss. Lt. Campenac 1 14 7 22 
19e Brigade Ss. Lt. Gase 32 7 2 42 
Total 4 95 19 2 120 
Avg. 
Strength 1 24 5 2 30 
% Change 
Unit Officers Men Hosp POW Total Mules 
16e Brigade -26.2 -65.2 
17e Brigade -22.6 -59.7 
18e Brigade -55.3 -75.8 
19e Brigade -16.3 -55.8 
Total% Change -29.0 -30.6 
99 AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillon du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 15 June 
1810, and Situation 30 May 1809. 
27 
31 
12 
55 
125 
31 
-69.7 
-50.0 
-86.8 
-42.1 
-62.9 
Table 34 - continued 465 
15 April 181l 1°0 
Army of Catalonia 
Unit Commander Off Men Total Mules 
16e Armien 1 23 24 15 
17e Simon 1 14 15 17 
18e Campemas 1 8 9 6 
19e Gase 1 31 32 39 
Total 4 76 80 77 
Avg. 1 19 20 19 
% Change 
Unit Off Men Total Mules 
16e 0 -23.3 -22.5 -44.4 
17e 0 -41.6 -40.0 -45.2 
18e 0 -61.9 -59.1 -50.0 
19e 0 -24.4 -23.8 -29.1 
Total% Chg from 1809 0 -55.0 -53.8 -77.2 
100 AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires, Situation, 15 April 
1811. 
Division 
GQ 
ler 
2e 
3e 
4e 
Total 
Table 34 - continued 
Situation, Brigades de Mulets de Bat 
Bdes 
17e, 18e 
18e, 19e 
16e 
18e 
Total 
August 1809101 
Employees 
28 
48 
31 
4 
5 
116 
% Change 
Men 
-32.9 -39.2 
Mules 
63 
80 
54 
5 
3 
205 
466 
Bats 
63 
80 
54 
3 
200 
101 SHAT, C(8) 362, VII Corps, Rapport du Situation, Mouvements et Emplacement 
du Corps d'Armee pendant, la mois de Aout 1809, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, 5 September 
1809. AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train, Situation, 30 May 1809. 
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Pack Mule Requisition 
1810102 
Department Division Militaire Conductors Pack Mules 
Tam lOe 16 41 
Arriege lOe 17 46 
Gers Ile 41 85 
Bouches du Rhone 9e 47 93 
Vaucluse 9e 33 63 
Total 154 328 
102AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Etapes, Transports, Convois et Equipages Militaire, 
General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur 25 July 1810. 
Table 34 - continued 468 
Bataillon Leger des Equipages Militaire 
Organization, 1811 103 
Unit Officers NC Os Men Horses Mules 
Battalion Staff 4 8 14 
(Mule Company)104 (1) (8) (51) (9) (92) 
Six Companies 6 48 300 54 552 
Workers105 18 
Trumpeters 6 
Total 10 56 324 68 552 
103AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 30 January 1811. 
104The soldier-muleteers included trumpeters. General Lacuee simply notes 306 
soldiers et trumpeters. There must have been one trumpeter per company, six in all. Ibid. 
105The unit workers included blacksmiths (Ouvriers-Marechaux), and pack harness 
makers. For maintenance operations, they were probably divided as one blacksmith and 
one harness maker per company (twelve) and three each at the depot. General Lacuee 
does not enumerate where these men are, he only notes that total of eighteen workers. 
Ibid. 
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TABLE 35 
Pack Mule Brigades 
Origins, 180910' 
Department Conscripts Mules Concentration 
Pyrenees Orientales 100 200 Perpignan 
Basses Pyrenees 250 660 Pau 
Haute Pyrenees 245 220 Tarbes 
Arriege 310 500 Foix 
Aude 45 90 Carcassonne 
Haute-Garonne 130 220 Toulouse 
Gers 210 330 Auch 
Landes 90 180 Mont de Marlin 
Total 1,380 2,400 
106AN, AFiv 1183, Bandesson, Rapport, 9 January 1809. 
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TABLE 36 
Pack Mule Brigades 
Organization 1809187 
Saddle Pack 
Personnel Number Horses/Mules Mules 
Commander, Lieutenant 1 
Marechal des logis chef 1 1 
Marechal des logis 2 2 
Brigadiers 4 4 
Trumpeter 1 1 
Solider Muleteers 108 70 120 
Harnessmaker109 1 
Farriers110 2 
Total 82 9 120 
107 AN, AFiv 1183, Minute de Decret Imperial, Projet de Decret, Organization, 
Compagnie de Mulets de Bat, nd., (8 February 1809). 
108Each soldier managed two pack mules, that is 60 soldier muleteers to handle the 
120 pack mules. This left ten men as spares 'haut le pied.' 
109Hamess makers were bourreliers or batiers. 
11
°Farriers or horse shoers. These, of course, specialied in mule shoeing and medical 
treatment. 
TABLE 37 
Supply Convoy to Barcelona111 
June 1810 
Avanced Guard112 
Brigade Polombini 
Dragons Napoleon 
Artillery 
Column Head113 
General T aviel 
Artillery114 
(3e Leger Artillery) 
HQ Baggage Vehicles 115 
Pack Mules 
3e prov. Cuirassiers (50 men) 
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lllSHAT, C(8) 133, Register, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, Marechal 
Macdonald, Ordre du Mouvement, 10 June 1810; C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald, Ordre 
du Mouvement, 10 June 1810. 
112General Polombini's Brigade is from Genreal Severoli's Division and had here an 
artillery 'slice' of a howitzer and an 8pdr cannon; and 200 cavalry, probably the Dragons 
Napoleon, SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; C(8) 133, 
Ordres du Jour, and C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald, Ordre du Mouvement, 10 June 1810. 
113General de Brigade Taviel was Army Artillery Commander and overall convoy 
commander, personlly commanding the head of the convoy column. SHAT C(8) 362, 
Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; C(8) 133, Ordres du Jour, and C(8) 335, 
Registre, Macdonald, Ordre du Mouvement, 10 June 1810. 
114The disposable artillery with General Taviel was the regimental artillery of the 3e 
Leger, the HQ attachment regiment. SHAT C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 
May 1810; C (8) 133, Ordres du Jour, and C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald, Ordre du 
Mouvement, IO June 1810. 
115The Headquarters (HQ) baggage and pack mules undoubtedly fell under the 
authority of the Vaguemester General, though Marshal Macdonald invested the actual 
convoy command to General Taviel. 
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CONVOY 
Brigade Salm 116 (Division Frere) 
(Dispersed through Convoy) 
6 Cos. infantry 
60 Cavalry 
1 cannon 
25 vehicles 
2 Cos. infantry 
20 Cavalry 
20 Vehicles 
4 Cos. Infantry 
40 Cavalry 
20 Vehicles 
2 Cos. Infantry 
20 Cavalry 
20 Vehicles 
4 Cos. Infantry 
40 Cavalry 
20 Vehicles 
2 Cos. Infantry 
20 Cavalry 
116General de Brigade Salm's brigade was in Division erere. He was attached to the 
HQ Staff and when General de Brigade Augereau, commanding that brigade returned to 
France with his brother, Marshal Augereau, Salm took command of it. Ibid. 
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20 Vehicles 
4 Cos. Infantry 
40 Cavalry 
100 Cavalry 
l Co. Infantry 
30 Bullock 
I Co. Infantry 
25 Bullock 
I Co. Infantry 
25 Bullock 
3 Cos. Infantry 
40 Cavalry 
25 Bullcok 
I Co. Infantry 
25 bullcok 
I Co. Infantry 
25 Bullcok 
I Co. Infantry 
25 Bullcok 
3 Cos. Infantry 
25 Bullock 
3 Cos. Infantry 
40 Cavalry 
25 bullcok 
Table 37 - continued 474 
1 Co. Infantry 
25 bullcok 
1 Co. Infantry 
25 bullcok 
1 Co. Infantry 
25 bullcok 
3 Cos. Infantry 
40 Cavalry 
25 Bullcok 
1 Co. Infantry 
25 Bullcok 
1 Co. Infantry 
25 Bullcok 
1 Co. Infantry 
25 bullcok 
1 Co. Infantry 
25 Bullock 
3 Cos. Infantry 
40 Cavalry 
Table 37 - continued 
Order of Battle 
Supply Convoy to Barcelona 
11 June 1810117 
(Present under arms) 
Reconnaissance in Force 
Division Guillot (Verdier) 
Three Brigades, of Generals Amey, Guillot and Devaux 
32e Leger 
2e Ligne 
16e Ligne 
56e Ligne 
Bataillon Valaison 
Regiment Wurtzbourg 
ler Ligne Berg 
2e Ligne Berg 
Bataillon de Prince 
4e Bataillon Tour d'Auvergne 
1 er Leger Westphalien 
2e Ligne Westphalien 
3e leger Westphalien 
4e Ligne Westphalien 
Total 
ler Leger Napolitan 
ler Ligne Napolitan 
2e Ligne Napolitan 
ler Chasseurs a cheval Napolitan 
2e Chasseurs a cheval Napolitan 
Total 
Division Pignatelli 
530 
465 
566 
659 
265 
711 
493 
486 
180 
267 
112 
214 
320 
246 
5,514 
780 
1,166 
1,494 
223 
69 
3,732 
117SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
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16 
3 
3 
4 
2 
15 
24 
21 
6 
4 
5 
1 
1 
5 
110 
6' 
18 
13 
232 
64 
383 
Table 37 - continued 
Division Rouyer 
Two Brigades of Generals Schwartz and De Cham bard 
4e ligne de Saxe 
5e de la Confederation du Rhin 
6e de la Confederation du Rhin 
Total 
Division Severoli 
1,437 
1,128 
535 
3,100 
Two Brigades of Generals Mazzuchelli, Polimbini (Fontane) 
ler Leger 
6e Ligne 
7e Ligne 
2e Leger 
4e Ligne 
Dragons Napoleon 
Chasseurs Royoux 
Sappers 
Train 
Artillerie a cheval 
Artillerie a pied 
Total 
ler Leger 
42e Ligne 
93e Ligne 
24e Dragons 
Artillerie a pied 
Division Frere118 
Two Brigades of Generals Salm and Loreney 
1,218 
1,637 
403 
1,457 
1,189 
262 
75 
90 
108 
61 
9 
6,309 
1,489 
1,791 
500 
711 
76 
Horses 
476 
60 
38 
18 
116 
252 
70 
85 
50 
457 
19 
19 
3 
686 
4 
118Division Frere detached one small brigade under General Loreney to remain in 
Upper Catalonia. It included the 7e Ligne, 1,809 mean and 20 horses, and the 3e Prov. 
Chasseurs a cheval with 242 men and 206 horses, Ibid. 
Table 37 - continued 
Unit Men 
Sappers 81 
Total 4,890 
GQG 
Marshal Macdonald and General de Brigade Guillemont 
3e Leger 
3e Prov. Cuirassiers 
Gendarmerie lmperiale 
Total 
Grand Total 
Division Frere 
Division Severoli 
Division Guillot 
Division Pignatelli 
Division Rouyer 
GQG 
Total 
Detached Troops 
849 
139 
61 
1,049 
24,594 
452 
179 
848 
434 
209 
1,274 
477 
Horses 
4 
941 
20 
118 
43 
161 
1,823 
123 
11 
55 
7 
151 
347 
Hirondelle 
V alonte de Dieu 
St. Jean 
N. des Carmin 
Hypolite 
Jean l'Herese 
Misercorde 
St. Joseph 
Eulerlie 
Assumption 
ND des Carmen 
Total 
TABLE 38 
Convoys 
Port Vendres to Barcelona 
1 November 1810119 
Flour 
20,624.4 kg 
42,840 kg 
41,616 kg 
27,540 kg 
42,840 kg 
21,296.6 kg 
36,720 kg 
26,377.2 kg 
55,080 kg 
50,796 kg 
18,360 kg 
384,091 kg 
478 
Fate 
Captured off Palamos 
Captured off Rosas 
Lost at sea 
Arrive at Rosas 
Lost at sea 
Burned off Palamos 
Burned off Palamos 
Arrived 
Arrived 
Arrived 
Arrived 
119SHAT C(19) 8, Port-Vendre, 1810-1811 Frigate Captain Hurlet, P~rt Vendres 
squadron, Etat des Batiements changes Ies Ier 9 bre 1810 pour comte du Gouvemment 
et destines a faire partie d'one expedition, 28 November 1810. 
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TABLE 39 
Convoys to Barcelona120 
1810-1811 
Ship Wheat Flour Rice Oats 
Convoy 1121 
L 'Infortune 19,200 kg 
St. Jean 16,620 kg 
Scoroion 6,000 kg 2,774 dl 
Les Deux Freres 16,800 kg 
St. Nicolas 31,800 kg 
Deux Marees 35,363 kg 16,560 kg 2,195 kg 
Total 35,363 kg 106,980 kg 2,195 kg 2,774 dl 
Convoy 11122 
St. Esprit 21,000 kg 
St. Pierre 25,800 kg 
Total 46,800 
Total 35,363 kg 153,780 kg 2,195 kg 2,774 di 
Convoy IIl123 
L'Hirondelle 49,200 kg 
Vierge du Rosaire 32,016 kg 
120SHAT, C(19) 8, Port-Vendres, 1810-11, Frigate Captan Hurtel, Etat Denrees qui ont 
ete versees dans les Magasin de la place de Roses, 19 April 1811, Etat des Batiments 
Faisant partie l'Expedition andonne pour Barcelone dans la I Oe Division Militaire nd. 
121This six ship convoy left Port-Vendres on 25 F eburary 1811, put into Rosas to 
discharge their cargos, destined for Fort Figueras. Successful voyage. 
122Departed Port-Vendres 11 April 1811 for Rosas and cargo for Figueras. Successful 
voyage. 
123Departed Port-Vendres 12 April 1811, for Palamos. Arrived and remained due to 
presence of the enemy. 
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Convoy 1y124 
La Providence 44,100 kg 3,300 kg 
La Marie 48,000 kg 
La Confiance 36,780 kg 
Vierge des Graces 62,889 kg 
Pierre Bienfaisant 40,197 kg 
La Concention 17,553 kg 
Le Salomon 20,753 kg 
Total 128,880 kg 144,692 kg 
Grand Total 35,363 kg 272,660 kg 2,195 kg 141,392 kg 
124Convoy held at Port-Vendre. 
TABLE 40 
Convoys, 9e Division Militaire 
Port Vendres - Barcelona 
April 1811125 
Ship Flour 
Convoy 1126 
St. Jean 40,860 kg 
La Victoire 27,000 kg 
Le Bien Aime 58,440 kg 
Les Deux Freres 61,500 kg 
L 'Annonciation 25,200 kg 
Les Amis Reunis 51,000 kg 
La Ste. Fran~oise 48,000 kg 
Le St. Pierre 69,000 kg 
Le St. Michel 24,000 kg 
des Carmes 42,000 kg 
Total 447,000 kg 
Convoy II 121 
L'Amiable Maguerite 93,000 kg 
St. Pierre 42,000 kg 
La Hte. Garonne 42,000 kg 
Le Amiable Victoire 48,000 kg 
La Clemence 47,082 kg 
Total 272,082 kg 
Grand Total 719,082 kg 
481 
Rice 
2,895kg 
7,294 kg 
1,810 kg 
1,728 kg 
2,416 kg 
2,070 kg 
6,192 kg 
947 kg 
2,171 kg 
27,523 kg 
1,251 kg 
1,251 kg 
28,774 kg 
125SHAT, C(l9) 8, Port-Vendres, 1810-11, Frigate Captain Hurlet, 9e Division Militaire 
(Convoys), 22 April 1811. This was one whole convoy but was split in two. 
126This ten ship convoy returned to port due to enemy threat. 
127This five ship convoy sailed but put into Agde. 
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TABLE 41 
Transport Ships 
Port Vendre to Barcelona 
1810-18l1128 
Shiu No. Name Tonnage Departure Unload Barce-
Date Iona 
1 L'Hirondelle 39 2/12/10 
2 La Jeune Therise 35 2/12/10 
3 La Misericorde 61 2/12/10 Palamos 
4 Le St. Joseuh 39 2/12/10 Arrive 
5 L'Assumation 86 2/12/10 Arrive 
6 des Carmes 27 2/12/10 Arrive 
7 La V alonte des 64 27/12/10 
Du ex 
8 des Carmes 48 27/12/10 Arrive 
9 L'Eidalie 91 27/12/10 
10 St. Jean 70 10/01/11 
11 L'Hvaolite 67 10/01/11 
12 St. Antoine 49 10/01/11 
13 Greusson 44 10/01/11 
14 Deux Freres 27 25/02/11 Rosas 
15 Scorn ion 29 25/02/11 Rosas 
16 St. Jean 28 25/02/11 Rosas 
17 L 'Infortune 28 25/02/11 Rosas 
18 St. Nicolas 61 25/02/11 Rosas 
19 St. Esarit 42 11/04/11 Rosas 
20 St. Pierre 38 11/04/11 Rosas 
21 L'Hyroudelle 71 11/04/11 Palamos 
128SHAT C(l9) 8, Port Vendres, 1810-11, IOe Division Militaire Commissaire des guerre 
Diutrass, Etat General des chargement effectves a Port Vendres pour le Ravitaillement de 
Barcelone, pendant le 4e Trimestre 1810 et le primier Trimestre 1811, 25 May 1811. 
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22 La Vierge du ? 13/04/11 Vendres 
Rosaire 
23 La Providence 77 13/04/11 Vendres 
24 La Marie 68 13/04/11 Vendres 
25 La Confiance 69 13/04/11 Vendres 
26 La Vierge des 31/03/11 Vendres 
Graces 
27 Bienfait 31/03/11 Vendres 
28 La ConceQtion 31/03/11 Vendres 
29 Salomon 31/03/11 Vendres 
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Ship No. Flour Kg Sacks# Oats di Sacks# Comments 
1 20,624.4 337 Captured at Palamos 
2 21,297.6 348 Burned at Palamos 
3 36,720 600 Unloaded at Palamos 
4 26,377.2 431 Arrive at Barcelona 
5 50,796 830 Arrive at Barcelona 
6 18,360 300 Arrive at Barcelona 
7 42,840 700 Captured by Corsairs 
8 27,540 450 Arrive at Barcelona 
9 55,080 900 Captured by Corsairs 
10 41,616 680 Captured by Corsairs 
11 42,840 700 Captured by Corsairs 
12 33,598.8 549 Captured by Corsairs 
13 16,080 268 2,956 232 Captured by Corsairs 
14 16,800 280 Cargo discharged at Rosas 
15 6,000 100 2,774 227 Cargo discharged at Rosas 
16 16,620 277 Cargo discharged at Rosas 
17 19,200 320 Cargo discharged at Rosas 
18 31,800 530 Cargo discharged at Rosas 
19 21,000 350 Cargo discharged at Rosas 
20 25,800 430 Cargo discharged at Rosas 
21 49,200 820 Discharged at Palamos 
22 7,372 673 (Captured, recaptured to 
Barcelona) 
23 44,100 735 3,300 366 Returned to Port-Vendres 
24 48,000 800 Returned to Port-Vendres 
25 36,780 613 Returned to Port-Vendres 
26 14,220 1,280 Returned to Port-Vendres 
27 8,850 992 Returned to Port-Vendres 
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28 4,327 340 Returned to Port-Vendres 
29 4,666 488 Returned to Port-Vendres 
Total 749,070 12,348 48,465 4,598 
RECAPITULATION 
Nos. Ships Flour Oats Disposition 
4 123,073.2 Arrived at Barcelona 
12 85,920 Discharged at Palamos 
9 273,976.8 10,328 Victim of Corsairs 
7 137,220 2,774 Discharged at Rosas 
7 128,880 35,363 Discharged at Port 
Vendres 
29 749,070 48,465 
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TABLE 42 
Convoy 
Port d'Agde to Barcelona 
27 October 181(}129 
Ship No. Ship Tons Freight Price/ Freight 
Tons Ton Charge 
1 L. Vierge de Lucelle 57 55 15.50 11,841.00 
2 Port Maurice 46 44 17.00 13,309.00 
3 La Conce12tion 47 45 17.00 12,578.00 
4 L. Vierge des Graces 50 48 15.50 11,479.00 
5 L 'Assum12tion 126 122 15.50 23,359.00 
6 L. Vierge d'Ausaire 49 47 17.00 10,461.00 
7 St. Jose12h 10 38 17.00 8,404.00 
8 L. Vierge de Misericorde 66 64 15.50 10,626.00 
9 Jesus et Marie 28 27 17.00 8,728.00 
10 La Ste. Vierge 65 63 15.50 12,970.00 
Total 574 553 123,755.00 
129This provender was packed in 14,967 sacks. SHAT, C(l9) 8, Agde, 1811, Etat des 
Batiments charges le 27 October 1810 pour le compte du Gouvemement destines a faire partie 
d' une expedition ordonnee pour Barcelone. 
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Table 42 - continued 
ShiQ No. Cargo (kgs) Flour Advance Gratification Other 
Grain Payment ExQenses 
1 26,477.613 2,400 850.00 800.00 
2 18,284.550 6,780 750.00 800.00 290.70 
3 27,095.993 2,820 750.00 800.00 
4 27,017.260 3,060 750.00 800.00 
5 89,259.338 5,580 1,800.00 1,300.00 87.50 
6 26,507.537 750.00 800.00 
7 7,920 650.00 800.00 
8 41,926.394 950.00 800.00 
9 13,311 450.00 800.00 68.00 
10 56,713.8 950.00 800.00 
Total 300,085.938 28,560 8,650.00 8,500.00 446.20 
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TABLE 43 
Convoys 
Agde to Barcelona 
October 1810 - May 1811136 
Ship Ship Depart Date Comments 
No. 
1 La Vielle de Port 21, 23 Arrive Barcelona 27 
Maurice 10/10 October 1810 
2 La Conception 10/10 October 1810 
3 La Vierge des Carmes 24/10/10 Taken by Corsairs 
4 L'Assumption 24/10/10 Arrive Barcelona 11 Jan 
1811. Joined Toulon Convoy 
5 La Vierge de Lorette 24/10/10 Sunk at sea 
6 St. Joseph 24/10/10 Captured by Corsairs 
7 St. Vierge 24/10/10 Arrive Barcelona 3 Nov. 
1810 
8 La Vierge de 24/10/10 Arrive Barcelona 3 Nov. 
Misericorde 1810 
9 St. Joseph et Marie 24/10/10 Toulon to Barcelona, arrived 
10 La Vierge du Rosaire 31/10/10 Arrive Barcelona, 3 Nov. 
1810 
11 La Vierge des Carmes 19/01/11 Captured by Corsairs 
12 Les Deux F reres 19/01/11 Ship diverted 
13 La Vierge 19/01/11 Arrived at Barcelona 
14 La Bien Armee 24/01/11 Arrived at Barcelona 
15 St. Jean-Baptiste 26/01/11 Arrive at Barcelona 
16 St. Antoine 2/01/11 Arrive at Barcelona 
17 L'Union 29/01/11 Attacked by Corsairs, burned 
off Palamos 
18 Les Deux N avires 29/01/11 Attacked by Corsairs, burned 
off Palamos 
130SHAT, C(l9) 8, Agde, Commissaire des guerres Serrot, 9e Divison Militaire, Etat General 
des Approvisionnements expedies pour le ravitaillement de Barcelone, pendant· le dernier 
Trimestre 1810 et le premier trimester 1811, Jusqu'au, 7 Mai 1811, 10 May 1811. 
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19 L 'heureuse Magdelaine 29/01/11 Attacked by Corsairs, burned 
off Palamos 
20 L'Auguste 29/01/11 Attacked by Corsairs, burned 
off Palamos 
21 La Victoire 30, 31/01/11 Probably lost at sea (Corsairs) 
22 L 'Annonciation 12/02/11 Probably lost at sea (Corsairs) 
23 Les Ames Reunies 15/02/11 Probably lost at sea (Corsairs) 
24 St. Francoise 1 7, 18/02/11 Probably lost at sea (Corsairs) 
25 St. Pierre 4, 10/03/11 Probably lost at sea (Corsairs) 
26 La Vierge des Carmes 4, 10/03/11 Probably lost at sea (Corsairs) 
27 St. Michel 10, 11/03/11 Probably lost at sea (Corsairs) 
28 St. Pierre 13, 15/03/11 Returned to Agde (Corsairs) 
29 L'Aimable Marguerite 18/03/11 Returned to Agde (Corsairs) 
30 L'Aimable Victoire 20/03/11 Returned to Agde (Corsairs) 
31 La Haute-Garonne 21/03/11 Returned to Agde (Corsairs) 
32 La Clemence 24/03/11 Returned to Agde (Corsairs) 
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Port d'Agde (2) 
Shi12 No. Grain Flour Rice Salt Sacks 
1 18,284 6,780 113 
2 27,095 2,820 47 
3 27,017 3,060 51 
4 89,359 5,640 93 
5 26,477 2,400 40 
6 14,967 7,420 326 
7 56,713 
8 41,926 30 
9 13,311 25 
10 26,507 40 
11 76,649 1,240 
12 61,500 1,025 
13 30,014 495 
14 60,250 999 
15 43,725 721 
16 31,306 62,500 500 
17 29,580 7,313 593 
18 2,495 30 
19 4,388 60 
20 2,199 30 
21 27,000 7,294 550 
22 25,200 1,722 445 
23 51,000 2,416 885 
24 48,000 2,070 830 
25 69,000 2,492 1,180 
26 42,000 2,171 730 
27 24,000 947 413 
28 42,000 1,254 719 
29 93,000 1,550 
30 
31 
32 
Total 341,556 
Table 43 - continued 
48,000 
42,000 
47,082 
891,823 62,240 
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TABLE 44 
Convoys 
Port d'Agde to Barcelona 
1810-1811131 
Ship Tons Grain Flour Arrive 
La Vierge de Lorette132 57 26,477.613 2,400 
La Ville de Port Maurice 46 18,284 6,780 27/10/10 
La Conception 47 27,095.993 2,820 25/10/10 
La Vierge des Graces133 50 27,017.250 3,060 
L 'Assumption 134 40 14,967.100 7,920 
La Vierge du Rosaire 49 26,507.534 3/11110 
St. Joseph IJs 40 14,967.100 7,920 
La Vierge de Misericorde 66 41,926.394 3/11110 
Jesus, Joseph, Marie136 28 13,311 
La Ste. Vierge 65 56,713.800 3/11/10 
131 SHAT, C(19) 8, Agde, Resume des Operations faites pour le Ravitaillement de Barcelone, 
6 May 1811. 
132La Vierge de Lorette sunk at sea. 
133La Vierge des Graces diverted with cargo to Sardinia and captured on discharging cargo. 
134L'Assumption was forced to Marsailles, joined later convoy. 
13sLe St. Joseph captured by Corsairs at Mahonais. 
136Jesus, Joseph, Marie ran around. 
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Ship Tons Flour Rice Salt Arrive 
St. Pierre137 64 42,000 1,251 
Ste. Francoise 71 48,000 2,070 14/03/11 
Les Ames Reunis 81 51,000 2,416 10/03/11 
L 'Annonciation 138 37 25,200 1,728 
Le St. Pierre139 112 69,000 2,192 
Le St. Michel140 46 24,000 947 
La Notre Dame des 77 42,000 2,171 
Carmes 141 
La Haute Garonne142 64 42,000 
L'Aimable Victoire143 76 48,000 
La Clemence144 83 47,082 
Le St. Jean Baptiste145 55 40,860 2,895 
Le St. Antoine 132 24,000 7,306 62,500 14/03/11 
La Vierge des Carmes 48 28,200 1,824 10/03/11 
La Victoire146 66 27,000 7,294 
La Vierge des Carmes 147 114 62,400 12,241 
137St. Pierre not sent, cargo shipped on new vessel. 
138L'Annociation got to Barcelona, Corsaires captured en return journey. 
139Le St. Pierre sunk at Sette, Corsair action. 
140St. Michel sunk at Sette Corsair action. 
141La Notre Dame sunk at Sette, Consair action. 
142La Haute Garonne returned to Agde. 
143La Aimable Victoire returned to Agde. 
144La Clemence returned to Agde. 
145Le Ste. Jean Baptiste not sent, cargo on new vessel. 
146La Victoire not sent, cargo on new vessel. 
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Les Deux Freres 148 95 61,500 
La Bien Aimee 149 89 58,440 1,810 
L'Aimable Marguette150 124 93,000 
Total 341,560.01 862,242 46,165 62,500 
Port at Agde 
Ships Lost 
October 1810 - March 1811 
Freight (kg) 
Shiu No. Grain Flour Rice Sacks 
3 27,017 3,060 51 
5 26,477 2,400 40 
6 14,967 7,420 326 
11 76,649 1,240 
17 29,580 7,313 593 
18 2,495 30 
19 4,388 60 
20 2,199 30 
21 27,000 7,294 550 
22 25,000 1,722 445 
23 51,000 2,416 85 
24 48,000 2,070 830 
25 69,000 2,492 1,180 
26 42,000 2,171 730 
27 24,000 947 413 
Total 68,461 405,109 35,507 7,403 
147La Vierge des Carmes ca12tured by Corsairs at Toulon after convoy. 
148Les Deux Freres captured by Corsairs at Toulon after convoy. 
149La Bien Aimee arrived at Barcelona. 
150L'Aimable Margueritte returned to Agde. 
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Quantities Lost 
Item Total Hauled Goods Lost % Goods Saved % 
Grain 341,556 kg 68,961 kg 20.0 272,595 kg 80.0 
Flour 891,823 kg 405,109 kg 45.4 486,714 kg 54.5 
Rice 62,240 kg 35,507 kg 57.1 26,733 kg 42.9 
Salt 62,500 kg 62,500 kg 100.0 
Sacks 16,015 kg 7,403 kg 46.2 8,612 kg 53.8 
Ships 32 kg 15 kg 46.9 17 kg 53.l 
Total Freight 1,358,119 kg 509,577 kg 37.5 848,542 kg 62.5 
Port de Sete151 
Ship No. Ship Date Comments 
1 L'Auguste 19/01/11 Captured at Matero 
2 L 'Heureuse Magdelle 19/01/11 Captured at Matero 
3 L'Union 21/01/11 Arrived 20 March 1811 
4 Les Deux Maires 21/01/11 Cargo discharged at Rosas 
5 St. Jean Baptiste 19/01/11 Ship lost off St. Filieu 
6 La Conception 20/01/11 Arrived at Barcelona152 
7 Le Savori 19/01/11 Arrived at Barcelona153 
8 St. Espirit 21/01/11 Returned to Sete (Corsairs) 
9 St. Louis 21/01/11 Arrived at Barcelona154 
151lbid. 
152La Conception captured by Corsairs during return trip 30 March 1811. 
153Le Savori captured by Corsairs during return trip, 30 March 1811. 
154St. Louis captured by Corsairs during return trip 30 March 1811. 
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Shit! No. Grain Flour Rice Salt Sacks 
1 32,792 7,916 1,447.25 900 
2 18,270 19,920 608 
3 24,000 12,400 400 
4 35,363 16,560 891 
5 7,250 12,000 1,083 325 
6 14,500 36,000 7,062.5 1,000 
7 18,125 12,000 1,439.5 600 
8 7,250 18,000 500 
9 10,950 6,000 1,086.5 400 
Total 144,500 168,404 12,119 12,400 5,624 
Port of Sete 
Ships Lost 
1810 - 1811 
Shi11 No. Freight Grain Flour Rice Salt Sacks 
1 32,792 7,916 1,447.5 900 
2 18,270 19,920 608 
5 7,250 12,000 1,083 325 
Total 58,312 39,836 2,530.5 1,833 
Quantities Lost 
Item Total Hauled Goods Lost % Goods Saved % 
Grain 144,500 kg 58,312 40.4 86,188 59.6 
Flour 168,404 kg 39,836 23.7 128,568 76.3 
Rice 12,119 kg 2,530.5 26.9 9,588.5 79.1 
Salt 12,400 kg 12,400 100.0 
Sacks 5,624 1,833 32.6 3,791 67.4 
Ships 9 3 30.0 6 60.0 
Total 337,423 kg 100,678.5 29.8 236,744.5 70.1 
Freight 
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TABLE 45 
Provisions to Barcelona 
Requests and Supply 
September 1810155 
Requests Gen. Prefect Quantity 
Quantity Item Lacombe St. Michel Corregiment Total Obtained 
Quintals Wheat 18,980 2,263 21,243 6,454 
Marc1s6 7,280 1,630 8,910 3,829 
Marc 1,950 1,950 57 
Marc 38,500 274 28,774 4,967 
Marc 14,100 14,100 
Marc 26 
Marc 2 
Liters Wine 1,678 
Resupply Quantities (qx) 
Method Origin Flour/Meal Rice Salt 
Sea Toulon 60,000 2,850 1,580 
Sea Cette, Agde, Port 30,000 500 250 
Vendre 
Land Perpignan 15,000 898 422 
Total 105,000 4,248 2,652 
m AN, AF iv 1175, ler Section, Bureau des Vivres, General Lacuee, Rapport a l'Empereur, 17 
November 1810. 
156The Quintal Marc (qx Marc) is a hundred weight in the Marc standard of weight. The 
French Marc equals 244.75 grams (3,777.5 English grains). This is the measure used. here. The 
Barcelona Marc equals 229.82 grams (3,550.75 grains). Doursther, Dictionnaire Universe!, 247-
251. 
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TABLE 46 
Imported Colonial Goods 
J. B. Boyer - Fonfrede 
Contract157 
Old Rate 
Item Quantity (gx) Rate/guintal, F. Price, F 
Cotton 500 120.00 60,000 
Sugar (crude) 1,500 110.00 165,000 
Sugar 1,500 200.00 300,000 
Coffee 600 300.00 180,000 
Indigo 100 30.00 3,000 
Cachenelli 30 8.00 240 
Dye (wool) 400 4.00 1,600 
Leather 870 1.50 1,305 
Total 5,500 911,145 
New Rate 
Cotton 500 600.00 300,000 
Sugar (crude) 1,500 300.00 450,000 
Sugar 1,500 400.00 600,000 
Coffee 600 400.00 240,000 
Indigo 100 900.00 90,000 
Cachenelli 30 2,000.00 60,000 
Dye (wool) 400 44.00 17,600 
Leather 870 13.50 11,745 
Total 5,500 1,969,345 
Gross Income 1,969,345 
911,145 
Net Income 1,058,200 
msHAT C(l9) 8, General Lacuee, Rapport a Napoleon, Le Transport du Grains OU Farines, 
27 October 1810, Tableau No. 1 · 
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Table 46 - continued 
Losses 158 
Cargo Marine Freight Total 
Loss Insurance Damage Reimbursement Exuense Grain Loss 
0 280,000 F. 100,000 F. 38,000 F. 
~ 280,000 F. 75,000 F. 63,250 F. 481,250 F. 24,750 F. 
113 280,000 F. 66,666 F. 84,334 F. 431,000 F. 33,000 F. 
Yz 280,000 F. 50,000 F. 126,500 F. 456,500 F. 49,500 F. 
% 280,000 F. 33,333 F. 168,667 F. 482,000 F. 66,000 F. 
o/4 280,000 F. 25,000 F. 189,750 F. 494,750 F. 74,250 F. 
All 280,000 F. 253,000 F. 533,000 F. 99,000 F. 
Profits 159 
Cargo Loss Exuense Receipt Losses Profit 
0 380,000 F. 1,058,200 F. 678,200 F. 
~ 418,250 F. 993,650 F. 375,400 F. 
113 431,000 F. 705,467 F. 274,467 F. 
Yz 456,500 F. 529,100 F. 92,600 F. 
o/s 482,000 F. 352,467 F. 129,533 F. 
o/.i 494,750 F. 264,550 F. 230,000 F. 
All 533,000 F. 533,000 F. 
Maximum loss includes 380,000 in insurance and cargo damage and in case of loss of whole 
cargo a loss of 533,000 F. or a total of 913,000 F. 
158lbid., Tableau 2. 
159lbid. 
TABLE 47 
Projected Sea Transport160 
Grain Prices 
Grain Province 
30,000 qx mare Fance 
20,000 qx mare Genoa 
20,000 qx mare Livorene 
30,000 qx mare Alger 
Total 100,000 qx mare, (18.80 F. avg.) 
Other Charges, Sacks, etc. 
Total 
Shipping fees (6.00 F/qx mare) 
Portage fees (1.00 F/qx mare) 
All other expenses 
Total Expenses 
Total Cost (total rate per qx - 33.40 F.) 
Price 
18.00 F/qx 
22.00 F/qx 
20.00 F/qx 
18.00 F/qx 
Other Commodities 
Rice - 3,000 qx at 37.50 F. 
Salt - 1,000 qx at 14.00 F. 
Shipping (6.00 F/qx) 
Other charges (portage) 
Total 
Grand Total 
Barcelona Commodity Prices 
One Quintal Marc of Wheat (Oct. 1810) 
Other Charges (shipping, insurance, etc.) 
Profit margin 
Total Cost, 100,000 qx mare grain 
160SHAT, C(19) 8, General Lacuee, Rapport, 27 October 1810. 
Cost 
540,000 F. 
440,000 F. 
400,000 F. 
540,000 F. 
1,920,000 F 
280,000 F 
2,200,000 F 
600,000 F 
100,000 F 
440.000 F 
1,100,000 F 
3,340,000 F 
112,500 F 
14,000 F 
24,000 Fs 
9.500 F 
160,000 F 
3,500,000 F 
50.00 F 
30.40 F 
16.60 F 
1,660,000 F 
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APPENDIX II 
INTENDANCE STRUCTURE, ARMY OF 
CATALONIA, 1807-1814 
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Appendix II 
When the Minstry of War organized the Division d'Observation des Pyrenees 
Orentales,1 it lacked an adminstrative infrastructure, even a Inspecteur aux revues. 
Paymaster or Commissaire des guerres. 2 As the division expanded into a corps, the 
Ministry of Military Administration assigned an Intendance. 
Corps Hq 
Division Chabran 
Division Lechi 
Cavalry Division 
1. Corps d'Obseivation des Pyrenees Orientales 
1807 - 18083 
Positions 
Commissaire Ordonnateur en chef 
Assistant 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Augier 
Pinot 
Laffosse 
Gini 
The VII Corps Intendance expanded in proportion, to support the now 43,000 men 
Corps to: 
1CN, No. 13411, Napoleon to Clarke, 23 December 1807 16:24-212; No. 13413, 
Napoleon to Clarke, 23 December 1807, 16:212-214. 
2Pierre Conard notes that this Observation Division lacked a transport service. 
Napoleon et la Catalogne, 39; SHAT, C(8) 485, Division d'Observation des Pyrenees 
Orientales, 15 December 1807. Commissaire des guerres Chambon of the lOe Division 
Militaire provided logistical support to the fledgling division. 
3SHAT, C(8) 485, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales 28 January 1808; 
Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrenees Orientales, 28 May 1808. 
VII Corps 
Division Reille 
Division Pino 
Division Souham 
Division Chabran 
Division Chabot 
Division Allemande 
Division Westphalienne 
Division Duhesme 
Position 
2. VII Corps 
18084 
Commissaire Ordonnateur en chef 
Commissaire des guerres (two) 
Adjoint (two) 
Adjoint Provisoine (four) 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire Ordonnateur 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Adjoint 
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Rey 
Sapia, Lousteau 
Thieff, Pinot 
Lapienne, 
Lidonie, 
Souilhagon, 
Muguet 
Grobert 
Panabelli, 
Galbiati 
Marchand 
Augier 
Lafosse 
Pinot 
Muguet 
By July 1809, the Indendance continued to fill, with only some personnel changes 
in the Division. 5 As the Corps restructed itself to besiege Gerona, General Verdier's 
formations received an lntendance/Administrative staff: 
4SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808; C(8) 362, Situation, VII 
Corps, 6 January 1809. 
5SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; Situation, VII Corps, 1 
December 1809. 
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3. Siege of Gerona6 
Unit Position Name 
HQ Commissaire Ordonnateur Grobert 
Adjoint Souillagon 
1st Division 
2nd Division Commissaire des guerres Grobert 
3rd Division Commissaire des guerres Gini 
The In ten dance structure of Army of Catalonia in February 1810 retain its basic 
structure: 
HQ 
Division Frere 
Division Seseroli 
Division Pignatelli 
Division Rouyer 
Division St. Michel 
4. VII Corps/Anny of Catalonia, 18107 
Position 
Commissaire Ordonnateur en Chef 
Commissaire des guerres 
Adjoint 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Rey 
Grobert, 
Sap in, 
Mullet 
Bois, Martin 
Marchand 
Galbati 
Cusin 
Augier 
In June 1810, the Post of Ordonnateur en chef passed to Commissaire-Ordonnateur 
Bourdon.8 Marshall Macdonald formed in mid-1810 a second Corps, the Corps d'Armee 
d'Haute-Catalogne with it's own Intendance organization. Commissaire des guerres Fain 
6SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Siege de Girone, 15 September 1809. 
7SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation VII Corps, I January 1810; Situation Armee de 
Catalogne, 31 May 1810. 
8SHAT, C(8) 133, CM, Ordres du Jour et Mouvements, Order of the Day 9 June 
1810. C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 October 1810, Situation, Armee de 
Catalogne, 1 December 1810. 
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served as Commissaire Ordonnateur, assisted by four Commissaires des guerres, (Robert, 
Mongenot, Catalogne, and Schaument) and two assistants (Muget and Menard). 9 Lower 
Catalonia, under General Maurice Mathieu had a Commissaire Ordonnateur (Commissaire 
des guerres Pierre) two Commissaires des guerres (Augier and Pinot) and three assistants 
(Bonard, Guidin, and Supemire). 
When General Decaen took command of the downsized Army of Catalonia in late 
1811 he also got an appropriately reduced Intendance: 
HQ 
Division Lamarque 
1 e Arr. T erritoriale 
2e Arr. Territoriale 
3e Arr. Territoriale 
5. Anny of Catalonia, 181110 
Position 
Ordonnateur en Chef 
Ordonnateur 
Commissaire des guerres 
Adjoints (five) 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Bourdon 
Blanchard 
Baymondon 
Leumont, 
St. Martin, 
Bois, Mongenot, 
Millet 
Gamot 
Leaumont, Fain, 
Catalonge 
Structurally, the army Intendance remained unchanged through 181211 when 
another army restructuring presented yet another reworking of the Intendant staff: 
9SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1810. 
10SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. 
11 SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; Situation, Armee 
de Catalogne, 16 July 1812. 
HQ 
Division de Segre 
Arr. de Figueras 
Arr. de Gironne 
Tarragonna 
Lerida 
Brigade de Reserve 
6. Anny of Catalonia, 181212 
Position 
Commissaire Ordonnateur en Chef 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
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Bourdon 
Bernard, Couvois, 
Mongon et 
Fain 
Leaumont 
Catalogne, 
Roullon 
Millet 
Rilliot 
The Intendance agam stabilized through 1813 (except for some changes in 
personnel) 13 and only changed when Marshal Souchet took command of the combined 
armies of Aragon and Catalonia in December 1813, when he restructed the entire 
organization. For example, he replaced General Decaen's Commissaire Ordonnateur en 
chef, M. Bourdon, with his own man, M. Bondurand. In 1814 then, Marshal Souchet 
restructured it as follows: 
HQ 
7. Anny of Aragon and Catalonia, 181414 
Position 
Ordonnateur en Chef 
Commissaire des guerres 
Adjoints 
Bondurand 
Benard, 
Mongenot 
St. Marint, 
Laperriere, 
Lepemey, 
12SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 December 1812. 
13SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 January 1813; Situation, Armee 
de Catalogne, 30 June 1813; Situation, Armee de Catalogne, 1 November 1813. 
14SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armee d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. 
1st Division 
2nd Division 
3rd Division 
4th Division 
5th Division 
Cavalry Division 
Cerdagne Brigade 
Barcelona 
Barcelona 
Pensicola 
Jaca 
Tortosa 
Lerida 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
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Bernard, 
Demailly 
Larreguy 
Bonnard 
Recamier 
Reymondon 
Augler 
Verniac 
Fain 
Mongenot 
Laperrier 
Fouet 
Faivre 
Ducrest, Cusin 
Artiguennaire 
The final structural change in the Intendance occurred in April 1814, as the 
Minstry of War continued its radical draw-down of troops in the Armee d'Aragon et de 
Catalogne to feed the 'front' in Eastern France: 
HQ 
I st Division 
Reserve 
Barcelona 
Figueras 
Tortosa 
Sagonte 
Pensicola 
8. Anny of Aragon and Catalonia, 181415 
Position 
Ordonnateur en Chef 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Adjoint 
Commissaire des guerres 
Commissaire des guerres 
Adjoint Provisione 
Adjoint 
Bondurand 
Beraud, 
de Leaumont 
Millet, Benard, 
Larreguy de 
Mailley. 
Monnier 
Recamier 
Mongonot 
Roulon 
Montelrund 
Lieutatant Gtbon 
Paperrica 
15SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armee d'Espagne, 1 April 1814; Situation, Armee 
d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814. 
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The Corps and Army level Intendance staffs as noted above only presents a small 
protion of the logistics personnel. The posts and fortresses, of course, had their own 
Intendance staffs which may be found in the Installation 'Situation' Reports. Figueras, for 
example, had four men on its staff: Commissaire des guerres Catalogne, Garde-Magazine 
des vivres, and Garde-Magazine de habillement. 16 The divisions were similarly manned. 
One of the largest divisions, the garrison of Barcelona had a uncharacteristically large 
Intendance, capable of administering not only its 8,000 odd man strength, but the hugh 
quantities of supplies required to feed and cloth it. Additionally, they kept the fortresses 
in Barcelona, Monjuich, the Citadel, and so forth, in a constant state of readiness to 
withstand a siege and to support other units moving through or near Barcelona which 
needed support for active field operations throughout Lower Catalonia. 
HQ 
Vivres Pain 
Viures Viande 
9. Ganison of Barcelona, 181417 
Position 
Commissaire des guerres 
Directeur 
Inspecteur 
Adjoint 
Garde-Magazine Principal 
Aide Garde-Magazine 
Aide Garde-Magazine Le 
Brigadier Principle 
Sous Employees des vivres (27) 
Grande Pare 
Mongenot 
Jourdain 
Lenoir 
Delille 
Simon, Durbon 
Sprigas, Benson 
Bechard, Andre, 
Rave, Seve 
La Place 
Carl et 
Harl et 
16SHAT, C(8) 411, Situation, Fort de Figueras, 1 March 1812; Situation, Fort de 
Figueras, 1 June 1812. 
17SHAT, C(8) 271 Commissaire des guerres Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. 
Fourrages 
Transports Auxilaire 
Aide-Garde Pare 
Sous Employees des vivres 
Grande Magazine de fourrages 
Aide-Garde Magazine 
Aide-Garde Magazine 
Chef du Pare 
Sous-Chef du Pare 
Brigadier 
Brigadier 
Chabnas 
3 
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Subza (pene) 
Subza (fits) 
Troubet 
Durand 
Grosseau (pere) 
Grosseur (fils) 
Alzine 
The organizational structure of the In ten dance remained basically the same through 
the war, shadowing the force structure changes within the Armee de Catalogne. The 
exceptional cases involved logistical support to newly organized formations, such as the 
Corps d'Armee de Haute Catalogne or the large garrisons which required a large staff. 
APPENDIX III 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
IN CATALONIA 
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Article I 
1. 
Imperial Decree Creating the Military 
Government of Catalonia1 
8 February 1810 
(Extract) 
Title I 
Government of Catalonia (1st Government) 
The VII Corps of the Army of Spain is titled the Army of Catalonia. 
Article 2 
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The Province of Catalonia will form a particular government under the title of the 
Government of Catalonia. 
Article 3 
The Commander in Chief of the Army of Catalonia is also the Governor of the Province 
and is invested full civil and military powers. 
Article 4 
Catalonia is considered in a State of Siege. 
Article 5 
The Governor is charged with the Administration of Police, Justice and Finances. He has 
the power to name all of his employees and institute necessary regulations. 
Article 6 
All revenues of the Province both ordinary and extraordinary levies are to be entered into 
the Army's chest to defray the cost of soldier pay and other military expenses. 
Authorized Copy 
Chief of the Historical Section 
Authorized Extract 
Prince de Wagram, et de 
Neuchatel, Major-General 
Alexandre Bertier 
1SHAT, C(8) 48, Letter, Marshal Augereau to General Clarke 24 February 1810; 
Minstry of War, Imperial Decree, (Copy) 8 February; Imperial Decree (Extracf Copy) 8 
February 1810. 
2. 
Scheme of a French Military 
Govemmenr 
Executive - Governor 1 Commander in Chief 
Conseil du Gouvemment - (Council of Government) 
Secretaire - General 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Provinces 
Administration and Justice 
Police and Religion 
War and Marine 
Finances, government statistics 
Military - Provincial Commander 
Executive - Intendant (Prefect) 
Conseil de Province - Six members 
Landlords (2) 
Merchances (2) 
Lawyers (1) 
Finance Employee (I) 
Cantons 
Conseil de Canton - four memebers 
Commune 
Conseiller du 
Gouvemement 
(4 members) 
(by province) 
Conseil Municipal - three members/1,000 citizens (12,000 - 22 members) 
(+12,000, 2 members/1,000) 
2Thiebault, Manuel General. 7e Subdivision, ler Divsion, ler Partie, 14-17. 
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3. 
Project to Organize Catalonia into 
Military Divisions, 
24 June 18103 
lerTableau 
Generals: 
one General de Division Commandant of Barcelona 
four Generals de Brigade to Command the Arrondissements 
Gendarmerie: 
two Legions a pied 
one Squadron 
Artillery: Two Directeurs 
Two Directeurs 
One Directeur 
Engines: 
Navy: 
Military Administration: 
one Commissaire Ordonnateur 
four Commissaires des guerres 
one Inspecteur aux revues 
four Sous-Inspecteurs aux revues 
Military Commands: 
Commands of the 1st Class: 
Commands of the 2nd Class: 
Commands of the 3rd Class: 
Commands of the 4th Class: 
Arrondissements or Intendances: 
Lerida, Tortosa, Tarragona, Barcelona 
Rosas, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich 
Urgel, Cardona, Berga 
All other posts 
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3SHAT, C(8) 50, Marshal Macdonald Projet d'Organization de la Province de 
Catalogne en Divisions Militaires, (ler Tableau), 24 June 1810. To be sure this project 
was originally the work of Augereau which Macdonald brought to fruitiori. Letter, 
Augereau to Clarke, 25 February 1810. 
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ler-Ter: Territory of Gerona and Vich 
Headquarters - Gerona 
2e-Llobregat: Territory of Mataro, Barcelona, Villa Franca, Cervera 
and Manrosa 
Headquarters - Barcelona 
Military Residence - Manresa 
3e-Bouches de l'Ebre: Territory of Tarragona, Tortosa and Lerida 
Headquarters - Reuss 
Military Residence - Tarragona, Tortosa 
4e-Segre: Territory of Aran, Talarn, Andorra, and Puigcerda 
Headquarters - Urgel 
Civil Administration 
Government: Governor General (Marshal Macdonald) 
Secretary General 
Conseil: Intendant General des Finances 
Intendant General civil ou Administratif 
Commissaire General du Justice 
Commissaire General de Police 
Commissaire General de Marine et de Commerce 
Arrondissements/Intendances: 
ler Arrondissement - Headquarters: Gerona 
Staff: Intendant des finances 
Intendant Civil ou Administratif 
Commissaire de Justice 
Commissaire de Police 
Commissaire de Marine et de Commerce 
2e Arrondissment - Llobrgat, Headquarters: Barcelona 
Staff: Same as above 
3e Arrondissment - Bouches de l'Ebre, Headquarters: Reuss 
Staff: Same as above 
4e Arrondissment - Segre, Headquarters: Urgel 
Staff: Intendant des finances 
Civil subdivisions/Sous-intendances 
Intendant Administratif et de Commerce 
Commissaire de Justice 
Commissaire de Police 
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1 er Arrondissment - Gerona 
Sous-Intendances: Figueras, Gerona, Vich 
2e Arrondissment - Barcelona 
Sous-Intendances - Mataro, Barcelona, Villa-Franca, Cervera, Manrosa 
3 e Arrondissment - Reuss 
Sous-Intendances - Tarragona, Tortosa, Lerida 
4e Arrondissment - Urgel 
Sous-Intendances: Aran et Talam and Andorra et Puigcerda 
4. 
2e Tableau 
Government Pe~onnel4 
(Proposition des Places) 
Conseil du Gouvemment - General 
Post 
Secretaire General 
du Gouvemment 
de la Catalogne 
Intendant General 
des Finances 
Secretaire General 
Intendant General 
Civil ou Administratif 
Secretaire General 
Commissaire General 
de Justice 
Commissaire General 
de Police 
Commissaire General 
de Marine et de 
Commerce 
Arrondissements 
ler Arrondissement -
Gerena 
Intendant des Finance 
Name 
Joseph Souque 
M. Bonecarrere 
M. Rouyer de Lametz 
Observations 
Secretary general of the 
Dept. of Loire, Secretary 
of Amiens, member; 
Corps Legislatif. Wise, 
talented. Macdonald 
wanted without delay. 
Macdonald requested his 
conformation 
Administrator of finaces 
active, honest, friend of 
Marshal Macdonald 
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4SHAT C(8) 50, Marshal Macdonald, Proposition a des Places, (2d Tableau), 24 June 
1810; 2d Copy, Proposition a des Places, (2d Tableau) 24 June 1810. 
Post 
Intendnat Civil ou 
Administratif 
Secretary General 
Commissaire de Justice 
Commissaire de Police 
Commissaire des Marine 
2e Arrondissement 
Intendant des Finances 
Secretaire General 
Intendant Civil et 
Administratif 
Commissaire de Justice 
Commissaire de Police 
Commissaire des Marine 
et Commerce 
3e Arrondissement 
Intendant des Finances 
Secretarie General 
Intendant Civil ou 
Administratif 
Secretaire General 
Name 
M. Belloc 
M. Billaloys - Boismont 
M. Beaumont - Brivasac 
Barcelona 
M. de Suppe 
M. Lasplaigne 
M. Robert de Gardien 
M. Tourval 
Reuss 
M. Durant 
M. Syvoir 
M. Perria - Duluc 
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Observations 
by Prince Chandlier, Ex-
Prefect 
A judge 
Recommended by the due 
de Rovigo 
Intendant Provisoire des 
Finances-Gerona, 
recommended by General 
Clarke 
Recommended by 
Intendant General Daru 
Landlord, Ex-
Administrator of the 
Lesere, honest, zealous, 
active, devoted to the 
Emperor, intimate friend 
of Macdonald 
Recommended by General 
Clarke 
Paris landlord, honest 
man, friend of Macdonald 
Recommended by General 
Clarke 
Sous-Prefet of Sanurre, 
Diplomat, good 
adminstrator 
Post 
Commissaire de Justice 
Commissaire de Police 
Commissaire des Marine 
et Commerce 
4e Arrondissment 
Intendant de Finances 
Secretaire General 
Intendant Civil ou 
Administratif 
Secretaire General 
Commissaire de Justice 
Commissaire de Police 
Urgel 
M. Petit 
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Observations 
Legislator, Ex-Sous-Prefet 
of Sanure, good 
aministrator 
Administrations 
Directors of Artillery 
Directors of Engineers 
Naval Director 
Commissaire Ordonnateur 
Commissairs des guerre 
Inspecteurs aux revues 
Sous-Inspecteur aux revues 
5. 
Divisions Militaire 
Catalonia5 
Central Administration 
Gendarmerie (two legions spied, one squadron) 
Arrondissements 
Arrondissement Territory 
Ter Gerona and Vich 
llobregat Mataro, Barcelona, 
Cervera & Manressa 
Bouches de l'Ebre Tarragona, Tortosa and 
Lerida 
Segre Aran, Talarn, Andora and 
Puigcerda 
HQ 
Gerona 
Number 
2 
2 
1 
1 
4 
1 
4 
Barcelonal6 
Reus7 
Urgel 
519 
5SHAT, C(8) 50, Marshal Macdonald Project d'Organisation de la Province de 
Catalogne en Divisions Militaire, Premier Tableau, 24 June 1810. 
6Military Residence was Manresa, Ibid. 
7Military Residence was Tarragona and Tortosa, Ibid. 
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Fortress Commands 
Class 
1st Class 
2nd Class 
3rd Class 
Post 
Lerida, Tortosa, Tarragona, Barcelona 
Rosas, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich 
Urgel, Berga, Cardona 
Civil Orgnaization 
Central Government 
Governor General 
Secretary General 
Council 
Intendant - General des Finances 
Indendant - General civil aux Administratif 
Commissaire General de Justice 
Commissaire General de Police 
Commissaire General de Marine et Commerce 
Arrondisse- Capital Sous-Intendants Council 
men ts 
Ter Gerona Gerona Intendants de Finances8 
(1st) Figueras lntendnat Civil au Administratifl 
Vi ch Commissaire de Justice 
Commissaire de Police 
Commissaire de Marine et de 
Commerce 
Llobregat Barcelona Barcelona Same 
(2d) Mataro 
Villa Francs 
Cervera 
Manresa 
8This office had a Secretaire General, Ibid. 
9This office had a Secretaire Geeeral, Ibid. 
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Arrondisse- Cauital Sous-Intendants Council 
men ts 
Bouch es Reuss Tarragona Same 
de l'Ebre Tortosa 
(3d) Lerida 
Segre Urgel Aran Intendant de Finances 
(4th) Talarn Intendant de Administratif et 
Commerc.e 
Andora Commissaire de Justice 
Puigcerda Commissaire de Police 
de l'Ebre Tortosa 
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